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ABSTRACT 
 
John Smith (1618-1652), the 17th century Cambridge Platonist, employed 
the traditional language of the spiritual senses of the soul to develop an early 
modern theological aesthetic central to his religious epistemology and thus to his 
philosophy of religion and systematic theology. Smith’s place in this tradition 
has been under-appreciated by scholars working on the Cambridge Platonists 
and the spiritual senses. However, as a Christian Platonist, Smith advocated 
intellectual intuition of Divine Goodness as the key to theological knowledge and 
spiritual practice. Furthermore, Smith’s theory of prophecy rests on the reception 
of sensible images in the imagination. In order to demonstrate this the 
dissertation first presents an interpretive summary of the spiritual senses 
tradition and proposes a functional typology that registers three uses of non-
corporeal perception throughout the history of Christian theology: (1) accounts 
xi 
  
of the origin and methods of theological knowledge, (2) descriptions of 
spirituality, and (3) attempts to systematically present or defend Christian 
theology. Additionally, Smith’s historical and intellectual context in early 
seventeenth century England is discussed with particular attention to how his 
education prepared him to contribute to the mystical tradition of the spiritual 
senses of the soul. Through a close reading of his extant writings it is shown that 
Smith’s theories of theological knowledge, method, and prophecy rest on his 
development of the spiritual senses tradition, combining intellectual intuition 
and imaginative perception. Likewise, the role of spiritual aesthetics in Smith’s 
prescriptive account of Christian piety is presented. Here the spiritual senses are 
both means and reward in the spiritual life through the process of deification 
(theosis). Moreover, it is shown how Smith’s theology forms a coherent system 
with intellectual intuition informing natural theology and revelation being 
supplemented by spiritual perception via the imagination. The central uniting 
feature therefore is the spiritual perception of theological truth. Finally, the 
dissertation closes with a summary of Smith’s various uses of the spiritual senses 
and proposes future research on his influence upon later figures including 
xii 
  
Jonathan Edwards, John Wesley, and suggests future constructive work inspired 
by Smith’s combination of reason and experience in religion.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
When Reason once is raised by the mighty force of the Divine Spirit 
into a converse with God, it is turn’d into Sense: That which before 
was onely Faith well built upon sure Principles, (for such our 
Science may be) now becomes Vision.1  
 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
This dissertation rectifies a serious gap in the current understanding of the 
theology of the Cambridge Platonist John Smith (1618-52).2 For Smith, theological 
knowledge was primarily the product of personal experience. Studies of the 
Cambridge Platonists in general and Smith in particular all agree that he used 
language derived from the physical senses to discuss this experience.3 For 
example, John Tulloch’s classic treatment of Rational Theology and Christian 
1 John Smith, Select Discourses (London: F. Flesher, for W. Morden Bookseller in 
Cambridg, 1660), 16. Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “Moral and Religious Aphorisms,” in The 
Cambridge Platonists, ed. C.A. Patrides (London: Edwin Arnold, 1969), #4 (p.326): “If there be no 
Knowledge, there is no Beginning of Religion.”  
 
2 For biography see chapter three below.  
 
  3 Including, but not limited to, Robert L. Armstrong, "Cambridge Platonists and Locke on 
Innate Ideas," Journal of the History of Ideas 30 (1969): 187-201;  Matthew Arnold, “Introduction” in 
The Natural Truth of Christianity” Selections from the Select Discourses of John Smith, ed. W.M. 
Metcalfe (London: Alexander Gardiner, 1882); E. T. Campagnac, The Cambridge Platonists (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1901); Charles Taliaferro and Alison J. Teply, eds., Cambridge Platonist 
Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 2004); and Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in 
Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 226-36.  
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Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century (1874), which established the 
basic understanding of the “Cambridge Platonists” for scholars in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, notes that for Smith the origin “of 
divine truth is a vital sense or faculty within us which lays hold of its appropriate 
objects.”4 Likewise, the most recent anthology of selections from the Cambridge 
Platonists assembled by Charles Taliaferro and Alison J. Teply for the Classics of 
Western Spirituality Series (2004) remarks that for Smith “the ‘inward sweetness 
and deliciousness’ in divine truth cannot be relished” without the purification of 
the soul.5 However, neither Tulloch nor Taliaferro and Teply make any reference 
to the spiritual senses tradition. In this, they are not alone, as scholars have been 
nearly silent on the fact that in using the language of sensation to describe 
theological understanding, Smith was following a centuries old Christian 
tradition.6 Scholars have typically been content to note Smith’s appeals to 
4 John Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth 
Century (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1874; Reprint, Elibron Classics, 
2005), 2: 141. Tulloch’s authority has been dominate in the study of the Cambridge Platonists 
until fairly recently, though he can still be profitably read.  
 
5 Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, 30.  
 
  6 Commentators typically note that Smith’s sources included Plotinus and Alexandrian 
Christian theologians in addition to other ancient philosophers such as Cicero, Epicurus, 
Lucretius, Aristotle, and of course Plato, but they tend to ignore the way he follows a longer 
Christian Platonist tradition that continued through the early modern period to today. Brad 
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spiritual sensation as an element in his theological method and have not 
explored the implications of the concept for his theology more generally.7  
More recently, this trend has begun to change as scholars of the spiritual 
senses have worked collaboratively on their theme as developed by a wide 
variety of authors. With the publication of The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in 
Western Christianity in 2012, the place of Smith within this tradition has finally 
been explicitly acknowledged alongside Origen, Bonaventure, and Balthasar.8 
However, this acknowledgment has been limited to an exploration, already 
Walton (Jonathan Edwards, Religious Affections and the Puritan Analysis of True Piety, Spiritual 
Sensation and Heart Religion [Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002]) mentions Smith as 
continuing a tradition of “heart language” within Puritan theology (and important antecedents in 
the history of Christian thought including Augustine and St. Bernard) with similarities to the 
spiritual senses tradition but with more emphasis on the will than the intellect and thus more 
emphasis on personal piety than theological knowledge. Still, his is the only study I am aware of 
that connects Smith to the medieval spiritual senses tradition.  
 
7 The literature on John Smith (see n. 3 p. 1 above) typically discusses his use of sensible 
metaphors for theological knowledge but does not ascribe to him a formal “doctrine of spiritual 
sense” in keeping with a long Christian tradition (patristic through medieval and early modern) 
nor does it explicate this concept in its full significance for Smith’s theology. This silence in the 
literature is puzzling, especially since all agree that Smith employs this language. It is likely that 
the reason for this has to do with the backgrounds and training of scholars working on the 
Cambridge Platonists, who tend to belong to the analytic school of philosophy and/or explicitly 
Protestant theology. Since much twentieth century work on the spiritual senses has been done by 
continental Roman Catholics, it may be that those with eyes to see this traditional theme in Smith 
simply have not been looking until very recently.   
 
8 Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley, eds., The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western 
Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 7, 19.  
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common in specialized studies of John Wesley and Jonathan Edwards, of his 
influence upon these better known eighteenth century figures.9  
In this regard, philosopher William J. Wainwright has, rightly, made 
much of the role of intellectual intuition in the theological method of Smith, but 
at the expense of an appreciation for the place the spiritual senses occupy in his 
theology more generally.10 While it is true that Smith speaks metaphorically of 
intellection as having a sensible character in his first Discourse (typically, 
“intellectual touch” or “vision”), he also appeals to “spiritual senses” on a closer 
analogy with the physical senses in the imagination.11 
9 For example, William J. Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards and his Puritan Predecessors,” 
in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, The Spiritual Senses, 224-40, and Mark T. Mealey, “John Wesley,” in 
Gavrilyuk and Coakley, The Spiritual Senses, 241-56, both mention Smith as an influence on 
Edwards and Wesley respectively. See also the more extended discussion in Mealey’s “Taste and 
See that the Lord is Good: John Wesley in the Christian Tradition of Spiritual Sensation” (PhD 
diss., University of St. Michael’s College, 2006), 20-49, passim. 
 
10 Wainwright suggests that the intellectual intuition that Smith speaks of constitutes his 
understanding of “spiritual sense” but ignores the role of the imagination in prophecy as well as 
the consistent appeal to multiply sensory modalities in Smith’s descriptions of the spiritual life.  
 
11 In this way, Smith offers an important counter-point for those accounts of spiritual 
sense that would stress either the metaphorical or the analogical use of the language of physical 
sense. While Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar have argued for one or the other, Smith 
employs both, albeit with a preference for the affect laden intellect over a physical and spiritual 
sensorium. See Karl Rahner, "The Spiritual Senses According to Origen," in Theological 
Investigations, 16 (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 81-103, and "The Doctrine of the Spiritual 
Senses in the Middle Ages," in Theological Investigations, 16 (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 104-
134, and Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics,  1; Seeing the Form 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982). This helps to account for the relative paucity of references in 
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R. J. Scott too has recently mentioned, in passing, that Smith had 
“confidence” in “the spiritual senses” in the context of a discussion of his theory 
of prophecy, but his study ignores the role of the spiritual senses in other aspects 
of Smith’s theology, above all methodology and the process of appropriating 
knowledge of the divine, or what amounts to the same thing for Smith, living the 
Christian life.12  
Thus, Smith’s theory of spiritual sensation has yet to be adequately 
understood in relation to the history and development of the Christian doctrine 
of the spiritual senses of the soul (an intellectual faculty or faculties for the 
sensation of non-physical, spiritual reality), or in its specific form and function 
within his theology.13  This dissertation therefore argues that the spiritual senses 
the current study to “theological aesthetics”; for Smith, embodied experience is, at best, of 
secondary importance. See chapter two and part II below.  
 
12 R. J. Scott, “Visions, Dreams, and the Discernment of Prophetic Passions: Sense and 
Reason in the Writings of the Cambridge Platonists and John Beale, 1640-60,” in Angles of Light? 
Sanctity and the Discernment of Spirits in the Early Modern Period, ed. Clare Copeland and Johannes 
Machielsen (Brill, 2012), 230. Scott, misses the mark exactly where Wainwright hits it by ignoring 
completely the “spiritual senses” in Smith’s methodology and theory of theological education.  
 
13 “Doctrine” is an important, but controverted, word in the context of this dissertation. 
Many (if not most) theologians have understood the “spiritual senses” to refer to a single doctrine, 
representing a single faculty or set of faculties. As will become clear below, I do not subscribe to 
this monistic view. There is no single “doctrine of the spiritual senses” in the Christian tradition 
(for my argument to this effect see chapter two). More importantly, neither is there a single 
faculty intended by this general term when applied to authors such as Smith. He does not have a 
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represents a complex and sophisticated tradition in Christian thought that 
played a central role in the theology of John Smith.  
Furthermore, like the loosely affiliated “school” to which he belongs, 
Smith is well known today for embracing tolerant liberal views on religion 
during the period of the English Civil War (1642-52) as well as advocating a 
strong notion of the ultimate harmony of reason and religion.14 Indeed, it is this 
single doctrine of the spiritual senses in the strict meaning of that phrase. Rather, he employs 
several different varieties of “spiritual sense” in order to address a series of theological problems 
(see chapters four, five, and six). In this, I read Smith as recapitulating the tradition (see chapter 
two). Those looking for insight into what the “spiritual senses” really are (e.g., are they sensible, 
imaginative, or intellective? Are they one or many? Single or separate physical and spiritual 
sensoria? Etc.) will not find their answer with Smith or a historical investigation of Christian uses 
of spiritual perception in general. Such work remains to be done in a constructive mode.  
  14 Members of the group often argued against such notable figures as Gassendi, Descartes, 
Spinoza, and Hobbes on the grounds that their “materialism” leads to atheism (either in the sense 
that there is no God distinct from the world or that there is nothing for such a God to do) and is 
therefore wrong and immoral (God and the Good being practically indistinguishable). The 
Cambridge Platonists (especially More and Cudworth) tried to maintain an atomistic physics and 
a spirit/matter dualism that they thought was the doctrine of the ancient “theologians” such as 
Moses and Plato (Sarah Hutton, "Cambridge Platonists," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
ed. Edward N. Zalta, last updated Nov 11, 2013, accessed 18 May 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2001/entries/cambridge-platonists/). The work of 
Cudworth illustrates nicely the group’s contention that the universe is suffused with Reason and 
that not even the Divine Will (Puritans) or the will of the monarch (Hobbes) can “overpower” 
Reason. Indeed, God acts reasonably for the Cambridge Platonists rather than according to an 
arbitrary will. In this sense, even God is constrained by Reason, but since the Divine Logos is God 
this constraint is self-imposed and amounts to a priority of the Divine Nature over the Divine 
Will (contra Scotus, etc.).  
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harmony that fuels their tolerance.15 Although the Cambridge Platonists 
(principally, B. Whichcote 1609-83, P. Sterry 1613-72, H. More 1614-87, R. 
Cudworth 1617-88, John Smith, and N. Culverwell 1618?-51)16 have long been 
recognized as vaguely “mystical” it has gone largely unnoticed that an important 
source for the mystical character of their theology was the ancient Christian 
doctrine of the spiritual senses.17 The situation is especially noteworthy in the 
15 On the relation between Smith’s willingness to allow a variety of religious views and 
his insistence on a realist epistemology see Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background 
(London: Chatto and Windus, 1957), 133-54. An important, though under-noticed element in 
Smith’s theological tolerance is his agreement with the Pseudo-Dionysius that ultimately human 
beings cannot know God in God’s essence. Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 124-5. Smith cites 
Pseudo-Dionysius on the notion of “divine darkness” here. Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical 
Theology, ch.1, in Paul Rorem, trans., Pseudo Dionysius: The Complete Works (New York and 
Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1988), 133f. 
 
16 There is little consensus on which figures should be called “Cambridge Platonists.” 
Generally, lists of members of the group include all those with identifiable connections to 
Whichcote. Some scholars object to including such Oxford thinkers as Norris or independent 
scholars like Anthony Ashley Cooper the third earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) in the group 
despite the influence of earlier Cambridge men on their thought. Until recently, women such as 
Anne Conway (1630-79) and Damaris (Cudworth) Masham (1658-1708) were not considered 
“Cambridge Platonists” in any meaningful sense. While the term usually refers to figures sharing 
a basically Neoplatonic worldview (though never exclusively so) during the 17th to early 18th 
centuries some use the descriptor for later thinkers. For the purposes of this project, the 
descriptor matters less than the fact that figures associated with the name in the seventeenth-
century share an affinity for spiritual sensibility with Smith. Those figures such as Whichcote, 
Cudworth, Sterry, More, Culverwell, and Worthington are particularly important for this 
dissertation in that they provide additional context and exposition for concepts Smith treats only 
briefly.  
 
17 John C. English ("John Wesley's Indebtedness to John Norris," Church History 60, no. 1 
[1991]: 55-69) makes explicit reference to a “Cambridge Platonist” (John Norris) holding a 
sophisticated and traditional doctrine of the spiritual senses. On this theme in Norris see Eugene 
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case of Smith since his reliance on this traditional account of theological 
knowledge is more prominent and developed than other members of the group. 
Thus, the failure of the scholarly literature to provide a detailed assessment of 
Smith’s spiritual senses reflects a more general failure in the academic 
understanding of theological aesthetics.  
The most general definition of the “spiritual senses” in the Western 
Christian context comes from Coolman who says that the doctrine, in all of its 
manifestations, “posits the existence of certain capacities or operations within the 
Derek Taylor, “Samuel Richardson’s ‘Clarissa’ (1747-1748) and ‘the Famous Mr. Norris, of 
Bemerton” (PhD diss., University of Florida, 2000), ch. 1. George Andrew Panichas (The Greek 
Spirit and the Mysticism of Henry More [Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Greek Orthodox Theological 
School, 1956]) comes close to making such a claim for Henry More but does not do so explicitly. 
Most scholars who have been sensitive to the mystical, experiential aspects of the Cambridge 
Platonists’ thought have written about aspects of the spiritual senses but have not acknowledged 
the specific tradition being drawn on. Only D. W. Dockrill ("The Fathers and the Theology of the 
Cambridge Platonists," Studia Patristica 17 [1982]: 427-33), Aharon Lichtenstein (Henry More: The 
Rational Theology of a Cambridge Platonist [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962]) and 
C. A. Patrides (The Cambridge Platonists) along with Panichas take seriously the fact that the 
Cambridge Platonists were reviving a mode of theology that dates back to the Greek Fathers but 
which did not end with them. However, even they do not make note of the way in which Western 
Christian speculation throughout the medieval period developed these themes in ways that are 
significant for the Cambridge Platonists. Walton (Jonathan Edwards) has made a case for the role 
of spiritual sensation in the theology of Jonathan Edwards as an expression of earlier Puritan 
thinking about the “religion of the heart,” but this affective component is partial and misleading 
with respect to Smith. Smith’s relationship to his Puritan contemporaries is therefore an 
important element in the task of contextualizing his reception of the ancient doctrine of the 
spiritual senses. Smith’s development of this concept more closely resembles the work of Catholic 
medieval theologians in its emphasis on knowledge mediated via spiritual apprehension. 
Spiritual sensation plays an important role in personal piety and the religious life for Smith, as it 
does for other Puritans, but unlike them Smith thinks that this faculty also provides theoretical 
knowledge where other Puritans typically reserve that to Scripture.  
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spiritual dimension of the person for the perception (in the widest sense of the 
term) of divine realities . . . which is in some way analogous to that of the 
physical senses.”18 Adherents affirm a continuum of knowledge or an 
“intellectual system” treating the physical world through physical sensation 
(sensible or natural theology), the mental or spiritual world through spiritual or 
inner sense (symbolic theology), and God through speculative or mystical 
theology.19 In its most basic formulation the doctrine affirms the existence of a 
faculty or faculties of perception that are directed toward non-physical reality 
and which reveal to the mind something of its character (i.e., not just that it is but 
something of what it is too). 
The most widely recognized treatments of the Christian doctrine of the 
spiritual senses took place in patristic and medieval theology from the third 
through approximately the 15th centuries CE.20 It is usually assumed that the 
  18 Boyd Taylor Coolman, Knowing God by Experience: The Spiritual Senses in the Theology of 
William of Auxerre (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 1 n. 1.  
 
  19 On the specifically Cambridge Platonist use of “intellectual system” see Ralph 
Cudworth’s The True Intellectual System of the Universe.  
 
  20 M. Canévet, "Sens spirituel," in Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique doctrine et 
histoire, ed. Marcel Viller (Paris: Beauchesne, 1990), 14: 599-617; Aimé Solignac, "Oculus," in Viller, 
(1982), 11: 591-601; M. Olphe-Galliard, "Les sens spirituels dans l'histoire de la spiritualité," in Nos 
Sens Et Dieu (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1954), 179-94; Karl Rahner, "The Spiritual Senses 
According to Origen," and "The Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses in the Middle Ages."   
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doctrine ceased to be a serious intellectual principle around the time of the 16th 
century Reformations.21 At that time, Christian theology in the West began to be 
based more firmly on authority than reason, even when the two were not seen as 
necessarily in conflict with each other. Subsequently, this form of theological 
aesthetics remained significant for “spirituality” and poetry but the academic, 
systematic, and philosophically rigorous development of the concept largely 
passed away until the 20th century; or so the standard scholarly accounts would 
have it.22  
  21 In 1533, Ignatius of Loyola presented what has been called the final stage in the 
development of the doctrine in his Spiritual Exercises (Balthasar, Seeing the Form, 367, 373-80).  
 
  22 The work of any popular writer in “spirituality” from the late medieval period to today 
confirms this observation. The writings of many figures make allusions to “spiritual sense” 
throughout the modern period but these are usually not developed as philosophical doctrines but 
are taken over with a kind of pious naiveté from Scripture to describe experience. Furthermore, 
other modern uses of “spiritual sensation” tend to be directed toward practical theology and 
personal piety. Spiritual sensation is often used to “prove” conversion or right relationship with 
God but more rarely informs an account of speculative, theoretical, knowledge as well, as is the 
case in adherents of what is here identified as the spiritual senses tradition. Christian poetry and 
hymnody continues to use imagery adapted from the senses regularly but usually in an uncritical 
naïve way. On this point see Geoffrey Wainwright and Karen B. Westerfield Tucker, eds. The 
Oxford History of Christian Worship (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). On the (relative) 
lack of development in the doctrine after the Reformation period, see Balthasar, Seeing the Form, 
365-80; Olphe-Galliard “Les sens spirituels”; A. Poulain, The Graces of Interior Prayer, trans. Daniel 
Considine, 6th ed. (London, 1910);  Bernard McGinn,  "The Language of Inner Experience in 
Christian Mysticism," Spiritus 1 (2001): 156-71; Karl Rahner, "The Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses 
in the Middle Ages”; and Sarah Coakley, "The Resurrection and the 'Spiritual Senses': On 
Wittgenstein, Epistemology, and the Risen Christ," in Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Gender 
and Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 130-152. The argument of this dissertation is 
not that Smith is unique in his move to reconstruct the doctrine of the spiritual senses with 
intellectual rigor during the early modern period. Rather, the argument is that he is notable for 
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Nonetheless, the fact that this account has been overstated can be shown, 
in part, by analyzing the use of the doctrine in the early modern period by John 
Smith, as supplemented by the work of other Cambridge Platonists. Review of 
the texts this group has left to us, as well as those deeply influenced by them, 
such as John Wesley (1703-91) and Jonathan Edwards (1703-58), reveals that it is 
precisely their insistence on “spiritual apprehension” that enables them to 
maintain a traditional theology even while accepting some of the findings of 
modern science and philosophy.23 The findings of the physical sciences are the 
result of the rational interpretation of the data of physical sensation while the 
findings of theology are the result of the rational interpretation (or illumination) 
of the data of spiritual sensation.24 The two are not ultimately in conflict for 
having done so and that both scholars of Cambridge Platonism and the spiritual senses have 
overlooked this.  
 
  23 The phrase “spiritual apprehension” is Coolman’s (Knowing God by Experience). I use 
the terms “modern” and “contemporary” as general descriptors to designate roughly the periods 
between the 15th century and the First World War (modern) and between 1918 and today 
(contemporary). I use the word “science” in both its classic meaning as a body of knowledge and 
also on occasion to describe (anachronistically) the natural philosophy of Smith’s period.  
 
  24 In fact, a review of the works of the Cambridge Platonists reveals two broad categories 
of “spiritual apprehension.” First, there is a group of texts, especially those by Cudworth and 
More, that stress the singular nature of the mind’s perception of divine realities through the 
faculty of intelligence or understanding. For these texts, the human mind or soul is intuitively 
aware of God through an apprehension of the intellect often discussed on analogy with vision. 
This apprehension takes the form of a kind of single spiritual sense in ways reminiscent of 
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Smith not because they are separate spheres with their own “truths” (as 
Gassendi and Locke were to argue)25 but because the truth of each is known by 
means of a different (sensory) modality. Theology is not a matter of simple 
textual, ecclesiastical, or political authority for Smith and the Cambridge 
Platonists either. Confirmation of religious views comes through intellectual 
encounter with God guaranteed by means of public morality. The doctrine of the 
spiritual senses served as an important, though understudied, element in Smith’s 
rational philosophy and theology by providing an account of the means by 
which purely spiritual realities come to be known.  
William of Auxerre’s treatment of the spiritual senses as formally one though materially multiple 
(Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 33-45). Particularly interesting are two faculties posited by 
More; the Boniform, which senses the Good, and Divine Sagacity, which perceives the truth when 
it “sees” it (Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, 18-9; Sarah Hutton, “Cambridge 
Platonists”). Second, there is a group of texts that speak of multiple spiritual sensations on 
analogy with (at least some of) the five physical senses (but always more than a single sensory 
modality). This tendency, while found in most of the Cambridge authors to some degree, is 
especially clear in the work of Smith and represents the tendency within the school to associate 
spiritual understanding with multiple modes of perception and intellection similar to the classic 
expressions of the five spiritual senses as found in Origen and others.  
 
  25 Antonia LoLordo, “Descartes’ One Rule of Logic: Gassendi’s Critique of Clear and 
Distinct Perceptions,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 no. 1 (2005): 51-72, “Gassendi 
on Human Knowledge of the Mind.” Archiv für Geschichte die Philosophie  87 (2005): 1-22, and 
Pierre Gassendi and the Birth of Early Modern Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
Neither Gassendi or Locke thought of these spheres as in conflict of course but they do appeal to 
different principles for attaining an understanding in each however.  
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Smith does not discuss his views on theological aesthetics in extensive 
detail in a single location within a text. Not even Smith’s discourse “Of the True 
Way or Method of attaining to Divine Knowledge” presents a full account of his 
doctrine of spiritual sensation.26 Since the spiritual senses perform a 
methodological and argumentative function within his work, Smith is more 
likely simply to use the concept than to explain it at great length.  
Two major approaches have been taken in interpreting Smith, and the 
Cambridge Platonists as a group; (1) theological and (2) philosophical/scientific. 
Understanding the Cambridge Platonists in terms of the history of English 
religion, especially the rise of liberalism and toleration, enjoyed a strong 
26 This is not at all unusual. For example, Origen’s important discussions of the topic 
range over more than 150 passages scattered throughout his extant works (Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, Origen Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings, translated by Robert J. Daly 
[Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001], 389-92). A. N. Williams’ study of the intellect (and the spiritual 
senses for some authors) in the patristic period likewise makes references to many passages 
scattered throughout the work of individual authors (and groups of authors) in order to elicit the 
“broad patterns” of thought (The Divine Sense: The Intellect in Patristic Theology [Cambridge 
University Press, 2007], 20). Coolman’s study of the spiritual senses in William of Auxerre 
similarly draws the structure of the doctrine out of separate passages and often treats these out of 
sequential order to make the concepts involved clear (Knowing God by Experience). Both Williams 
and Coolman however avoid an important problem facing Balthasar's interpretation of Origen by 
relating their selected passages to their historical chronology. In this way, they register 
development in the thinking of their subjects. Balthasar in contrast tends to read topically 
without regard to the effects of time on Origen's theology.  
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following among scholars of “two or three generations ago”.27 Scholars of this 
orientation succeeded in bringing to contemporary eyes Smith and his 
colleagues’ positive attitude toward the role of reason in matters of faith as well 
as religious tolerance but at the expense of the recognition of their theologies as 
continuations of a long tradition within Christian thinking. By framing the 
Cambridge Platonists in their immediate religious and political context rather 
than the longer history of Christian theology, this approach missed the 
importance of the role of spiritual sensation in their thought. Furthermore, it 
failed to notice the way in which Smith especially reconstructed the doctrine.28 
In contrast, the literature on Smith has focused on too narrow a context for 
the idea of spiritual sensation both historically and within Smith’s texts. Tulloch, 
for example, notes that Smith’s spiritual sensation is the heart of his theological 
27 A. Rupert Hall, Henry More and the Scientific Revolution Cambridge Science Biographic 
Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 59. In many ways, this dissertation has 
been inspired by the reappraisal of the Cambridge Platonists as “spiritual” authors marked by 
the publishing of Taliaferro and Teply’s volume in the Classics of Western Spirituality series from 
Paulist Press.  
 
28 Typical accounts of the Cambridge Platonists as religious figures spend little time 
positioning the group within the history of Christian mystical speculation but instead situate 
them within the more narrow (and for that reason deceptive) context of the 17th century religion 
and politics of Brittan. See for example, Tulloch, Rational Theology, vol. 2, and Geoffrey Philip 
Henry Pawson, The Cambridge Platonists and Their Place in Religious Thought (New York: B. 
Franklin Reprints, 1974).  
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thought but then goes on to discuss the concept in terms of his methodology 
only, and even there in only the most summary, cursory way.29 Pawson too 
remarks that Smith attempted to revive the theology of St. John, Clement of 
Alexandria, and Origen without detailing how.30 The scholarship on Smith thus 
lacks the depth of treatment and historical breadth of contextualization necessary 
to give an accurate account of his thought. By allowing Smith to speak within the 
context of the history of theology, and by listening to his complete theological 
system, the role of spiritual sensation in his thought will become clear.   
More recently, there has been a significant push to understand the 
Cambridge Platonists in terms of their involvement with early modern science 
and philosophy. This approach makes much of their correspondence with 
Descartes, their relationships with the Royal Society, materialism, “atheism,” the 
occult, and both (pseudo)empiricism (e.g., Boyle) and rationalism (e.g., Spinoza, 
29 Tulloch, Rational Theology, 2: 140f. All scholars repeat this pattern when treating Smith’s 
thought, though most do not give spiritual sensation as much (albeit, unsupported) credit as 
Tulloch. There is a tendency in the literature, perhaps following the lead of Tulloch, to think that 
the mere fact that Smith is a “Platonist” explains all that is necessary to know about his 
theological epistemology. This attitude seems content to ignore the centuries of Christian 
development that Smith also inherits as a Christian theologian and which justifies his use of the 
Neoplatonic tradition. In other words, scholars have assumed that there is nothing more to 
discuss because they have ignored the development of the Christian doctrine of the spiritual 
senses.  
 
30 Pawson, The Cambridge Platonists, 35.  
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Leibniz).31 This approach understandably focuses nearly all of its attention on 
those members of the group whose thought extended to scientific and 
31 See for example Hall (Henry More) who makes much of More’s involvement with the 
Royal Society, the philosophy of Descartes, and the occult. Rogers, et al. (The Cambridge Platonists 
in Philosophical Context: Politics, Metaphysics, and Religion [Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1997]) contains excellent essays on the relationship between the Cambridge Platonists 
and contemporary philosophy and science, especially their disputes with Hobbes and Descartes 
on the question of mechanical science and materialism (which they at various times and in 
differing ways took to be supportive of and a denial of a properly religious worldview 
respectively). See also Charles Taliaferro, Evidence and Faith: Philosophy and Religion since the 
Seventeenth Century, The Evolution of Modern Philosophy, ed. Paul Guyer and Gary Hatfield 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005); J. E. Saveson, "Descartes' Influence on John Smith, 
Cambridge Platonist," Journal of the History of Ideas 20 (1959): 258-62, and "Differing Reactions to 
Descartes among the Cambridge Platonists," Journal of the History of Ideas 31 (1960): 560-7. The 
group likely inspired elements of John Locke’s thought via Cudworth’s daughter and Locke 
praised Cudworth’s True Intellectual System as a grand compendium of ancient philosophy 
(Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, 24-5). Newton was deeply impressed by 
Cudworth’s System too and copied much of it directly into his own work (Danton B. Sailor, 
"Newton's Debt to Cudworth," Journal of the History of Ideas 49 [1988]: 511-7). More, a fellow of the 
Royal Society, carried on a correspondence with many leading figures in natural philosophy 
including Robert Boyle whose air-pump experiment More (wrongly, or so Boyle himself thought) 
took to be evidence of a “spiritual force in the air” (Robert A. Greene, "Henry More and Robert 
Boyle on the Spirit of Nature," Journal of the History of Ideas 23 [1962]: 451-70). More’s theory of the 
nature of space almost certainly influenced Newton’s ideas of absolute space (J.E. Power, "More 
and Newton on Absolute Space," Journal of the History of Ideas 31 [1970]: 289-96). More’s student, 
Anne Conway developed a vitalistic philosophy inspired by her teacher’s work in response to 
Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza that influenced Leibniz (Carolyn Merchant, "The Vitalism of 
Anne Conway: Its Impact on Leibniz's Concept of the Monad," Journal of the History of Philosophy 
17 [1979]: 255-68; Anne Conway, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], xxix-xxxiii). The group, especially More, 
influenced the idealism of Berkley as well (Serge Hutin, Henry More: Essai sur les doctrines 
théosophiques chez les platoniciens de Cambridge [Hildesheim: Gg. Olms, 1966], 197-201). Both 
Cudworth and More made a deep impression on the ethical rationalists of the 18th century 
through their arguments for “moral faculties” (Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and 
Immutable Morality with a Treatise of Freewill, ed. Sarah Hutton, Cambridge Texts in the History of 
Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996]; Hutton, "Cambridge Platonists"). In 
general, the history of philosophy and science approach to the Cambridge Platonists singles out 
Cudworth and More for study and dismisses the rest as (mere) theologians (Hall’s Henry More, 
for example, is very clear, and unapologetic, on this point). This is unfortunate and misleading as 
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philosophical circles that are still significant in the academy (especially 
Cudworth, More, and Norris) at the expense of the religious and literary 
contributions of Cambridge Platonists like Smith and his teacher Whichcote. 
Thus, the significance of the Cambridge Platonists is often absorbed into the 
scholarly question of the rise of modern scientific rationalism out of (purported) 
medieval superstition, magic, and mysticism. In other words, this newer 
interpretive approach tries to understand the Cambridge Platonists in their full 
intellectual context. While this approach has clear advantages over the earlier, 
nearly exclusively theological approach, it too has serious limitations in that it 
tends to see the theology of these figures as little more than a constraint on their 
development as philosophers and scientists even as it notes the theological 
inspiration of their philosophical and scientific ideas.32 The approach also tends 
it tends to highlight only those elements of their thought that had lasting philosophic and 
scientific impact while downplaying their theological motives and concerns, which were always 
the heart of their work. Norris remains significant as a figure in the history of philosophy for 
popularizing Malebranche in England and to a lesser extent for his influence on the theology of 
Wesley (English, “John Wesley’s Indebtedness”).  
 
  32 This is true of studies on the Cambridge Platonists even when it is no longer indicative 
of the best in contemporary work in this area. A prominent recent example can be found in Hall 
(Henry More) who portrays More as a misguided (proto)scientist. It might be argued that More’s 
scientific errors arise largely because he is approaching his topic (perhaps unconsciously) from 
the perspective of a kind of “sensible theology” and not the empirical science gaining ascendancy 
in his day, despite his forays into “experimental” work. In other words, perhaps we misread 
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to obscure the significance of Smith as a Cambridge Platonist in particular, 
despite his undisputed status as a key figure in the movement, since he had only 
a peripheral (and far from unique) relationship with the rise of early modern 
science. Furthermore, this approach promotes reading the entire group for their 
importance in modern science and philosophy more than as figures within a 
Christian theological tradition. These tendencies have left Smith understudied in 
recent years and have contributed to the less than rigorous treatment of his 
theology.  
Both of these common approaches tend to see the group from the 
perspective of their importance for contemporary thought rather than letting them 
emerge out of the theological tradition that was their intellectual home. By 
maintaining a doctrine of the spiritual senses, Smith was able to understand 
work in science, philosophy, and religion within a larger theological unity. By 
making judgments based on the sensory modality equipped to supply 
knowledge of physical, mental, and spiritual realities Smith was a scientist, 
philosopher, and theologian at the same time. In this way, Smith was like the 
More when we read him as a philosopher/scientist rather than as a theologian concerned with 
natural (scientific), symbolic (philosophical), and speculative (mystical) theology.  
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great theologians of the spiritual senses tradition before him, and one needs to 
grasp this unity in order to understand the particular dimensions of his thought 
as parts of a systematic whole.  
By means of his doctrine of spiritual sensation, Smith was able to maintain 
the reasonableness of his faith. That is, he was able to come to a degree of critical 
self-understanding without recourse to a theology like the neo-Aristotelian 
systems of the Thomists, or the Protestant Scholastics, both of which ultimately 
rest on assent to the authority of the Bible as interpreted by some clerical body or 
another.33 The spiritual senses, as an intellectual faculty, likewise distinguish 
Smith’s theology from the “enthusiastic” religion of his day that stressed the 
emotional over the rational.34 By means of his theological aesthetic, Smith sought 
to unite the life of the heart and the life of the mind in a single cognitive and 
33 Indeed, Smith was not one to accept anyone’s views on authority alone. As Pawson 
puts it, “He made no man’s system his shroud” (Pawson, The Cambridge Platonists and Their Place 
in Religious Thought, 34).  
 
34 Luxon has written insightfully on the movement, especially during the Civil War and 
its immediate aftermath, of intense experiential religion (with multiple “Christs” and various 
prophets) among Puritans especially. Thomas Luxon, “Not I, But Christ: Allegory and the Puritan 
Self,” ELH 60 no. 4 (1993): 899-937, and Literal Figures: Puritan Allegory and the Reformation Crisis in 
Representation (University of Chicago Press, 1995). See also Richard L. Greaves, and Robert Zaller, 
eds. Biographical Dictionary of British Radicals in the Seventeenth Century. 3 vols. (Brighton, Sussex: 
Harvester Press, 1983); Joe Lee Davis, “Mystical Versus Enthusiastic Sensibility,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 4 no. 3 (1943): 301-19; and Nigel Smith, Perfection Proclaimed: Language and 
Literature in English Radical Religion, 1640-1660, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).   
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conative spiritual exercise like Plotinus, Origen, Augustine, Bonaventure, and 
Nicholas of Cusa had before him.   
While the Cambridge Platonists have tended to be portrayed as either 
liberal theologians with an eye for the important trends in their culture, or as 
proto-scientists or philosophers in the modern/contemporary sense with a 
curious allegiance to traditional religion this is an oversimplification that 
ironically complicates rather than illuminates our understanding. By treating the 
Cambridge Platonists, through the example of Smith, as a development within 
the theological tradition of the spiritual senses a much richer understanding of 
their work in theology as well as philosophy and science is won.  
For this to succeed, we must let Smith speak to us out of his theological 
tradition without projecting what might be important to us back onto him. In this 
way, we will come to better understand his theology and, by means of it, his role 
in the history of the doctrine of the spiritual senses. Thus, this study of the 
spiritual senses in the theology of John Smith will shed light on (1) the history of 
the doctrine generally by showing its continuing importance in a modern 
Protestant theology, (2) Smith’s theology by showing the way in which it came 
out of, and carried on, a long Christian tradition, and (3) the relationship 
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between Smith’s theological, philosophical, and scientific thought by showing 
this to be dependent on his doctrine of spiritual sensation. That is, to understand 
what Smith’s doctrine is we have also to understand what it does rather than 
merely read about it in a single location as commentators on his “theological 
epistemology” have done. This process of seeing is made possible by 
approaching his text holistically with the tradition of spiritual sensation in view.  
In order to demonstrate the significance of the spiritual senses for Smith’s 
theology this dissertation will first present an overview of the development of 
this key concept in Christian mysticism. In this way, it will become possible to 
identify how Smith continues and modifies the tradition. This review and 
interpretation of the literature will itself make a modest, yet significant, 
contribution to the contemporary understanding of the spiritual senses and by 
extension mystical theology in general.35 This study will not completely satisfy 
the need for an account of the doctrine throughout its history because it will trace 
35 Indeed, a prominent English language author in the field has said of the spiritual 
senses that “there is no in-depth account of this central thread in the history of Christian 
mysticism” (McGinn, "The Language of Inner Experience,” 168 n. 4). Mealey agrees, “Taste and 
See,” 34.  
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the trajectory most important for Smith.36 However, it does contribute to the 
unprecedented resurgence in scholarly attention being paid by theologians and 
philosophers reexamine the spiritual senses tradition and the Cambridge 
Platonists.37  
Given the role the Cambridge Platonists played in the intellectual life of 
their times, and the lasting historical and intellectual significance of the 
36 In addition this project will not give an account of the relationship of “inner sense” to 
the spiritual senses tradition. Inner sense is related to, but usually distinct from, the “spiritual 
senses.” The philosophical roots of inner sense are in Aristotle where they are the means by 
which the perceptions of the external word are apprehended by the mind. The spiritual senses 
are sometimes depicted on analogy with the external and the inner senses (Coolman, Knowing 
God, 42 n.75). The inner senses are the means by which the perception of the outer and inner 
worlds (material and spiritual) is made known. In this sense, one may speak of the spiritual 
senses as a kind of inner sense attuned to God’s manifestation in or to the human spirit. The full 
relation between neo-Aristotelian inner sense and Neoplatonic spiritual sense remains to be 
studied with necessary depth and this dissertation can only hope to contribute to such a future 
philosophic study. See Mark Aloysius Gaffney, The Psychology of the Interior Senses (London: B. 
Herder Book Co., 1942). A much larger project would be required to make anything like a 
definitive study of this issue but it would be an important step in tracing the continuities and 
differences in Christian intellectual thought from its beginnings through Kant and to today.  
 
37 For example, Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), 51-4; Coakley, "The Resurrection and the 'Spiritual Senses'”; 
Coolman, Knowing God; Dillon, "Aisthêsis Noêtê”; Carmela Vircillo Franklin, “Words as Food: 
Signifying the Bible in the Early Middle Ages,” in Settimane di  studio della Fondazione Centro 
italiano di studi sull’ alto Medioevo 52, (Spoleto, 2005) 2:733-62; Rachel Fulton, "’Taste and See That 
the Lord Is Sweet’ (Ps. 33.9): The Flavor of God in the Monastic West," The Journal of Religion 86, 
no. 2 (2005): 169-204; Gavrilyuk and Coakley, The Spiritual Senses; Rosemary Drage Hale, "‘Taste 
and See, for God Is Sweet’: Sensory Perception and Memory in Medieval Christian Mystical 
Experience," in Vox Mystica: Essays on Medieval Mysticism in Honor of Professor Valerie M. Lagorio, 
ed. Anne Clark Barlett (Rochester, NY: D. S. Brewer, 1995); Gordon Rudy, Mystical Language of 
Sensation in the Later Middle Ages, Studies in Medieval History and Culture, 14 (New York: 
Routledge, 2002); Fabio Massimo Tedoldi, La dottrina dei cinque sensi spirituali in San Bonaventura 
(Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1999; and Williams, The Divine Sense.  
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innovations of the seventeenth century, the importance of coming to a better 
understanding of their theology is clear. Furthermore, there is no better figure for 
such a study than Smith who possessed what has been called the “richest and 
most beautiful mind” among the Cambridge Platonists.38 Smith’s has been 
praised as “the most considerable work left to us by this Cambridge School,” and 
the Select Discourses have been called as great a work in English literature as they 
are in theology.39 Indeed, nearly every commentator gives a glowing appraisal of 
Smith’s Discourses in philosophical, theological, and literary terms even while 
they relegate him to far briefer exposition than his peers. It is as if the scholars 
who have worked with Smith like him, but do not know what to make of him. It 
is my contention that the reason for this is a lack of proper perspective. When 
Smith is seen in his relationship to the tradition of the spiritual senses the reason 
for the significance attributed to him becomes clear.  
 
38 Quoted in Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, 29.   
 
39 Matthew Arnold, “Introduction,” in The Natural Truth of Christianity, ed. W.M. Metcalfe 
(London: Alexander Gardiner, 1882), xi, quoted by Taliaferro and Teply, 205 n.173.  
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1.2 Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of two major parts. Part I reviews the history of 
the development of the doctrine of the spiritual senses and offer an interpretation 
thereof in light of recent scholarship (Chapter Two) and the intellectual milieu by 
means of which Smith received the concept from his predecessors and 
contemporaries (Chapter Three).  
 Part II provides a close reading of John Smith’s Select Discourses as 
amplified by his intellectual inheritance and the work of his peers at Cambridge. 
Chapter Four presents Smith’s employment of the spiritual senses in his account 
of the source of and methods for appropriating theological knowledge. Chapter 
Five outlines the role played by the spiritual senses in Smith’s account of the 
Christian life. Chapter Six demonstrates how the spiritual senses hold Smith’s 
theology together in a coherent system of thought.  
A concluding seventh chapter picks up where the preceding extended 
section of textual exegesis leaves off with an analytical summary and 
reconstruction of Smith’s doctrine of the spiritual senses. Also, the influence of 
Smith, and particularly his doctrine of the spiritual senses, on future figures is 
reviewed, including Jonathan Edwards, John Wesley, the British Romantics, 
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American Transcendentalists, and twentieth century scholars like Rufus Jones 
and William Ralph Inge. The dissertation closes with prospects for future 
research and an Appendix gives the organization of the Select Discourses across 
published editions.   
 
 
 
 
    
PART I  
 
CHAPTER 2: THE SPIRITUAL SENSES TRADITION 
 
I will make all my goodness pass before thee, and I 
will proclaim the name of the LORD before thee; and 
will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will 
show mercy on whom I will show mercy. And he 
said, Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no 
man see me, and live. 
Exodus 33:19-20, KJV 
 
O taste and see that the LORD is good. 
Psalm 34:8, KJV 
 
Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God. 
Matthew 5:8, KJV 
 
For just as in the body there are different sense of 
tasting and seeing, so are there, as Solomon says, 
divine faculties of perception. 
Origen, Commentary on John 20, 33 
 
And hence, having no spiritual senses, no inlets of 
spiritual knowledge, the natural man recieveth not 
the things of the Spirit of God. 
John Wesley, “Awake, Thou that Sleepest” 
(Ser. 3, I.11) 
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2.1 The ‘Spiritual Senses’: The Contours of a Paradox 
Sensory language has been used to describe the encounter between 
humanity and God across every era of Christian history (patristic, medieval, and 
modern) and on every branch of the Christian family tree (Eastern, Orthodox, 
Catholic, Anglican, and Protestant). From the very beginning of Christian 
thought, we find references that seem to suggest a capacity for the non-physical 
perception of divine realities. This apparently paradoxical notion is, most 
broadly speaking, what is usually meant by the term “spiritual sense(s)” in 
philosophical and theological discourse.1 The language of spiritual sense can 
1 See for example, Karl Rahner, "The Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses in the Middle Ages," 
in Theological Investigations, 16 (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 104-34 and Coolman, Knowing 
God by Experience: The Spiritual Senses in the Theology of William of Auxerre (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2004). The most basic characteristic of the spiritual senses, 
its sensory and noetic quality, is also found across religious traditions in various manifestations. 
On the noetic aspects of the spiritual senses according to Origen see Robert J. Hauck, “Like a 
Gleaming Flash”: Matthew 6:22-23, Luke 11:34-36 and the Divine Sense in Origen, Anglican 
Theological Review 88, no. 4 (2006): 557-73. While further comparative study of this phenomenon is 
warranted, this dissertation will make a more modest and textually based argument within the 
single religious tradition of Christianity. While attention will be paid to the Christian tradition of 
the spiritual senses – especially as developed in the Latin West and eventually the Anglo-
Germanic North and far western New World – no study of this concept can avoid some degree of 
cross-cultural study. The roots of the concept are found in the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament, 
Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. Significant developments in Jewish and Islamic thought further 
influenced the medieval Christian discussion of the spiritual senses from “outside” the tradition 
as well (Harry Austryn Wolfson, "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic 
Texts," The Harvard Theological Review 28, no. 2 [1935]: 69-133). Specifically, this study will explore 
the doctrine of the spiritual senses in its historical trajectory from Origen in the third to John 
Smith in the 17th century. In this respect, while the dissertation aims to supply a much-needed 
general account of the history of the doctrine such an account will not be complete. The full 
intellectual history of the spiritual senses remains to be written. For now, this dissertation aims to 
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make a certain kind of rhetorical or literary sense in isolation but its reference to 
a stable object or “doctrine” can be seen only in the history of such language.2 As 
Dillon has alerted us, the deep philosophical roots of Christian theological 
aesthetics go back at least as far as Plato.3  
While this dissertation is focused on a very specific appropriation and 
development of the expressly Christian tradition of the spiritual senses, the 
phenomenon can be found across the major world religions as well as across the 
centuries of philosophical and theological speculation.4 Indeed, the place of 
contribute to that goal by demonstrating the continuing significance of the doctrine beyond the 
commonly accepted time of its demise as an intellectual principle.  
 
2 The present chapter can offer only a taste of the full extent of the literature on the 
spiritual senses. I hope to publish a (nearly) complete bibliography on the theme in the near 
future that will represent the range of texts I have consulted. Here however I make mention only 
of those texts that I have explicitly used to construct my arguments. It should also be noted that 
the overall plan of this chapter predates the work of Gavrilyuk and Coakley on the spiritual 
senses. Where I have followed these or other authors directly is clearly indicated in the text 
and/or notes to follow.  
 
3 On the Platonic roots see, John Dillon, "Aisthêsis Noêtê: A Doctrine of Spiritual Senses 
in Origen and Plotinus," n Hellenica et Judaica: Hommage a Valentin Nikiprowetzky, ed. A Caquot, M. 
Hadas-Lebel and J. Riaud (Leuven: Peeters, 1986), 443-55. The ancient Egyptian Book of the Dead for 
example asks the gods to give senses like their own to the deceased human’s soul (Eva von 
Dassow, Ogden Goelet, and Carol Andrews, The Egyptian Book of the Dead, the Book of Going Forth 
by Day: The Papyrus of Ani and the Balance of Chapters from the Theban Recension, translated by 
Raymond Faulkner (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 1998), Chapter 1, Plate 6.).  
 
4 Eckel has noted sensory imagery related to religious understanding in a Buddhist 
context (Malcolm David Eckel, To See the Buddha: A Philosopher's Quest for the Meaning of Emptiness 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). On the Eastern Orthodox Christian vision of divine 
light, see Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, translated by members of 
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sensation and sensuality is an important growing area of comparative study. The 
recent collection of essays Perceiving the Divine through the Human Body alone 
catalogues Hindu, Buddhist, Daoist, and Christian varieties of “spiritual 
sensation” in the broadest sense.5  
Nevertheless, the critical understanding of the Christian tradition of the 
spiritual senses requires the examination of a topic that has yet to have its full 
the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius (London, 1957). The Hindu Yoga Sutra of Patañjali (2nd 
century BCE) speaks of the development of “prescience” and “higher hearing, touch, vision, taste, 
and smell” that reveal the “subtle” and the “remote, and the past and future” as well as 
sensations of the divine in modes analogous to the five physical senses (Yoga Sutra 3.35 in 
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, and Charles A. Moore, eds. A Sourcebook of Indian Philosophy [Princeton 
University Press, 1957], 475). The enigmatic Daoist classic the Daodejing also speaks of a kind of 
sight, hearing, and touch of the Dao that goes beyond normal sense perception (Daodejing, 14 in 
Wing-Tsit Chan, A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy [Princeton University Press, 1963] 146). 
Mystical vision and experience of “Divine light” is a common element in Jewish and Islamic 
thought as well. On mystical perception in Judaism, see Moshe Idel, Ascensions on High in Jewish 
Mysticism: Pillars, Lines, Ladders Pasts Incorporated, V. 2. (Budapest; New York: Central European 
University Press, 2005); Peter Schäfer, The Hidden and Manifest God: Some Major Themes in Early 
Jewish Mysticism, Suny Series in Judaica (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992); and 
Gershom Gerhard Scholem, Jewish Mysticism in the Middle Ages (New York: Judaica Press, 1964). 
For studies of mystical perception in Islam, see Alexander D Knysh, Islamic Mysticism: A Short 
History, Themes in Islamic Studies, 1 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2000), and Wolfson, "The Internal 
Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts." Diana Lobel, Between Mysticism and 
Philosophy: Sufi Language of Religious Experience in Judah Ha-Levi's Kuzari, SUNY Series in Jewish 
Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000) discusses mystical perception 
in a comparative Jewish and Islamic context. 
 
5 Thomas Cattoi, and June McDaniel, eds., Perceiving the Divine Through the Human Body: 
Mystical Sensuality (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).  
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history written.6 This chapter seeks to present a kind of schematic first draft of 
such a history. By laying bare the contours it will later become possible to see 
John Smith’s place within, and his contributions to, this tradition in the chapters 
to follow.  
 
Introduction to the Paradox  
Already in the Hebrew Bible we find the invitation to “taste and see that 
the Lord is good,” as though immaterial things such as God and goodness could 
be “tasted” or “seen.”7 The Christian (New) Testament only multiplies this use of 
sensory language by connecting purity of heart to the vision of God.8 Paul speaks 
both of seeing God “face to face” and of seeing “the glory of the Lord as in a 
6 On this see Bernard McGinn, "The Language of Inner Experience in Christian 
Mysticism," Spiritus 1 (2001): 156-71. Also, Mark T. Mealey, “Taste and See that the Lord is Good: 
John Wesley in the Christian Tradition of Spiritual Sensation” (PhD diss., University of St. 
Michael’s College, 2006), 30, 34, 20-49. 
 
7 Psalm 34: 8. On the central place of the Bible in the spiritual senses tradition see Mealey, 
“Taste and See,” 38-41.  
 
8 Matthew 5: 8. 
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mirror.”9 Elsewhere, we read of smelling the aroma of Christ and even touching 
the divine Word.10  
All of this language, and there are numerous additional examples, raises 
obvious questions in light of the equally well attested notion that God cannot be 
“seen” as well as the obvious fact that unlike his first disciples, we can no longer 
encounter Jesus Christ in his physical, earthly, form.11 What, then, can these 
descriptions of a purportedly sensory experience of the Divine possible mean? 
It is logically possible to interpret talk of “spiritual sense” in at least three 
broad ways. One might take a dismissive attitude to such talk and read it as mere 
nonsense. This might include reading this language literally, and in the process 
raising the apparent problems of outright heresy as well as further issues related 
to the exact composition of these “senses” and their relationship to the physical 
senses.12 One might understand spiritual sensation as a metaphorical reference to 
9 1 Corinthians 13: 12; 2 Corinthians 2:18.  
 
10 2 Corinthians 2: 15; 1 John 1: 1.  
 
11 Exodus 33: 19-20. On the role of the senses in making an otherwise absent Christ 
present to the Christian in the Gospel of John see Dorothy Lee, “The Gospel of John and the Five 
Senses,” Journal of Biblical Literature 129, no. 1 (2010): 115-27, especially, 125-7. 
 
12 Anthropomorphites have long been considered Christian heretics. See Irenaeus, Against 
Heresies 2:13:3 in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1, ed. Philip Schaff, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 
2005, accessed 19 May 2014, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf01.ix.iii.xiv.html.  
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some otherwise well-known faculty such as the intellect. Finally, one may read 
the “spiritual senses” as analogous in some non-literal yet meaningful way to the 
physical senses and in the process raise difficult further questions about just 
what this might mean, and again, how these are related to the rest of our 
perceptual and noetic faculties.13  
Many authors throughout Christian history have tried to explore the 
meaning of spiritual sense secure in the notion that, whatever else might be 
rightly said, it is meaningful and useful to do so, despite the obvious issues this 
raises. Passages such as the epigraphs that opened this chapter are prime 
examples of a nearly two-thousand year old tendency in Christian thought and 
letters to speak of what we might today call “religious or spiritual experiences” 
in terms borrowed from everyday sense perception. This kind of language can be 
found in Patristic exegesis and apologetics,14 medieval monasticism,15 the 
13 Hauck, for example, makes a convincing case for an analogical use of this language in 
Origen (“Like a Gleaming Flash,” 573). On these potential meanings, expressed in terms of 
definitions of key terms see Mealey, “Taste and See,” 34-43. While we cover the same territory 
Mealey’s approach of offering definitions of terms like “images of sensation,” and “philosophical,” 
and “theological” categories is problematic because they these terms (or their equivalents) are 
also used by the authors in the tradition in their own ways. By defining them ahead of time, and 
injecting a modern (though ultimately Thomistic) distinction between philosophy and theology 
Mealey projects perhaps as much as he illuminates here.  
 
14 For example, Origen, Commentaria in Epistulam B. Pauli ad Romans, 4. 5 (PG 14. 977D-
978A) and Augustine, Confessiones, X.27.38 (CCL 27). Also noteworthy are early examples of the 
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treatises of the schoolmen,16 the hymnody of the early Methodists,17 the 
contemporary work of theologians,18 philosophers of religion,19 priests, pastors, 
and patriarchs.20 In fact, once one begins to look, the spiritual senses appear to be 
a very common theme in the history of Christian thought.  
use of the spiritual senses in spirituality. See, Sebastian Brock, The Luminous Eye: The Spiritual 
World Vision of Saint Ephrem (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1992), 27-9, 38-9, 46-51, and 
67-84.  
 
15 For example, Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermo de diversis, 10. 2-4, in Jean Leclerq, et al., eds., 
Sancti Bernardi opera (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1957-1977), VI.I: 122-4. Also, Rachel Fulton, 
“’Taste and See that the Lord is Sweet’ (Ps. 33:9): The Flavor of God in the Monastic West,” The 
Journal of Religion 86, no. 2 (2005): 169-204. 
 
16 See, for example, the work of B. T. Coolman on William of Auxerre (Knowing God by 
Experience), “Alexander of Hales,” in Paul L. Gavrilyuk, and Sarah Coakley, eds., The Spiritual 
Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 121-
39, and “Thomas Gallus,” op. cit., 140-58.  
 
17 See the hymns of Charles and John Wesley in A Collection of Hymns for the Use of the 
People Called Methodists (London, 1781). One need look no further than the 7th and 8th stanzas of 
the first hymn for prime examples. Cited by Mark T. Mealey, “John Wesley,” in Gavrilyuk and 
Coakley, 243.  
 
18 For example, Sarah Coakley, "The Resurrection and the 'Spiritual Senses': On 
Wittgenstein, Epistemology, and the Risen Christ," in Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Gender 
and Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 130-52. 
 
19 William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1993). Alston’s approach has recently been given new life in the work of 
Wesley Wildman (Religious and Spiritual Experiences [Cambridge University Press, 2011]) as well 
as being featured in William J. Abraham’s “Analytic Philosophers of Religion,” in Gavrilyuk and 
Coakley, 275-90, especially 281-4.  
 
20 Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, “Song and Space: Art, Architecture, and Liturgy,” 
in Encountering the Mystery: Understanding Orthodox Christianity Today (New York: Doubleday, 
2008) for example, makes reference to hearing, seeing, and touching the “word of life” (31). The 
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What makes the language of spiritual sensation noteworthy is, therefore, 
not its rarity but its apparently paradoxical nature within Christian thought. The 
qualification of Moses being granted a view of God’s “back”21 notwithstanding, 
the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions have all been eager to maintain the 
impossibility of seeing God. This originally distinguished the people of Israel from 
their neighbors, who could gaze upon idols thought to make present their 
various Gods and Goddesses.22 Christian tradition has long maintained that an 
exception of sorts exists in the person of Jesus Christ who has seen God, because 
he is of, from, and for God’s purposes in the Incarnation of God’s Logos.23 
first encyclical letter issued by Pope Francis, Lumen Fidei, makes explicit use of various images of 
“spiritual sensation” (especially vision) throughout. English translation: The Light of Faith (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2013). 
 
21 Exodus 33: 23. The notion that Moses spoke to God “face to face” (Exodus 33: 11)  is 
another interesting (potential) challenge but this was nearly always interpreted allegorically or 
symbolically rather than literally since it would suggest that God has a physical face. On this in 
the Patristic period see Christopher A. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the 
Knowledge of God: In Your Light We Shall See Light (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 101-10.  
 
22 At least in theory, if not in practice. See, for example, Judith M. Hadley, The Cult of 
Asherah in Ancient Israel and Judah: Evidence for a Hebrew Goddess (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000).  
 
23 John 1:18; 1: 14.  
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However, we are told by this same Jesus that “the pure in heart . . . will see 
God.”24  
The Christian tradition of understanding God as non-physical, and 
beyond human comprehension, appears to stand in deep conflict therefore with 
the notion that one may “see” or otherwise perceive God in any way 
(metaphorical or literal). This theological constraint makes it all the more 
surprising that one can find such language so often in Christian texts, from the 
Bible itself, through the musings of theologians, and the poetry of the 
hymnodists. If God is non-physical, and thus non-sensible, there should not be 
any of the talk about sensing God that one finds in the history of Christian 
thought.  
 
Interpretive Options 
So, the affirmation of spiritual sensation – the perception of divine and 
therefore (apparently) imperceptible things – entails the paradox of “seeing” the 
God who remains always unseen and indeed invisible. One might take our first 
24 Matthew 5: 8. While it might be argued that it makes sense for the divine Logos and 
Son of the Father to see God, an extension of God’s self-perception. This on its own however does 
little to account for the apparent conflict between the human vision of God being impossible 
(Exodus 33) and the vision of God being promised to the pure in heart. 
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logical option and dismiss all talk of the perception of spiritual realities as 
basically meaningless. This potential meaninglessness would arise from a 
contradiction between the prohibition on sensing God and the assertion to do 
just that. With such a reading what we have been calling a “paradox” descends 
into the realm of outright foolishness. Such a view, however, would seem to rest 
on the willful ignorance of the ubiquity of such language in Christian texts from 
the biblical witness onward even up to our day.25 If meaningless, then why such 
persistence? Likewise, why is this language so often used both in prayer, liturgy, 
popular devotion and academic theology? The spiritual senses are appealed to, it 
would seem, too often to be meaningless or arbitrary. Thus, this option has not 
been taken seriously by theologians (or most scholars in general). For this reason, 
we will not entertain this possibility further.  
Perhaps then, as a second possibility, such language is metaphorical or 
poetic? That is to say, it may be that spiritual sensation is not meaningless but 
that it has a basically different meaning from the literal meaning this language 
conveys. For example, when we say in modern English that we “see what you 
mean” we do not mean that another person’s meaning is actually visible to us. 
25 On this see, for example, John Eudes Bamberger, “Thomas Merton: Reflections on the 
Way of Prayer,” Cistercian Studies Quarterly 45.1 (2010): 83-4.  
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We do not really “see” in this case but rather we understand. In this same way, 
many authors throughout Christian history have made use of the language of the 
senses to describe what is in fact a matter of intellection rather than perception.  
For example, William Wainwright has argued that John Smith’s “spiritual 
senses” are a kind of intellectual intuition.26 As we will see in chapter four below, 
this reading of Smith is limited and overly simplistic, but more to the point here 
altogether too much has been made of the distinction between spiritual sense as 
metaphor for intellection, as in the case of Thomas Aquinas, and the analogical 
use of such language to refer to a kind of spiritual capacity for spiritual 
perception, as in the case of Origen.27 In fact, it is difficult to imagine why 
26 William J. Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards and his Puritan Predecessors,” in 
Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 229-31, 240.  
 
27 See Richard Cross, “Thomas Aquinas,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 174-89. Also, Peter 
Dillard, “Keeping the Vision: Aquinas and the Problem of Disembodied Beatitude,” New 
Blackfriars 93 no. 1046 (2012): 397-411. Most of Origen’s primary texts on the spiritual senses are 
conveniently collected and extracted under topic headings in Hans Urs von Balthasar, Origen 
Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings, trans. Robert J. Daly (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
2001). Important secondary sources on Origen’s doctrine of spiritual sensibility include: Hans Urs 
von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, 1; Seeing the Form, (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1982), 367-71; Robert M. Berchman, From Philo to Origen: Middle Platonism in 
Transition (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984); L. Boeve, and Laurence Paul Hemming, eds., 
Divinising Experience: Essays in the History of Religious Experience from Origen to Ricœur, Studies in 
Philosophical Theology, 23 (Leuven; Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2004); Henri Crouzel, Origen: The Life 
and Thought of the First Great Theologian, trans. A.S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1989); Jean 
Daniélou, Origen, trans. W. Mitchell (London: Sheed & Ward, 1955); György Heidl, Origen's 
Influence on the Young Augustine: A Chapter of the History of Origenism (Louaize, Lebanon; 
Piscataway, NJ: University of Notre Dame; Gorgias Press, 2003); Karl Rahner, "The Spiritual 
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language originally used for perception would be employed to describe 
intellection unless there is something very much like perception going on in the 
process of thinking. Indeed, it may be that intellection involves, or can plausibly 
be conceived of as involving, intellectual intuition.28  
More interesting than the metaphorical interpretation of spiritual 
sensation is a third approach, more suitable to some authors and some texts than 
to others, which identifies such language as descriptions not of otherwise well-
known functions of the mind or soul, but rather of some capacity (or capacities) 
that are literally spiritually sensate. That is, in some cases the intent truly does 
seem to be to indicate a capacity for experiencing spiritual realities (i.e., God, 
grace, love, etc.) via a faculty or power analogous to one or more of the five 
Senses According to Origen," in Theological Investigations, 16: 81-103 (New York: Seabury Press, 
1979); John M. Rist, Eros and Psyche; Studies in Plato, Plotinus, and Origen, Phoenix: Journal of the 
Classical Association of Canada, Supplementary Vol. 6 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1964); A. Tripolitis, The Doctrine of the Soul in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen (New York: Libra 
1978); A. N. Williams, The Divine Sense: The Intellect in Patristic Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). In addition to these important sources nearly all studies on the spiritual 
senses discuss Origen to some extent and typically record his influence on future theologians too.  
 
28 Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards and His Puritan Predecessors,” 224-40. Intellectual 
intuition becomes philosophically suspect with the success of Kant’s critical philosophy in the 
late eighteenth century. However, for this reason, a Kantian standard in epistemology is 
anachronistic in the treatment of nearly all the figures dealt with here. A constructive defense of 
the spiritual senses in light of modern philosophy must await future research. However, the 
continued presence of active interest in employing the spiritual senses in one form or another (see 
the remains of this chapter) gives the lie to the notion that such talk is without merit after Kant.  
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physical senses.29 For example, as we will see in greater detail below, Origen of 
Alexandria argued that the spiritual senses are an additional faculty (or set of 
faculties) beyond the usual physical senses, and perhaps intellect as well.30 
  
2.2 Diversity in Language, Use and Meaning 
Unlike determinate loci in Christian doctrine, such as the Incarnation, 
there is little stable or unified vocabulary in the discussion of the “spiritual 
senses” when the tradition is taken as a whole. In fact, many authors, such as 
29 I restrict my analysis to those theories that posit between one and five spiritual senses 
(following Balthasar and recent scholarly practice) and will not go into the speculations about up 
to twelve discussed by Fabio Massimo Tedoldi (La dottrina dei cinque sensi spirituali in San 
Bonaventura [Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1999]). This move is justified by the 
fact that it is the versions of the doctrine that speak of either one sense (usually “spiritual vision”) 
or as many as five (matching the physical senses) that have had the greatest historical impact and 
is represented in the classic texts in the history of Christian thought. That these “classics” are 
such only now in hindsight in no way diminishes their importance. While Smith and the 
Cambridge Platonists tend to make explicit reference to ancient Greek authors more than 
medieval Latin ones the fact remains that their religious heritage is Western and Latin more than 
it is Eastern and Greek. As Protestants in seventeenth century England their religious view point 
owes much to the trajectory or development that passes through Augustine, the medieval 
synthesis of Bonaventure (and in a negative sense Thomas), and the speculations of the 
Renaissance humanists and Reformers of the Church (Luther, Calvin, Cranmer, etc.). Smith 
therefore relies explicitly on Plotinus and the Alexandrian theologians but he also references the 
“Schoolmen” of his own, Latin, tradition (see, for example, Smith, Select Discourses [1660], 126). 
Smith reads his ancient sources through the tradition of interpretation in the Latin West. This 
interpretation will be argued for throughout the dissertation. For an under used example of more 
than five senses see J. Homer Herriott, “The Ten Senses in the Siete Partidas,” Hispanic Review 20 
no. 4 (1952): 269-81.   
 
30 For more on this issue see the discussion in Derek Michaud, “The Patristic Roots of 
John Smith’s ‘True Way of Method of Attaining to Divine Knowledge,’” in Cattoi and McDaniel, 
141-58 and Mark J. McInroy, “Origen of Alexandria,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 20-35. 
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Pseudo-Dionysius, do not explicitly speak of “spiritual sense” (or their cognates) 
at all. This does not mean however that they have nothing to say on the topic of 
spiritual perception.31 This lack of a unified vocabulary has not kept scholars 
from identifying a common concern and even threads of recurring terminology 
around the basic idea of non-physical sensation of divine realities however. 
There is currently a fairly stable, if complex and sometimes contested, 
scholarly vocabulary about the spiritual senses, especially, but not only, around 
the interpretation of the primary texts in the tradition. The spiritual senses have 
generally been treated as having implications for various issues in philosophy 
(epistemology and metaphysics especially) and theology (Christology, 
anthropology, etc.). As we will see below, since at least Poulain in the early 20th 
century through the most recent work on the spiritual senses the consensus 
among theologians and philosophers of religion is that the spiritual senses are 
best understood as analogous to the physical senses.  
While much work in recent years has been analytical or exegetical, and to 
that extent not explicitly constructive of a contemporary doctrine of spiritual 
31 After all, one may use the idea of physical sense without making literal or explicit 
reference to vision, touch, taste, smell or hearing. Consider: “Hey, do you know where my keys 
are? Oh, never mind. I found them right here.” 
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sensation, there have also been notable figures who have drawn on the notion to 
inform their own systematic work in theology and the philosophy of religion. For 
example, Hans Urs von Balthasar made extensive use of his impressive analytical 
and exegetical work on the spiritual senses in his own theological aesthetics.32 
Balthasar’s aesthetic has stimulated a great deal of work in a revitalized Roman 
Catholic emphasis on theological aesthetics and the birth of a self-consciously 
aesthetic approach in Protestant theology as well.33 Additionally, the philosopher 
William Alston developed his “theory of appearing” into a theory of divine 
perception in response to the evidence from the history of mystical or spiritual 
experience.34  
The terms “spiritual sense(s)” and “spiritual sensation” have been used  in 
a  large variety of ways that involve either sensibility in general or a particular 
(physical) sense – sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch – suitability qualified or 
modified by terms such as spirit, soul, heart, mind or intellect, inner, or faith. 
32 See McInroy, “Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar,” 257-74. 
 
33 See Oleg V. Bychkov and James Fodor, eds., Theological Aesthetics after von Balthasar 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008).  
 
34 William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1999).  
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This broad categorial use of “spiritual sense” as an “umbrella term” is reflected 
in the work of Gavrilyuk and Coakley and constitutes an advance in scholarly 
consensus over the past century or so.35  
Origen of Alexandria is usually credited with initiating the “spiritual 
senses tradition.” He speaks often of “spiritual senses” but also of “inner sense” 
as well as other formulations consistent with the general theme of spiritual 
perception. That is, the noetic perception of spiritual realities not the physical 
perception of disembodied spirits (or ghosts). In fact, although Rudy has recently 
challenged accepted scholarly consensus on this issue,36 Origen is best seen as 
arguing for a distinctly immaterial, spiritual sensory capacity which is analogous 
to the physical senses but which requires withdrawal from the physical world for 
its activation in the noetic, spiritual realm.37  
35 A degree of openness or vagueness in the definition of spiritual sense is necessary if we 
are to speak of a “tradition.” After all, things change over time and in each author or even text. 
Therefore, to see the whole requires a general approach capable of registering the common 
themes across the differences. It is with this breadth of reference that the term “spiritual sense(s)” 
is used here.  
 
36 Gordon Rudy, Mystical Language of Sensation in the Later Middle Ages, Studies in 
Medieval History and Culture, 14 (New York: Routledge, 2002), 1-15.  
 
37 Rahner, “The ‘Spiritual Senses’ According to Origen,” 89; Mark J. McInroy, “Origen of 
Alexandria,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 20-35; and Michaud, “The Patristic Roots,” 144-50.  
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A common source of complication, and often confusion, arises from the 
Aristotelian language of “inner sense.” This inner sense is often identified with 
the “common sense” of Aristotle’s De Anima, De Partibus Animalium, and De 
Memoria et Reminiscentia which is thought to unite the objects of the different 
sensory modalities to give a unified object of judgment to the understanding.38  
Confusion about Origen’s “spiritual sense” (sometimes called “inner sense” to 
mark it is a function of the “inner man” rather than the carnally minded and 
bodily “outer man”) and “inner sense” in Aristotelian psychology reached a peak 
in the medieval West39 but the two were seen by most as distinct faculties, 
38 See Pavel Gregoric, Aristotle on the Common Sense (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011). Also, Miira Tuominen, “Common Sense and phantasia in Antiquity,” in Sourcebook for the 
History of the Philosophy of Mind, S. Knuuttila and J. Sihvola, eds. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 107-
29.  
 
39 Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 1-3; Paul l. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley, 
“Introduction,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 14. On the role of the inner and outer senses in 
medieval mysticism see, Niklaus Largier, “Inner Senses – Outer Senses: The Practice of Emotions 
in Medieval Mysticism,” in Codierungen von Emotionen im Mittelalter/Emotions and Sensibilties in the 
Middle Ages, ed. C. Stephen Jaeger and Andrea Kasten (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 
2003), 3-15. On the inner senses in medieval philosophy see, Simo Knuuttila and Pekka 
Kärkkäinen, “Medieval Theories of Internal Senses,” in Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy 
of Mind, S. Knuuttila and J. Sihvola, eds. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 131-45. On Cartesian 
developments of the medieval tradition see Lucian Petrescu, “Descartes and the Internal Senses: 
On Memory and Remembrance,” in Branching Off: The Early Moderns in Quest of the Unity of 
Knowledge, ed. Vlad Alexandrescu (Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2009), 116-39.  
 
 
 
                                                 
44 
 
however some, such as Nicholas of Cusa, sought to amalgamate them.40 Notable 
approaches to the spiritual senses, whether or not they include “inner senses,” 
include the following.41  
  
Spiritualized Senses 
Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor both make little explicit use 
of the term “spiritual senses” (????????????????????) while also clearly 
speaking of the perception (in a broad or analogous sense) of divine things.42 For 
example, Gregory of Nyssa has his Macrina refer to the “eyes of the soul” in 
40 On Cusa see, Garth W. Green, “Nicholas of Cusa,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 211-5. On 
medieval inner sense see Harry Austryn Wolfson, "Maimonides on the Internal Senses," Jewish 
Quarterly Review N.S. 25 (1935), and "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew 
Philosophic Texts."; Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 43, 48, 134; Nicholas H. Steneck, 
“Albert the Great on the Classification and Localization of the Internal Senses,” Isis 65 no. 2 (1974): 
193-211. See also Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Inner Touch: Archaeology of a Sensation (New York: 
Zone Books, 2009).  
 
41 For a definitional approach to much the same territory see Mealey, “Taste and See,” 34-
43. 
 
42 Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” 5; Sarah Coakley, “Gregory of Nyssa,” in 
Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 36-55; Frederick D. Aquino, “Maximus the Confessor,” in Gavrilyuk and 
Coakley, 104-120. See also A.S. Evans, “The Mind Sees: Spiritual Senses in Gregory of Nyssa’s de 
anima et de resurrection” (Undergraduate Thesis, Harvard College, 2002) and Natalie M. Carnes, 
“Senses of Beauty” (PhD diss., Duke University, 2011), ch. 4. Cf. Gregory of Nazianzus in 
Christopher A. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light 
We Shall See Light (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 83. 
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relation to thinking in his De anima et resurrection.43 Likewise, over a century later, 
Maximus too speaks of “divine perception” through the “eyes of the mind.”44 
Unlike Origen before them, Gregory and Maximus do not see the spiritual senses 
in opposition to the natural physical senses. For both the spiritual senses are the 
culmination of the life of piety and asceticism.45 In fact, as Sarah Coakley has 
convincingly argued Gregory came to see the spiritual senses as a transformation 
of the physical senses.46 This anticipates the spirituality of the Hesychast Gregory 
Palamas (1296/7-1359), and since then, Eastern Orthodoxy more generally.47 The 
43 PG 46.28L; The Soul and the Resurrection, trans. and intro. Catharine P. Roth (Crestwood, 
NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1993), 34.  
 
44 Mystagogia XXIII 2, 36-7, in Selected Writings, trans. George C. Berthold (New York; 
Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1985), 204-5.  
 
45 Coakley, “Gregory of Nyssa” and Aquino, “Maximus the Confessor,” 104-5.  
 
46 Coakley, “Gregory of Nyssa.”  
 
47 The perception of grace was defined as doctrine in the East between 1341 and 1351 and 
as remained central to Orthodox spirituality since. John Meyendorff, A Study of Gregory Palamas, 
trans. George Lawrence (London: Faith Press, 1964), 42-62, 94-101. Interestingly, the renewal of 
interest in pagan Platonism in the Greek East that preceded and directly informed the growth of 
Renaissance Platonism was itself a reaction to the Hesychast movement. Against the view of 
Palamas that one may see the “uncreated light” as the disciples did at the Transfiguration of Jesus 
(Matthew 17:1–9, Mark 9:2-8, Luke 9:28–36) with one’s physical eyes figures such as Barlaam of 
Calabria (c.1290-1348), Gregory Akindynos (c.1300-1348), and later Georgius Gemistus Plethon 
(c.1355–1452/1454) argued on the authority of the ancient Platonic tradition that to literally “see” 
God was foolishness. This “Hesychast Controversy” raged through the middle of the fourteenth 
century with the view of Palamas eventually winning out. However, the opposition that the 
Palamites focused led to intensified study of the pre-Christian religion and philosophy of late 
antiquity. By the time of the Council of Ferrara/Florence (1431-49) when Plethon taught Platonic 
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seriousness with which these and other theologians treated the implications of 
the Incarnation for a positive appraisal of the human body led them to see the 
spiritual senses as amplifications of natural powers of perception and 
understanding. The physical is deified and transformed rather than given up.48  
  
Sensus Spirituales 
Medieval Western authors developed a more stable vocabulary for 
spiritual perception focused around the Latin term sensus spirituales. Figures such 
as, famously, Bonaventure, made use of the concept in their commentaries, 
treatises, and mystical works.49 We will see the uses to which Bonaventure put 
philosophy to the likes of Cosimo de' Medici (1389-1464) the stage was set for the Florentine 
Academy of Ficino, Poliziano, Landino, Pico, and de' Becchi, which in turn helped to inspire the 
rebirth of Platonism in England that led to the “Cambridge Platonists.” See Niketas Siniossoglou, 
Radical Platonism in Byzantium: Illumination and Utopia in Gemistos Plethon (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 93-124. On the Platonic tradition in seventeenth century England 
generally see Sarah Hutton, “Introduction to the Renaissance and Seventeenth Century,” in 
Platonism and the English Imagination, ed. Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 67-75.  
 
48 A similar transformation of the bodily senses is discussed in a radically different 
cultural context by Nancy E. Van Deusen in “Reading the Body: Mystical Theology and Spiritual 
Actualization in Early Seventeenth –Century Lima,” Journal of Religious History 33, no. 1 (2009): 1-
27. On the development of the cult of relics and icons, another way in which the physical senses 
become spiritualized, see Patricia Cox Miller, The Corporeal Imagination: Signifying the Holy in Late 
Ancient Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).  
 
49 On Bonaventure’s doctrine of the spiritual senses see: Hans Urs von Balthasar, The 
Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, 1; Seeing the Form (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 
371-3; The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, 2, Studies in Theological Style: Clerical Styles (San 
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his understanding of the spiritual senses below. By his day other early scholastic 
thinkers had made extensive, systematic, use of the spiritual senses too.  
For example, William of Auxerre developed notions of spiritual sense in 
his discussion of the Beatific Vision.50 “The delight by which we delight in God 
will not only be in love, but also in vision.”51 Moreover, William used the 
spiritual senses to account for symbolic theology, perceiving God’s effects in the 
world52 as well as in mystic theology to explain perception of God’s effects 
within the soul.53 Even the sacrament of the Eucharist was imagined as an 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984), 315-26; J. G. Bougerol, "Sensus spirituals," in Lexique Saint 
Bonaventure, ed. J.G. Bougerol (Paris, 1969), 117-8; Christopher M. Cullen,  Bonaventure (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Stephen Fields, "Balthasar and Rahner on the Spiritual 
Senses," Theological Studies 57 (1996): 225-41; Karl Rahner, “Der Begriff der Ecstasis bei 
Bonaventura.” RAM 9 (1934): 1-19; "The Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses in the Middle Ages." In 
Theological Investigations, 16 (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 104-34; Fabio Massimo Tedoldi, La 
dottrina dei cinque sensi spirituali in San Bonaventura (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 
1999); and Gregory F. LaNave, “Bonaventure,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 159-173.  
 
50 Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 21-49. See also K. E. Kirk, The Vision of God: The 
Christian Doctrine of the Summum Bonum (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).  
 
51 Summa Aurea IV 18.3.3.1: 501,137ff. Quoted by Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 24-
5.  
 
52 Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 161-183.  
 
53 Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 184-217. Cf. Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis in 
Deum, ch. 4, in Works of St. Bonaventure, vol 2. Philotheus Boehner and Zachary Hayes, eds. (St. 
Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2002).   
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occasion for the exercise of spiritual touch and taste.54 “Since this food is the 
highest sweetness, and since it has entirely every delight and every sweetness of 
taste, it would seem that it greatly delights him who has a well-disposed palate 
of the heart, since extremely sweet corporal food delights extremely the well-
disposed corporal palate. Therefore, since the body of Christ is an extremely 
delicious food, it delights to the full him whose palate of the heart is well 
disposed.”55 
  
The Sense of the Heart 
Nevertheless, the medieval period also saw a marked increase in the use 
of terms such as the “eyes” or “sense of the heart.” Figures such as Bernard of 
Clairvaux picked up on the strongly affective dimensions in Augustine’s 
treatment of the spiritual life and stressed the role of emotion and will in 
spiritual perception. This more affective sort of spiritual sense exerted 
considerable influence on later mystics such as Hadewijch of Antwerp, 
54 Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 218-234. On a more broadly liturgical approach to 
the spiritual senses see Ella Louise Johnson, “Liturgical Exercise as a Theological Anthropology 
in Gertrud the Great of Helfta’s ‘Documenta Spiritualium Exercitionum.’” (PhD diss., University 
of St. Michael’s College, 2010), chs. 3 and 4 esp.  
 
55 Summa Aurea IV 7.3: 152,83ff. Quoted by Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 2226-7.  
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Mechthild of Magdeburg, and Richard Rolle.56 These themes of experiential 
spirituality carried on in much popular Catholic devotion and even formed an 
important aspect of English Puritanism too. For example, John Bradford (1510-
1555), William Perkins (1558-1602), and Richard Baxter (1615-1691).57 
 
Synesthesia  
In addition to this emphasis on the “heart” Bernard of Clairvaux in 
particular, among others, is notable for the synesthesia in his discussion of 
spiritual sense. As McGinn has noted, for Bernard the spiritual senses mix and 
mingle to a remarkable degree. Imagery drawn from sight mixes freely with 
themes drawn from hearing, touch, and taste.58 This blending of the language of 
56 Bernard McGinn, “Late Medieval Mystics,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 190-209. For a 
much more developed account of the spiritual senses in Bernard see Killian McDonnell, “Spirit 
and Experience in Bernard of Clairvaux,” Theological Studies 58 (1997): 3-18.  
 
57 On this see Brad Walton, Jonathan Edwards, Religious Affections, and the Puritan Analysis 
of True Piety, Spiritual Sensation, and Heart Religion (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002). On 
the influence of Bernard on John Calvin see Dennis E. Tamburello, Union with Christ: John Calvin 
and the Mysticism of St. Bernard (Westminster John Knox Press, 1994). On the tricky business of the 
label “Puritan” to describe “the hotter sort of Protestant” in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries see Ian Hugh Clary, “Hot Protestants: A Taxonomy of English Puritanism,” Puritan 
Reformed Journal 2 no. 1 (2010): 41-66. In general, my usage follows that of my sources as given in 
the notes. Overall, however, a “Puritan” is an English Protestant, unsatisfied with the extent of 
reformation in the Church of England who is usually also an adherent of one version or other of 
the theology of John Calvin as well.  
 
58 Bernard McGinn, The Growth of Mysticism, The Presence of God: A History of Western 
Christian Mysticism (New York: Crossroad, 1994), 187.  
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the five physical senses with each other is a consistent theme throughout the 
whole history of Christian speculation on the spiritual senses.59 
 
Sensus Divinitatis 
Still others, notably John Calvin, speak of a generic “divine sense” (sensus 
divinitatis), a phrase already found in Origen. For example, Origen importantly 
quoted from an unknown Greek version of Proverbs 2:5 as biblical evidence for a 
“divine sense” (???????????????60 Much more well-known is the case of Calvin, 
who makes frequent appeal to the sensus divinitatis. For example,  
there exists in the human mind and indeed by natural instinct, some sense 
of Deity [sensus divinitatis], we hold to be beyond dispute, since God 
himself, to prevent any man from pretending ignorance, has endued all 
men with some idea of his Godhead . . . this is not a doctrine which is first 
learned at school, but one as to which every man is, from the womb, his 
own master; one which nature herself allows no individual to forget.61 
 
59 Exodus 20:18 for example confuses sight and hearing. See University of California 
Television, “Synaesthesia in Mystical Traditions,” YouTube, 26 March 2008, accessed 20 April 
2014, http://youtu.be/6LorvbKs79w.   
 
60 Contra Celsum I. 48 (PG 11.749A), trans. Henry Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1953), 44.  
 
61 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, book 1, chapter 3, trans. Henry Beverage, 
Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2005, accessed 30 May 2014,  
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html. See also Paul Helm, “Turretin on the Senses,” 
Helm’s Deep: Philosophical Theology, 1 September 2012, accessed 4 April 2014, 
http://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2012/09/turretin-on-senses.html.  
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Sense of Faith 
 
From the 16th century European Reformations on it becomes more 
common to find references to spiritual perception as a “sense of faith” (using the 
“eyes of faith” or some other organ). In developing this terminology the 
Reformers, Protestant and Roman Catholic, were picking up a thread already to 
be found in Augustine who remarked that “faith has its eyes.”62 This notion was 
used by Thomas Aquinas too.63 In modern Roman Catholicism the expression 
62 Augustine, Epistle 120, 2.8 (PL 33: 458). Particularly relevant secondary sources on 
Augustine’s use of spiritual sense include Donald X. Burt, "Let Me Know Myself”: Reflections on the 
Prayer of Augustine (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2002); Henry Chadwick, Augustine 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); John C. Cooper, "The Basic Philosophical and 
Theological Notions of Saint Augustine," Augustinian Studies 15 (1984): 93-113; György Heidl, 
Origen's Influence on the Young Augustine: A Chapter of the History of Origenism (Louaize, Lebanon; 
Piscataway, NJ: University of Notre Dame; Gorgias Press, 2003); Paul Henry, The Path to 
Transcendence: From Philosophy to Mysticism in Saint Augustine (Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1981); 
P. L. Landisberg, "Les sens spirituels chez saint Augustin," Dieu vivant 11 (1948): 83-105; Margaret 
Miles, "Vision: The Eye of the Body and the Eye of the Mind in Saint Augustine's ‘De Trinitate’ 
and ‘Confessions’," The Journal of Religion 63, no. 2 (1983): 125-42 in addition to the extensive 
secondary literature on Augustine’s thought more generally. Augustine is more often associated 
with the (related) concept of divine illumination in this literature but a strong case can be (and 
has been) made for his significant role in the transmission of the spiritual senses to the West (Karl 
Rahner, "The Spiritual Senses According to Origen,” 102). 
 
63 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 3 q. 55, a. 2, ad I, in The Complete English Edition in 
Five Volumes, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN: Christian 
Classics, 1981). 
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plays an important role in interpreting revelation.64 Among Protestants one finds 
consistent use of such terms as “sense of faith” and “eyes of faith” especially 
among the English Puritans.65 Today one can find the phrase “eyes of faith” in a 
whole host of publications that intend to illuminate some area of study or other 
from an evangelical Protestant perspective.66 Apparently, in recent years these 
phrases have come to mean something like a “faith-based lens” on the world.  
  
Intellectual Intuition 
Finally, there are authors that speak of intellection in strikingly sensual 
ways as a kind of intuition of the mind. Early modern rationalists, such as the 
Cambridge Platonists for example, routinely speak of the perception of divine 
things through “intellectual touch”67 but they were also comfortable with the 
language of “inner sense(s),” “sense(s) of faith,” “sense(s) of the heart,” and 
64 On the modern Roman Catholic use of sensus fidei see Ormond Rush, The Eyes of Faith: 
The Sense of the Faithful and the Church's Reception of Revelation (Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America, 2009).  
 
65 Walton, Jonathan Edwards.   
 
66 For example, see the Christian College Coalition Series published by HarperCollins. 
 
67 For example, John Smith, Select Discourses, (1660), 3.  
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“spiritual sense(s)” as well. The works of the Cambridge Platonists reveal two 
broad categories of “spiritual apprehension.”  
First, there is a group of texts, especially those by Cudworth and More, 
that stress the singular nature of the mind’s perception of divine realities through 
the faculty of intelligence or understanding. For these texts, the human mind or 
soul is intuitively aware of God through an apprehension of the intellect often 
discussed on analogy with vision.68 This apprehension takes the form of a kind of 
single spiritual sense in ways reminiscent of William of Auxerre’s treatment of 
the spiritual senses as formally one though materially multiple.69 Particularly 
interesting are two faculties posited by More; the “boniform,” which senses the 
Good, and “divine sagacity,” which perceives the truth when it “sees” it.70  
68 Ralph Cudworth argued for the existence of God on the basis of human knowledge in 
The True Intellectual System of the Universe, chapter 5, section 1, in Cragg, The Cambridge Platonists, 
195-203. See also Cudworth’s Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, ed. Sarah Hutton 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), IV. 1, pp.73-83. Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann 
and John Reynell Morell have said of Henry More that he “derived all philosophical knowledge 
from intellectual Intuition” (A Manual of the History of Philosophy [London: Bell & Daldy, 1870], 
321). For a discussion of this single faculty in Origen as it relates to biblical exegesis especially, 
see Hauck, “Like a Gleaming Flash,” 560-8.  
 
69 Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 33-45. 
 
70 For the “boniform faculty,” see Henry More, Enchiridion Ethicum, (London, 1667), 
English translation, Handbook of Ethics (London, 1690), 156-8. See also Susan James, Passion and 
Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
226-8. For “divine sagacity” see his Divine Dialogues (London, 1668), 404. On the faculty similar to 
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Second, there is a group of texts that speak of multiple spiritual sensations 
on analogy with (at least some of) the five physical senses (but always more than 
a single sensory modality). This tendency, while found in most of the Cambridge 
authors to some degree, is especially associated with the work of Smith and 
represents the tendency within the school to associate spiritual understanding 
with multiple modes of perception and intellection similar to the expressions of 
the five spiritual senses as found in Origen and others.71 
  
Historical Trends 
These examples of terminological diversity, and they are just that, a 
selective collection of examples, could be multiplied endlessly. The sheer variety 
of terms used to express the central theme of perception of spiritual (intellectual) 
the boniform known as the “moral sense” posited by 18th century thinkers see Luigi Turco, 
“Sympathy and Moral Sense: 1725-1740,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7:1 (1999): 79-
101, Daniel Carey, “Method, Moral Sense, and the Problem of Diversity: Francis Hutcheson and 
the Scottish Enlightenment” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 5:2 (1997): 275-96; and 
Patrick Müller, “Hobbes, Locke and the Consequences: Shaftesbury’s Moral Sense and Political 
Agitation in Early Eighteenth-century England,” Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies (2013; doi: 
10.1111/1754-0208.12075): 1-16.  
 
71 On intellectual intuition in a theological context see, Christopher Dawson, “On 
Spiritual Intuition in Christian Philosophy,” in The Dawson Newsletter, Winter 1994, repub. 
EWTN.com, ND, accessed 12 April 2014, 
http://www.ewtn.com/library/THEOLOGY/DAWSICP.HTM. Also of interest is Nicholas Bunnin, 
“God’s Knowledge and Ours: Kant and Mou Zongsan on Intellectual Intuition,” Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy 35 no. 4 (2008): 613-24.  
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things – the divine realm, we might say (as many do) – makes an overview a 
daunting task to be sure. Adding to the potential for confusion, these terms do 
not fall on a neat line of historical development. All of the various expressions 
mentioned above and others gestured at via a formula of sorts (i.e., “sense of . . . 
,” “eyes of . . . ,” etc.) are found throughout the whole history of Christian 
reflection on spiritual perception. 
Only two trends can be clearly identified in the use of terms over time. (1) 
With the dawn of Western Latin scholasticism, the explicit use of “spiritual 
sense(s)” multiplies significantly only to decrease again during the rise of 
humanism in the Renaissance. (2)The use of the language of the heart multiplies 
greatly with the rise of Protestant and Roman Catholic (Counter-Reformation) 
pieties in the 16th century, fueled by and large by advances in printing and 
literacy as well as the democratization of devotional reading and reflection. 
 
In What Way a “Tradition”? 
These trends have contributed to the notion, common among medievalists 
and Roman Catholic scholars, that the tradition of the “spiritual senses” all but 
died out with the advent of the modern world and especially Protestantism. This 
claim rests on a very specific, and needlessly narrow, definition of the tradition 
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itself. In the following sections I make a case for a more expansive view of the 
phenomena collectively labeled “spiritual sense,” as well as for a more broad 
conception of just what constitutes this “tradition.” By revisiting these basic 
commitments it becomes possible to demonstrate clearly what the past century of 
research has only gestured at; that the spiritual senses tradition is alive and well, 
but also characterized by a very wide diversity of expressions.  
  
2.3 The Spiritual Senses Tradition 
While it is clear that Christians have often spoken in this way it is not 
obvious that this manner of speaking is a tradition of thought or even more 
formally a “doctrine” and not merely a collection of commonly employed 
metaphors.72 Each of the passages discussed above, and countless others like 
them, can seem perfectly intelligible in their own right. They are satisfying, each 
in their own way, to the contemplative mind of the theologian, the imagination 
72 It may be objected that this manner of speaking is merely metaphorical and thus does 
not represent a clear “tradition” so much as a collection of vaguely similar expressions which 
fully exhaust their meaning within the confines of their own texts. In light of the ubiquity of the 
theme over nearly two thousand years this objection seems obtuse in the extreme. Still, there is 
much to learn by analyzing just how the tradition is a tradition. Thus, the present section. My 
sense of what constitutes a “tradition” is similar in this respect to that of Andrew Louth in that 
we both recognize the “tacit” nature of many traditions (Discerning the Mystery [Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1983], 73-95). I owe this observation to Mark Mealey.  
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of the poet, and the prayerful gaze of the spiritual seeker. Many are also 
suggestive of philosophical insights into the nature of humanity, perception, 
knowledge and the Divine as well.  
As texts, these passages, and indeed the works they are taken from as a 
whole, have a kind of obvious sense to them. When, however, the flow of time 
and the happenstances of history are allowed to shine upon them, individually 
and especially collectively, a kind of loose trajectory does take shape. There is in 
fact a tradition illustrated by these texts, even when that tradition is itself 
composed of multiple, sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting, 
subtraditions of more close resemblance. After all, it would be impossible to 
recognize different authors as treating the theme if they did not represent, in 
some sense, a tradition.73  
In some cases this tradition is explicit and clear. Such as when we find the 
language of perceiving the Divine in Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the 
Confessor, both of whom were clearly influenced by Origen of Alexandria. 
Neither Gregory nor Maximus however agrees in every detail with Origen. In 
73 The vague sort of understanding of a tradition of the spiritual senses has clearly been 
accepted by the leading scholars in this area. There could not be a volume such as Gavrilyuk and 
Coakley’s without this agreement.  
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fact, their debt to Origen remains clear regardless, and perhaps even because of, 
the differences between Origen and Nyssa especially.74 Gregory’s spiritual senses 
are a clear response to, or development of, those of Origen, just as Maximus 
develops themes found in Gregory.  
In other cases, this tradition of Christian language of spiritual sensation or 
perception is less obvious in a hereditary sense but nonetheless clear. Many 
authors speak, for example, of the “eyes of the heart” across the centuries but not 
always with any clear line of influence between writers. In this case, the imagery 
is biblical and so there is no mystery about its spread among otherwise unrelated 
Christians.75 However, some terms such as the varieties of “spiritual sense” 
appear across time and geography without any clear line of descent from a 
previous author or the common biblical origin that accounts for “eyes of the 
heart” among other phrases. In this way, one may speak of the “tradition” of the 
Christian spiritual senses as a complex series (or group of subtraditions) of 
borrowings, inspiration, and non-coincidental re-discovery.76  
74 See Coakley, “Gregory of Nyssa,” 42-6, 48-9.  
 
75 Ephesians 1: 18. 
 
76 We may thus speak of a tradition in the strict sense running from Origen through many 
of the notable figures in patristic and medieval (mystical/spiritual) theology and including both 
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 Each major modern commentator on the spiritual senses has her or his 
own definition of the tradition. This has led to a multitude of sometimes 
overlapping “traditions” each reflecting a different conception of just what is, or 
more often ought to be, counted as “spiritual sense(s)”. Often these competing 
traditions are informed by the confessional allegiances of their authors; Catholics 
speak of a Catholic tradition and Protestants speak of a Protestant tradition 
without acknowledging the clear lines of influence between these groups of 
Christians for example.  
 For these, and other reasons to be discussed in the remains of this chapter, 
we should follow the suggestion of Gavrilyuk and Coakley and speak of this 
tradition in a wide sense as involving “a series of overlapping ‘family 
resemblances’” between a variety of teachings that had “diverse beginnings in 
the Christian tradition (although always inspired by biblical prototype and 
supporters of the Origenist doctrine and those who modify or even reject outright the classic 
formulation of the doctrine, especially those who appeal to Aristotelian psychology to do so. Call 
this the tradition de jure. We may also speak in a broader sense of a tradition that includes all 
those Christian authors who take up this manner of speaking but who are less clearly indebted to 
the de jure tradition, either because they find it of little interest per se or because they simply 
have no access to this tradition. We may call this the tradition de facto. Importantly, this de facto 
line of tradition is marked by numerous (apparent) discoveries of the “spiritual senses” by 
authors treating topics and drawing on biblical passages nevertheless common to the de jure 
tradition. As will become clear throughout the remaining of this chapter however I do not see 
any significant reason to give the de jure priority over the de facto.  
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suggestion)” and doctrines constituting “a hybrid history of marriages of 
convenience – or natural attrait – with classical philosophies” all of which 
contributes to a wide range of “Christian epistemologies”.77  
Thus, in the interpretation of the spiritual senses there are two intimately 
related problems. First, there is the problem of identifying the tradition. Just 
what should count as belonging? However, where recent interpreters are content 
to mark out a motif with multiple families of interpretation I am arguing for a 
more unified tradition characterized by a functional typology capable of 
registering a wide variety of specifications. Second, there is the problem of 
defining the spiritual senses themselves. What are these things we have been 
calling “spiritual senses”? In order to provide an answer to this issue we will 
review the dominant recent interpretations and argue that a functional approach 
makes up for their weaknesses. In this way, my interpretation addresses both of 
the central problems in the field, thereby advancing it in a way that remains open 
to further refinement and specification as well as demonstrating the place of John 
Smith within the tradition.  
   
77 Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” 18.  
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2.4 Modern Theological Interpretations of the Spiritual Senses 
 There have been three major moments in the theological interpretation of 
the spiritual senses in the last century.78 Shortly after the turn of the early 
twentieth century Augustin-Francois Poulain continued, and brought special 
attention to, a particularly Jesuit line of interpretation of the spiritual senses that 
goes back to at least Giovanni Battista Scaramelli in the eighteenth century.79 
Poulain’s Des graces d’oraison was in turn a strong influence on the work of Karl 
Rahner who was (with Hans Urs von Balthasar) central to the “rediscovery of the 
topic of the spiritual senses in twentieth-century theology.”80 After these two 
78 There were, of course, a large number of scholars working on the theme of spiritual 
sensation in one author or even in a school of thinkers in addition to these four moments. 
However, as far as I am aware, and indeed, as far as the literature would have it, only Poulain, 
Rahner, Gavrilyuk and Coakley as well as the handful of other recent approaches included below 
treat the spiritual senses in general at any significant length. I do not include Balthasar in this list 
for two basic reasons. First, Gavrilyuk and Coakley do not take him up in their overview of the 
field (but they do discuss Poulain and Rahner). Second, unlike Rahner, Balthasar’s influence has 
been felt more directly and widely in the aesthetics of physically sensible objects (Christian art, 
etc.). Indeed, Bychkov and Fodor’s Theological Aesthetics after von Balthasar (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2008) does not include the phrase “spiritual sense(s)” at all. The best study of Balthasar’s spiritual 
senses work is Mark McInroy, “Perceiving Splendor: The ‘Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses’ in 
Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Theological Aesthetics” (PhD diss., Harvard Divinity School, 2009).  
 
79 Coakley, “Gregory of Nyssa,” 40. Giovanni Battista Scaramelli, A Handbook of Mystical 
Theology, trans. and abr. D.H.S. Nicholson, intro. Allan Armstrong (Berwick, ME: Ibis Press, 2005), 
19-22, 42, 99-102, 142.  
 
80 Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” xiii. Augustin-Francois Poulain, Des graces 
d’oraison, 10th ed. (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1922); English translations, The Graces of Interior Prayer (St. 
Louis: Herder, 1910), also, trans. L. L. Yorke Smith from the 6th ed. and corrected to accord with 
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giants of twentieth century Roman Catholic theology the next major attempt at a 
comprehensive assessment of the spiritual senses came in the form of The 
Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity, co-edited by the Orthodox 
theologian Paul Gavrilyuk and Anglican philosopher of religion and feminist 
theologian Sarah Coakley.81  
 
Poulain 
Born in 1836 August Poulain was a prominent Jesuit author in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His approach was firmly within the 
“manual” tradition of Neo-Scholasticism but his topics of interest were in 
mystical theology and spirituality. In 1901 he published the first of ten editions of 
Des graces d’oraison (Graces of Interior Prayer). While under appreciated in 
the 10th French ed. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1950). I cite from the 1910 
Herder edition in a 1996 reprint by Kessinger Publishing.  
 
81 In addition, a handful of other lesser known approaches employed by theologians or 
those working in fields of immediate importance for theology such as philosophy, history, and 
literary studies will be mentioned very briefly near the close of the present section simply to 
register the full range of current work in this area.  
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Anglophone theology, Poulain’s work was an essential inspiration for the later 
twentieth century flourishing of spiritual senses studies in German.82  
Poulain’s discussion of the spiritual senses comes in chapter six of Graces 
of Interior Prayer and forms the “second fundamental character of the mystic 
union: the interior possession of God” and the “manner in which it is felt.”83 
Thus, Poulain sees the spiritual senses as the mode whereby the mystical 
experience is known. In this he follows the tradition of the Jesuits Scaramelli and 
Father de le Reguera who likewise saw the spiritual senses as a vital aspect of the 
experience of the “approved mystics” of the Roman Catholic Church.84  
Poulain opens with a basic definition of the spiritual senses. “In the mystic 
union we have an experimental knowledge of the presence of God,” which is 
“the result of an impression, a spiritual sensation of a special kind.”85 From this 
starting point it is clear that Poulain approaches his topic as a consequence of his 
real goal, understanding “mysticism” in its orthodox (Roman Catholic) 
82 Mark J. McInroy, “Origen of Alexandria,” 22 and “Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von 
Balthasar,” 259, both in Gavrilyuk and Coakley.  
 
83 Poulain, Graces, 88.  
 
84 Ibid., 88 n. 
 
85 Ibid., 88.  
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manifestations. The spiritual senses are not, therefore, Poulain’s primary focus. 
Rather they are important for the function they play in mysticism.  
Poulain goes on immediately to describe these spiritual senses as 
“intellectual” and yet “having some resemblance to the bodily senses, so that in an 
analogous manner ‘the soul’ is able to perceive the presence of pure spirits, and 
the presence of God in particular.”86 So, whatever else is involved, the spiritual 
senses are somehow like the physical senses and they are also involved with the 
intellect. They have a noetic quality that accompanies their affectivity. Thus, the 
spiritual senses are not, for Poulain, merely matters of subjective experience in 
the loose sense, but offer a window into the nature of spiritual realities as well. In 
this respect, the spiritual senses play an implicitly central role in theological 
methodology as well.  
Poulain dismisses the notion that the spiritual senses might merely be the 
result of the religious imagination on the grounds that the imagination can only 
reproduce those things previously known by the physical senses (bodily things 
with colors, sounds, etc.). Since the spiritual senses are means of contact with 
86 Ibid.   
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spiritual objects the imagination can be of little to no help here. Rather, the 
spiritual senses are a matter of “purely intellectual imitation.”87  
Drawing widely from the history of Catholic mysticism (especially the 
Counter-Reformation figures Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross), as well as 
his own estimate of the common consensus, Poulain asserts that there are, in fact, 
spiritual versions of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell.88 Such phrases as to 
“see God” are “not mere metaphors” for Poulain. This is not simply poetic 
license. Rather, such language intends an experience with a “close analogy” to 
the physical senses.89 That is, when the mystic speaks of divine union as 
accompanied by the sight of God they are not merely reporting a vague 
“spiritual experience.” Instead, there is something very much like vision about 
their experience, and likewise for the remaining four spiritual senses too.  
87 Ibid. In this respect, Poulain would seem to be in substantial agreement with Thomas 
Aquinas who does not understand a spiritual sense “as any kind of special faculty,” but instead 
“uses the term to refer to an act of cognition” (Richard Cross, “Thomas Aquinas,” in Gavrilyuk 
and Coakley, 181). Unlike Cross’s Thomas however, Poulain sees no reason to think that 
“spiritual sense” is unworthy of special attention.  
 
88 Poulain, Graces, 89. 
 
89 Ibid., 90. Hauck, “Like a Gleaming Flash,” 573 supports this analogical interpretation in 
the case of Origen specifically.  
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While he is insistent that all five of the physical senses have their spiritual 
analogue, Poulain focuses above all on what he takes to be the most basic of 
these modalities, touch.90 The reason for this is that Poulain sees the spiritual 
senses as disclosures of the presence of God “in” the soul.91 This presence, 
closeness, or “saturation” of the soul by God is immediate and not “at a 
distance.” Thus, it bears a close analogy with touch and is referred to often as 
“interior touch.”92  Here again we see that Poulain’s central interest is not the 
spiritual senses so much as the phenomenon of mystical union.93  
Elaborating on the intellectual character of the spiritual senses, Poulain 
suggests, again following the example of Scaramelli, that the mystical experience 
is “produced . . . by the [divine] gift of wisdom.”94 Implicitly this wisdom is in 
contrast to scientific or merely propositional knowledge too as, following the 
long tradition going back at least to St. Augustine in the Latin West, Poulain 
90 Poulain, Graces, 90-98, 102-13. 
 
91 Ibid., 91.  
 
92 Ibid., 91. 
 
93 Cf. “proof #1,” Ibid., 93.  
 
94 Ibid., 96. 
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describes wisdom “as a sweet-savored knowledge of divine things.” This “tasted 
knowledge” relies, rhetorically, as it did with Augustine, William of Auxerre, 
and Bonaventure, on the etymology of sapientia from sapere meaning both “to be 
wise” and “to taste.”95 Thus, it is not doctrinal precision that would seem to come 
from intellectual effects of these spiritual senses so much as the kind of living 
familiarity that comes from first-hand experience; knowing as we know a friend 
not as we know an object. The knowledge on offer via the spiritual senses is not 
abstract or the result of a process of cognitive abstraction. The spiritual senses 
reveal and occasion wisdom rather than discursive thinking.96  
 
Rahner  
After Poulain, and indeed following directly in his footsteps in many 
ways, the next major movement in the recent theological interpretation of the 
spiritual senses comes with the exegetical and theoretical work of Karl Rahner.  
95 Ibid. Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity, 14, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, series 1, vol. 3,  
ed. Philip Schaff, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2005, accessed 19 May 2014, 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf103.iv.i.xvi.html.  
 
96 Poulain, Graces, 88. 
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Karl Rahner, SJ (1904 - 1984), was one of the most influential Roman 
Catholic theologians of the 20th century.97 As Mark McInroy has recently noted, 
“Rahner’s articles on the spiritual senses are routinely acknowledged as among 
the most important studies . . . in the twentieth century.”98 Theologians, 
philosophers, historians, and others all typically begin their comments on this 
strange doctrine with mention of Rahner’s work on the subject.99 Rahner wrote 
two influential articles on the spiritual senses in addition to making use of the 
97 Prior to Vatican II, he was associated with the Nouvelle Théologie school, some aspects 
of which were condemned by Pope Pius XII in the encyclical Humani Generis. See Hans Boersma, 
Nouvelle Theologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
Also, Pius XII, Humani Generis, 12 August 1950, ET available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xii/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
xii_enc_12081950_humani-generis_en.html, accessed 16 May 2014. By the time of the Second 
Vatican Council his theology had come to deeply influence Roman Catholic thinking.  For more 
on Rahner and his influence see, “Karl Rahner (1904-1984),” ed. Derek Michaud, incorporating 
material by Joas Adiprasetya (2005), Phil LaFountain (1999), and JeeHo Kim (1999), in The Boston 
Collaborative Encyclopedia of Western Theology, ed. Wesley Wildman, accessed 16 May 2014, 
http://people.bu.edu/wwildman/bce/rahner.htm.  
 
98 McInroy, “Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar,” 258. Cf. Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 
“Introduction,” 4. 
 
99 For example, Kevin Hart, The Dark Gaze: Maurice Blanchot and the Sacred (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 230, 277, Frank Burch Brown, Good Taste, Bad Taste, and 
Christian Taste: Aesthetics in Religious Life (Oxford University Press, 2000), 272 n.4, Bamberger, 
“Thomas Merton,” 83-4, Hauck, “Like a Gleaming Flash,” 565, and Andrew Louth, The Origins of 
the Christian Mystical Tradition from Plato to Denys 2nd ed. (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 66 n.13.  
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notion in his own constructive work.100 For our purposes, it is Rahner the 
interpreter not, Rahner the creative theologian, that is our focus.101  
 Unlike Poulain, Rahner nowhere gives a very detailed account of the 
spiritual senses in general. He offers a basic definition of the spiritual senses but 
this is no systematic picture of the contours of such a doctrine.102 Rahner opens 
his article on Origen by placing the spiritual senses in the context of mystical 
experience.103 Like Poulain, experience is the basic category here and it is 
100 On this constructive use see McInroy, “Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar.”  
 
101 While Rahner addressed the spiritual senses in two early, and heavily influential, 
articles, and may even have incorporated aspects of this tradition in his own constructive 
theology his general theory of the spiritual senses is found in his exegetical and historical work 
on Origen. It is what Rahner says in this article above all that has earned him his place atop the 
recent scholarship on the topic. Of course, his article on Bonaventure has been influential as well 
but more in the particular area of Bonaventure studies than in the spiritual senses in general. Still, 
my account of Rahner’s theory of the spiritual senses makes occasional, usually complicating, 
references to this later article as well.  
 
102 However, Rahner does give an extensive account of what he takes to be Origen’s 
“spiritual sense doctrine.” While the status of the “spiritual senses” as a “doctrine” depends 
entirely on what is taken to constitute a doctrine, nonetheless, this is Rahner’s usage and it is very 
common in the literature on this topic for that reason.  Since Origen is the originator of what 
Rahner calls the “doctrine of the spiritual senses,” and since he compares other patristic authors 
to Origen as the paradigmatic example of the doctrine, we can safely assume that the general 
character of Origen’s doctrine represents what, for Rahner, constitutes the normative view on this 
topic. Cf. Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” 4-5. Also, the original French title of the 
Rahner’s essay on Origen, “Le debut d'une doctrine des cinq sens spirituels chez Origene” makes 
the sense in which he marks the beginning of the doctrine very clear.  
 
103 Rahner, “The Spiritual Senses according to Origen,” 81.  
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expressed in, or with, the spiritual senses. Unlike Poulain however, Rahner is 
comfortable referring to the spiritual senses as “imaginative.”104  
Rahner’s most influential contribution comes in the form of his definition 
of the doctrine of the spiritual senses. “One can only speak properly of an idea or 
doctrine of spiritual faculties when these partly imaginative, partly literal 
expressions . . . are found in a complete system in which five instruments are 
involved in the spiritual perception of immaterial realities.”105 So, for Rahner the 
spiritual senses involve five key aspects. First, faculties that are expressed with 
“partly imaginative” and “partly literal” language. Presumably this combination 
of figurative and realistic language means something like analogy. Second, these 
expressions are to be found in a “complete system.” In other words, in order to 
count as an example of the spiritual senses an author must make regular use of 
such language according to a recognizable plan. Third, the central mark of a 
systematic account of spiritual sense is the explicit use of “five instruments” or 
spiritual correlates of the five physical senses. Fourth, this doctrine concerns, of 
course, “spiritual perception.” And fifth, the object of this perception are 
104 Ibid.   
 
105 Ibid., 82.  
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“immaterial realities.” These last two points emphasize that the spiritual senses 
are not a species of physical sensation but rather something else entirely.  
Thus, “Rahner proposes to understand the spiritual senses on a close 
analogy with the five physical senses.”106 On this “five senses analogy” Rahner 
sees the physical and the spiritual sense “as two different sets of powers or 
faculties, operating in tandem or separately, or, alternatively, as two states of the 
same fivefold sensorium directed at different objects altogether”.107 In this way, 
Rahner’s theory remains open to a wide variety of specifications even while it 
ignores those authors who do not speak (clearly) of five spiritual senses.  
Complicating matters significantly however is the fact that Rahner did not 
restrict himself to his own definition in his article on Origen’s spiritual senses. He 
includes, for example, Diadochus of Photike, who speaks of a single spiritual 
sense only and should therefore not count as an example of the spiritual senses. 
Moreover, in his next treatment of the spiritual senses in the theology of 
Bonaventure, Rahner shows little continued interest in the criteria he set forth in 
the article on Origen. In fact, in this later essay, “Rahner was more concerned to 
106 Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” 4.  
 
107 Ibid., 5. 
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emphasize the unitive character of spiritual perception than to justify the fivefold 
division of the senses, which he had come to consider ‘rather forced’.”108 Many 
have noted the incongruities here between an earlier and later view of the 
spiritual senses in Rahner109 however very little time passed between the original 
publication of these essays; the first in 1932, the second in 1933. Additionally, 
Rahner saw fit to include them both in the German edition of volume twelve of 
his Schriften zur Theologie,110 albeit with abridgments to each. It may be that there 
is not so much different in these apparently contradictory accounts as first 
appears to be the case. For in the Origen article, as we have seen, the theory of 
spiritual sense is placed within a (unitary) vision of “spiritual experience” in 
general. Moreover, Rahner notes that even in Origen, who arguably fits his five 
analogy theory best of all the figures he takes up, there is a strong sense of the 
five spiritual senses as “different species of the general divine sense.”111  
108 Ibid., 5.  
 
109 For example, see Stephen Fields, "Balthasar and Rahner on the Spiritual Senses" 
Theological Studies 57 (1996): 229-32. 
 
110 (Einsiedeln: Verlagsansalt Benzigu & Co., 1975).  
 
111 Rahner, “The Spiritual Senses according to Origen,” 89. 
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Therefore, Rahner’s considered view on the spiritual senses overall, as 
opposed to the author and text specific accounts within which one finds this 
general theory, is that there is a single capacity for “spiritual experience,” or 
alternatively a single “divine sense” as well as five manifestations of this 
capability on close analogy with the physical senses. Just as one capacity to 
experience our world is expressed (or made actual) by the five physical senses so 
too is our capacity to experience spiritual realities expressed (or made actual) by 
the five spiritual senses. On this view, Rahner’s famous concern for religious 
experience fits perfectly well with his exegetical and historical work on the 
spiritual senses.112 
  
Gavrilyuk and Coakley 
 The third major moment in the recent theological interpretation of the 
spiritual senses came with the publication of The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in 
Western Christianity, edited by Paul Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley. This collection 
of essays on significant figures (or movements) in the history of Christian 
112 McInroy, “Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar,” 263-8.   
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discussion of the spiritual senses113 offers a wealth of insight on individual 
authors and texts. However, as a unified collection it also represents a significant 
interpretation of the spiritual senses in general as well. Even in the selection of 
figures to be discussed there is operative a kind of general or basic theory of the 
spiritual senses in this volume. This, and its place at the leading edge of 
international scholarship on this topic, makes The Spiritual Senses at least as 
significant as Poulain and Rahner, even though time has yet to reveal this 
volume’s influence in the field. In the following I will offer an overview of the 
general account of the spiritual senses presented by this work as a whole, 
especially as this is formulated in the editor’s “Introduction.”  
 Whereas Poulain begins his study of the spiritual senses with medieval 
authors, and Rahner begins with Origen, Gavrilyuk and Coakley rightly begin 
with scripture. They point out that the Hebrew Bible and the Christian New 
Testament contain many examples of “sensory language” used “to express 
human encounters with the divine.”114  
113 Despite its title the collection includes figures from the Greek East too (Origen, 
Gregory of Nyssa, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Maximus the Confessor).  
 
114 Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” 1. Passages such as Ps 34 (33): 9, 1 Pet 2:3, Isa 
1:10, Hos 4:1, Mt 5:8, 1 Cor 13:12, 2 Cor 2:15, 2 Cor 2:18, and 1 Jn 1:1 “point to certain features of 
human cognition that makes perception-like contact with God possible” (Ibid.).  
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 By noting the biblical roots of the spiritual senses Gavrilyuk and Coakley 
give occasion to register the distinction from, as well as occasional connection to, 
the “non-literal modes of interpreting scripture” that also go by the name 
“spiritual sense(s).”115 What is meant here, is, of course, a sort of “non-physical 
human perception” and not the allegorical reading of scripture. However, some 
authors who make use of this unusual form of perception do speak of the ability 
to do the non-literal interpretation of scripture as closely related to the capacity 
to (literally in some sense) “see” divine realities.116  
 Gavrilyuk and Coakley raise the obvious problem inherent in the very 
idea of “spiritual sensation.” Epistemologically, it is not at all clear that we have, 
or could conceivably have, faculties of perception in addition to the familiar five 
physical senses. Metaphysically too, God is simply not the sort of entity that 
115 Ibid., 4. 
 
116 Additional important biblical loci in the spiritual senses tradition include, Moses’ 
ascent of Mount Sinai (connected to Platonic intellectual ascent since Philo), and the problematic 
passages of Gen 32:30 and Ex 33:20 (which suggest that divine perception is impossible, at least in 
this earthly life). Paul’s “eschatological vision” found in 1 Cor 13:12 and 2 Cor 3:18, 2 Cor 12:2-4 
fueled “reflection on the beatific vision” (Ibid., 11.). The Song of Songs with its abundant sensory 
language too provided fertile ground for speculation about the spiritual senses. Likewise many 
allusions to the five sense or the spiritual senses were found in exegesis of prophetic appeals to 
hear and obey as well as many of the Gospel parables including Lk 14:15-24, Jn 4:16-8, Jn 20:17, 
Lk 24: 30-1, among others (Ibid.). Despite this wealth of material in the biblical texts there is of 
course no biblical doctrine of the spiritual senses. Any such formalized teaching is the result of 
the work of the theologian (or prophet) in discerning the spirit (meaning) of the biblical letter.  
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could be an object of perception. How can one “see” a God who is “ontologically 
different from all ordinary objects of perception”?117 Moreover, in addition to 
these philosophical problems there are, perhaps more importantly for the 
Christian theologian, scriptural passages that suggest the impossibility of 
perceiving God.118  
 After noting that these problems can be dealt with in many ways, 
including skepticism (either of a rationalist or empiricist sort), or by way of a 
theory of the spiritual senses as an example of the theological anthropology 
required for divine self-communication, Gavrilyuk and Coakley offer their basic 
definition of the spiritual senses.  
‘Spiritual senses’ is an umbrella term covering a variety of overlapping, 
yet distinct, expressions in which ‘sense’ in general or a particular sensory 
modality (vision, audition, olfaction, touch or taste) is typically qualified 
by reference to spirit . . . , heart . . . , soul . . . , mind or intellect . . . , inner 
[man] . . . , or faith.119  
 
Notice that unlike Rahner, and to some extent Poulain, Gavrilyuk and Coakley 
do not seek to pin down a narrow definition of spiritual sense. Instead, following 
117 Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” 1.  
 
118 For example, 2 Corinthians 4: 18 and Hebrews 11: 27 suggest that God cannot be seen 
and Exodus 33: 20 famously proclaims that “no one can see Me [God] and live.”  
 
119 Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” 2. 
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the evidence of the essays in their collection, and the recent history of scholarship 
on spiritual perception, they look to register the full variety of interesting and/or 
historically or theologically influential use of spiritual sense(s).120 By embracing 
an “umbrella” approach to their topic, Gavrilyuk and Coakley make it possible 
to register the otherwise hidden cross pollination between and among authors 
with otherwise apparently incongruent teachings on the spiritual senses. For 
example, their definition allows one to speak of “spiritual sense(s)” with regard 
to Origen’s separate set of spiritually sensible faculties, the Reformed (Calvinist) 
tradition of the sensus divinitatis, and even the notoriously difficult to trace, 
subtle, or implicit “use of the language of sense-perception to describe divine-
human encounter” such as one finds in Augustine.121   
 Where Rahner’s approach sought to set boundaries for a doctrine of the 
spiritual senses, Gavrilyuk and Coakley cast a wide net and pick up on the 
reality of a plurality of teachings about divine perception. A tradition comes into 
view composed of family resemblances united as much by the functions they 
perform as by the nature of the faculties or powers described. As we will see in 
120 Ibid., 3.  
 
121 Ibid.  
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the next section, this feature of the treatment of the spiritual senses by Gavrilyuk 
and Coakley marks a significant advance over both Poulain and Rahner that 
leads to the present study’s proposed theory of the spiritual senses; which forms 
the basis for the interpretation of John Smith that follows in parts two and three 
below.  
 Gavrilyuk and Coakley offer a strong critique of the approach of Rahner, 
even while acknowledging the debt all current scholarship owes to his path 
clearing work.122 In particular, and as we have just seen, Gavrilyuk and Coakley 
are critical of Rahner’s “five senses analogy” theory, calling it, “unduly 
restrictive.” They note that not even Origen has what really warrants the 
appellation of a “full system” when it comes to the spiritual senses. Moreover, 
many, if not most, authors who speak of spiritual sensation discuss less than the 
full complement of five senses. Some authors, they point out, stress one or 
another sense. Others emphasize a single sensory capacity. While still others 
conceive of some senses as aligned with intellect and others with affectivity. 
Finally, they note that even Rahner himself is inconsistent on his five senses 
122 Ibid., 4-6. 
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requirement.123 To this we may add that if a figure as universally deemed 
important in the literature on the spiritual senses as Bonaventure is not a neat 
and obvious fit for Rahner’s definition, then it is fatally flawed. Thus, the need 
for the wider net cast by Gavrilyuk and Coakley.  
 In perhaps the most significant among the consequences of their 
expanded view of the spiritual senses, Gavrilyuk and Coakley notice that while 
one may interpret the language of the spiritual senses metaphorically, “it is by no 
means obvious . . . that every correlation of the senses with the intellect can be 
reduced to a metaphor depicting ordinary mental activity.” For, by metaphor one 
typically means that “no close similarity with the functioning of a physical 
sensation is intended” while an analogy “obtains when the operation of the 
spiritual sense is described in terms a kin to the operation of physical 
sensation.”124    
 Indeed, the Platonic tradition, which continued as an important aspect of 
Christian theology, has always spoken of an “intellectual vision.”125 Thus, the 
123 Ibid., 5.  
 
124 Ibid., 6.  
 
125 Ibid., 7.  
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tradition of the “spiritual senses” includes at least some (analogical) accounts of 
the operation of the intellect itself. As we will see, and as Gavrilyuk and Coakley 
themselves also note, this will form an important part of John Smith’s doctrine of 
the spiritual senses.126  
 Similarly, Gavrilyuk and Coakley also make a significant advance in the 
field by making room for the often confusing, and occasionally confused, 
relationship between Aristotelian “inner senses”127 and the, differently “inner”, 
spiritual senses.128  
  
2.5 Non-theological Approaches 
In addition to the major movements in the theological reception and 
interpretation of the spiritual senses outlined above there are several minor 
126 As I employ the term, “doctrine” means simply “teaching” not the more rigorous (and 
arbitrary) meaning intended by Rahner.  
 
127 See Pavel Gregoric, Aristotle on the Common Sense (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011) and Garth W. Green, “Nicholas of Cusa,” 210-223.  
 
128 Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” 9. While Origen did use the language of 
“inner senses” to refer to his spiritual senses by the medieval period most authors “were aware of 
the difference” (Ibid., 10). Origen’s call to remove oneself from outer sense to activate the 
inner/spiritual senses can seem somewhat odd to modern readers. However, Stephen Hawking is 
said to have developed the ability to do complex mathematics in his mind when he could not use 
pen and paper anymore. He also uses mental “images” of four-dimensional space-time. Could he 
do this if his gaze was external? Perhaps capacities really do open up in this way? 
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moments that warrant mention. Primarily these other approaches are important 
because they are recent and common in fields of direct relevance for theology.   
Scholars in the academic study of religion (“religious studies”) have 
tended to view the literature from what we have been calling the spiritual senses 
tradition in markedly different ways from the theological accounts we have 
reviewed thus far. For example, historians like Gordon Rudy, have tended to 
focus exclusively on what can be gleaned about the authors and their readers 
from texts in this tradition. As he says, “my topic is not God or mystical union; it 
is what people say and think about God and mystical union—it is about people.”129 
This methodological non-realism is very common in religious studies, and across 
the humanities, when theological texts are concerned. However, one need not 
rehearse the debate between realists and non-realists to notice that it is not 
obvious that texts which purport to be about the Divine can be accurately 
understood as simply “human artifacts.”130 Surely the intent to speak truthfully 
about actually spiritual things is an important aspect of these texts.  
129 Gordon Rudy, Mystical Language of Sensation in the Later Middle Ages (New York: 
Routledge, 2002), xi.  
 
130 Ibid. See Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger, 
Reason & Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 19-32 on realism vs. non-realism in the philosophy of religion.  
 
 
                                                 
82 
 
Likewise, critical theorists have tended to focus attention on the spiritual 
senses as a means of discussing the body in the context of so-called “mystical” 
texts. For example, Patricia Dailey’s recent account of “The Body and Its Senses” 
stresses the way the “inner senses” (which is her preferred term for what we are 
calling “spiritual senses”) are located in the “inner” person. However, rather 
than Paul or Origen’s spiritual “inner man” Dailey is concerned with a two-fold 
body. She opens her essay, “the body is not presented as a united whole but is 
divided into at least two parts, inner and outer, united only in an unknowable 
future.”131 The result is to offer a reading, especially of the affectively saturated 
texts of medieval mystics (e.g., Hadewijch) that minimizes the oppositional 
“dualism” between spirit and body. In this way, many postmodern themes are 
blended together in a “discourse” that bears remarkably little resemblance to the 
works of theology upon whom they are meant to be commentaries.132  
131 Patricia Dailey, “The Body and Its Senses,” in The Cambridge Companion to Christian 
Mysticism, Amy Hollywood and Patricia Z. Beckman, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 
264. To this example one can add the work of Caroline Walker Bynum (Holy Feast and Holy Fast: 
The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women [University of California Press, 1988]) and 
Niklaus Largier (“The Plasticity of the Soul: Mystical Darkness, Touch, and Aesthetic Experience.” 
Modern Language Notes 125 (2010): 536–551) among others.  
 
132 Thus, some scholars have worked hard to save their sources from the more 
egregiously foolish sounding meanings of “spiritual sensation” in the name of good textual or 
historical studies. They do so however by falling prey to the more subtle anachronism that so 
often bedevils textual scholarship where theology and spirituality is concerned. That said, there is 
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By our contemporary (secular) standards spiritual sensation is an 
oxymoron at least (which it always was) but more often hopelessly enigmatic 
poetics. It can be tempting therefore to read these texts as if the materialism of 
our day was a valid lens for reading the work of the ancients. Is it really 
necessary to posit a second inner body in order to make sense of language about 
“inner” or “spiritual” sensation? Perhaps, but only if one already thinks that 
sensation must be in some sense bodily.  
We misread texts employing spiritual sense if we do not take what they 
say seriously. We also do them a disservice if we read them as if their authors 
were unaware of the paradoxical nature of their language.133 Both tendencies are 
a legitimate tension in the tradition between dualistic and monistic versions of spiritual sense. On 
this, see Stefanie Knauss, “Aisthesis: Theology and the Senses,” Crosscurrents, March (2013): 106-
21.  
 
133 Or, what might amount to the same thing, if we read older texts as if the sensory 
experiences that they describe are somehow fundamentally foreign to us. Many scholars have 
suggested that our basic sensory perceptions are culturally, and thus historically, constructed. 
Suspiciously however these scholars are almost always historians! See for example, Mark M. 
Smith’s Sensing the Past: Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, and Touching in History (University of 
California Press, 2007). While what we see, hear etc. is surely culturally conditioned the sensory 
modalities themselves would seem to be a priori in the sense that they are the mode by which 
these culturally conditioned experiences are had. Therefore, when an ancient text speaks of 
seeing it would seem safe to assume that this is the same sensory modality (vision) we are 
accustomed to today. This is made more complex, but not unintelligible, by the addition of the 
spiritual qualifier to vision or any other sensory modality. Recently, John H. McWhorter has 
argued strongly against this notion of language as a “filter” through which one sees the world in 
his The Language Hoax: Why the World Looks the Same in Any Language (Oxford University Press, 
2014).  
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to be avoided as much as possible if the texts are to speak to us today. However, 
a kind of creeping anachronism cannot be avoided if they are to speak to us, 
today. We cannot read these texts as though the seamless unity they so often 
presuppose between science and religion, materiality and spirituality, body and 
soul are lived realities for us. In fact, we would do well to be aware of the appeal 
of these texts precisely because they speak to us of, and out of, a world made 
strange to us by our modern advances in technical skill and descriptive 
analysis.134 Much of the appeal here is of a world that is whole; united across all 
dimensions of reality, a scientific and sacramental cosmos within which we are 
made to feel at home in body, mind and spirit. 
At another level however this longed for rest in a cosmos that includes 
ourselves, as selves, and not merely objects in time and space was always a goal 
of these authors and never completely realized. Nowhere is this clearer than in 
the frequent tension in the texts (and their authors?) between the present 
134 This is, I think, a major part of the fascination of the “spiritual senses” for scholars like 
Rudy and Dailey who are drawn to what they take to be the (surprising?) unity of the bodily and 
the spiritual in these texts.  
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possibility of spiritual sensation and the eschatological certainty of the beatific 
vision, the sensation of God “face to face.”135  
Thus, while there is much to be learned from the non-theological literature 
on the spiritual senses, it is not merely a matter of allegiance to one’s discipline 
that would suggest the focus on theological interpretations followed here. There 
are good reasons to think that a theologically informed approach to these texts is 
simply a more faithful reading of the texts. Their authors would seem to intend 
by their words something about God and human nature and not merely about 
their individual subjective experiences (Rudy) nor, certainly, to offer solutions to 
our own late-modern problems (Dailey).  
  
2.6 Toward a Functional Approach to the Spiritual Senses Tradition  
 Each of the major movements in the modern interpretation of the spiritual 
senses offers important insights into our subject. However, as we have seen, each 
builds upon the apparent weaknesses of the last as well. For example, Rahner’s 
definition expands on that offered by Poulain even as it narrows focus on 
systematic uses of analogues of each of the five senses. Moreover, where 
135 See K. E. Kirk, The Vision of God: The Christian Doctrine of the Summum Bonum (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1966). 
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Poulain’s treatment was limited (or contextualized) by his primary emphasis on 
a Neo-Scholastic account of mystical experience, with Rahner the field widens to 
include “spiritual perception” more generally. That is, whereas for Poulain the 
spiritual senses are marks of expressly mystical experience for Rahner the 
spiritual senses are placed within a broader context of religious experience ad 
theological anthropology. Especially noteworthy in this regard is Rahner’s 
willingness to discuss the spiritual senses as the means by which prophetic 
inspiration is accomplished.136 In contrast, Poulain’s treatment is limited to the 
mystical experience of truths already known by revelation. Gavrilyuk and 
Coakley likewise make clear advances over the work of Rahner. Most notably 
they have definitively challenged his insistence that in order to speak of the 
spiritual senses one must have clear evidence of a full system of five spiritual 
senses.  
 Overall the trend has been for greater clarity but also for an increasingly 
broad understanding of “spiritual sense” as including diverse expressions and a 
wide array of sensory modalities bearing an analogous relationship to the 
physical senses. Most tellingly of all is the development of the scholarly 
136 See chapter four, starting on p.228.  
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consensus around the function of the spiritual senses.137 For Poulain, they were 
part and parcel of (especially early modern Roman Catholic) mystical experience. 
For Rahner, they can be understood to perform this mystical or spiritual function 
as well as forming the means by which revelation is received by prophets and 
theological truths are appropriated by adept Christians as well.  
 For Gavrilyuk and Coakley, all of these functions remain but to them are 
added a more explicit role in intellection (spiritual senses as intellectual intuition) 
and in the presentation of a systematic theology. Over recent decades it has 
become increasingly clear that determining an exact, and completely consistent, 
account of what the spiritual senses are (or what such language is meant to refer 
to precisely) is both exceedingly difficult to accomplish and of questionable 
utility as well. As Gavrilyuk and Coakley have shown, there are any number of 
(often conflicting) specifications of the spiritual senses that have been historically 
significant and remain philosophically and theologically interesting even today. 
To arbitrarily rule any of these out of consideration (as Rahner did) is misguided 
and unnecessary. What is called for therefore is an approach to the spiritual 
137 Even Mealey’s schematic typology arranged by questions is, fundamentally, functional 
in the end. His questions about the “thematic place,” source of legitimacy, the stability and 
significance of the category, relation to dogma, and relation to “modern canons of meaning” are 
all concerned with what I am calling the systematic, spiritual, and originating (or source) 
functions of the spiritual senses. Mealey, “Taste and See,” 44-9.   
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senses based on the range of functions of the analogous expressions of non-
physical perception. The example of Bonaventure illustrates nicely the 
hermeneutical strength of such an approach.  
 
 
Bonaventure as an Example  
St. Bonaventure offers an excellent example of why function is a better 
way to look at the spiritual senses than making a determination of what they are, 
how many there are, and how they work. He used the “spiritual senses” in 
several distinct ways and this has led scholars to try to resolve the apparent 
contradictions in his thought.138  
For example, as Stephen Fields has made clear, Hans Urs von Balthasar 
and Karl Rahner offered conflicting, yet persuasive, accounts of Bonaventure’s 
theory of the spiritual senses.139 Both focus on the Breviloquium and Itinerarium 
Mentis in Deum. Likewise, both Balthasar and Rahner place the spiritual senses 
along the mystical path consisting of the purgative, illuminative, and unitive 
stages or ways.  
138 Jean-Francois Bonnefoy, Le Saint-Esprit et ses dons selon saint Bonaventure (Paris: J. Vrin, 
1929), 210-5.  
 
139 Fields, “Balthasar and Rahner on the Spiritual Senses.”  
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However, Balthasar offered a “kataphatic interpretation that focuse[d] on 
the journey’s second [illuminative] stage.” For him, Bonaventure’s spiritual 
senses are connected to the physical senses and reach perfection “when they 
perceive the full meaning of the Christ-form.”140 Rahner, on the other hand, 
offered “an apophatic interpretation that focuse[d] on the journey’s third 
[unitive] stage.” For him, Bonaventure’s spiritual senses are distinct from the 
physical senses and reach their perfection as the corporeal senses become dim 
and “the intellect and will attain a mystical union with the utterly 
Transcendent.”141 So, Rahner reads Bonaventure as essentially dualistic with 
respect to the physical and spiritual senses while Balthasar reads him as 
embracing an embodied anthropology where spiritual perfection arises within 
the body. For Balthasar, Bonaventure’s spiritual senses unite the “higher and 
lower faculties of the soul . . . the intellect and will and with the corporeal 
senses.”142  
140 Ibid., 235.  
 
141 Ibid., 235.  
 
142 Ibid., 237.  
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More recently, Gregory LaNave has offered yet another account which 
locates Bonaventure’s theory of the spiritual senses “within his doctrine of grace” 
as well as “religious knowledge.”143 Drawing on a far wider reading of 
Bonaventure’s corpus, including a predilection for the very early Commentary on 
the Sentences, LaNave sees the spiritual senses as “the ‘use of interior grace with 
respect to God himself according to a proportion to the five senses’.”144 Since, 
“’To sense’ is ‘to know a thing as present’” according to Bonaventure’s 
Commentary on the Sentences, LaNave compares knowing God as present via the 
spiritual senses to the act of “’putting on the mind of Christ’” in the intellect.145 
Thus, for LaNave, Bonaventure speaks of “the spiritual senses only when the 
question becomes how we grasp God in his ultimate self-expression – what it is 
about what is known that engages our ability to know.”146  
The spiritual senses are, then, the means by which those sanctified by 
grace receive the self-revelation of God in Christ the Word. In this manner, 
143 Gregory LaNave, “Bonaventure,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 159.  
 
144 Ibid., 162.  
 
145 Ibid., 163.  
 
146 Ibid., 169.  
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LaNave is Christocentric in ways that resemble Balthasar. However, for LaNave, 
the apparent contradictions between the supposedly different accounts of 
Bonaventure’s spiritual senses are resolved (or dissolved) by noting that 
wherever he speaks of them they are related to the state of grace and that the 
object is the Word.  
So, for Rahner, the spiritual senses are a matter of unitive mystical 
experience, for Balthasar, a matter of Christian experience more generally as 
informed by Christ, and according to LaNave, the means by which “the soul 
knows God when it apprehends him in his self-expression.”147 But who, if any, 
offers the correct interpretation? Each tries, in their own way, to resolve the 
ambiguity in the various references to the spiritual senses in Bonaventure’s 
corpus. However, both Rahner and Balthasar accomplish this resolution by 
asserting that aspects of their own constructive theological projects are present in 
Bonaventure. This makes one suspicious of the degree to which they truly exegete 
Bonaventure.148 LaNave too is not above some measure of suspicion in this 
147 Ibid., 172.  
 
148 Indeed, it would seem that they are involved in at least this degree of eisegesis. 
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regard since as a modern systematic theologian he has an interest in finding 
workable material in the Seraphic Doctor.  
If, instead of concerning ourselves primarily with questions of what the 
spiritual senses are we were to focus more closely on how the various references 
to them function in Bonaventure’s work we would eliminate the confusions that 
arise when trying to make divergent uses consistent with each other. We would 
simply notice, as Rahner, Balthasar, and LaNave have also done, that 
Bonaventure uses the language of the spiritual senses in his explanation of the 
source of theological knowledge, his account of the spiritual life, and in his 
attempts to offer a systematic presentation of the content of the Christian faith. 
The question of the compatibility of these various uses with each other becomes, 
from this functional perspective, secondary at best.149  
In fact, from a functional perspective it is possible to learn from all three of 
our interpreters without necessarily siding with any one of them against the 
others. It may be that Bonaventure’s “spiritual senses” contributes to a 
systematic theology by being concerned both with theological anthropology (as 
149 In short, there is no need on this functional approach to think of the “spiritual senses” 
as designating a single group of acts, powers, or faculties. In this way it is possible to more 
generously compare texts of different genres and those with radically different contexts and 
audiences too.  
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Rahner emphasizes) and by drawing attention to the Divine object of these 
senses (as LaNave argues).150 In either case, the “spiritual senses” are being 
employed in order to give a systematic account, and both may well have been 
intended by Bonaventure.151  
Additionally, a functional approach matches well the tendency in the 
recent spiritual senses scholarship to employ this concept as a means of 
explaining some other issue or concern, and leaving the spiritual senses 
themselves frustratingly unexplained. Authors such as Bonaventure are far more 
concerned to use the spiritual senses as an explanation than to offer an 
explanation of them. In this sense, the spiritual senses perform a functional task 
even as they remain underdeveloped themselves. This means that the effort to 
pin down exactly what they are is sometimes misguided. Some authors simply 
do not define the spiritual senses in a clear or consistent way at all, even while 
employing them for various ends. They are an explanation, not something 
explained.  
150 For surely the way in which God makes God’s self present to us (LaNave) is itself an 
important aspect of who we are, considered theologically (Rahner & Balthasar), and vice versa.  
 
151 This is not to say, definitively, that Bonnefoy was correct in his assessment that 
Bonaventure speaks equivocally on this subject. Rather, it is to suggest that such issues are of 
minor importance compared to the conceptual work that the “spiritual senses” are put to. 
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2.7 The Functional Typology of the Spiritual Senses Tradition 
In the interests, therefore, of remaining open to all the actual (and 
possible) complexity in the use of the language of spiritual sensation, I offer a 
functional typology rather than a strict definition of the spiritual senses. In 
proposing this typology, I carry forward the recent trend toward a wider 
application of the “spiritual senses” while simultaneously providing a more 
defined account of the tradition precisely as a complex collection of trajectories 
within a fixed range of functional types. Examples of each of these types are 
drawn from the latest research on the spiritual senses as are the types 
themselves.  
Specialists may object that my approach is so generalized as to be 
promiscuously inclusive. However, my approach is no more so than the editors 
and contributors to The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity 
have been. Likewise, for that matter, any of the countless scholars who have 
appealed to the “doctrine of the spiritual senses” in passing. A degree of 
abstraction and comparison is always involved when we associate any texts or 
figures that are not clearly, historically, and textually, linked to each other and 
employing identical formulations. Moreover, by embracing the current 
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consensus152 as to the general character of the spiritual senses as involving non-
physical sensation and adding to it the further specification that this sensation is 
employed in the service of one or more broad functional types, my approach is 
actually more specific than the received view.  
With all the forgoing in view, my proposal is to interpret the entire 
spiritual senses tradition, broadly construed along the lines outlined above, as 
involving language of non-physical perception with one or more of the following 
three functional purposes: first to account for the source of theological 
knowledge; second to explicate important features of the spiritual life; and third, 
to provide conceptual leverage to provide a systematic account of the relevant 
aspects of a theological perspective.  
Thus, my definition of the spiritual senses remains open to as wide a 
variety of specific theories or usages as possible while also unifying the often 
disparate strands of this tradition of “family resemblances.”  Indeed, it is only by 
casting one’s net this wide that one can meaningfully speak of a “tradition” at all. 
152 Assertions of a “consensus” in theology are notoriously liable to appear premature or 
simply foolish. However, given the concerted effort of the leading scholars in the field; the work 
of all contributors (and others) at multiple rounds of meetings and consultations to refine their 
individual essays and to provide substantive contributions to the “Introduction” it is well 
warranted to consider the approach outlined by Gavrilyuk and Coakley to be the scholarly 
consensus at this time. For more on the process of producing The Spiritual Senses. See the “Forward” 
to that volume, xiii-xiv.   
 
 
                                                 
96 
 
With this appropriate level of vagueness, my proposal continues the trajectory of 
recent scholarship and remains open to future correction or adaptation as the 
field develops. This openness is, perhaps, the greatest strength of my approach.  
The functional typology has four key elements.  
First, the “spiritual senses” require some reference to, or employment of, 
non-physical modes or means of perception. This may take the form of any 
number of specific phrases so long as the clear intent is to signify the perception 
of things that cannot normally, literally, be perceived. “Objects” like Goodness 
itself, grace, truth, and God, for example, cannot normally be perceived by the 
physical senses because they are (or are taken to be) non-physical. Claims to 
perceive such objects, or objects of their ken, are thus claims to “spiritual sense” 
as understood here.153   
These modes of non-physical perception are intended to function in one or 
another, or often some combination of, three ways. These are as explanatory 
153 I take this to be noncontroversial as the object of these “senses” is universally 
understood to be of a “spiritual” nature. In the case of the Incarnate Logos and the sacramental 
presence of the divine things become slightly more complex as there is in those instances a 
physically sensible object present. However, to perceive the Divinity of Christ is something in 
addition to perceiving his humanity. If it were not, presumably everyone he encountered would 
have recognized who he was. Likewise, while everyone may see the physical host in the eucharist 
only some will perceive, in or through the bread perhaps, Christ.  
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principles in the areas of (1) the source and thus also the methods of theology, (2) 
spirituality, and (3) the systematic cognition, apprehension, and presentation of a 
holistic view of reality as such.  
Thus, the second element of my interpretation of the spiritual senses is 
that it can be used to provide an account of the origin of theological 
knowledge.154 Gregory the Great speaks of prophecy has involving spiritual 
touch and sight in his Homilies on Ezekiel155 and as George Demacopoulos has 
demonstrated, the discernment of scripture too involves spiritual perception.156 
The medieval schoolmen too look to spiritual sensation for an account of 
theological knowledge. For example, Alexander of Hales, Thomas Gallus, and 
Bonaventure all speak of the heights of mystical ascent in terms of the affective 
154 “Theological” here includes “intellectual” in the Platonic sense, just as, more generally 
throughout, “spiritual” includes (or is at least compatible with) “intellectual” as well. 
 
155 See, Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Book of the Prophet Ezekiel, trans. Theodosa 
Tomkinson, 2nd ed. (Etna, CA: Center for Traditionalist Orthodox Studies, 2008), 1.1.4-14, pp.29-36.  
  
156 “Gregory the Great,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 71-85, especially 72-8. Gregory is not 
unique in this regard among patristic authors. Origen, Cyril of Jerusalem, John Chrysostom, 
Ambrose of Milan, Augustine, and Gregory of Nyssa speak of spiritual sensation being involved 
in theological knowledge too.  
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spiritual senses of touch and taste assuming the role of intellect in the 
contemplation of God.157 
Third, the spiritual senses are frequently used to express, both 
descriptively and proscriptively, the proper spiritual path. The faithful “taste” 
Christ in the Eucharist158 and “see” God’s grace at work in the soul.159 They feel 
the Divine presence in prayer, ecstasy, and mystical union.160 One need look no 
further, really, than a hymnal or the transcript of any number of uplifting 
157 See Boyd T. Coolman, “Alexander of Hales,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 121-39, 
especially 133-9, and “Thomas Gallus,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 140-58, especially 147-55. On 
Bonaventure, see also Gregory F. LaNave, “Bonaventure,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 159-73. This 
list of medieval uses of the spiritual senses in theological knowledge could be added to; for 
example, William of Auxerre, William of Saint-Thierry, and Bernard of Clairvaux all had 
interesting things to say in this regard too as well as other patristic and modern authors. On the 
merger of the affective and the cognitive at the apex of the soul see Pekka Kärkkäinen, 
“Synderesis in Late Medieval Philosophy and the Wittenberg Reformers,” British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy 20 no. 5 (2012): 881-901.  
 
158 On this in William of Auxerre, see Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 218-234. For 
an interpretation of this theme in the middle ages generally see Ann W. Astell, Eating Beauty: The 
Eucharist and the Spiritual Arts of the Middle Ages (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
2006). For the patristic era see Georgia Frank, “’Taste and See’: The Eucharist and the Eyes of 
Faith in the Fourth Century,” Church History 70 no. 4 (2001): 619-43. On taste in all its 
manifestations (spiritual and otherwise) see Priscilla Parkhurrst Ferguson, “The Senses of Taste,” 
The American Historical Review 116 no. 2 (2011): 371-84.  
 
159 On the connection between the spiritual senses and the transformation of the soul by 
grace see Bonaventure’s Itinerarium mentis in Deum, 4. Also, LaNave, “Bonaventure,” 162-5.  
 
160 Poulain, Graces, 88-113. See also, for example, Ralph Dekoninck, “Feel and Taste”: 
Senses in the ‘Spiritual Exercises’ of Saint Ignatius,” Revue d’Histoire Ecclesiastique 101 no. 3-4 
(2006): 1228-31.  
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sermons in any contemporary church to see the spiritual senses being discussed 
in relation to living the Christian life.161 Often spirituality and some sense or 
other of receiving divine wisdom go hand in hand as well.162 For, as Rowan 
Williams has noted in reference to the Philokalia, “There is no ‘spirituality’ free of 
doctrine.”163 
Fourth, the spiritual senses are also used as a means to unite the disparate 
elements of the human experience into a unified account of reality as such.164 For 
example, as the non-physical counterpart to the five bodily senses the spiritual 
senses link us to eternal, invisible, and immutable elements just as it is by the 
161 Popular books in Christian spirituality too often take up the theme. For example, 
evangelical John Piper, Seeing and Savoring Jesus Christ (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2004), and 
Anglican Martin Warner, Known to the Senses (London: Morehouse, 2004).  
 
162 Thus type one and two are often found together in discussions of the experience of 
prophets, seers, and visionaries. On this see, for example, Pedro Gomez, “’Accende lumen 
sensibus’: A Philosophico-Theological Approach to the Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses in 
Medieval Monastic Theology,” Teologia y Vida 49, no. 4 (2008): 749-770, and Daniel Simmons, 
“’We shall be like him, for we shall see him’: Augustine’s De Trinitate and the Purification of the 
Mind” International Journal of Systematic Theology 15 no., 3)(2013): 240-64.  
 
163 Rowan Williams, “The Theological World of the Philokalia,” in Brock Bingaman and 
Bradley Nassif, eds., The Philokalia: A Classic Text of Orthodox Spirituality, with a forward by 
Kallistos Ware (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 102-21, here, 103.  
 
164 This is the import of Green’s argument that Nicholas of Cusa attempted to synthesize 
Aristotelian cognitive psychology and the Origenist spiritual senses into a single account 
(“Nicholas of Cusa”).  
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physical senses that the material world is known.165 This systematic instinct is 
perhaps more clear the closer to our own time we come.166 Enlightenment figures 
such as Jonathan Edwards and John Wesley both sought to construct theologies 
that remain faithful to the content of their faith and the experience thereof and to 
the latest in philosophical and scientific thinking. Edwards tried to model 
spiritual perception closely on the model of sense perception given by John 
Locke.167 Wesley too builds much of his notion of spiritual sense in response to, 
indeed on the model of, empiricism.168 One measure of the systematic use of the 
spiritual senses lies in the degree to which this notion, in whatever specification, 
is brought to bear in order to account for some aspect of a theology. For 
165 On the systematic function in Bernard of Clairvaux see Killian McDonnell, “Spirit and 
Experience in Bernard of Clairvaux,” Theological Studies 58 (1997): 3-18, especially 7-18. On a 
parallel in Hildegard see Maria Eugenia Gongora, “Look, Know, Imagine: The Vision of the 
Source and the Three Maids in ‘Liber Divinorum Operum’ by Hildegard de Bingen,” Revista 
Chilena de Literature 68 (2006): 105-21.  
 
166 See Peter R. Anstey, “Branching Off: The Early Moderns in Quest for the Unity of 
Knowledge,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 no. 4 (2011): 819-22.  
 
167 Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards,” 225 n.5, 231-40. Also, Paul R. Baumgartner, 
“Jonathan Edwards: The Theory Behind His use of Figurative Language,” PMLA 78 no. 4 (1963): 
321-5, and Michael J. McClymond, "Spiritual Perception in Jonathan Edwards," The Journal of 
Religion 77, no. 2 (1997): 195-216. There are also curious parallels in Edwards with Maximus the 
Confessor. See Michael D. Giobson, “The Beauty of the Redemption of the World: The 
Theological Aesthetics of Maximus the Confessor and Jonathan Edwards,” Harvard Theological 
Review 101 no. 1 (2008): 45-75.  
 
168 Mealey, “John Wesley,” 241-56, especially 244-250. 
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Bonaventure, in addition to whatever else they do, the spiritual senses are 
located “within his doctrine of grace and of religious knowledge.”169 We might 
bemoan the fact that Bonaventure only speaks explicitly about just what he 
thinks the spiritual senses are in a “dozen or so” locations with LaNave170 or we 
can recognize, with Bamberger, that authors have taken up this doctrine, 
“usually only in passing, without any intent to give a further development to 
it.”171 We know what is beneath us by bodily sense, but we know ourselves and 
what is above or beyond us by spiritual sense.172 Thus, by employing the 
spiritual senses one is able to conceive of a single account of human experience, 
from the everyday to the Beatific.173  
As we will see in part two below, this functional typology accounts well 
for the spiritual senses tradition in general, and the uses John Smith put this 
tradition to in particular. Only the arguments offered below for Smith’s 
169 LaNave, “Bonaventure,” 159.  
 
170 Ibid. 
 
171 Bamberger, “Thomas Merton,” 83.  
 
172 The example here is Platonic, ultimately originating with Origen, but the spiritual 
senses need not be thought of in as hierarchical a way. 
 
173 On the eclipse of the beatific expectation in modernity see Louis Dupre, “On the 
Natural Desire of Seeing God,” Radical Orthodoxy: Theology, Philosophy, Politics 1 nos. 1-2 (2012): 
81-94.  
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appropriation of these functions from those who came before him can begin to 
demonstrate the adequacy of my interpretative theory. A full defense of the 
perspective must await an assessment of its usefulness in guiding future research 
on the spiritual senses. However, as we have seen above, there are very good 
reasons to think that this perspective represents the current scholarly consensus.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 The tradition of the spiritual senses in Christian theology is thus 
characterized by paradox, a wide range of individual specifications or theories, 
and these have been understood by modern scholars in a variety of ways. We 
have seen that the trend in recent interpretation has been to include a wider 
variety of phenomena under the general label of “spiritual sense.” Most 
importantly a new interpretation of this tradition as involving non-physical 
perception and three functional types has been offered that benefits from the 
trajectory in recent scholarship and accounts for the range of interpretations 
offered for individual theories in the field as well.  
 Armed with this theoretical and historical context we are now in a 
position to fully appreciate the place of John Smith within the Christian tradition 
of the spiritual senses. In part two below we will see how Smith used his own 
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formulations of spiritual perception to perform each of the three functional tasks 
we have identified in this chapter. First, however, the following chapter will 
position Smith in his intellectual milieu. For one can only truly appreciate the use 
to which he put the spiritual senses if one knows the world to which he was 
addressing his discourse.  
 
 
    
 
CHAPTER 3: SMITH IN CONTEXT 
 
   
3.1 Why Smith? 
John Smith has never escaped the attention of scholars in fields as diverse 
as the history of philosophy,1 religious studies,2 theology,3 literature,4 history of 
science and mathematics.5 Smith’s name appears, as often as not in a footnote 
1 For example, they are often noted as early commentators on, and sometimes followers 
of, Descartes. See, for example, Danton B. Sailor, "Cudworth and Descartes," Journal of the History 
of Ideas 23, no. 1 (1962): 133-40; J. E. Saveson, "Descartes' Influence on John Smith, Cambridge 
Platonist," Journal of the History of Ideas 20 (1959): 258-62, “Differing Reactions to Descartes among 
the Cambridge Platonists," Journal of the History of Ideas 31 (1960): 560-7;  
 
2 See Charles Taliaferro, and Alison J. Teply, eds., Cambridge Platonist Spirituality (New 
York: Paulist Press, 2004), 3, 13, 21, 28-9, 31-2, 37, 41, 44.  
 
3 They are especially associated with the movement known as latitudinarianism. See 
Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England 
1660-1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 25-88; Martin I. J. Griffin Jr., 
Latitudinarianism in the Seventeenth-Century Church of England, ed. Richard H. Popkin and Lila 
Freedman, annotated ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1992); and Patrick Müller, “Hobbes, Locke and the 
Consequences: Shaftesbury’s Moral Sense and Political Agitation in Early Eighteenth-century 
England,” Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies (2013; doi: 10.1111/1754-0208.12075): 1-16. 
 
4 Smith, especially, has long been noted as an artful writer. See, J. E. Saveson, "Some 
Aspects of the Thought and Style of John Smith the Cambridge Platonist." Ph.D. thesis, 
Fitzwilliam House, Cambridge University, 1955. Douglas Hedley has (rightly) called him “the 
most eloquent of the Cambridge Platonists” (Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000], 284).  
 
5 References to Whichcote, Smith, More, and Cudworth abound in Mordechai Feingold, 
ed., Before Newton: The Life and Times of Isaac Barrow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990) for example. On More in particular see A. Rupert Hall, Henry More and the Scientific 
Revolution Cambridge Science Biographic Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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crediting him with inspiring some other better known figure, in a broad 
scholarly literature and it has for several centuries.6 There are, however, precious 
few studies of any length or depth on Smith himself.7 Indeed, one is consistently 
offered his name, and often his own words too in order to explain more obscure 
passages in the works of his fellow “Cambridge Platonists” especially Henry 
More and Ralph Cudworth. Anyone deemed relevant, even essential, for a 
proper study of so many other figures and important movements in the history 
of thought is surely due study in his own right. This is one of the central aims of 
the present chapter.  
Also, John Gascoigne, Cambridge in the Age of the Enlightenment: Science, Religion and Politics from 
the Restoration to the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
 
6 See for example, John C. English, “The Cambridge Platonists in Wesley’s ‘Christian 
Library’,” Proceedings of the Wesley Historical Society 36 (1968): 161-8. John Wesley republished 
several Cambridge Platonists in his massive “Christian Library” series, including a few of Smith’s 
Select Discourses. This helped to keep Smith et al. in print well through the eighteenth and into the 
nineteenth centuries. By the early twentieth century a whole range of anthologies were published 
containing representative works of the “Cambridge Platonists,” always including Smith. See, for 
example, E. T. Campagnac, The Cambridge Platonists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1901); 
Gerald R. Cragg, The Cambridge Platonists (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); C. A. 
Patrides, The Cambridge Platonists; and, most recently, Charles Taliaferro, and Alison J. Teply, eds., 
Cambridge Platonist Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 2004). 
 
7 The great exception to this rule of thumb is Mario Micheletti, Il pensiero religioso di John 
Smith, platonico di Cambridge (Padua: La Garangola, 1976). Nevertheless, my sketch of Smith’s life 
and times is thematic at most. Those interested in the biographical details of Smith’s life can do 
little better than Simon Patrick’s funeral sermon, notwithstanding the considerable hagiography. 
For a fuller picture of Smith’s context one must consult the sources given in the notes to this 
chapter. My purpose here is not historiographical or biographical per se but rather contextual.  
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Given his current relative obscurity – Smith has seldom appeared on 
reading lists in philosophy or theology since the late nineteenth century – as well 
as the combination of the strangeness and the universally acknowledged 
significance of his intellectual and cultural context, an extensive introduction to 
Smith and his times, is not only useful, but essential. For Smith’s thought arises 
out of, and speaks to, an intensely complex world of intellectual, geographic, and 
religious dynamism.8   
Given the thematic preoccupation of this dissertation it may be fairly 
asked, how or from whom did Smith receive the spiritual senses tradition? 
However, as our study of this tradition has shown, the ingredients were readily 
available to anyone in Smith’s context. The biblical, patristic, and medieval 
sources were all ready to hand, as were more recent important developments in 
philosophy and theology. Moreover, the spiritual senses tradition is not the sort 
that passes from master to student in a direct line only. Rather, it is a family of 
modes of thought that arise naturally within certain aspects of Christian 
8 Smith’s context will be a constant companion in our discussion of his theory of the 
spiritual senses in part two below. In order therefore understand what he has to say on this our 
primary focus it is necessary to first come to an appreciation of his world.  
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philosophy and theology. So, where Smith gets his ideas is a topic taken up in 
the midst of the close reading of his discourses to follow in part two below.  
Thus, the present chapter proceeds as follows. First, a discussion of the 
intellectual context into which Smith was born with special attention to its 
quality as an “age of discovery.” Second, we explore the educational culture of 
Smith’s day with special focus on his own intellectual formation, especially at 
Emmanuel College Cambridge under Benjamin Whichcote. In this way we will 
see that Smith was educated in, or perhaps better, between two great 
pedagogical eras; the scholastic and the modern. Third, is an exposition of the 
political and religious turmoil that marked Smith’s adult life, culminating in civil 
war for his nation and an appointment as a Fellow of Queens’ College 
Cambridge for himself. Finally, we present the remains of his substantial 
personal library bequeathed to Queens’ College upon his death in 1652 as a 
window into his formation and inclinations. The chapter closes with some 
preliminary remarks about the single literary product available from Smith, the 
posthumously published Select Discourses, collected and edited by John 
Worthington in 1660.  
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3.2 Into New Worlds 
While the long march of history pushes ever forward and greets everyone 
with a fresh horizon, some of us are blessed, as the Chinese say, to live in 
interesting times. Our own time, with the speedy advance of technology and a 
technologically driven (obsessed?) culture, is surely an “interesting time.” 
However, only time will tell for us. For those born in the early seventeenth 
century we can now see with the aide of hindsight that their world really was 
new. It was during the dawn of the modern world that John Smith was born in 
the rural English town of (Thorpe) Achurch in 1618.  
Known in the Doomsday Book as Asechirce, and located in eastern 
Northhamptonshire in the East Midlands of England, the town had been settled, 
or at least given its permanent name, during the Danish Invasions of the early 
Middle Ages (“Thorpe” being a common Danish place name).9 The village 
church, dedicated to St. John the Baptist, was first built in 1218 by Sir Ascelin de 
Waterville in thanks for his safe return from the Holy Land during the Third 
Crusade under Richard Cœur de Lion.10 This Church was most likely the scene of 
9 Williams, “Memoir,” v.  
 
10 “Parishes: Thorpe Achurch,” A History of the County of Northampton Vol. 3, ed. William 
Page, British History Online, ND, accessed 14 April 2014, http://www.british-
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much of Smith’s early formation in Christian piety and perhaps learning more 
generally. In which case, reports of his “Puritan” roots are well founded, albeit of 
an established church variety often unknown in North America.11 During Smith’s 
youth, the Rector of St. John the Baptist Church was Robert Browne, the famous 
Puritan non-conformist, turned priest in the Church of England, who served 
there from 1591 to 1633 when he was jailed for not paying taxes.12 It has also been 
suggested that Smith may have “received the rudiments of his education at the 
Grammar School of Oundle” near Achurch but this is little more than a likely 
supposition.13  
history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=66273. Also, The Page Arnold Partnership, “St. John the 
Baptist, Achurch, Northhamptonshire,” Northhamptonshire.co.uk, ND, accessed 14 April 2014, 
http://www.northamptonshire.co.uk/guides/achurch/7pic.htm.  
 
11 Micheletti, Il pensiero religioso, 13, 91, 294.  
 
12  Augustus Jessopp, “Browne, Robert,” in Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. 7, ed. 
Leslie Stephen (London: Macmillan, 1886), 57-61. Although by Smith’s day Browne had repented 
of his earlier separation from the Church of England, the Congregationalism that he first gave 
notable voice to in England followed the tide of discovery and exploration to bring the Pilgrim 
Fathers to the far shores of North America. 
 
13 Williams, “Memoir,” vi.  
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Our John Smith was apparently the son of John and Catharine (or 
“Katherine”) Smith,14 both of whom seem to have been of relatively advanced 
age at his birth.15 Nearly all biographies give his birth year as 1618, however 
Williams reports that Smith’s mother was buried “April 4th, 1616.”16 Thus, our 
Smith would seem to have been born early in 1616. The Parish Register of 
Achurch notes his baptism on “February 15th, 1617.”17 This would make Smith 
nearly two years older than reported by Simon Patrick in his Funeral Sermon as 
well as the “memoir of our Author” written by Lord Hailes.18 However, at the 
time of his death Smith left what he calls “that small land which my Father left 
me in Achurch” to his mother.19 Thus, Williams’ birth date cannot be accurate as 
14 Henry Griffin Williams, “Memoir of the Author,” in Select Discourses 4th ed. corrected 
and revised (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1859), v.  
 
15 Ibid.  
 
16 These dates are from the Parish Register at Achurch as quoted by Williams, “Memoir,” 
v. 
17 Quoted in Williams, “Memoir,” v. 
 
18 Simon Patrick, “A Sermon Preached at the Funeral of Mr John Smith late Fellow of 
Queens College in Cambridge, who departed this life Aug. 7. 1652. And lyes interred in the 
Chappel of the Same College. With A Short Account of his Life and Death,” in Smith, Select 
Discourses (London, 1660), 506. Lord Hailes [David Dalrymple], “Memoir of the Author” in Select 
Discourses 3rd ed. carefully corrected (London: Rivingtons and Cochran, 1821), 7.  
 
19 “Will of John Smith, M.A. fell. Qu., dat. 3 Aug. prob. 12 Aug. 1652,” Cambridge 
University Library, Baker MSS, Mm.1.37, 215. 
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his account rests in part on the supposed burial of Smith’s mother in 1616. For 
this reason, there is little doubt that he was born in 1618 after all.20  
The elder Smith would seem to have been a small landowning farmer at 
Achurch.21 Indeed, the parish records indicate that he was churchwarden there in 
1601, 1616, 1621, and 1622. He clearly, therefore, “enjoyed the respect of those 
among whom he lived.”22  
 
3.2.1 Geographical Discovery23 
While typical accounts of the early seventeenth century in England tend to 
focus on religion, politics, and various markers of “modernity,”24 our treatment 
20 Moreover, Williams, like most commentators on Smith, knows nothing of his will. He 
seems to have learned everything he knows about the disposition of Smith’s estate from Patrick’s 
Autobiography only.  
 
21 Kennet, Register and Chronicle, 127, cited by Williams, “Memoir,” vi. The younger Smith 
mentions “that small land which my Father left me in Achurch” in his will as well.  
 
22 Williams, “Memoir,” vi.  
 
23 The remaining subsections of 3.2 as well as sections 3.2 and 3.4 below offer a relatively 
detailed overview of some of the more significant historical and intellectual trends that formed 
the milieu into which Smith was cast. Those familiar with the late Renaissance and Early Modern 
periods may safely proceed directly to section 3.5.  
24 For example, the economic shift toward capitalism (Christopher Hill, The World Turned 
Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution [New York: Viking Press, 1972]; Max 
Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism [London: Taylor & Francis, 2001]). On the 
construction of “modernity” generally see  Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of 
Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).  
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of Smith’s formative context will take an unusually transatlantic perspective. For, 
while Smith never traveled far from his birthplace in the East Midlands, the 
horizons of his mental world extended all the way to the distant shores of New 
England and beyond. The intellectual and entrepreneurial excitement of 
geographic discovery was, of course, matched in the early seventeenth century 
by the explosive flurry of activity and self-conscious development in philosophy 
as well as the soon to be ascendant modern sciences. Just as Smith was to grow 
up in a world full of reports of new lands populated by unknown peoples he also 
lived in a world with a new heliocentric cosmos above and a heart within that 
bore more than a passing resemblance to the pumps used to drain the nearby 
fens of Cambridgeshire.25  
The “discovery” and settlement of the New World, especially for our 
purposes the English colonies in North America, is easily overlooked by 
historians of religion, theology, or (especially) philosophy but to their great loss. 
For one cannot rightly appreciate this era without an understanding of the true 
breadth and scope of the spirit of discovery that was in the air. Smith came of age 
25 On this see, Henry Clifford Darby, The Draining of the Fens (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). See also section 3.2.2 below.  
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in a generation that not only knew of faraway places but could imagine them as 
really possible destinations for exploration or even resettlement as many of his 
fellow Emmanuel College men were to do when they left to settle in New 
England.26  
From our late modern perspective of instantaneous global 
communications it can be hard to imagine it but nearly half of the planet was 
“new” to Smith’s contemporaries. Only five or six generations separate him from 
the epochal voyage of 1492. For all the renewed realism in our appraisal of 
Christopher Columbus’s accomplishments (he did not, after all, “discover” 
anything; the Americas were already well-known to many millions), motives 
(profit, empire, etc.), and methods (murder in the name of God among them), he 
did usher in an new age of discovery for Europeans and set in motion 
developments that profoundly changed England.27  
26 Including Smith’s near contemporary, John Harvard (1607-1638), who left a significant 
endowment to the new college in Cambridge Massachusetts thereafter named in his honor. On 
the founding of Harvard College see Samuel Eliot Morison, The Founding of Harvard College 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), esp. 92-107, and 210-227 on John Harvard’s 
role. See also section 3.4 below.  
 
27 Without the transatlantic Spanish Empire there is no defeat of the Spanish Armada in 
1588, and, perhaps, without Spanish gold from the New World, no rebuilding of St. Peter’s to 
help set off the Protestant Reformation itself. In any event, unlike so many of his favorite authors 
Smith was born into a world that included North and South America. Indeed, through the more 
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Among the impressive volumes Smith eventually left to Queens’ College 
Library is a copy of Captain John Smith’s Generall Historie of Virginia, New-
England, and the Summer Isles.28 The Captain’s narrative includes, most famously, 
the story of the early settlement of Jamestown in what is now the US 
Commonwealth of Virginia.  
By the year of our John Smith’s birth, English exploration and commercial 
settlement had been underway for over a century.29 Smith’s was, therefore, a 
sophisticated, English speaking, North Atlantic world, even as he keep his finger 
on the pulse of discoveries of different sorts on the European continent. But 
North America was not the only “new world” to be explored as Smith arrived on 
recent adventures of his fellow Englishmen, Smith was actually very familiar with the Atlantic 
coast of North America. 
 
28 John Smith, The Generall Historie of Virginia, New England, and the Summer Isles (London: 
I.D. and I.H. for Michael Sparkes, 1627), Queens’ College Old Library, D.1.32.  Also, Queens' MS 
47, Queens’ College Donation List (17th century), p.33 (available at 
http://issuu.com/03776/docs/qunsdonors, accessed 4 April 2014) and J.E. Saveson, “Catalogue of 
the Library of John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist,” Appendix in "Some Aspects of the Thought 
and Style of John Smith the Cambridge Platonist" (Ph.D. thesis, Fitzwilliam House, Cambridge 
University, 1955), 54. This work includes a reference to the Kennebec River in Maine as a 
particularly wild and inhospitable place. This river runs through my home town of Skowhegan.  
 
29 On this history see Peter C. Mancall, Envisioning America: English Plans for the 
Colonization of North America, 1580-1640 (Boston: Bedford Books, 1995).  
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the scene.30 This spirit of discovery extended into the sciences, philosophy, and 
theology as well.  
 
3.2.2 Scientific Discovery 
Smith’s lifetime saw the spread of the heliocentric model of the universe 
as well as the sometimes intense debates this “Copernican Revolution” 
inspired.31 Moreover, for all his respect of ancient wisdom, Smith was also 
unperturbed by the displacement of the Earth from the center of the universe.32  
30 During the same period of English exploration and colonial expansion in North 
America, there were similar developments in Central and South America, India and the East 
Indies, and Africa too. For an interesting perspective on this history see, Hugh Edward Egerton, 
A Short History of British Colonial Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). The East 
India Company settled at Surat in 1608 which remained the headquarters for the Company until 
its move to Bombay in 1687. A trading facility was built at Machilipatnam on the Coromandel 
Coast of India in 1611 and the Spice Island of Run was defended against the claims of the Dutch 
by Nathaniel Courthope in 1616. After protracted conflicts with the Dutch over ownership and 
trading rights Run was finally ceded to the Netherlands in exchange for the North American 
island of Manhattan in 1665. On the adventures of the East India Company see, for example, K. N. 
Chaudhuri, The English East India Company: The Study of an Early Joint-stock Company 1600-1640, 
Vol. 4 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1999). England’s exploits were merely one, relatively small, 
part of a larger pan-European period of discovery and expansion of economic and political power 
and influence throughout the world. Across the highways of the seas the Spanish, Portuguese, 
Dutch, English, and others brought about the first great age of “globalization.” As one of the best 
read scholars of his day, Smith was well versed in all these developments. His was one of the 
very first generations to receive prompt, if not always very accurate, word about the habits and 
habitats of peoples and places around the planet. In short, Smith’s geographical world (and to 
some extent his economic world as well) was well on its way to becoming very much like our 
own.  
 
31 In 1543, with the publication of De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, Nicholaus 
Copernicus (1473-1543) offered a viable challenge to the Ptolemaic geocentricism that had been 
astronomical orthodoxy for over thirteen centuries. There were many heliocentric proposals 
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While copies of Copernicus’ works are not among those listed in the 
donation of books Smith made to Queens’ College upon his death, his reading in 
astronomy does show evidence of being primarily in “the Copernican 
tradition.”33 Copernicus’s heliocentrism was initially not widely accepted but it 
was nonetheless tolerated for nearly six decades, so long as it was considered a 
hypothesis, useful for calculation, and not a definitive statement of fact.34 Just two 
before Copernicus but his finally took hold. For example, Aristarchus of Samos proposed a 
moving Earth in the third century BCE (Thomas Heath, Aristarchus of Samos, the Ancient 
Copernicus [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913]).  Already by 1514 Copernicus had shared a small 
Commentary (Commentariolus) with friends and associates in which he laid out the rudiments of 
his heliocentric system. See N. M. Swerdlow, trans., “The Derivation and First Draft of 
Copernicus's Planetary Theory: A Translation of the Commentariolus with Commentary,” 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 117 (1973): 423–512. Also, Koyré, Closed World, 28-
57. Already by the later 1530s however Copernicus’s heliocentric theory was well known among 
the intellectual elite of Europe, even if his arguments were not yet fully available. Famously, in 
the spring of 1539, Georg Joachim Rheticus, a mathematics professor at Wittenberg, was given 
leave to learn Copernicus’s system first-hand in Frauenberg, Poland. News of this trip seems to 
have prompted the great Reformer Martin Luther to comment that Copernicus “wishes to turn 
the whole of astronomy upside down”. Luther continued, “So it goes now. Whoever wants to be 
clever must agree with nothing that others esteem,” a remarkably cynical statement from one so 
intent on turning centuries of Catholic belief and practice “upside down.” Martin Luther, Table 
Talk, [4 June 1539], in Luther’s Works Vol. 54, ed. Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1967), 358–9. 
 
32 On this development in scientific understanding see Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed 
World to the Infinite Universe (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958).  
 
33 J. E. Saveson, “The Library of John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist,” Notes and Queries, 
May 1958, 216.  
 
34 Indeed, an unauthorized preface to Copernicus’ De revolutionibus was added to the first 
edition that suggested it be treated as a mathematical theory only (Michael J. Crowe,  Theories of 
the World from Antiquity to the Copernican Revolution [Dover, 2001], 85). This (mis)interpretation 
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years before Smith’s birth, religious opposition to heliocentrism had grown to the 
point that Copernicus’s ideas were in serious danger of official sanction by the 
Roman Catholic Church. The great Italian physicist, mathematician, astronomer, 
and philosopher, Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) who was, by this time, a convinced 
Copernican, attempted to come to the defense of Copernicus in Rome. However, 
De revolutionibus was declared contrary to scripture by the Congregation of the 
Index in 1616 and Galileo was told to stay away from the controversial, and 
apparently unbiblical, theory of heliocentrism.35  
Galileo initially agreed and did not speak openly about his heliocentric 
beliefs until 1632 when his friend, now Pope Urban VIII, and the Office of the 
Inquisition, approved of his publication of Dialogo sopraidue massimi systemi del 
stuck easily since without observational evidence Copernicus’s theory seemed little more than a 
mathematical model, not clearly related to reality at all. Indeed, it must be remembered that even 
Galileo’s great assault on Aristotelian science was only partly empirical. His hypothesis that 
objects fall at a uniform rate regardless of mass was based on reason alone (presented in De Motu, 
1590). Scholars are mixed on the question of the famous experiment from the Leaning Tower of 
Pisa testing this hypothesis. Many think that Galileo never made such an experiment, having 
already established that Aristotle was wrong and that he was correct by a priori reasoning. So, 
while the moons of Jupiter and their use as support for the heliocentric model of the solar system 
was the result of observations through the telescope, some of Galileo’s contributions were of a 
purely rational nature. Altogether fitting for a teacher of mathematics at the University of Pisa.  
 
35 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, ed., The Essential Galileo (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2008), 11. An 
account of the “Galileo affair” can be found in this book pp.12-16. See also Peter Machamer,  
"Galileo Galilei," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 13  
June 2013, accessed 16 May 2014,  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/galileo/.  
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mondo, The Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems. Galileo had 
overreached however as he did far more than present the arguments for and 
against geocentrism and heliocentrism, but actually made only the heliocentric 
system seem viable.36 Thus, Galileo was accused of making a case for the, still-
banned, Copernican system. He was tried and found guilty of “vehement 
suspicion of heresy” in June of 1633.37 Sentenced to prison at first, his sentence 
was commuted to house arrest the following day, however his works were also 
banned from publication.38 This ban seems, however, only to have helped to 
spread the works of Galileo and the offending heliocentrism still further across 
Europe. Smith’s donations to Queens’ College library included six volumes of 
Galileo’s works, including a 1635 edition of Dialogus de Systemate Mundi.39 
36 Largely this was accomplished through the foolish incompetence of the defender of 
geocentricism in his dialogue, Simplicio, an Italian name borrowed from the Greek Simplicius, 
the famous late Neoplatonist and particular favorite of the Cambridge Platonists. Simplicio can 
carry, however, the connotation of a simpleton in Italian too. 
 
37 Finocchiaro, Galileo, 15.  
 
38 Ibid., 16.  
 
39 Queens' MS 47, p.27. Also, Saveson, “The Library of John Smith,” 216 and Saveson, 
“Catalogue,” 28-29. In Smith’s discourse “Of Prophecy” he speaks of “an evening star shining 
upon the conspicable hemisphere, when another [star] was set” (Select Discourses [1859], 267). 
This may well be a reference to the Earth rotating on its axis, a key part of the new astronomy of 
this era. On Smith’s theory of prophecy more generally see section 4.2 below.  
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In addition to these works of Galileo, Smith also possessed several texts by 
Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), who established the heliocentric model of the solar 
system still in use today.40 Kepler’s laws of planetary motion directly informed 
Newton’s theory of universal gravitation and thus helped to usher in the 
Enlightenment conception of the universe. Smith was therefore among the 
leading lights of early modern science.  
Smith donated eleven works by Kepler to Queens’ upon his death. Most of 
these were first editions including a copy of the Paralipomena in Vitellionem that 
includes an inscription, presumably in Smith’s own hand, reading “Johannes 
Smith.”41 All the most significant astronomical works are present among them,42 
such as the Harmonices Mundi (The Harmony of the World, 1619), and including 
40 On Kepler see Daniel A. Di Liscia, "Johannes Kepler," The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 2 May 2011, accessed 16 May 2014,  
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/kepler/. Also Koyré, Closed World, 58-87. Until 
Kepler, there was an altogether unfamiliar distance between astronomy (and astrology) which 
were considered liberal arts, and the “natural philosophy” or sciences of mathematics and 
physics. Astronomy utilized mathematical models (especially geometry) from ancient times, 
however it was only with Kepler and Galileo that mathematics began to be important in physics 
too. In fact, Kepler’s greatest contribution to early modern science is probably his combination of 
the mathematics of astronomy and the cosmology of ancient physics. 
 
41 Queens’ MS 47, 27; Saveson, “Catalogue,” 37; J. Kepler, Paralipomena in Vitellionem, 
quibus Astronomiae Pars Optica traditur.(Frankfurt-on-Main, 1604), Queens’ Old Library C.14.32.  
 
42 With the exception of the Tabulae Rudolphinae (1627). Smith’s interests in astronomy, 
therefore, seem to be primarily theoretical rather than practical. This general attitude is reflected 
in his theology as well. See especially sections 4.1 and 4.2 below.  
 
 
 
                                                 
120 
 
what Carl Sagan has called the first work of science fiction, Kepler’s 
posthumously published novel, Somnium (The Dream, 1634).43 Smith was even 
acquainted with Kepler’s work on the geometry of snowflakes as set forth in De 
Nive Sexangula (On the Six-Cornered Snowflake, 1611).44  
Thus, Smith came into a world fast on its way toward the modern 
scientific worldview. But it was not just the received wisdom of the ancients on 
matters related to the macrocosmos that were being re-evaluated in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The microcosmos of the human body 
too was being reassessed in Smith’s day as scholars and increasingly medical 
practitioners themselves sought to find more effective treatments for disease than 
those found in centuries old authorities.  
In 1543 Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564) published De humani corporis fabrica, 
On the Fabric of the Human Body, dramatically correcting the anatomical 
orthodoxy that had held sway since Galen (130-200).45 Parting ways with 
43 Carl Sagan, "The Harmony of the Worlds" episode, in the series, “Cosmos: A Personal 
Voyage,” first aired on PBS, 1980.  
 
44 Queens’ MS 47, 27; Saveson, “Catalogue,” 37.  
 
45 H. K. Walker, “The Origins of the History and Physical Examination,” in H.K Walker, 
W. D. Hall, and J. W. Hurst, eds., Clinical Methods: The History, Physical, and Laboratory 
Examinations 3rd ed. (Boston: Butterworths, 1990), ch. 1, accessed 15 April 2014, 
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tradition, and good morals by the standards of his day, Vesalius began to dissect 
a corpse during his anatomy lecture at the University of Padua, long the center of 
medical instruction. His magnum opus, the Fabrica was based on these lectures. 
The text is notable for its detail, including many fine woodcuts to illustrate the 
structures discussed in the text, and its correction of many serious errors made 
by Galen and repeated for over a millennium.46 The Fabrica met with significant 
success, both in its official published form and in pirated copies that circulated 
widely in Europe.47  
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK458/. For primary texts in the history of anatomy and 
medicine see David J. Rothman, Steven Marcus, and Stephanie A. Kiceluk, eds., Medicine and 
Western Civilization (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995). While the rebirth of 
artistic interest in the human body that accompanied the Renaissance had made human 
dissection more common than it had been in the Middle Ages, there was still little opposition to 
the authority of Galen on anatomical matters. Domenico Laurenza, Art and Anatomy in 
Renaissance Italy: Images from a Scientific Revolution (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 
2012). 
 
46 Among these errors was the notion that the major blood vessels begin in the liver. 
Through observation Vesalius noted that Galen was mistaken on this (they arise in the heart) 
because Galen had used animals (dogs and monkeys) rather than human beings. Roger Kenneth 
French, Medicine Before Science: The Business of Medicine from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 141-3, 149. Lois N. Magner, A History of Medicine 
(CRC Press, 1992), 158-63. Arranged in seven books, Fabrica treats the skeletal, muscular, 
circulatory, cardio-pulmonary, nervous, and digestive systems with the care of an expert 
observer and the artistic mastery of the late Renaissance. Indeed, without the development of 
realistic drawing techniques by the Renaissance masters, Vesalius’ masterpiece would scarcely 
have been imaginable. 
 
47 The demand for anatomy texts and the heavy cost of the Fabrica, led Vesalius to 
publish a much condensed Epitome of the larger work, and kind of “short introduction” to the 
Fabrica. In 1555 a second edition appeared and a third appears to have been contemplated as 
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For all his advances in anatomy, both technical and theoretical, Vesalius 
followed Galen on the incorrect notion that the veins and arteries carry two 
different sorts of blood. The correct theory of the circulation of the blood would 
await the work of a fellow Englishman during Smith’s lifetime, William Harvey 
(1578-1657).48 Beyond living a fascinating life during a tumultuous period, 
Harvey is best remembered for finally describing accurately the circulation of the 
blood in his justly celebrated Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in 
Animalibus, An Anatomical Exercise on the Motion of the Heart and Blood by Living 
Beings (1628).49  
In De motu cordis Harvey argues that rather than there being two systems 
of blood as Galen had insisted, a single volume is circulated throughout the 
Vesalius himself made significant annotations to a copy of the second edition. “U[university] of 
T[oronto] acquires annotated copy of Vesalius's great anatomical book,”  U of T News, March 26, 
2013, accessed 15 April 2014, http://news.utoronto.ca/u-t-acquires-annotated-copy-vesaliuss-
great-anatomical-book.  
 
48 See Thomas Wright, William Harvey: A Life in Circulation (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 3-204.  
 
49 William Harvey, “On The Motion Of The Heart And Blood In Animals,” 1628, trans. 
Robert Willis, in Scientific Papers; Physiology, Medicine, Surgery, Geology, with Introductions, Notes 
and Illustrations The Harvard Classics v. 38 (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1910), available in 
Paul Halsall, ed., Internet Modern History Sourcebook, Fordham University, 1998-, accessed 15 April 
2014, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1628harvey-blood.asp. Harvey’s theory dates from 
his lectures of 1616.  
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body. Most important for the intellectual context that Smith inherited however 
was the method employed by Harvey to make his great advance in physiology 
and anatomy. Building on the work of others Harvey added above all a 
willingness, and the ability, to engage in careful observation and 
experimentation. By combining anatomical observation and experiments, such as 
selectively opening and closing of the veins and arteries by the use of tourniquets 
and ligatures, he was able to work out what must be the case about the heart.  
It was by treating the heart as a mechanism that its true physiological 
function was first understood. The importance for biological and medical science 
of Harvey’s discovery was noticed immediately but the mechanization of biology 
was to have lasting effects in philosophy as well. Indeed, the great seventeenth 
century materialist Thomas Hobbes is said to have noted that of modern authors 
only Harvey was taught during his lifetime.50 
We can be sure that Smith was aware of, and approved, Harvey’s theory 
from his own words. In Smith’s discourse “On the Immortality of the Soul” he 
speaks of “The constant circulation of the blood through all our veins and 
50 Stewart Duncan, "Thomas Hobbes," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward 
N. Zalta, last modified 4 February 2013, accessed 15 April 2014,  
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/hobbes/, §4. 
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arteries.”51 From the context of this unmistakable reference to the circulation of 
the blood, Smith was comfortable thinking of the body in mechanical terms along 
the lines developed by Harvey and Descartes.52 Moreover, from the list of works 
donated to Queens’ by Smith we know that he owned at least one work by 
Harvey, Exercitationes de Generatione Animalium (1651).53  
This sampling of the discoveries of the period immediately preceding 
Smith’s lifetime and work clearly shows that he was born into a period of intense 
novelty in natural philosophy. These technical and practical developments went 
hand in hand, of course, with new developments in philosophy proper too, as we 
will see in the next section.54 Both practice and theory demanded a new account 
by Smith’s day, and for many the “new philosophy,” associated (retrospectively) 
51 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 87. Quoted from the modernized version in Smith, Select 
Discourses (1859), 88.  
 
52 See Saveson, "Descartes' Influence on John Smith," 258-62. 
 
53 Queens’ MS 47, 27; Saveson, “Catalogue,” 35. As important as Harvey’s discovery was, 
there remained an important hole in the theory until the year of the first publication of Smith’s 
Select Discourses (1660), when Marcello Malpighi observed blood moving through capillaries in 
the lung of a frog using the other great observational device of the early modern period, the 
microscope. L. J. DiDio, “Marcello Malpighi: The Father of Microscopic Anatomy,” Italian Journal 
of Anatomical Embryology 100, Supplement 1 (1995): 3-9. 
 
54 For the place of the Cambridge Platonists in their philosophical milieu see, G. A. J. 
Rogers, J. M. Vienne, and Y. C. Zarka, eds., The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context: 
Politics, Metaphysics, and Religion (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997).  
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with Rene Descartes above all, was that way forward. As we will see however, 
Smith responded to these same pressures by looking simultaneously to the great 
discoveries of his time and back to the ancient wisdom embedded in Christian 
Platonism.  
   
3.3 Between the Times:  
Scholastic and Modern Learning in Smith’s Cambridge 
John Smith enrolled at Emmanuel College, Cambridge on the 5th of April 
1636. College records report that he entered as a “sizar,” roughly the seventeenth 
century equivalent of a work-study student. Sizars would perform various tasks 
in college in exchange for their tuition and board.55 According to Samuel Salter, 
Smith’s job included recording the sermons and other discourses of his tutor and 
benefactor Benjamin Whichcote.56  
55 “Sizar,” Encyclopædia Britannica, Vol. 25 (Chicago, 1911), accessed 15 April 2014,   
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Sizar.  
 
56 Salter says that one “Mr. Smith” took down Whichcote’s sermons. Salter also says that 
this Smith said that he “lived upon Dr. Whichcote.” The similarities to our Smith, who spoke in 
this same way of his relationship with Whichcote according to Worthington and Patrick makes it 
seem most likely that it was among Smith’s duties as a sizar to record his tutor’s sermons (Samuel 
Salter, “Preface to this New Edition,” Moral and Religious Aphorisms. Collected from the Manuscript 
Papers of The Reverend and Learned Doctor Whichcote [London, 1753], xviii). Perhaps this was a more 
suitable task for one with the obvious intellect and frail health of Smith than cleaning, etc., in 
college.  
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Whichcote is universally recognized as a founding member of the 
Cambridge Platonist movement. Indeed, it is in large measure his influence that 
gave to the group their idiosyncratic “Platonism.”57 He taught both Smith and 
Peter Sterry and probably Ralph Cudworth and Nathaniel Culverwell as well.58 
Whichcote enrolled at Emmanuel in 1626 but reacted strongly against the 
orthodox Calvinism he was taught by Anthony Tuckney.59 In 1633 Whichcote 
became a fellow at Emmanuel and three years later he began a series of lectures 
at Holy Trinity Church which lasted nearly two decades in which he gradually 
came to advocate broadly tolerant ideas colored by the hodgepodge of Platonic 
and Stoic philosophy that came to be known as “Cambridge Platonism.”  
By the “early 1640s” Whichcote was teaching what Samuel Salter called a 
“nobler, freer and more generous set of opinions” than the Calvinism then 
57 For example, while they advocated innate ideas they did not have much time for the 
Platonic doctrine of recollection. See Dominic Scott, “Platonic Recollection and the Cambridge 
Platonism,” Hermathena No. 149 (1990): 73-97 (reprinted in Platonism and the English Imagination, 
ed. Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005], 139-50. 
Scott, does not discuss Smith in this article but does, rightly, note that he subscribed to a notion of 
innate ideas (n.11, pp.77 and 95).  
 
58 Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, 12.  
 
59 More on their disagreement below.  
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dominant at Emmanuel.60 More tellingly for our purposes, Bishop Burnet reports 
that Whichcote was “disgusted with the dry, systematical way[s]” of his day. 
Instead of merely promoting the late scholastic curriculum, Whichcote had 
begun to assign more reading in ancient philosophy, “chiefly Plato, Tully 
[Cicero] and Plotin[us].”61 This reference to Plotinus is particularly telling as he 
would become a key influence on Smith.  
Alison Teply has suggested that another great light in the “Cambridge 
Platonist” movement may have been responsible for bringing the study of 
Plotinus to Cambridge. Henry More (1614-1687) of Christ’s College (physically 
near Emmanuel and also deeply “Puritan” at the time) had read widely in the 
“Platonik Writers, Marsilius Ficinus, Plotinus himself” as well as “the Mystical 
Divines” by the time he took his degree.62 Ralph Cudworth too had become a 
Fellow at Emmanuel during Smith’s student days there. Passmore has suggested 
60 Samuel Salter, “Preface,” “Eight Letters of Dr. Anthony Tuckney and Dr Benjamin 
Whichcote,” in Moral and Religious Aphorisms (London, 1753), xx.  Cited in Alison J. Teply, “The 
Mystical Theology of Peter Sterry: A Study in Neoplatonist Puritanism” (Ph.D. Thesis, Emmanuel 
College, University of Cambridge, 2004), 12.  
 
61 Bishop Burnet, History of My Own Time, 1753, 261. Cited by Teply, “Mystical Theology,” 
12.  
 
62 Teply, “Mystical Theology,” 11.  
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that Smith was Cudworth’s “pupil and admirer” on the strength of a letter from 
Dillingham to Sancroft.63 The extent to which Smith learned directly from More 
or Cudworth is unclear but it is likely that they did reinforce the interests and 
competencies that Smith was already forming under the guidance of Whichcote.  
Mention should also be made of another, too-often-neglected, figure in the 
growth of Platonism at Emmanuel College, Peter Sterry. As Teply has 
demonstrated, Sterry was among the very first to “make a public profession of 
Platonism in the University of Cambridge.”64 There is good reason to take this 
claim cum grano salis (Platonic theses were defended in the schools throughout 
the medieval period from time to time). However, Sterry is nonetheless a critical 
example of the combination of Puritanism and Platonism that seems, from the 
63 J. A. Passmore, Ralph Cudworth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 15. 
Marjorie Hope Nicolson agrees with this view of the student-pupil relationship between 
Cudworth and Smith. See her "Christ's College and the Latitude-Men," Modern Philology 27, no. 1 
(1929): 39, 41-2. Despite obvious similarities on many issues (and we will see several in part two 
below) there seems to be little reason to suppose that the relationship was unidirectional in the 
ways supposed by Passmore and Nicolson. Yes, Cudworth was a Fellow during Smith’s later 
student years at Emmanuel but that does not mean that any similarities between the two are the 
result of Cudworth’s influence. 
 
64 Thomas Baker, Harleian MS 7033; Baker vi. 84. Cited by Teply, “Mystical Theology,” 11.  
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outside, so strange in this period at Emmanuel College.65 How is it that scholars 
raised to be Puritans found their way to Platonism?  
Again, Teply has given us the essential clue. There was a small group of 
loosely associated Humanist Puritans in this period.66 Men like Richard 
Holdsworth, briefly Master of Emmanuel College who was a “moderate 
Calvinist” had taught at the “Platonist Gresham College [London] in 1629” 
where he defended “’Pagan’ authors and greatly admir[ed] Plato.”67 Moreover, 
Sterry himself became chaplain to the “Puritan Robert Greville, Lord Brooke” 
(1608-1643) in either 1637 or 1638, shortly after being made a fellow of 
Emmanuel. Other Puritan Platonists, such as Thomas Dugard (a Sidney Sussex 
graduate) also maintained friendships with Sterry and Brooke. Indeed, in the 
turmoil leading up to the Civil War, Lord Brooke provided security for many 
65 For an interesting account of another understudied Puritan Platonist see Norma P. 
Rogers, “John Sherman: Puritan and Cambridge Platonist” (PhD diss., University of Mississippi, 
1986).  
 
66 Micheletti, Il pensiero religioso, 116, 182.  
 
67 Teply, “Mystical Theology,” 19. See also Sarah Hutton, “Plato in Tudor Academies,” in 
Francis Ames-Lewis, ed., Sir Thomas Gresham and Gresham College – Studies in the Intellectual 
History of London in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 1999).   
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more moderate divines. Thus a circle of temperate Puritans, educated at 
Cambridge, and open to Platonic philosophy formed around Brooke.68  
These more tolerant (pseudo-latitudinarian) and humanistic Puritans help 
to explain the presence of Platonic learning at Cambridge in the 1630s and 
1640s.69 In fact, it may even be the case that Sterry himself taught John Smith, 
thus helping to pass Platonic predilections to our author. In any event, we know 
that Smith was well aware of moderate Reformers well read in Platonic 
philosophy; Brooke’s Nature of Truth (1640), an influential stimulus to the 
“formation of Platonic ideas during the early decades of the seventeenth-
century,” was included in Smith’s library donation to Queens’ College.70 
68 Teply, “Mystical Theology,” 20-52. See also James Deotis Roberts, From Puritanism to 
Platonism in Seventeenth Century England (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969).  
 
69 On the notion of “latitudinarianism” see Simon Patrick, A Brief Account of the New Sect 
of Latitude-Men (London, 1662); Edward Fowler, The Principles and Practices of Certaine Moderate 
Divines of the Church of England Abusively Called Latitudinarians (Greatly Misunderstood) Truly 
Represented and Defended Wherein (by the Way) Some Controversies of No Mean Importance Are 
Succinctly Discussed in a Free Discourse between the Two Intimate Friends: In III Parts, 2nd ed. (London: 
Printed for Lodowick Lloyd, 1671); E. A. George, Seventeenth Century Men of Latitude (New York, 
1908); Marjorie Hope Nicolson, "Christ's College and the Latitude-Men," Modern Philology 27, no. 
1 (1929): 35-53; John Spurr, "'Latitudinarianism' and the Restoration Church," The Historical 
Journal 31, no. 1 (1988): 61-82. Most basically the phrase distinguishes a style of churchmanship 
noted for tolerance of a wide variety of views and practices so long as essentials are observed. It 
is something like a predecessor to what in contemporary America is called “liberal” or “mainline 
Protestantism.”  
 
70 Ibid., 36. See also Queens’ MS 47, 21, and Saveson, “Catalogue,” 14.  
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Though almost certainly exposed to a wider range of texts and modes of 
thought by his tutor Whichcote, and perhaps also Peter Sterry and others too, 
Smith’s official education at Emmanuel would have followed the then standard 
late scholastic curriculum. However, beyond these generalities, precious little is 
known about the education that Smith received at Emmanuel.  
Richard Holdsworth (one-time President of Emmanuel) reports an ideal 
course of study in his “Directions for Study” but there is no record of what 
students such as Smith actually read.71 This lacuna is mitigated somewhat by the 
more general observations scholars have made about the curriculum at 
seventeenth century Cambridge more broadly. In what follows, I will outline this 
course of study using Costello as a central guide, supplemented by primary 
sources related directly to Smith.  
The scholar of thirteenth century Paris would have clearly recognized the 
work of seventeenth century Cambridge.72 By this period scholasticism held on 
71 Richard Holdsworth, “Directions for a Student in the Universitie,” Emmanuel College, 
Cambridge, MS 1.2.27.(1); reprinted as “Appendix II,” in Harris Francis Fletcher, The Intellectual 
Development of John Milton: The Cambridge University Period (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 
1961), 2: 623-64.  
 
72 Though, of course, with the differences that accrue over time in any living tradition. 
Scholastic forms and subject matter had come of age in Paris and Oxford during the early 
centuries of the first gathering of scholars along the river Cam (12th and 13th centuries). 
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as the official mode of thought and instruction in the University and its Colleges, 
even if in some respects they had grown tired and merely formal.73 In an age 
such as ours when academic fashions race by at the speed of digital 
communications the contrast could not be greater.  
Instruction took the form of three basic scholastic practices and the 
informal tutoring that still marks an Oxbridge education. Teaching officials in the 
Schools and the Colleges gave regular lectures on the central texts of the 
curriculum in the medieval style with students taking down lectures word for 
word so as to have their text available for later study. By Smith’s day the 
increasing accessibility of printed books was making the lecture less important 
than it had originally been, but they continued throughout the seventeenth 
century nonetheless.  
More dynamic than the formal scholastic lecture were the disputation and 
its written cousin the declamation. Disputations were held in both the Colleges 
and in the Schools as a “way of examining the talents of those who aspired to a 
73 William T. Costello, The Scholastic Curriculum at Early Seventeenth-Century Cambridge 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 4. 
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Cambridge degree.”74 Theses, which could be assigned or chosen by the student, 
were presented with full academic ceremonial and defended via syllogistic 
arguments and debate. As live oral battles of wits, the disputations were a 
highlight of the academic life of the University as well as being great 
entertainment. The intellectual and rhetorical talent required for participants in a 
disputation made for excellent training of young scholars. But most of the skills 
needed for disputations were practiced in a third form of scholastic practice, the 
declamation.  
The declamation was essentially “a polished essay,” though, like the 
disputation meant to be presented orally.75 They were regularly assigned, both 
privately in College and publically in the Schools. The central task of the 
declamation was effective oratory in a clear and plain rhetorical style. However, 
precision in argumentation was expected as well.76 
74 Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 146. On the medieval disputation see Alex Novikoff, 
“Toward a Cultural History of Scholastic Disputation,” American Historical Review (April 2012): 
330-64, accessed 20 April 2014, https://www.academia.edu/4051209/, and The Medieval Culture of 
Disputation: Pedagogy, Practice, and Performance (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2013). 
 
75 Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 146.   
 
76 Ibid., 32. 
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The primary subject matter for an undergraduate at early seventeenth 
century Cambridge followed the scholastic pattern as well. Students read the 
three arts of logic, rhetoric, and ethics and the four sciences of metaphysics, 
physics, mathematics, and “cosmography” (a combination of geography and 
what would today be geology, anthropology, history, and the like).77 Graduate 
studies at Cambridge were limited to the highest medieval disciplines: music, 
law, medicine, and above all, theology.  
 
3.3.1 Logic 
 The logic studied at seventeenth century Cambridge was Aristotelian.78 
This does not mean that it was Aristotle himself that students read however. 
Through “such manuals as Keckermann’s Systema Logicae, Burgersdicius’ 
Institutimum Logicarum Libri Duo, Heorebords Annotamenta, and Eustachius of St. 
Paul’s Summa Philosophiae Quadripartia” undergraduates received “Aristotle 
77 Ibid., 148. On the scholastic curriculum in the (Italian) Renaissance see Paul Oskar 
Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1961), 92-119.  
 
78 On British Aristotelianism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries see Marco Sgarbi, 
“Towards a Reassessment of British Aristotelianism,” Vivarium 50 no. 1 (2012): 85-109. Smith’s 
logical training is best seen in his argumentation for the principles of natural theology. See 
section 6.1 below.  
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resystematized and simplified.”79 Thus, the syllogism and a priori argument was 
highly praised as the way to true science. This lead to a relative lack of attention 
to inductive, a posteriori, methods of argument in the Cambridge curriculum. 
Over time, this meant that the newer scientific approaches of Bacon and Galileo 
had no clear line of entry into the curriculum. As we will see below, Smith 
managed to work around this delay in the modernization of the curriculum 
through extensive reading, discussion, and correspondence.80 
  
3.3.2 Rhetoric 
 Every reader of Smith has been impressed by his eloquence. While 
undoubtedly owning to his own unique genius, rhetoric was also a central part 
of the seventeenth century curriculum as well. Having learned through his 
studies in logic to seek the truth the Cambridge undergraduate turned to rhetoric 
79 Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 45. Also, M. Sgarbi, “Logic in the Universities of the 
British Isles,” in The Aristotelian Tradition and the Rise of British Empiricism (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2013), 35-9.  
 
80 John Wallis appealed to correspondence with Smith to back up his claim to have 
developed a method for solving cubic equations in which he mentions that Smith had asked him 
for his assistance on a some aspects of Descartes’ Geometry. John Wallis, A Treatise on Algebra, both 
Historical and Critical (London: Richard Davis, Oxford, 1685), 121, 177, 209. The original 
correspondence with Smith is lost but the contents thereof have been more-or-less reconstructed 
in Philip Beeley and Christoph Scriba, eds., Correspondence of John Wallis (1616-1703) (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 1: 9.  
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to make some profitable use of that truth. Holdsworth says of rhetoric that it 
“teaches the nature of men’s passions and affections, how to raise and move 
them, how to allay, quiet and change them, a knowledge necessary not only in 
writing, but speeches and letters, but also in common discourse and dealing with 
men, if not to make use of it yourself at least to discover it to other men that you 
may not be at any time abused and over reached by it.”81 In short, rhetoric 
teaches one how to persuade and how not to be persuaded by others too easily. 
In the still largely oral academic culture of seventeenth century Cambridge the 
ability to speak well cannot be overestimated.   
 Holdsworth recommends that students keep a commonplace book (i.e., 
notebook) for what Costello calls “the idiomatic fruits of reading” primarily in 
the Latin classics.82 The idea being to learn artful expression by imitation of the 
masters and in the process to gain fluency in good Latin too.83 In addition to this 
method of imitation, Holdsworth recommended a number of manuals in oratory, 
81 Holdsworth, “Directions,” quoted in Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 55. On the use of 
these notebooks in early modern England see Richard Yeo, “Notebooks as Memory Aids: 
Precepts and Practices in Early Modern England,” Memory Studies 1, no. 1 (2008): 115-36.  
 
82 For an example of these “notebooks” see C. J. Cook, The Palfrey Notebook: Records of 
Study in Seventeenth-Century Cambridge (Woodbridg: Boydell Press, 2011).  
 
83 Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 56.  
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but above all that of the French Jesuit, Nicolas Caussin (1583-1651), De Eloqentia 
sacra et humana.84  
Smith would seem to have taken this, or some similar, advice to heart as 
his single extant “commonplace book” is full of quotations from the Greek and 
Roman classics, poetry, oratory, history, geography as well as the philosophical 
sciences.85 Moreover, the list of authorities given in the early pages of Caussin’s 
De Eloquentia (1630) includes nearly every author referenced by Smith in his 
Select Discourses, with the exceptions of moderns like Descartes and Platonists 
such as Plotinus and Proclus.86 For example, Caussin recommends Aristotle, 
Cicero, Augustine, Plato, Plutarch, Tacitus, Pliny, (Pseudo-)Dionysius, Origen, 
84 Ibid., 56-7. Holdsworth, “Directions,” 11, 33. Nicholas Caussin, De Eloquentia Sacra et 
Humana Libri XVI (Cologne, 1634). A slightly earlier edition of this same text was still being used 
by the American Founding Father, John Adams (1735-1826) in the eighteenth century. As Adams 
was educated at Harvard College and that institution’s roots lay in Emmanuel College, 
Cambridge, it would seem likely that the advice to study Caussin’s rhetoric continued well into 
the century following Holdsworth’s “Directions.” Adams’ own copy is Nicholas Caussin, De 
Eloquentia Sacra et Humana Libri XVI (Paris, 1630), Internet Archive, accessed 16 April 2014, 
https://archive.org/details/nicolaicaussinit00caus. On the connections between the two 
Cambridges, see Daniel Walker Howe, “The Cambridge Platonists of Old England and the 
Cambridge Platonists of New England,” Church History, 57, no. 4 (1988), 470-85.  
 
85 Cambridge University Library MS Dd.ix.44. This manuscript is described in A Catalogue 
of the Manuscripts Preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge, ed. Syndics of the 
University Press (Cambridge: University Press, 1856), I: 403 (item 531). It contains historical, 
geographical and cosmographical notes on many topics as well as some notes on figures of 
philosophical and theological significance. 
 
86 Caussin, “Auctores qui Laudantur et Expenduntur,” in De Eloquentia.  
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Clement of Alexandria, Chrysostom, Tertullian, and others, all of whom appear 
in Smith’s Discourses frequently. A fine copy of De Eloquentia was donated by 
Smith to Queens’ College.87 
Holdsworth was also keen on memorizing choice passages out of key 
authors in a process he called “getting without book.” It would seem that Smith 
excelled at this too, since Simon Patrick referred to him as a “living library” 
capable of sharing what he had gleaned from his wide reading with any who 
should seek to converse with him.88  
 
3.3.3 Ethics 
 As in many other areas, the curriculum at Cambridge looked to Aristotle 
for its guide to ethics, at least in the early decades of the seventeenth century. 
Aristotelian “virtue ethics” was studied, like logic, less in the original than in 
commentaries or summaries by Catholics such as “Victoria, Lessius, De Lugo, 
Suarez, and Dominicus Soto” and Protestants like “Melanchthon or Grotius.”89 
87 Queens’ MS 47, 22; Saveson, “Catalogue,” 20. See Charles Trinkaus, In our Image and 
Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought, 2 vols. (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1995). 
 
88 Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 58; Simon Patrick, “Funeral Sermon” (1660), 506-7.  
 
89 Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 64. 
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Thus while Aristotelian, the student of ethics was also exposed to (relatively) 
modern texts and concerns. For example, Smith himself owned four works by 
Grotius, including a copy of the Mare Liberum.90 His collection also included the 
Historiae Florentinae of Machiavelli,91 Sadler’s Rights of the Kingdom (1649),92 and 
John Selden’s De Jure Naturali (1640),93 among many others.  
 While centrally concerned with virtue after the style of Aristotle, the 
Cambridge undergraduate knew this approach to morality as it related to others 
from classical antiquity as well. Fellow student at Emmanuel, John Balderston, 
notes the Epicurean concern for pleasure, the Stoic view of virtue as its own 
90 Smith also owned copies of Grotius’ Defensio Fidei Catholicae de Satisfactione Christi, 
adversus Faustum Socinum (Leyden, 1617), Apologeticus (Paris, 1622), De Imperio Summarum 
Potestatum circa Sacra, Commentarius Posthumus (Paris, 1647), as well as the  Mare Liberum (edition 
uncertain). Queens’ MS 47, 25; Saveson, “Catalogue,” 30, 70 n.54. Smith’s own moral theory is 
essentially Aristotelean in the sense that it places great emphasis on the cultivation of virtue. But, 
far more importantly, his ethics is theological and spiritual. See especially chapters four and five 
below.    
 
91 Queens’ MS 47, 29; J.E. Saveson, “Catalogue,” 42. Nicolai Machiavelli, Historiae 
Florentinae Libri VIII (Strassburg, 1610).  
 
92 Queens’ MS 47, 32; J.E. Saveson, “Catalogue,” 53. John Sadler, Rights of the Kingdom; or 
customs of our Ancestours (London, 1649).   
 
93 Queens’ MS 47, 33; J.E. Saveson, “Catalogue,” 55. John Selden, De Jure Naturali et 
Gentium, juxta Disciplinam Ehraeorum Libri Septem (London, 1640).  
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reward, the Platonic goal of “assimilation to God” along with Aristotle’s 
“virtuous activity.”94  
 In an age as fully saturated with religion (and religious controversy) as the 
seventeenth century in England, much of what would today be the purview of 
philosophical (meta)ethics was then dealt with under the rubric of theology. 
Questions about the moral nature of humanity for example often took the form 
of disputes between Catholic and Protestant (and different types of each) over 
predestination, justification, etc.95  
 
3.3.4 Metaphysics 
For the seventeenth century, as it had for centuries, metaphysics meant 
the primary philosophical science, which dealt with the most generalized 
principles of being and which prescinded being entirely from its status as 
literary or economic, sensible or suprasensible.96  
 
In other words, metaphysics included the study of Being qua Being, just as it had 
for Aristotle.  Closely aligned with theology, in that it too dealt with God, 
94 Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 65. See also John Sellars, Stoicism (Berkeley and Los 
Angles: University of California Press, 2006).   
 
95 On this see, for example, Jill Kraye, Risto Saarinen, eds., Moral Philosophy on the 
Threshold of Modernity (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006).  
 
96 Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 71.  
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metaphysics differed in that it did not rely on revelation but instead upon reason 
alone (or so the scholastic thought). Natural theology therefore was a matter of 
metaphysical speculation but so too was the general principles of substance, 
form, potential, actuality, and the four causes, which are central to an 
Aristotelian account of any sensible or material being at all.  
 Despite the predominance of Aristotelian metaphysics at seventeenth 
century Cambridge, the Platonic tradition was not (completely) neglected. For 
example, Neoplatonic themes are clearly apparent in verses composed to 
introduce some disputations in the Schools.97 Moreover, as early as 1605 the 
Platonic thesis that “the soul of the man is the man” (Animus cuiusque quisque) 
was defended before the Schools and was introduced with the statement that 
“only Plato [and presumably the Platonists with him] among all the philosophers 
dared” to hold this thesis. The disputant continues, “This opinion is acceptable to 
me, not because Platonic, though Plato’s authority carries more weight with me 
than that of any other philosopher, but because his opinion seems to me to 
approach nearer the truth.”98 So, while the architectonic of metaphysical study 
97 Ibid., 18.  
 
98 Quoted in Costello, 30.  
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remained Aristotelian, already by the early years of the seventeenth century 
room was being made for the Platonism that would come to prominence in 
Smith and the other Cambridge Platonists.99  
 With Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, Smith was among the first at 
Cambridge to read the new metaphysics of Rene Descartes. While More carried 
on a correspondence with Descartes and both he and Cudworth cooled to his 
system over time, Smith remained an uncritical admirer of Cartesian philosophy 
up to his death in 1652. For Smith, Cartesian dualism sat well with ancient 
99 The “Platonism” of the Cambridge Platonists was never pure or simple however. As 
Sarah Hutton has cautioned, the Cambridge Platonists were well versed in many schools of 
ancient philosophy (Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, etc.) as well as the new developments 
of Descartes and Hobbes. See Hutton, "The Cambridge Platonists" and “Introduction to the 
Renaissance and Seventeenth Century,” in Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton, eds., Platonism and 
the English Imagination (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 67-75. Also, John Sellars, “Stoics 
Against Stoics in Cudworth’s A Treatise of Freewill,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 
no.5 (2012): 935-52, and “Is God a Mindless Vegetable? Cudworth on Stoic Theology,” Intellectual 
History Review 21 no.2 (2011): 121-33; and This mixed bag should not come as a surprise however. 
The Platonism present in scholastic philosophy was always a hybrid form combining Christian, 
Stoic, and Aristotelian elements. In short, scholastic Platonism was Christian Neoplatonism.  
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Platonism.100 In Descartes’ metaphysics “Smith found contemporary support for 
the philosophy of Plotinus.”101  
There are no references to Thomas Hobbes in the Select Discourses at all; 
Smith seems to have been unaware of Hobbes’s challenge to the incorporeal soul 
and the spiritual God that Smith took for granted.102 Where More and Cudworth 
were to become strong opponents of new varieties of corporealism,103 the atheism 
and materialism that concerned Smith took the form of ancient atomism 
(Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius).104 Commentators have typically 
dismissed this as a touch of antiquarian curiosity on his part, as if these ancient 
100 “Gli stessi argomenti per l'immortalita dell'anima in cui l'originalita di Smith consiste 
nella combinazione di platonismo e cartesianesimo, sono discussioni speculative elaborate dalla 
ragione per chiarire una convinzione generata dall fede . . . ” (Micheletti, Il pensiero religioso, 100; 
see also 81 and 262). See also chapter six below.  
 
101 Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, 30. Also, Saveson, “Differing 
Reactions to Descartes among the Cambridge Platonists,” Journal of the History of Ideas 21 (1960): 
567.  
 
102 Tulloch, Rational Theology, 2: 141.  
 
103 On More’s opposition to Descartes see Hall, Henry More, 135-7, 146-67, 193, 236. For 
More and Cudworth against Hobbes see I. Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-century 
Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 80-133. For an argument on behalf of Hobbes against Cudworth see 
Stewart Duncan, "Knowledge of God in ‘Leviathan’,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 no.1 (2005): 
31-48. For Cudworth against Descartes see, for example, his True Intellectual System (1678), 53.  
 
104 Micheletti, Il pensiero religioso, 332. See chapter 6 below.  
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theories were irrelevant.105 In this, scholarship on Smith has sold him short as a 
Christian apologist just as set against materialism as More and Cudworth.  
While atomism and various forms of attendant materialism did explode 
on to the European philosophical scene in the mid-seventeenth century, the roots 
of this flowering go far deeper and were well known to Smith. For one thing, late 
medieval and early Renaissance philosophy already had significant attempts to 
explain the natural world in terms of atoms, among them the religious reformer 
John Wycliffe (1320-84).106 Both Erasmus and Sir Thomas More in the sixteenth 
century thought the philosophy of Lucretius a serious enough matter to compose 
a fictional dialogue titled The Epicurean (Erasmus) and to include the epicurean 
“pleasure principle” as the guiding force of the (superior) morality of the 
inhabitants of Utopia (More).107  
105 Tulloch, Rational Theology, 2:141-2 and Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist 
Spirituality, 29-30 are typical in this regard.  
 
106 Emily Michael, “John Wyclif’s Atomism,” in Christophe Grellard, and Aurâelien 
Robert, eds., Atomism in Late Medieval Philosophy and Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 183-220.  
 
107 Stephen Greenblatt, The Swerve: How the World Became Modern (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2011), 227-8. Desiderius Erasmus, “The Epicurean,” in Colloquies, Vol. 1, 
trans. Craig Ringwalt Thompson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 1070-94. Thomas 
More, Utopia, ed. George M. Logan and Robert Merrihew Adams (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). In their later disputes Martin Luther often accused Erasmus 
of being an “epicurean,” clear evidence that it was plausible that one might be such in the early 
sixteenth century. Charles Kay Smith, “French Philosophy and English Politics in Interregnum 
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In the early seventeenth century, on the heels of the execution of Giordano 
Bruno, Jesuits at the University of Pisa were given a Latin prayer against the 
temptations of atomism to recite daily.  
Nothing comes from atoms. 
All the bodies of the world shine with the beauty of their forms.  
Without these the globe would only be an immense chaos.  
In the beginning God made all things, so that they might generate something.  
Consider to be nothing that from which nothing can come.  
You, O Democritus, form nothing different starting from atoms.  
Atoms produce nothing; therefore atoms are nothing.108  
 
When Bruno began to write his “heretical” views of the cosmos as infinite, the 
heliocentric solar system,109 pantheism, and the denial of the divinity of Jesus, he 
chose to do so in Latin verse, following Lucretius’s De rerum natura as his 
guide.110 Indeed, Greenblatt has argued convincingly that Bruno was deeply 
Poetry,” in Malcolm Smuts, ed., The Stuart Court and Europe: Essays in Politics and Political Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 177. Also, Catherine Wilson, “Epicureanism in 
Early Modern Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, ed. James Warren 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 266-86.  
 
108 Anonymous, “Exercitatio de formis substantialibus et de qualitatibus physicis, in 
Pietro Reddondi, Galileo Heretic, trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 340, quoted 
by Greenblatt, The Swerve, 250.      
 
109 See Koyré, Closed World, 28-57.  
 
110 Ingrid D. Rowland, Giordano Bruno: Philosopher/Heretic (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2008), 214. Importantly, it was not for his scientific views that Bruno was burnt at the 
stake in 1600 but rather his theological opinions. There was no official position within the 
Catholic Church against heliocentrism at the time. Sheila Rabin, "Nicolaus Copernicus," The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 16 August 2010, accessed 19 
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influenced by his reading of Lucretius while Rowland notes that much of what is 
“most revolutionary” in Bruno “had already been ventured by ancient Greek 
philosophers.”111 
In England, Puritans frequently hurled the label “epicurean” at the 
despised members of King Charles’ Court. Some of this was simply a fashionable 
and learned way of calling Royalists un-Godly in the moral sense. However, 
there were actually some entanglements with actual philosophical Epicureanism 
at Court too.112 Clearly, then, materialism in the form of Epicurean atomism was 
a living concern in Smith’s day. When he offers arguments directed against 
Epicurus and Lucretius he is not only offering a lesson in the history of 
April 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/copernicus/.  Also, M. A. 
Finocchiaro, “Philosophy versus Religion and Science versus Religion: the Trials of Bruno and 
Galileo,” in H. Gatti, ed., Giordano Bruno: Philosopher of the Renaissance (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 
51–96.   
 
111 Greenblatt, The Swerve, 233-41; Rowland, Giordano Bruno, 216.  
 
112 C. K. Smith, “French Philosophy and English Politics,” 177-8. Also, Reid Barbour, “The 
Early Stuart Epicure,” English Literary Renaissance 23 (1993): 173-200; Douglas Brooks-Davis, The 
Mercurian Monarch: Magical Politics from Spencer to Pope (Manchester, 1983), 101-7. More generally, 
see Catherine Wilson, Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008).  
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philosophy. Smith is there making a case against a real threat to sound Christian 
philosophy as he understands it.113  
 
3.3.5 Physics 
 Early seventeenth century physics included elements of what today 
would be called philosophy and several sciences too. What kept all the disparate 
strands of physics, or natural philosophy, together was that it treated being in so 
far as it is subject to change. Physics was, in its more philosophical guise, 
essentially “concerned with the universal principles of matter, form, time, place, 
and extension.”114 In addition, physics treated the physical composition of the 
universe including astronomy, the elements (ether, fire, air, water, and earth), 
113 There are two potential reasons why this has been ignored by scholars working on 
Smith and the Cambridge Platonists more broadly. First, it has become eccentric in the extreme to 
think of ancient schools of philosophy, and the texts associated with them, as anything like a 
living challenge to our understandings of nature and ourselves. This was not so in Smith’s day 
when, as we have seen, the texts, phrases, and modes of thought of the ancients were the very 
stuff of current thinking and writing. Second, compared to More and Cudworth (who lived to 
respond to the challenge of Hobbes and the “mind-body problem” in ways that were not as 
relevant in Smith’s lifetime, Smith offers relatively little in the way of explicit argument against 
his ancient atomist foes. See chapter six in part II below for my argument that this owes much to 
Smith’s reliance on the spiritual senses in his theology. In short, for Smith one can “see” that the 
Epicurean system is false when one lives and thus comes to consciousness of the true Christian 
Neoplatonic system.  
 
114 Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 90.  
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Aristotelian psychology including the rational soul of human beings, and the 
origin of the world.  
  
3.3.6 Mathematics 
 The state of mathematical knowledge at early seventeenth century 
Cambridge lagged well behind that of universities in Italy and elsewhere. 
Emmanuel student John Wallis reports that during his time there (the early 
1630s) he “did thenceforth prosecute it [mathematics] . . . not as a formal study, 
but as a pleasing diversion, at spare hours . . . For I had none to direct me.”115 The 
general lack of notebooks and disputations related to mathematics makes it all 
the more remarkable that among Smith’s personal library collection are several 
works from the cutting edge of early modern mathematics. For example, Smith 
owned a copy of Descartes’ Geometry and many books of astronomy in the 
tradition of Copernicus.116 These include eleven works by Kepler, Galileo’s 
Dialogus de Systemate Mundi, as well as works by Rheticus (Narratio Prima) and 
the scientific works of Giordano Bruno.117  
115 Quoted in Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 102.  
 
116 Saveson, “The Library of John Smith,” 216.  
 
117 Ibid.; Saveson, “Catalogue,” 14, 28-9, 37.  
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 In addition to these newer texts in mathematics and physics, Smith also 
possessed, and likely used in conjunction with Descartes’ Geometry in his 
mathematical teaching, copies of the geometrical works of Jacobi de Billy, 
Bonaventura Cavalieri, Oronce Fine, Marini Ghetaldi, Michaelis Havemanni, 
Petri Ryffii, and  Petrus Ramus.118 He would have also had available the Elements 
of Euclid with an influential preface by the sixteenth century magus John Dee.119 
Mordechai Feingold tells us that it was most likely Smith, and a few others, that 
set Isaac Barrow on his path toward the development of the fundamental 
theorem of calculus, a key step on the road to the great breakthroughs of 
Barrow’s student, Isaac Newton a generation later.120 Unlike his contemporaries, 
Smith both had the opportunity to study mathematics and obviously the 
proficiency to help bring that field to prominence at Cambridge by the end of the 
seventeenth century.  
118 Saveson, “Catalogue,” 12, 17, 28, 32, 51.  
 
119 Translated by Sir Henry Billingsley and first published in 1570 and again in 1650. On 
the preface by Dee see, Gerald Suster, ed., John Dee (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books, 2003), 
37-46.  
 
120 Mordechai Feingold, “Isaac Barrow: Divine, Scholar, Mathematician,” in Mordechai 
Feingold, ed., Before Newton: The Life and Times of Isaac Barrow (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
19. More on Smith’s mathematical teaching below.  
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3.3.7 Cosmography 
 The last of the four sciences in the undergraduate curriculum is virtually 
unheard of today and in fact was heavily neglected even in the seventeenth 
century. Cosmography was the science of the general features of the cosmos, 
including the heavens and the Earth. It included what today would be called 
geophysics and geography, but also history, physical and cultural anthropology, 
and comparative religions/philosophies too. Cosmography treated the shape and 
location of geographic features as well as the cultures and histories of the 
inhabitants of far off lands.  
Surprisingly, given the pace of English colonization at the time, there was 
little emphasis on cosmography at seventeenth century Cambridge. This may be 
related, as Costello suggests, to the poor state of mathematical knowledge since 
cartography increasingly relied on mathematics during this period.121 But, most 
likely the work of merchants and explorers was simply not “academic” enough 
to receive attention at Cambridge in the early modern period.122  
121 Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 104.  
 
122 Even so, there were notable efforts made in this area such as the cosmographic works 
of Samuel Purchas. Ibid.   
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In this area, Smith’s interests seem to be particularly unusual for his 
context. As we have already seen, he had deep interests in the geography and 
history of the world. Smith’s commonplace book is mostly full of citations from 
histories.123 His library too included a vast number of histories and geographic 
texts as well.124 Smith’s interests here are suggestive of an active imagination on 
his part, precisely the sort of lively faculty that plays a central role in his version 
of the spiritual senses.125  
In light of his unusual interest in cosmography, mathematics and the new 
physics, Smith was clearly no less concerned with the developments of his own 
day than the classical and scholastic elements of his education. Smith was a 
modern scholar but one who clearly knew his scholastic tradition too. As we will 
see in Part II below, this combination was to serve him well when he came to 
compose his Select Discourses.  
 
123 A Catalogue of the Manuscripts Preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge, ed. 
Syndics of the University Press (Cambridge: University Press, 1856), I: 403 (item 531). 
 
124 For example, the geographical works of Lamberti Danaei, Ferrari, Abraham Golnitzi, 
among many others. Saveson, “Catalogue,” 24, 27, 31.  
 
125 See part two below. 
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3.3.8 Theology 
 In addition to the undergraduate studies outlined above there were four 
graduate disciplines in early modern Cambridge; theology, medicine, law, and 
music.126 There is little evidence however of any particular interest in law or 
music on Smith’s part, and this is basically in keeping with the overall paucity of 
these studies at Cambridge. Medicine too was not a major concern of the scholars 
along the Cam. Most who did study the healing arts did so after they left 
Cambridge, often at the great international center for medical training, Padua, as 
we have seen in the example of Harvey.127 The one area that really excelled at 
Cambridge was theology. We will see much more about the religious situation in 
Smith’s time at Cambridge in the next section but the academic aspects (which 
are not really distinguishable from the more general religious and political 
situation) can be presented relatively briefly.  
 At Emmanuel there were, by statute, weekly theological disputations that 
were intended to follow the “usual custom of the other colleges.”128 Presumably 
126 Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 107.  
 
127 Ibid., 128-45. On Renaissance medical education see Nancy G. Siraisi, Medieval and 
Early Renaissance Medicine: An Introduction to Knowledge and Practice (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009), 48-77.  
 
128 Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 110.  
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then, such theological battles of wits were common across Cambridge. In 
addition to disputations conducted by Fellows and attended by scholars there 
were opportunities to be schooled in the basics of Puritan, that is Calvinist, 
theology at Emmanuel. For example, in 1628 Anthony Tuckney, who would 
eventually engage in valuable epistolary debate with Whichcote and rise to the 
Mastership of Emmanuel, delivered what has been recorded as “A brief and 
pithy catechism” in the College Chapel.  
This catechesis as well as the numerous sermons given in chapel (attended 
by all while in college), from the pulpits of the surrounding churches, and the 
University sermons given at Great St. Mary’s were well attended by scholars 
who were encouraged to take them down word for word (“diting”) so that their 
content could be further reflected on and studied later.129 Often sermons were 
answered by another preacher in something resembling the disputation; a kind 
of disputation by alternating sermons.130 The Divinity School disputations too 
“were the acme of the school exercises, and the undergraduates attended.”131 
129 Ibid., 111.  
 
130 Ibid., 111-2.  
 
131 Ibid., 112. 
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Thus, the Cambridge student was well versed and rehearsed in theology and 
theological controversy.132 
 The content of the majority of theological instruction at Cambridge in the 
early seventeenth century was Reformed, in the Lutheran/Calvinist sense, while 
on issues of ecclesiology, ritual, and the like, opinions differed from very nearly 
what would today be called Anglo-Catholic to non-conformist and extreme 
Protestant (Presbyterian, Congregational, etc.). Even those who wished to 
maintain the episcopacy and the rituals of the medieval church tended to be 
thoroughly Protestant on issues of salvation, stressing the free gift of salvation 
through faith. Indeed, the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England are fully 
consistent with a Reformed interpretation even as they keep open the possibility 
of retaining some Catholic practices. This is why, while Emmanuel College was a 
clearly “Puritan” institution in Smith’s day, this does not mean that its members 
opposed the established Church of England. Not all Puritans were non-
conformists, or indeed Parliamentarians during the Civil War. Holdsworth, for 
example, was both a Puritan and a Royalist.  
132 So much so that one recent graduate was able to argue, complete with full scholastic 
flourish, with a French Catholic priest in Latin. Ibid.  
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The theology taught along the Cam was a kind of scholastic Protestantism. 
Prominent among the disputation topics in theology were the central issues of 
contention between Protestants and Catholics at the time. However the only real 
options open to members of Cambridge Colleges was how Protestant to be; 
Catholicism was itself essentially illegal from 1559-1685 and again from 1688-
1829 in England.133 Students of theology included Calvinists of various stripes, 
including the more extreme Puritans like Anthony Tuckney, but also Arminians 
of either High (Laudian) or Low Church sorts too.134 While they differed deeply 
133 “History of the Catholic Church in England (16th – 19th Century),” Pope Benedict XVI 
in the United Kingdom, accessed 16 April 2014http://www.thepapalvisit.org.uk/The-Catholic-
Faith/History-of-the-Catholic-Church-in-England-16th-19th-Century. Edwin Burton, Edward 
D'Alton, and Jarvis Kelley, "Penal Laws," in The Catholic Encyclopedia Vol. 11 (New York: Robert 
Appleton Company, 1911), accessed 16 April 2014, 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11611c.htm.  
 
134 Arminianism takes its name from Jacobus Arminius (1560–1609). His basic tenants 
were: “1. Prior to being drawn and enabled, one is unable to believe . . . able only to resist. 2. 
Having been drawn and enabled, but prior to regeneration, one is able to believe . . . able also to 
resist. 3. After one believes, God then regenerates; one is able to continue believing . . . able also 
to resist. 4. Upon resisting to the point of unbelief, one is unable again to believe . . . able only to 
resist” (Stephen Ashby, "Reformed Arminianism," in Four Views on Eternal Security [Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 2002], 159). Thus, “Arminianism” is associated, especially by (orthodox) Calvinists 
with the notion that one may (must) cooperate with grace in the process of salvation. Arminians 
were often accused of Pelagianism (the heresy that original sin left no taint on human nature) by 
opponents. The classic study with regard to the Cambridge Platonists (Cudworth and More 
primarily) is Rosalie L. Colie, Light and Enlightenment: A Study of the Cambridge Platonists and the 
Dutch Arminians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957). “Laudian” refers to that style of 
churchmanship promulgated by Archbishop William Laud. It was “High” in ritual and 
ecclesiology and tended toward Arminianism in theology.  
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on issues of grace, justification, the freedom of the will as well as ritual and 
polity, a common collection of texts and authors remained the steady diet of the 
typical Cambridge divine. Medieval schoolmen such as Thomas Aquinas, 
Bonaventure, and John Duns Scotus, were read and used along with modern 
scholastics such as Suarez, Molina, and Victoria.135 With these masters, and many 
others, the scholar was also expected to turn to the Church Fathers for help in 
understanding scripture. Among them, Augustine, Justin Martyr, Clement of 
Alexandria, and Ambrose of Millan, figured prominently. Even a figure of such 
questioned orthodoxy as Origen was read, even at Puritan Emmanuel.136  
Notice should also be made of the move toward reading scripture in its 
original languages, Hebrew and Greek, rather than in Latin only. Here the 
driving forces are Renaissance humanism and the Protestant Reformation. In 
135 Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 121, and 81. Scholastic authors abound in the libraries 
of Emmanuel and Queens’ Colleges in the early seventeenth century. See S. Bush, Jr. and C. J. 
Rasmussen, The Library of Emmanuel College Cambridge 1584-1637 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) and T. H. Horne, A Catalogue of the Library of The College of St. Margaret and 
St. Bernard, Commonly Called Queen’s College in the University of Cambridge (London, 1827).  
 
136 Origen‘s Contra Celsum, was owned by both Emmanuel and Queens‘ Colleges’s 
Libraries in a 1605 Greek and Latin edition. For Emmanuel College see Bush and Rasmussen, The 
Library of Emmanuel College, 146. This volume was in the collection for the first year of Smith‘s 
undergraduate studies in the College. There was also most likely a copy, of the same edition, at 
Queens‘ College when he became a fellow in 1644. See Horne, Catalogue, 122. The edition in both 
cases was that of David Hoeschelius.  
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fact, it was Catholic humanism that led to Erasmus’ Greek New Testament. And 
one of the first great vernacular translations of the Bible was composed by 
Martin Luther in German from that quintessential work of humanist 
scholarship.137 Moreover, many an Oxbridge don was set to work in the early 
seventeenth century putting the sacred texts into English out of their originals.138  
Smith too was well read in Hebrew and Greek as well as Latin, and shows 
clear signs of interest in other Near Eastern languages in his library collection as 
well.139 Like Thomas Aquinas, who read and learned from Maimonides, and the 
Renaissance Platonist Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who read the Kabbalah, 
John Smith benefited from a relatively extensive study of Judaica. Smith was well 
137 Luther’s New Testament in Early New High German (1522) used as its source text the 
second edition of Erasmus’s Textus Receptus (1519).   
 
138 The Holy Bible, Conteyning the Old Testament, and the New: Newly Translated out of the 
Originall Tongues (London: Robert Barker, 1611). On the process of translating this “Authorized” 
or “King James Version” from a theological perspective see Alister McGrath, In the Beginning: The 
Story of the King James Bible and How It Changed a Nation, a Language, and a Culture (New York: 
Random House, 2008), and for a historical account, Adam Nicolson, God's Secretaries: The Making 
of the King James Bible (New York: HarperCollins, 2003).  
 
139 Saveson, "The Library of John Smith," 216 ; Saveson, “Catalogue,” 9-78.  
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versed in the Talmud and the works of many Rabbis, but above all the Great 
Rambam himself whom he relies on often in his discourse on prophecy.140  
As we have seen above, Smith was both a product of his educational 
milieu and in some respects highly unusual for his day. His fluency with the 
classics shows his clear debt to the late scholastic curriculum. Simultaneously his 
interest and expertise in the new science, mathematics and cosmography mark 
him out as a thoroughly modern thinker as well. However, even his modern 
concerns for geography and history are typically put to use in service of Smith’s 
classical rhetoric. As we will see in part II, the new learning seemed to fit in 
seamlessly with the old for Smith; all offering occasions for embellishment with 
an apt quote or commonplace.  
Perhaps most noteworthy in terms of Smith’s divergence from the typical 
pattern is his Platonism. In an age still dominated by the long (albeit dimming) 
shadow of Aristotle, Smith and his colleagues were unusual for their interest in, 
140 This rabbinic learning is nowhere more in evidence than in the sixth of his Select 
Discourses, “Of Prophesie” (Smith, Select Discourses [1660], 167-280). The wealth of references 
herein to the work of Maimonides and other Rabbis may help to account for this discourse 
remaining influential well into the following century and beyond. Indeed, this discourse was 
translated into Latin for a Continental audience and included in Jean Le Clerc’s Commentary on the 
Prophets (Amsterdam, 1731). The further details of Smith’s reading and influences in theology are 
explored in depth in chapter four below. 
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and approval of, Platonic modes of thought. However, it would be a mistake to 
make too much of this apparent “outbreak” of Platonism at Cambridge. 
Platonism had always been present within scholasticism and Smith is a second 
generation Platonist after Whichcote and Sterry.141 Moreover, the rhetorical text 
recommended by Holdsworth at Emmanuel lists Plato and several Platonist 
Fathers as important authorities. Among them, Smith was particularly drawn to 
Origen and Clement of Alexandria. Interest in the later pagan Neoplatonists, 
such as Simplicius (c.490 – c.560) who Smith cites approvingly many times, is 
much more unusual for a seventeenth century Cambridge scholar. However, this 
is in all likelihood the influence of the Renaissance Neoplatonism centered in the 
Platonic Academy of Florence. There Ficino and others were acquainted with, 
used, and translated later Neoplatonists such as Iamblichus and Proclus.142 
141 See, for example, Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas' Doctrine of God as 
Expounded in the Summa Theologiae (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). On 
Whichcote, Sterry, More, and other contemporary Platonists see Teply, “Mystical Theology,” 18-
21, 36-52.  
 
142 Ficino alone translated Plato, Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, Iamblichus, and Pseudo-
Dionysius. He also wrote commentaries on several of Plato’s dialogues, Plotinus, Porphyry, and 
Proclus and used a wide variety of platonic and Hermetic sources in his own constructive work. 
Paul Oskar Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1943); James Hankins, Plato in the Italian Renaissance, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1989); Amos Edelheit, 
Ficino, Pico, and Savonarola: The Evolution of Humanist Theology 1461/2-1498 (Leiden: Brill, 2008); 
Michael J. B. Allen, and Valery Rees, with Martin Davies, eds., Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His 
Philosophy, His Legacy (Leiden: Brill, 2002). On the rise of Platonism in the Renaissance see, for 
 
 
                                                 
160 
 
  
3.4 The Politics of Faith: Civil War & Fellowship at Queens’ 
 The religious and political context into which Smith was born is the stuff 
of whole libraries, and, therefore, cannot be given adequate treatment here.143 
Nonetheless, it is critical to an appreciation of Smith to note at least the broadest 
outlines of the religio-political situation.  
 From the start, no one was happy with the English Reformation. Begun as 
a matter of state to remedy Henry VIII’s (1491-1547) need for a male heir, it also 
afforded an opportunity for what started as an underground movement keen to 
example, K. Meredith Ziebart, Nicolaus Cusanus on Faith and the Intellect: A Case Study in 15th-
Century Fides-Ratio Controversy (Leiden: Brill, 2013) and James Hankins, Humanism and Platonism 
in the Italian Renaissance, Vol. 1 (Rome: Ed. di Storia e Letteratura, 2003). On Plato in England at 
this period see Sears Jayne, Plato in Renaissance England (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1995). The classic study of the impact of Florentine Platonism in England is Ernst Cassirer, The 
Platonic Renaissance in England, trans. James P. Pettegrove (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 
1953). However, the impact on the Cambridge Platonists seems to have been primarily as 
transmitters of ancient Platonist texts. Smith, for example, makes no explicit reference to Ficino’s 
thought at all. See Sarah Hutton, “Marsilio Ficino and Ralph Cudworth,” in The Rebirth of Platonic 
Theology, ed. James Hankins and Fabrizio Meroi (Florence: Olschki, 2013), 295-310.  
 
143 Particularly useful secondary sources include: Steven Ozment, The Age of Reform, 1250-
1550: An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1981); Diarmaid MacCulloch, The Reformation: A History (New York: Penguin, 
2005); David Bagchi, and David C. Steinmetz, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Reformation 
Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and G. W. Bernard, The King's 
Reformation: Henry VIII and the Remaking of the English Church (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2007).  
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follow the lead of the Protestant Reformers in Continental Europe.144 With the 
Act of Supremacy (1534) ties between English bishops and the Pope were cut and 
shortly thereafter Henry declared himself to be head of the English Church.145  
 Upon his death in 1547, Henry’s Protestant son Edward succeeded to the 
throne and used the royal supremacy to take the Church in a much more 
Reformed, Calvinist, direction.146 Just as the Church seemed to be heading clearly 
144 Many of whom first began to read Luther at the White Horse Inn in Cambridge. This is 
commemorated with a “blue plaque” on an otherwise nondescript wall of King’s College facing 
King’s Parade. See Jo Edkins, “Plaques and notices in Cambridge,” 2010, accessed 15 April 2014, 
http://gwydir.demon.co.uk/jo/walks/plaques.htm#inn.  
 
145 Still, the King that had earned the title “defender of the faith” for his opposition to 
Luther’s views on the sacraments remained a Catholic at heart. Bernard, The King’s Reformation, 
225-42. Also, Christopher Haigh, English Reformations: Religion, Politics and Society under the Tudors 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 152-67.  
 
146 “Calvinist” is a notoriously difficult label. In general however, it refers to followers of 
the theology of John Calvin (laid out in his many scriptural commentaries and in the Institutio 
Christianae religionis [1536] and subsequently revised and translated several times; John Calvin, 
Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beverage [London, 1599]). In general, what is 
typically taken to represent Calvin’s thought most, especially in early seventeenth century 
England, are (1) the sufficiency of scripture, (2) salvation by faith not works or merit, (3) 
emphasis on covenant, (4) total depravity owing to original sin, (5) monergism in salvation 
through God’s free election and grace (there is no cooperation with grace on the part of the 
believer), and (6) double-predestination, the idea that God has already ordained some for 
salvation and some for damnation. Beyond these basics, Calvinist or Reformed theologians differ 
widely on specifics. Returning to the Reformation in England, in 1548, “images” began to be 
removed from churches, including also vestments, ashes, palms, holy water, and crucifixes – all 
important objects in Catholic ritual. In 1549 Thomas Cranmer finished the first English Book of 
Common Prayer, emphasizing the participation of the laity, providing for the reading of the entire 
Bible over the year, and retaining the fast days but not also the feasts of the saints. Three years 
later this first Book of Common Prayer was replaced by a second that was even more expressly 
Protestant; it removed all reference to the “real presence” of Christ in the eucharist, did away 
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in the direction of Calvinism in terms of ritual, polity, and doctrine Edward VI 
died only to be followed by his half-sister Mary and the return of Roman 
Catholicism in 1554. Protestants of many varieties were executed at the stake 
during Mary’s brief reign; nearly three hundred in total including five bishops, 
one hundred priests, and sixty women.147  
In 1558 the moderate Protestant Elizabeth was crowned Queen, ushering 
in the “Elizabethan Settlement.”148 In 1563, the Thirty-nine Articles were drafted 
as a statement of doctrine for the Church of England, marking the via media of 
Anglicanism; Reformed in doctrine, yet Catholic (to some extent) in worship.149 
with vestments, the sign of the cross during confirmation, holy oil, the reserved sacrament, and 
prayers for the dead, as they imply either purgatory or the intervention of saints or both. 
Diarmaid MacCulloch, Thomas Cranmer: A Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 173-454.   
 
147 See Eamon Duffy and David Loades, eds., The Church of Mary Tudor (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2007) and John Foxe, Acts and Monuments (London, 1563). Foxe’s “Book of Martyrs” was 
added to, reprinted, and translated several times in the late sixteenth century and has remained 
continuously in print to this day. See also, Haigh, English Reformations, 203-50.  
 
148 See, for example, A. G. Dickens, The English Reformation (Fontana, 1967) and Judith 
Maltby, Prayer book and People in Elizabethan and Early Stuart England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
 
149 See Elizabeth’s Acts of Supremacy (1559), Uniformity (1559), and Subscription to the 
Thirty-nine Articles (1571), collected in Henry Gee and William John Hardy, eds., Documents 
Illustrative of English Church History (London: Macmillan, 1914), 416-545., available at 
http://history.hanover.edu/texts/ENGref/links.html, accessed 17 April 2014. The phrase “via 
media” is above all associated with Richard Hooker’s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1594-1604), 
although he nowhere uses it. The phrase is generally meant to signify the particularly Anglican 
approach to theology and the life of the Church; Reformed in doctrine but Catholic in ritual and 
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In 1603, James Stuart succeeded Elizabeth.150 By this point, the English Church 
contained a wide variety of views on nearly all matters. “Puritans,” in particular, 
sought for a more complete Reformation of the Church of England along 
Calvinist lines.  
Already by 1584 Emmanuel College had been founded in Cambridge by 
Sir Walter Mildmay, Chancellor of the Exchequer to Elizabeth and a Puritan, to 
train Protestant (Reformed/Calvinist) preachers.151 Thus by the dawn of the 
seventeenth century, Emmanuel was a center of learned Calvinism.152 During 
James’ reign the Authorized Version of the Bible was commissioned and first 
governance. See, Richard Hooker, The Works of that Learned and Judicious Divine Mr. Richard Hooker 
with an Account of His Life and Death by Isaac Walton, Arranged by the Rev. John Keble, 7th 
edition revised by R.W. Church and F. Paget, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), available 
from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1731, accessed 17 April 2014. Also, W. J. Torrence Kirby, 
Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 18-28 on the dangers of an over-
simplification of Hooker’s place in the “middle way.” His alternatives were not, orthodox 
Protestantism on the one hand and Roman Catholicism on the other. Rather, his horizons were 
within the more-or-less Reformed vision of the Elizabethan Church.  
 
150 Jenny Wormald, "James VI and I (1566–1625)," in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). See also Barry Coward, A Companion to Stuart 
Britain (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).  
 
151 Emmanuel College, “History of the College,” Emmanuel College Website, accessed 17 
April 2014, http://www.emma.cam.ac.uk/about/history/college/.  
 
152 On the history of Emmanuel College see A. Sarah Bendall, Christopher Nugent, 
Lawrence Brooke and Patrick Collinson, A History of Emmanuel College, Cambridge (Boydell Press, 
1999).  
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published in 1611, becoming the standard edition in English until very recently. 
Many bishops appointed under James were Calvinist, but the elements of 
Catholic ritual and polity set in place by Elizabeth remained in most cases. Still, 
by the second decade of the seventeenth century the Church of England was 
strongly Reformed in theological orientation.153  
A period of growth in the direction of High Church Anglicanism (if not 
Catholicism) began in 1625 with the coronation of Charles I (1600-1649). Under 
the direction of Archbishop of Canterbury, William Laud (1573-1645), more 
ornate rituals and decorations were (re-)established in the Church of England, 
much to the dismay of the Puritan party. Moreover, Laud and others among the 
“Caroline Divines” leaned toward Arminianism, and thus away from Calvinism, 
in doctrine.154 This made many Puritans eager to leave England altogether and in 
153 Tom Webster, Godly Clergy in Early Stuart England: The Caroline Puritan Movement, 
c.1620-1643 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-14, 36-59. While the more extreme 
Calvinists, known as Puritans, were by no means a majority a basically Reformed outlook was 
very common in the Church of England (and not just among Presbyterians). While James favored 
the episcopal governance of the Church he also had no time for Arminians or Dissenters. On this, 
see David Harris Willson, King James VI & I (London: Jonathan Cape, 1963), 240-1.  
 
154 Chief among these “divines” are Lancelot Andrewes and William Laud himself among 
others. On them see, Benjamin Guyer, Beauty of Holiness: The Caroline Divines and Their Writings 
(Norwhich, UK: Canterbury Press, 2012); and John E. Booty, “Standard Divines,” in The Study of 
Anglicanism, Stephen Sykes, John E. Booty, and Jonathan Knight, eds., (Minneapolis, MN: 
Augsburg Fortress, 1998), 176-86.  
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fact helped bring about the Great Migration of English Puritans (and others) to 
New England in the 1630-1640s.155  
By the time Smith arrived at Emmanuel in 1636 there were separatist 
Puritans, conforming Puritans, Arminians, Laudians, and a variety of 
Anabaptists in England, each vying for influence, if not over the nation as a 
whole, then at least over their own individual spiritual lives. To what extent this 
diversity led to political instability will be explored below. For now, we turn to a 
more focused review of some of the religious tensions within Cambridge in the 
period by way of the example of a series of letters between the Cambridge 
Platonist Benjamin Whichcote and the Puritan Anthony Tuckney.156  
 
155 See, Virginia DeJohn Anderson, New England's Generation: The Great Migration and the 
Formation of Society and Culture in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1991). Also, Webster, Godly Clergy, 167-332, on the religious roots of New England 
migration. Among the families that made the pious migration from England to New England 
were the ancestors of my maternal grandmother who settled Hingham and Dorchester, 
Massachusetts.   
 
156 To separate our treatment of religion and politics in the years of Smith’s life at 
Cambridge is already to misunderstand the deeply intertwined nature of both in early modern 
English history. Still, for purely analytical purposes, and to facilitate presentation of this key 
context, this degree of anachronism is justified. 
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3.4.1 Tuckney and Whichcote Correspondence 
  Tuckney was named Master of Emmanuel in 1645 after already having 
established himself as an excellent tutor there in the 1630s. Among his students 
was Benjamin Whichcote. Salter reports that he was “a man of great reading and 
much knowledge, a ready and elegant Latinist, but narrow, stiff, and 
dogmatical” in religion.157 In fact, he was a strict Puritan of the Presbyterian sort 
who was equally suspicious of Roman Catholics, Arminians, and Independents 
(Congregationalists, Baptists, etc.).158 Tuckney played an active role in the 
doctrinal work of the Westminster Assembly of Divines.159 In 1653 he was named 
Master of St. John’s College and in 1655 Regius Professor of Divinity.160 As 
Whichcote’s former tutor, Tuckney initially believed him to be a like-minded 
Puritan but in the autumn of 1651 a commencement sermon delivered by his 
protégé gave him reason to doubt. In the first of eight letters exchanged between 
157 Salter, “Preface,” xii.  
 
158 Tulloch, Rational Theology, 2: 53.  
 
159 The Westminster Assembly was a committee formed by Parliament during the English 
Civil War to work on reforms for the Church of England. It was Puritan in orientation and the 
resultant documents of this Assembly are still held as the standard of orthodoxy by some 
Calvinists even today. More on the Assembly below with respect to the governance of Cambridge 
Colleges under their influence.   
 
160 Emmanuel College, “Anthony Tuckney (1599-1670),” Emmanuel College Website, 
accessed 17 April 2014, http://www.emma.cam.ac.uk/about/history/masters/?id=5.  
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them in quick succession, Tuckney wrote to Whichcote, then Vice-Chancellor of 
the University and Provost of King’s College, on the eighth of September 1651 to 
express his, and others’, distress at the content of his sermon and his teaching in 
recent years.  
While the full exchange well rewards careful study, an exposition of the 
first two letters only will give a taste of the issues involved for both the orthodox 
Calvinist and the budding “Cambridge Platonist.”161 In his first letter, Tuckney 
comes to his point immediately by contrasting “ingenuity” with “saving grace” 
by which he means to draw a distinction between the natural light of reason 
Whichcote has been praising, and the supernatural, imputed righteousness that 
is the work of the Holy Spirit.  
More specifically, Tuckney takes issue with four things he has observed in 
Whichcote’s recent sermon. First, Tuckney opposes Whichcote’s assertion that 
some things in religion may be disagreed upon by equally well intentioned 
161 While the disagreement between the two men is heated there is an impressive degree 
of affection expressed by both for the other. They are an excellent example of committed debate 
that does not become personal and degenerate into ad hominem attacks and counter attacks. Each 
seems honestly to seek the truth and be willing to hear the other out and even be persuaded (to 
some extent) by the other. The correspondence can be found in Samuel Salter, ed., Moral and 
Religious Aphorisms, Collected from the Manuscript Papers of the Reverend and Learned Doctor 
Whichcote (London: J. Payne, 1753) and in Tod E. Jones, ed., The Cambridge Platonists: A Brief 
Introduction, With Eight Letters of Dr. Anthony Tuckney and Dr. Benjamin Whichcote, with 
translations by Sarah E. Phang (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005), 51-156.  
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people. Indeed, for Whichcote, some issues in piety and polity are adiaphora 
(“things indifferent”) for which competing evidence may be found in scripture. 
Thus, there is no way to determine who is correct. For the Calvinist, this is 
“unsafe and unsound” presumably because it suggests that Puritan 
interpretations of scripture might be in error. Indeed, in the Church of England 
many ancient Catholic customs were retained for exactly the reason that nothing 
in scripture suggested that they should be removed and that they do no harm.  
Tuckney’s second objection is that Whichcote advocated limiting religious 
language to those “Scripture words and expressions” upon which “all parties 
agree” in order to limit disagreements over “forms of words which are from 
fallible men” that disrupt the peace of Christendom. Third, Tuckney returns to 
his suspicions about the role of human reason in religion. Where Whichcote had 
advocated using one’s rational faculties to discern spiritual matters for one’s self, 
Tuckney worries that such license (“libertas prophetandi”) opens the door to all 
manner of monstrous opinions. The use of the language of prophesy here on 
Tuckney’s part recalls both the early church’s struggles with the Montanist 
heresy and more recent conflicts, dating from the reign of Elizabeth I, over 
“prophesyings,” meetings of clergy and laity to discuss scripture and the state of 
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the church including the need for reform.162 In the later sense, prophesy was 
associated with a breakdown of discipline in the Church of England.163 While 
Tuckney wished to see the Church of England reformed on Presbyterian lines he 
was still very much in favor of a centralized Church polity.164    
Finally, Tuckney comes to an objection that goes to the very heart of his 
disagreement with Whichcote and illustrates nicely the central preoccupation of 
the orthodox Calvinist; reconciliation between humanity and God. For Calvin, as 
for Tuckney, the reconciliation of sinful human beings with their Creator is an 
entirely divine action. Against the traditional Catholic model of cooperation with 
God’s grace (synergism) Calvin and other Reformed theologians (including 
Luther, Beza, and Cramner)165 argued that humanity is in no position to even 
162 Roger E. Moore, “Sir Philip Sidney’s Defense of Prophesying,” Studies in English 
Literature 1500-1900 50 no.1 (2010): 35-62.  
 
163 John D. Schaeffer, “Tropical Latitude: Prophecy, Orality, and the Rhetoric of Tolerance 
in Jeremy Taylor’s The Liberty of Prophesying,” Studies in Philology 101 no.4 (2004): 454-70.  
 
164 Jones, Eight Letters, 71-3. This offers an excellent reminder for Americans especially 
who tend to think of “Puritans” as being synonymous with the more radical sort that famously 
settled in New England. Even they were mostly in favor of the established Church of England too 
however. Separatist or Non-conformist Puritans were in the minority at least until the height of 
the Civil Wars.  
 
165 Indeed, disagreement over this was one of the central issues in the Reformation from 
the very start. 
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cooperate with grace. Reconciliation with God is thus God’s doing in the individual 
by grace through faith. All of the active contribution stems from God’s side of the 
relationship (monergism). Whichcote, in contrast, seemed to be advocating the 
idea that human beings can and must cooperate with grace through the use of 
their reason and will.  
Within days Whichcote wrote a humble reply to his old tutor. First he 
addresses their relationship and the offense that Tuckney had taken at his 
commencement sermon. More interestingly for our purposes, Whichcote 
explains the ideas he had presented in his sermon from his notes. First, that “all 
truly good men among us, do substantially agree; in all things saving.”166 That is, 
that while various sorts of Christians disagree on many things all agree on the 
issue of salvation. An odd claim, given the Reformed preoccupation with 
opposing salvation by grace through faith to the good works of (stereotypical) 
Catholic theology. The important point here is not the current state of agreement 
but Whichcote’s faith that such an agreement can be had between Christians of 
good faith and clear reason.  
166 Jones, Eight Letters, 77.  
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Second, Whichcote repeats the claim that the issues that Christians differ 
on are non-canonical. He mentions too that perhaps the level of specificity that 
gives rise to disagreement is in excess of the divinely appointed revelation. The 
disagreements that arise stand, therefore, upon what God has seen fit to keep 
veiled from us.167 The clear connotation being that our theologizing is too-often a 
blasphemous presumption on our part. In this respect, Whichcote seeks to be 
more scriptural, and more humble than his Puritan interlocutor.  
Third, Whichcote’s proposal to restrain theological language to those 
expressions that are found in scripture is elaborated as a practical device for 
keeping the peace among Christians.168 The century of religious warfare in 
Europe is clearly in his mind here as he seeks to find common ground and good 
pious reasons for limiting theological language to those things upon which all 
can agree. However, he is quick to establish his Protestant bona fides in this 
regard by making the connection between sola scriptura and this call for humility 
and economy in theological discourse. Far from calling for unchecked 
167 Ibid. 
 
168 Ibid., 77-8.  
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rationalism as Tuckney feared, Whichcote is upping the ante on a fundamental 
principle of Protestantism.  
Fourth, Whichcote quickly and directly affirms that he does, in fact, think 
that an “ingenuous-spirited Christian, after application to God, and diligent use 
of meanes to finde-out truth; might fairly propose, without offense taken, what 
upon search he finds cause to believe; and whereon he will venture his own 
soule.”169 In other words, an intelligent Christian can, and should, use his 
faculties to grow in the pious knowledge of God.  
Finally, on the issue of reconciliation, Whichcote explains that he “had no 
intention of undervaluing the free grace of God, but only sought to bring out the 
necessity of Christ’s work being recognized as not only something without us 
but also within us.”170 In short, where Tuckney’s Calvinism would prefer to hear 
of complete monergism in salvation, Whichcote maintains that the work of God 
must be internalized too and not merely an act from outside of the human heart. 
169 Ibid., 78.  
 
170 Tulloch, Rational Theology, 2: 64.  
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To the imputed righteousness of Tuckney, Whichcote seeks to add sanctification 
and reform of the soul in the image and likeness of God.171  
Still, despite his largely scriptural arguments in response, Tuckney 
persisted in condemning the way Whichcote had “cried up” (we might say, 
“talked up”) reason. His dislike of the employment (or advocating) of reason in 
theology is best summed up in his denunciation of the (over)use of the phrase, 
“the spirit of man is the candle of the Lord.”172 Ironically, this biblical phrase is 
thought by Tuckney to have “no relation to the truths of supernatural or 
evangelical theology.”173 So, where Whichcote sees a biblical precedent for the 
life of the pious mind, Tuckney would have no elevation of human faculties, 
even to work with the grace of God. In this, Tuckney is a classic example of 
monergistic thinking, while Whichcote, for all his protestations to the contrary, is 
also a monergist, albeit of a more internal kind. For Whichcote salvation is 
entirely the work of God (he is not a synergist) but this work is not simply a 
matter of declaring us to be reconciled from without but also of making us 
regenerate from within too. In this sense, we can identify both Reformed 
171 Perhaps an indication of the classic Platonist formula that only “like can know like.”  
 
172 Proverbs 20:27.  
 
173 Jones, Eight Letters, 84-85; Tulloch, Rational Theology, 2: 65-6.  
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theological elements and more “mystical” aspects in the teaching of Whichcote; 
he is, to this extent, a Reformed Platonist while Tuckney is a Calvinist Puritan.  
Neither, however, represent the radical ends of the ideological spectrum 
in their period. They are, after all, academics as well as religionists. Theirs is, 
therefore, a dispute among colleagues. For all his resistance to the importance of 
reason in religious matters (as advocated by Whichcote) Tuckney was famous in 
his own time for making appointments to fellowships on the basis of erudition 
not piety since while, “they may deceive me, in their Godliness; they can not, in 
their Scholarship.”174  
 
3.4.2 Disputes in State and Church 
 During Smith’s early childhood, as Calvinism was very popular in the 
Puritan varieties discussed above, Charles I married the Catholic daughter of 
Henry IV of France, Henrietta Maria in 1625. The match was deeply unpopular, 
partly owing to the historic enmity between the English and the French, but also 
because it seemed to signal a change in religion for the monarch and thus the 
nation. For Puritans who already thought of the Church of England as “papist” 
174 Slater’s “Preface,” in Jones, Eight Letters, 59.  
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an actual Catholic in the Royal family was cause for serious alarm.175 As if to 
confirm his papist leanings, at least in Puritan eyes, Charles re-issued the 
Anglican Thirty-nine Articles in 1628. The following year, Parliament, 
increasingly dominated by Puritans, passed Three Resolutions against the 
excesses of Charles’ reign. In response, Charles had several members arrested.176 
 Rocky relations between King and Parliament continued through 1633 
when Charles, in an effort to curb the rise of Puritanism, appointed Laud 
Archbishop of Canterbury. At the same time that Laud was reforming the 
Church of England, Charles was imposing new taxes, called “ship money” to pay 
for the royal navy. A tax not approved by Parliament flew in the face of Magna 
Carta and the Three Resolutions of 1629. Moreover, as merchants were often 
Puritans many of those who saw in Charles an enemy to their faith found a pick-
pocket as well.177  
175 Diane Purkiss, The English Civil War: Papists, Gentlewomen, Soldiers, and Witchfinders in 
the Birth of Modern Britain (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 244-51.  
 
176 Anthony Milton, "Laud, William (1573–1645)," in Dictionary of National Biography 
(London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1885-1900). The resolutions were: First, that Parliament would 
oppose any change in religion. Second, that they would condemn any taxes levied without their 
consent. And third, that to pay illegal taxes was a violation of English liberty. 
 
177 Keith Lindley, The English Civil War and Revolution: A Sourcebook (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1998), 7, 12, 35-7.  
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 In April 1640 a new Parliament refused to authorize any new taxes to pay 
for the King’s conflicts in Scotland, where the Book of Common Prayer had recently 
been imposed on the deeply Calvinist Kirk. Charles was also already involved in 
conflict in Ireland along Catholic/Protestant lines too and thus in desperate need 
of funds.178 The “Short Parliament” was dismissed after just three weeks of non-
cooperation with the King. By November 1640 however Charles was willing to 
deal, and the “Long Parliament” approved funds to handle the Scots but only if 
Charles granted concessions to Parliament.179 The legislative body had begun to 
take the upper hand after over a decade of being shut out of the business of the 
Kingdom.  
 In 1641 Parliament’s grievances against the King were put to paper in the 
Grand Remonstrance.180 By January of 1642 both Parliament and the King were 
preparing for war, even as negotiations continued. In June, Parliament proposed 
Nineteen Propositions to Charles. Among these was the demand for a new 
178 Lindley, Sourcebook, 9, 13, 18, 21, 24, 46, 79-84.  
 
179 Ibid., 7-17, 60-78.  
 
180 “The Grand Remonstrance, with the Petition accompanying it,” in Samuel Rawson 
Gardiner, ed., The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625-1660 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1906), available at http://www.constitution.org/eng/conpur043.htm, accessed 18 April 2014.  
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constitution that would place Parliament in charge of nearly all matters of state. 
By August, Charles gave his answer as he raised his standard against Parliament 
at Nottingham. On October 23rd 1642 the armies of the King and Parliament 
fought to a stalemate in the first battle of the English Civil Wars at Edgehill in 
Warwickshire.181  
 The following August (1643) the Solemn League and Covenant was 
drafted. The document, accepted by the English Parliament in September, 
guaranteed to preserve the Scottish Kirk and to reform the religion of England 
and Ireland along Calvinist lines “according to the word of God and the example 
of the best reformed churches.”182 A synod of divines and Members of Parliament 
had already been gathered to propose reforms in faith, polity, ritual, and 
government of the kingdom (a necessity since the Church of England was 
essentially a department of state, answerable to the crown). This Westminster 
181 Michael Braddick, God's Fury, England's Fire: A New History of the English Civil Wars 
(Penguin, 2009), 209-61.  
 
182 “The Solemn League and Covenant,” in Gardiner, Constitutional Documents, available 
at http://www.constitution.org/eng/conpur058.htm, accessed 18 April 2014. Also, Braddick, God’s 
Fury, 304-22.   
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Assembly (1643-1653) sought to model the Church of England on the 
Presbyterian system of the Scottish Kirk.183 
 By the summer of 1646 Charles surrendered to a Scottish army aligned 
with the English Parliament.184 At the close of this First Civil War (1642-1646) 
three political and religious factions remained in England: Royalists, 
Independents (or separatists/nonconformists) and Presbyterians. While 
Parliament debated a new constitution (the “Putney Debates”) Charles escaped 
leading to the Second Civil War.185 This conflict ended with the recapture of 
Charles (December 1648), his trial, and execution (30 January 1649).186 However, 
later in 1649 a Third Civil War erupted between Parliament and Royalists 
including Charles II in league with Scottish covenanters. Under Oliver Cromwell, 
183 During its ten years the Assembly produced a new constitution, as well as a 
Confession of Faith, a pair of Catechisms, and a Directory for Public Worship (1645; known as the 
Westminster Directory in Scotland). John Murray, “The Work of the Westminster Assembly” The 
Presbyterian Guardian,  11 (1942), in The Westminster Presbyterian,  
http://www.westminsterconfession.org/confessional-standards/the-work-of-the-westminster-
assembly.php, accessed 18 April 2014. The best source on the work of the Assembly is Chad Van 
Dixhoorn, ed., The Minutes and Papers of the Westminster Assembly 1643-1652, 5 vols. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012).  
 
184 Purkiss, English Civil War, 451-62. Charles was imprisoned in late January 1647.  
 
185 Ibid., 532-51.  
 
186 Ibid., 552-60.  
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the Parliamentary forces won a decisive victory and established the 
Commonwealth of England, which persisted until the restoration of the 
monarchy in 1660.187     
  
3.4.3 Cambridge during the Wars 
 Cambridge remained in Parliamentary hands throughout the Civil Wars, 
but the effects of these conflicts were deeply felt there nonetheless. In January 
1644 Parliament appointed Edward Montagu, the second Earl of Manchester, to 
“regulate” the University of Cambridge. He, and his designees, were granted the 
“power to call before them all provosts, masters, and fellows of the colleges, all 
students and members of the University.” Manchester was also given “power to 
eject such as he shall judge unfit for their places . . . and to place other fitting 
persons in their room, such as shall be approved of by the assembly of divines 
sitting at Westminster.” Moreover, the authority to “administer the late covenant 
. . . to all persons” and to “examine and inhibit all such as do obstruct the 
reformation, now endeavoured by the Parliament and assembly of divines.”188  
187 Lindley, Sourcebook, 167-175.  
 
188 “Regulation of the University of Cambridge, Monday, 22 January 1643/1644,” William 
Oldys and Thomas Park, The Harleian Miscellany (London: John White, 1809), 3: 246-7. On this 
period at Cambridge generally see G. R. Evans, The University of Cambridge: A New History 
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 It was in this context that Manchester removed Dr. Edward Martin from 
his post as President of Queens’ College. On the eighth, ninth, and eleventh days 
of April 1644, he also ejected nine fellows from the College.189 In total, over two 
hundred fellows were ejected from Cambridge Colleges.190 The charges against 
the ejected fellows of Queens’ were “non-residence,” “not returning to College 
when summoned,” and, one suspects the real reason in the midst of Puritan 
reform, for “refusing to take the solemn league and covenant.”191  
 On April eleventh Manchester appointed Herbert Palmer the new 
President of Queens’ and installed replacement fellows, including John Smith 
from Emmanuel, who had “been examined and approved by” the Westminster 
Assembly.192 It was this bit of Parliamentary intervention and an arcane policy at 
Emmanuel that led to Smith’s all too short tenure at Queens’. By statute no two 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 211-20 and David Hoyle, Reformation and Religious Identity in 
Cambridge, 1590-1644 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2007).  
 
189 Williams, “Memoir,” vii-viii.  
 
190 John Twigg, A History of Queens’ College, Cambridge 1448-1986 (Bury St. Edmunds and 
Wolfeboro, NH: The Boydell Press, 1987), 522.  
 
191 Williams, “Memoir,” vii.  
 
192 Williams, “Memoir,” viii. See also Arnold Gwynne Matthews, Walker Revised: Being a 
Revision of John Walker's Sufferings of the Clergy During the Grand Rebellion, 1642-60 (Clarendon 
Press, 1948).  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
181 
 
fellows of Emmanuel could then be of the same county of origin. Since William 
Dillingham, who enrolled around the same time as Smith, was also from 
Northhamptonshire, and took his BA a year before Smith, he and not Smith rose 
to a fellowship there in 1642.193  
 That Smith was selected within days of the ejections that made his 
position available says much about the estimate of his talents among those 
involved. That Smith accepted the fellowship says that he was “agreeable to the 
late solemn nation league and Covenant” as well.194 The degree to which Smith 
was committed to the Westminster Assembly’s agenda is unclear, but in any case 
they were clearly committed to him.  
 Little detail remains concerning Smith’s work at Queens’. However as a 
Fellow he would have begun to tutor students immediately.195 By the 24th of June, 
1644, Smith was named Hebrew Lecturer, a sign that the familiarity with Jewish 
193 Williams, “Memoir,” vii. Much has been made in the literature on Smith of this county 
policy but it would seem that Smith was also simply slower to proceed to the MA then 
Dillingham.  
 
194 Twigg, History of Queens’ College, 525; Queens’ College Archives, Box 31.  
 
195 Williams, “Memoir,” viii-xi. See also, Simon Patrick, “The Autobiography of Symon 
Patrick,” in The Works of Symon Patrick: Including His Autobiography, ed. Alexander Taylor (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1858), 9: 418-23.   
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literature evident in the Select Discourses was already well in hand and well 
known. In the fall of that year (10 September) he was named “Censor 
Philosophicus” as well. To this already impressive collection of appointments 
was added the post of Greek Praelector on 16th September 1645.  Clearly then, he 
was already a well-respected authority on the literature for which he has come to 
be especially known. Moreover, his position as a “Censor Philosophicus,” a 
position previously held by the late President Martin, while only just having 
been made a fellow would seem to suggest that he was on friendly terms with 
those in power.196  
 When in 1648 the Lord Mayor of London, Sir John Wollaston, sought to 
improve the quality of mathematics at Cambridge with funds for a University 
196 Martin, it should be noted, had been elected President at the urging of Archbishop 
Laud in 1631. William George Searle, The History of the Queens' College of St Margaret and St 
Bernard in the University of Cambridge: 1560-1662 (Cambridge: Deighton, Bell and Co., 1871), 469. 
Recent discoveries of high church choir music from the 1630s at Queens’ College has begun to 
shed light on the degree to which the institution embraced Laudian reforms under Martin. Tim 
Eggington, “Musical discovery in Queens’ Old Library: tenor part book of early English church 
music found bound up within ‘Book of Common Prayer’,” Queens’ Old Library Books Blog, 15 
October 2013, accessed 22 April 2014, http://queenslib.wordpress.com/2013/10/15/important-
discovery-in-queens-college-old-library-tenor-part-book-of-16th17th-century-english-church-
found-bound-up-within-a-printed-copy-of-the-booke-of-common-prayer/.  
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Lecturer, it was John Smith who “was appointed the first incumbent.”197 He 
seems to have taken up the post in November of 1648 “with a course of lectures 
on Descartes’ Geometry” a volume that, as we have seen, was among those 
donated to Queens’ College upon Smith’s death in 1652.198  
 In 1650, Smith was named Dean and Catechist of Queens’ College. It was 
in this capacity, which included regular preaching and teaching in the College 
Chapel, that Smith came to draft the majority of the discourses later published by 
Worthington as the Select Discourses.199  
  
197 Mordechai Feingold, “Isaac Barrow and the Foundation of the Lucasian Professorship,” 
in Kevin C. Knox and Richard Noakes, eds., From Newton to Hawking: A History of Cambridge 
University’s Lucasian Professors of Mathematics (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 49.  
 
198 Strangely, the appropriate copy among the collections of Queens’ College Library 
today has no annotations at all. It is almost certain that Isaac Barrow was among those attending 
Smith’s lectures. By 1652 this Wollastonian Lectuership had ceased since in that year John Pell 
was seeking funding for a new lecturer in mathematics and in 1658 John Worthington, Smith’ 
editor, was petitioning for funds for a professorship in mathematics as well. This position would 
eventually be funded by Lucas becoming the famous Lucasian Professorship of Mathematics held 
by Isaac Barrow, Isaac Newton, and Steven Hawking. See Feingold, “Isaac Barrow,” 49 n.6. 
Worthington mentions Smith’s mathematical lectures in his “To the Reader,” in Select Discourses 
(1660), x. See also Beeley and Scriba, Correspondence of John Wallis, 1: 9. 
 
199 William Ralph Inge, The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought: The Hulsean 
Lectures at Cambridge 1925-1926 (New York and London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926), 62; 
Williams, “Memoir,” ix; Worthington, “To the Reader,” xii-xxx; Mario Micheletti, Il pensiero 
religioso di John Smith, platonico di Cambridge (Padua: La Garangola, 1976), 17.  
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3.5 Smith’s Last Days 
 Smith’s health seems to have been fragile from the first, as one might 
expect of one who died so young. This may help to explain the length of time 
Smith spent at studies. He did not earn the Master of Arts until 1644. Health 
concerns may also be behind the otherwise curious (though not unheard of) fact 
that while the statutes of Queens’ College required that he be ordained in 1646 to 
maintain his fellowship, Smith was granted permission to postpone for four 
years.200 Smith appears to not have been ordained at all, perhaps owing to 
concerns over his health or other practical issues related to the Civil War. In any 
event, his contribution to the learned ministry in England was significant in his 
various capacities at Queens’ College (1644-1652).  
In 1651 Smith fell ill with what was most likely the beginning stages of 
tuberculosis. By the spring of 1652 he had transferred his students to his friend 
Simon Patrick. In the spring of that year Smith went to London seeking treatment 
from Dr. Theodore Mayerne.201 On May 5th the “Master and Fellows” granted 
200 Williams, “Memoir of the Author,” ix.  The Order is dated Jan. 19 1646 (1647). 
 
201 Patrick gives his name as “Mahern”. Patrick, “Autobiography,” 420-1. See also Hugh 
Redwald Trevor-Roper, Europe's Physician: The Various Life of Sir Theodore de Mayerne (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2006).  
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Smith “his whole stipend and dividend for this current quarter and likewise his 
stipend for so much of the last quarter as he was absent upon the same cause of 
his sicknesse.”202 He continued a patient of Mayerne for a few months but “he 
derived no benefit” from this care.203  
In late July, Smith returned to Cambridge, apparently resigned to his fate 
after finding no relief from any of his many medical practitioners. After lying in a 
“state of listlessness for nearly a week” he experienced a lucid moment during 
which his friends took down his last will and testament. Smith died however 
before he could sign this document on the 7th of August 1652. He was buried in 
the College Chapel of Queens’ College, the site of the funeral sermon given by 
Simon Patrick and likely many of Smith’s own discourses. Smith was 
accompanied to the grave by the Vice-Chancellor of the University, all the Heads 
of House (Masters, Presidents, etc.), the Fellows, and students. He now lies, 
appropriately for a “living library,” in the present War Memorial Library of 
Queens’ College.204 
202 Queens’ College Register, quoted by Williams, “Memoir,” xi n.1.   
 
203 Williams, “Memoir,” xi.  
 
204 There is no known marker for his burial.  
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3.6 The Select Discourses  
          Other than the remembrances of friends, John Worthington, Simon Patrick, 
and others, his library gift to Queens' College, and a single commonplace book, 
all that we have from John Smith is the posthumously published Select 
Discourses.205 These were collected and edited by Worthington from papers given 
to him by Cradock upon Smith’s death. How long Worthington possessed them 
is not known. The Discourses were primarily composed during Smith’s time as 
Catechist at Queens’.206 Indeed, several were first preached in the Chapel there, 
and all were apparently meant to be delivered aloud. To his original papers 
however Smith added considerable material after they had been presented.207 
But, even these were in need of significant editing.208  
205  “A Common Place Book,” Cambridge University Library MS Dd.ix.44. See the 
Appendix below for a full listing of the discourses contained in the Select Discourses. Cf. the 
arrangement of Gregory of Nazianzus’s Theological Orations and Origen’s On First Principles 
(Christopher A. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light 
We Shall See Light [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008], 39). Like these patristic texts the Select 
Discourses starts with theological method, proceeds to the general character of theology in general 
and closes with specifically revealed theology.  
 
206 Worthington, “To the Reader,” v; Williams, “Memoir,” ix; Micheletti, Il pensiero 
religioso, 17.  
 
207 Worthington, “To the Reader,” iii-iv.  
 
208 Ibid., iv.   
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Worthington’s procedure was four-fold. First, gathering papers that “were 
loose and scattered” in some cases forming proper “discourses” out of diverse 
material.209 Second, transcribing the papers and examining the quotations in 
Smith’s discourses.210 With the help of unnamed friends, Worthington identified 
whatever quotations seemed most important (i.e., where the substance was 
significant and Smith had not provided author or text). Third, in a remarkable 
gesture, Worthington also sought to translate from the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew 
into English the significant quotations that were not also already clear from the 
context of the surrounding English text. Fourth, Worthington added, especially 
to the first six discourses which he reports were written as a single treatise 
“without any distinction or sections,” divisions between discourses, chapters, 
and sections as they seemed to facilitate the reading of the text. Worthington also 
added summaries of the contents of each discourse, chapter or section.211 
The text of the Select Discourses published in 1660 by F. Flesher in London 
for W. Morden, a bookseller in Cambridge, was, as many seventeenth century 
209 Ibid., v.  
  
210 Ibid., iv-v.   
 
211 Ibid., v.  
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volumes were, highly flawed. There were numerous mistakes in text and 
citations from the start. Moreover, the highly non-standard spellings are 
annoying at best to the modern reader (some words have multiple spellings on 
the same page!). Thus it is no surprise that the Select Discourses were reprinted in 
a “corrected” edition by John Hayes in Cambridge, again for Morden. 
Apparently Smith was something of a “bestseller.”  
Still, the text left much to be desired, and in 1821 another full edition, this 
time “carefully corrected” appeared in London at the hands of Rivington and 
Cochran. By far the most helpful edition to date, however, was that “corrected 
and revised” by Henry Griffin Williams published by Cambridge University 
Press in 1859. Above all, Williams’ edition provides the best published guide to 
the massive number of quotations in Smith’s text.212  
Among the more obvious issues with the original 1660 text, which has 
been the most widely used and reprinted over recent years, is the fact that 
Worthington’s translations from Latin, Greek, and Hebrew are haphazard at 
212 Williams makes frequent alterations to Smith’s original but faithfully conveys the 
sense always even when he moves Smith’s quotations in foreign languages to footnotes. The 
great advantage of his edition is the number and quality of the citations to Smith’s (likely) 
sources. Its biggest limitation is that these sources are given in nineteenth century editions with 
no regard for the texts Smith had access to.  
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best. While he probably did translate what, in his day, seemed most in need of 
“Englishing,” a great number of phrases remained un-translated in his and most 
of the following editions. In fact, many quotations are not referenced even in 
Williams’ edition of 1859.213 There remains, therefore, a clear need for a proper 
critical edition of the Select Discourses.  
Beyond the state of the text in the most basic sense, there is also the matter 
of the work’s treatment at the hands of Worthington. The original papers upon 
which the Select Discourses are based appear to be lost, so the degree to which 
they can be said to reflect the authentic work of Smith or a kind of collaboration 
between Smith and his editor cannot be adequately judged. From what 
Worthington tells us about his procedure in bringing the Select Discourses to print 
it seems most reasonable to conclude that the texts, as we have them, are 
substantially Smith’s but to a considerable extent the organization belongs to 
Worthington. An answer to these questions must await a careful study of the 
known works of Worthington and a critical edition of the Select Discourses.  
For the purposes of the present study, the authorship of the Select 
Discourses is assumed rather than carefully argued. That is, I take the published 
213 For example, a key quotation from Origen is left untranslated. Smith, Select Discourses 
(1660), 4. On this, see chapter four below.   
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editions of the Select Discourses to be, de facto, the work of (the literary) John 
Smith. The historical Smith is, as nearly as can be discerned, the literary Smith, 
albeit with allowances made for the editing of his work by a friend. There is no 
reason to suspect that Smith himself did not in fact write the Select Discourses, 
even if the presentation of them owes much to Worthington. None of Smith’s 
close companions treats the Select Discourses as anything but an authentic 
presentation of his thought and teaching.  
  
3.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter we have situated Smith in his intellectual and cultural 
milieu. We have seen that his was an age of discovery in geography, the sciences, 
and philosophy. Smith was educated in a mixture of the older scholastic style 
and work at the very cutting edge of early modern science, philosophy, and 
mathematics. We have also seen how Smith’s career at Queens’ College involved 
all these influences during the tumultuous period of the English Civil Wars. In 
part II below we will see specifically how all these elements contribute to Smith’s 
use of the spiritual senses tradition. As argued in chapter two above, this 
tradition is best understood by way of a functional typology.  
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The “spiritual senses” are employed by the tradition to (1) explain the 
source of theological knowledge, (2) account for aspects of the spiritual life, and 
(3) to hold together one’s theology as a coherent system of thought. Thus, chapter 
four presents the role of the spiritual senses in Smith’s account of the 
appropriation and ultimate source of theological knowledge. Chapter five 
demonstrates the place of spiritual sensation in Smith’s description of the 
spiritual life. Finally, chapter six argues that the spiritual senses perform a 
central systematic function in Smith’s theology. In this way, both Smith’s debts to 
the tradition and his innovations therein become clear, illustrating his place in 
Christian theological aesthetics generally.   
 
 
 
    
PART II 
 
CHAPTER 4: THE SOURCE OF THEOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
How do we come to know the Divine? From where do we receive the 
theological knowledge that is presupposed by the life of faith? For surely, we 
cannot love and serve a God that we do not first know.1 Such Augustinian 
considerations were not lost on John Smith. He too felt the pressing need to give 
an account of the source of theological understanding. Indeed, the growing 
skepticism of his early modern world made such an account all the more acutely 
felt.2 Smith responded to this need with an apologetic just as surely as More and 
Cudworth. Inheriting a newly relevant, yet ultimately, Patristic sense of the need 
to answer critiques of traditional theology, Smith was also heir to the scholastic 
distinction between the rational or natural and the revealed knowledge of God.3 
1 Augustine, Confessions, I. 1.  
 
2 Peter Klein, "Skepticism," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,  ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
28 October 2010, accessed 28 May 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/skepticism/.  
 
3 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Anton Pegis (University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1975), I, ch.3, n.2.   
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Thus, to appreciate Smith’s account of the origins of theological understanding 
one must look, above all, in two places.  
First, for the source or method of coming to natural knowledge of God 
one must consult the first discourse, “On the True Way or Method of Attaining to 
Divine Knowledge.”4 Here we find that for Smith rational theology, and the 
personal appropriation of revealed truths, rests on “spiritual sensation.” Indeed, 
Smith draws from Origen both as a model and as a source for constructing his 
own account. Second, for the corresponding, and complementary, account of the 
source of revealed theology one must turn to the sixth discourse “Of Prophesie.”5 
Here we find that revealed truths are communicated to the prophet in sensible 
images in the imagination and intellectually via intuitions.6 In both cases these 
4 John Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 1-21. For Smith, “natural theology” does not mean 
the complete absence of scriptural references. Rather, it signifies that branch of theology that 
attempts to give rational arguments in support of theological claims. In short, natural theology is, 
for Smith, rational theology (as opposed to biblical exegesis).  
 
5 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 169-281; (1859), 170-293. For an excellent overview of the 
philosophical issues raised by prophecy see, Scott A. Davison, "Prophecy," in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 26 March 2010, accessed 2 May 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/prophecy/.  
 
6 Smith is not very explicit or consistent with his use of terms. Partly this is because much 
of the philosophical terminology relevant to his discussion of religious epistemology was in a 
period of flux between older scholastic meanings and early modern ones familiar in the work of 
figures like Locke, Hume, and Kant. Also, Smith is adverse to the terminological precision of the 
old scholasticism because it “entombs” our understanding of divinity more than it enlightens. 
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communications are supplied, ultimately, by God. While some are merely 
inspired by the presence of the Holy Spirit, others receive actual spiritual (i.e., 
non-corporeal) sensations of the Divine will in the imagination, either in a vision 
or in a dream. Still others, Moses and presumably Jesus Christ as well, receive an 
“intellectual touch” in the intellect without a sensible image (“face to face”). In 
such cases of what Smith calls “prophecy proper” the prophet comes to know by 
spiritual perception.  
Both rational (natural) and revealed theology involve, for Smith, what we 
have identified as the “spiritual senses.” Each combines the metaphorical 
However, from his usage “mind,” “soul,” and “intellect” refer to the same non-corporeal aspect 
of the human person as that which thinks or employs reason in an immediate, intuitive, and non-
discursive way. He would seem to have in view something much like nous in the Neoplatonic 
sense but he rarely uses the term except in quoting some ancient authority or other. On the 
concept of mind in the Cambridge Platonists (really More and Cudworth only) see G. A. J. Rogers, 
“John Locke and the Cambridge Platonists on the Nature of the Mind,” in Essays on the Concept of 
Mind in Early-modern Philosophy??????????? ??????????????????? ??????????????????????????
Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 81-96.  Also Alexander M. Schlutz, “Epistemology, Metaphysics, and 
Rhetoric: Contests of Imagination,” in Mind’s World: Imagination and Subjectivity from Descartes to 
Romanticism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 15-35. “Imagination,” “fancy” 
(phantasia) and variations on these terms are used by Smith for the faculty of representing objects 
of perception. It is the “stage” upon which information is presented to the understanding. 
However, there is no reason to think that this must be the result of the external senses for Smith. 
This inner sense of imagination is capable of receiving images directly, as in the case of prophecy, 
without an external sensory object. See the Oxford English Dictionary under “imagination,” 1.a. 
“the power or capacity to form internal images or ideas of objects and situations not actually 
present to the senses”; 1.b. “an inner image or idea of an object or objects not actually present to 
the senses”; also “fantasy/phantasy,” 1.a. “mental apprehension of an object of perception”; and 
“fancy,” A.1. “in scholastic psychology: = FANTASY n.1”; A.4.a. “In early use synonymous with 
IMAGINATION,” A.4.b. “a mental image.”  
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(intellection as “vision”) and the analogical (perception of a spiritual kind). In 
both cases the imagination serves as a bridge between the sensible realm of 
corporeal reality and the purely intellectual realm of reason and God. 7 And, 
both, in the final analysis, disclose the same Divine truths. For Smith, as for other 
Christian Platonists such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas,8 natural theology is 
complemented or completed, but not replaced, by revealed theology.9 Like his 
7 While Smith draws explicitly on primarily Patristic and Rabbinic sources, Marsilio 
Ficino had also spoken of the imagination as a vehicle for divine presence. See, Daniel Pickering 
Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic: From Ficino to Campanella (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2000), 76-80; John Cocking, Imagination: A Study in the History of Ideas 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2005), 178-81; on this in Agrippa, see Christopher I. Lehrich, The Language of 
Demons and Angels: Cornelius Agrippa's Occult Philosophia (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 57-65. For an 
interesting overview of the history of the imagination in western thought see W. Norris Clarke, 
“The Creative Imagination in Western Thought,” in The Creative Retrieval of Saint Thomas Aquinas: 
Essays in Thomistic Philosophy, New and Old (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), 209-25.  
 
8 On Thomas as a Christian Platonist despite of his obvious Aristotelianism, see Wayne J. 
Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas' Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000) and “Aquinas and the Platonists,” in The Platonic Tradition in 
the Middle Ages: A Doxographic Approach, ed. Stephen Gersh and Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, with the 
assistance of Pierter Th. van Wingerden (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter,2002), 279-324. On 
Aristotle himself as a Platonist see Lloyd P. Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2006). For objections to this argument see, for example, the review of 
Aristotle and Other Platonists by John Bussanich in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (13 March 
2006), accessed 24 April 2014, https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24985-aristotle-and-other-platonists/.   
 
9 See Benjamin Whichcote, “Moral and Religious Aphorisms,” in The Cambridge Platonists, 
ed. C.A. Patrides (London: Edwin Arnold, 1969), #99 (p.327): “Reason discovers, what is Natural; 
and Reason receives, what is Supernatural.”  
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tutor Whichcote therefore, Smith does not set the rational and the spiritual 
against each other, “for spiritual is most rational.”10 
  
4.1 The Source of Rational Theology  
In the chapel at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, among the more unusual 
sights in an otherwise properly plain, “Puritan” space, whose only images are of 
opened books, are a series of stained glass windows. Like St. Paul’s in London, 
this Wren church too did not survive the Victorian love of interior decoration. 
Along the north wall, a series of panels depict great ecclesial and educational 
organizers and systematic theologians, ranging from St. Augustine to John 
Harvard. Along the south wall, one finds a series of panels representing great 
figures in spirituality and mystical theology. The series begins with Origen of 
Alexandria and the second to the last is John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist. 
Origen and Smith, the windows tell us, have a connection. The Emmanuel 
College Chapel windows present vestiges in light and glass of an insight from a 
more romantic age, when resonance and sensitivity were still important tools for 
10 Benjamin Whichcote, in Jones, The Cambridge Platonists, 138. Cf. Smith, Select Discourses 
(1660), 434. See also, Whichcote, “The Use of Reason in Matters of Religion,” in C.A. Patrides, 42-
61, and “Moral and Religious Aphorisms,” in C.A. Patrides, #76 (p.327).  
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the scholar.11 And the windows are correct; there is a deep bond between Origen 
and Smith, a tradition unbroken by the fall of empires and the discovery of new 
worlds.  
This section explores a key aspect of that tradition. It provides an analysis 
of the reception and modification of Origen of Alexandria’s doctrine of the 
spiritual senses in the “Discourse on the True Way or Method of Attaining to 
Divine Knowledge.” The analysis offered here is twofold. First, an argument 
about the exegetical and hermeneutical roots of Origen’s presentation of the 
spiritual senses is compared to a closely analogous approach found in Smith. 
Second, Origen is shown to have supplied an important source for Smith’s 
conception and employment of the spiritual senses as the means by which one 
comes to natural knowledge of the Divine and the way to appropriate revelation 
for one’s self.  
As will be demonstrated below, Smith accepted important elements of the 
doctrine of the spiritual senses as he found it in Origen but was too modern to 
take the doctrine on authority. Instead, Smith offers his own case for the spiritual 
11 For images see, “College Chapel Windows,” Emmanuel College Website, accessed 24 
April 2014, http://www.emma.cam.ac.uk/collegelife/chapel/windows/.  
 
 
 
                                                 
198 
 
senses, at once mimicking Origen’s interpretive synthesis of (Middle/Neo-
)Platonism and Scripture (as model), and echoing Origen’s own words (as 
source). Smith used this twofold influence as the basis for his distinctive 
theological method that seeks to base all other theological work on immediately 
self-evident principles encountered through spiritual sensation.  
“The True Way,” Smith’s first discourse, begins by making his intentions 
and his methods clear. Just as all other arts and sciences have as their basis and 
starting point some precondition or principle(s) upon which everything else 
depends so too with divinity.12 Divinity rests on and in fact is “a divine life” 
rather than a “divine science.”13 The principle for the intelligibility of divinity 
lays in the varieties of “Spiritual Sensation” which unite the will, intellect, and 
the affections, says Smith, and this is the basis of his theological method.14 
Smith’s intent here is to establish a firm foundation upon which all his later work 
12 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 1-2.  
 
13 Ibid., 2. 
 
14 Ibid.   
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can stand. In this, his deep admiration for Descartes shines through.15 However, 
much of what Smith has to say about this method echoes Origen.16  
 
4.1.1 Origen as Model 
 Origen affirmed the existence of a set of five spiritual senses analogous to 
the physical senses located in the mind or soul, what Origen calls the “inner 
man,” which is distinct from the physical body and thus also from the physical 
senses.17 Origen largely developed his view based on biblical evidence and as a 
way of interpreting passages where the clearly non-sensible (i.e., spiritual, 
conceptual or intellectual) is said to be sensed.18  
15 On the relationship between Smith and Descartes, see J. E. Saveson, "Descartes' 
Influence on John Smith, Cambridge Platonist," Journal of the History of Ideas 20 (1959): 258-62, and 
"Differing Reactions to Descartes among the Cambridge Platonists," Journal of the History of Ideas 
31 (1960): 560-7. 
 
16 While it is not usually possible to demonstrate a clear line of influence directly to 
Origen (he makes very few direct references to Origen for example) Smith’s understanding of the 
sensible nature of spiritual understanding nevertheless echoes the Alexandrian in important 
ways and in at least one critical case makes direct appeal to the Father of the spiritual senses. 
 
17 Smith too, as we have seen, tends to speak of the “mind” and “soul” as essentially the 
same thing. Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “The Work of Reason,” in Cragg, The Cambridge Platonists, 
63 where he equates the “internal” with the mind and soul.  
  18 Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition From Plato to Denys (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 66-7. This point is not without contention however. Several 
scholars have suggested that Origen’s language about the spiritual senses is best understood as 
metaphorical either throughout his corpus or in one supposed stage or another in his developing 
thoughts on the matter. The received scholarly opinion on the issue is however that 
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For I do not suppose that the visible heaven was actually opened, and its 
physical structure divided, in order that Ezekiel might be able to record 
such an occurrence….although such an occurrence may be a stumbling-
block to the simple, who in their simplicity would set the whole world in 
movement, and split in sunder the compact and mighty body of the whole 
heavens. But he who examines such matters more profoundly will say, 
that there being, as the Scripture calls it, a kind of general divine 
perception which the blessed man alone knows how to discover, 
according to the saying of Solomon, You shall find a divine sense; and as 
there are various forms of this perceptive power, such as a faculty of 
vision which can naturally see things that are better than bodies, among 
which are ranked the cherubim and seraphim; and a faculty of hearing 
which can perceive voices which have not their being in the air; and a 
sense of taste which can make use of living bread that has come down 
from heaven, and that gives life unto the world; and so also a sense of 
smelling, which scents such things as leads Paul to say that he is a sweet 
savour of Christ unto God; and a sense of touch, by which John says that 
he handled with his hands of the Word of life; — the blessed prophets 
having discovered this divine perception, and seeing and hearing in this 
divine manner, and tasting likewise, and smelling, so to speak, with no 
sensible organs of perception, and laying hold on the Logos by faith, so 
that a healing effluence from it comes upon them, saw in this manner 
what they record as having seen, and heard what they say they heard….19 
  
Thus, for Origen the spiritual or allegorical reading of scripture suggests that 
references to sensing the divine are not literal accounts. In this way, Origen 
notwithstanding elements of metaphor here and there, Origen, by in large, does intend to speak 
of five spiritual senses that function analogously to the physical senses. See the work of Dillon, 
Rudy, and McInroy on this topic.  
 
19 Origen, Contra Celsum, I.48 (Crombie, trans.). This translation is taken from the Ante 
Nicene Fathers translation with corrections to match Chadwick in the reference to Proverbs 2:5.  
“Knowledge” has been changed to the misreading of the LXX that Origen actually gives, “sense.” 
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counters the ridicule of Celsus and other critics of Christian doctrine. At the same 
time, however, Origen is convinced that references to spiritual senses are not 
without literal meaning of some kind. That is, rather than reading these passages 
as mere metaphorical references to knowledge, or comprehension, Origen takes a 
sudden and unexpected turn by suggesting such passages refer to literal spiritual 
senses, actual spiritual capacities for perceiving the non-sensory.20  
While Karl Rahner is certainly correct about the exegetical provenance of 
Origen’s doctrine, his claim that it is a conclusion based solely on scripture fails 
to convince.21 Beyond the possible incarnational or sacramental reasons for such 
a reading lies the possibility, suggested by Dillon, that Origen is drawing on 
previous and contemporaneous speculation about “a noetic correlate of sense-
perception” found in Plato, Albinus, a Gnostic treatise (Zostrianos), Plotinus 
20 Some passages related to spiritual sensation do seem to be simply metaphorical for 
Origen but clearly not all. Some of Origen’s reading of scripture seems to indicate an analogy 
between spiritual sense and physical sense. For a sample of the debate on this point see Louth, 
Origins, 66-7; J. M. Dillon, “Aisthesis Noete: A Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses in Origen and in 
Plotinus,” in Hellenica et Judaica, A. Caquot, et al., eds. (Leuven; Paris: Peeters, 1986), 443-55; and 
G. Rudy, Mystical Language of Sensation in the Later Middle Ages (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
 
21 Karl Rahner, « Le debut d’une doctrine des cinq sens spirituals chez Origene, » Revue 
d’ascetique et de mystique 13 (1932): 112-45; English translation, “The ‘Spiritual Senses’ According 
to Origen,” in Theological Investigations, XVI (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 89-103. The claim 
about the exclusively biblical source of Origen’s doctrine is made on p.83 in the ET.  
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(Ennead VI.7), and Philo.22 Only if the spiritual senses have an initial air of 
plausibility can the move to read biblical passages allegorically, but not totally 
so, be justified.23  
Without some reason to suggest that such a thing is even possible, Origen 
should be expected simply to allegorize the language of sensing the divine out of 
the picture entirely. Since Origen does not do that, and instead affirms literally 
spiritual senses, and given that there was ample non-Christian speculation about 
spiritual sensibility in Origen’s intellectual milieu, it seems likely that he asserts 
his view of the spiritual senses with a basically platonic philosophical and a 
Christian scriptural background in mind. Origen finds the spiritual senses in his 
reading of the Bible but he was able to find them because he already had access 
to the philosophic tools needed to “see” them. Origen’s interpretation was thus 
likely given additional, and necessary, philosophical credence by a common 
22 Dillon, “Aisthesis Noete,” 454-5, here 455. To Dillon’s suggestive, albeit speculative, list 
could be added the much more ancient tradition of the postmortem opening of the senses in 
order to interact with the Gods found in the Egyptian Book of the Dead and numerous additional 
passages in Plato that speak of “intellectual vision” and inner “eyes” (e.g., Republic 519A, 
Symposium 219A, etc.) as well as other passages from Plotinus of particular interest to John Smith 
such as Ennead I.8.1, I.6.9, I.3.4, and VI.7.13.  
 
23 Dillon is far more nuanced in his discussion but I argue that he need not be in this area. 
This same kind of plausible warrant seems to be at work in other decisions of Origen to limit his 
allegorizing. For example, his numerous appeals to Old Testament signs for Christ only makes 
sense in light of a knowledge of Christ as that to which the allegory refers.  
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tradition within the intellectual context Origen shared with Plotinus and others 
who also suggest similar intellectual senses.24 Regardless of the specific methods 
employed, Origen’s concerns are exegetical and, to that extent, Rahner is correct.25 
As we have seen, Origen draws on scripture and, if our argument based 
on Dillon’s suggestion is correct, elements in the prevailing philosophical 
speculations of his day to advance the reality of the spiritual senses of the soul. In 
much the same manner, Smith appeals directly to scripture and the 
Neoplatonism of Plotinus as his “evidence” for the spiritual sensation upon 
which all theological understanding rests. Spiritual concepts are understood by 
being perceived, and this spiritual sensibility is thoroughly intellectual and 
therefore not physical, and yet, somehow, still best described by way of 
perceptual language. For both Smith and Origen the spiritual senses are 
capacities of mind that are both conceptual and perceptual. Perceptual in the 
sense that it is by means of these senses that purely noetic (purely spiritual) 
24 The apologetic impulse in Contra Celsum, is made more clear by this suggestion as well. 
 
25 As Mark McInroy has pointed out, in following the suggestion of Dillon against the 
position articulated by Rahner, I am parting company with most observers since Rahner’s 
influential treatment of Origen’s doctrine of spiritual sense. While Rahner’s approach makes 
Origen’s thoughts on these matters seem more clearly “Christian,” mine makes what Origen says 
more clearly intelligible.  
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objects are brought to awareness and conceptual in the sense that they have to do 
with realities that are by their very nature concepts or ideas not physically 
sensible things. In this sense, what we have here are examples of intellectual 
intuition.  
Smith is notable for his insistence that divinity is a practical, living 
enterprise.26 Divinity is a “Divine life,” rather than a “science” conveyed by mere 
“Verbal description” because it has to do with things of “Sense & Life” and thus 
requires “Sentient and Vital faculties.” Smith here makes explicit his 
employment of Neoplatonism in the service of scriptural exegesis, and both in 
spiritual guidance, by combining Plotinus’ affirmation that, in Smith’s words, 
“Every thing is best known by that which bears a just resemblance and analogie 
with it” with the biblical principle, derived specifically from Proverbs 10, that a 
good life is the prolepsis for coming to an understanding of divine things.27  
26 See in the first instance Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 2 but the point is made 
repeatedly throughout the First Discourse and the whole of the Select Discourses. 
 
27 Ibid., 2. Smith’s plotinian reference is to Ennead I.8.1. The biblical allusion is to Proverbs 
10 (“the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom”). On the Stoic notion of a prolepsis and on 
their epistemology generally see R. J. Hankinson, “Stoic Epistemology,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Stoicism, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 59-84. 
On the influence of the Cambridge Platonists on the moral sense theory of Shaftesbury, including 
his use of “preconceptions” for the Stoic notion of prolepsis see Patrick Müller, “Hobbes, Locke 
and the Consequences: Shaftesbury’s Moral Sense and Political Agitation in Early Eighteenth-
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A little later, Smith introduces the sixth Beatitude from the Sermon on the 
Mount (Matthew 5:8) with a reference to Plotinus; “Divinity is indeed a true 
enflux from that eternal light” but this light does not merely enlighten, but 
enlivens also. While the framework for intelligibility here is borrowed from the 
light mysticism common to Plotinus and Origen (and others),28 the authority for 
Smith’s point lies with Christ, who connects “purity of heart with the beatific 
vision.” In this way, Smith offers support for his claim that what is essential in 
theology is a practical, existential, and spiritually sensitive approach and not the 
study or composition of dry treatises.29 In nearly the same breath, Smith returns 
to Plotinus and the imagery of light for the idea that just “as the eye cannot 
behold the sun . . . unless it hath the form and resemblance of the sun drawn in 
it” so too for the soul to “behold God . . . unless it be Godlike.” This touchstone 
on the landscape of platonic intelligibility leads back again to scripture 
immediately, “and the apostle St. Paul, when he would lay open the right way of 
century England,” Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies (2013; doi: 10.1111/1754-0208.12075): 1-16, 
esp. 7-11. 
 
28 See Louth, Origins, 35-72.  
 
29 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 2.  
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attaining to divine truth, saith, that ‘knowledge puffeth up,’ but it is ‘love that 
edifieth.’”30  
For Smith, no less than Origen, emotion and the will, especially love, play 
a central role in the directedness of our attention. When we strive after physical 
things, we are drawn by our love (or “lust) away from the inner spiritual realities 
and therefore we fail to love rightly that which is more valuable in itself (i.e., 
spirit not matter). When we direct our wills toward inner spiritual things, love 
plays a positive role in spiritual sensation. The spiritual senses are partly 
activated by, and partly cause and deepen, love of God possible through God’s 
grace in creation and salvation. It is within the inner realm of the heart that the 
spiritual senses operate for Smith. In this, Smith differs slightly from Origen who 
stresses intellect with respect to the spiritual senses, but for both it is the inner 
person, the mind or soul, which is the locus of spiritual sensation. However, like 
Origen, Smith finds his basis for spiritual sensibility in the Bible with the aid of a 
(neo)platonic framework that helps to make it noticeable and plausible. 
30 Ibid., 3. The Pauline reference is to I Cor. 8:1. The reference to Plotinus appears to be 
Ennead I.2.4. On the perfection of divine knowledge in love in Smith, Richard Hooker, Pascal, and 
others see Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 234-42.  
 
 
 
                                                 
207 
 
Three additional passages form the heart of Smith’s affirmation of the 
reality and necessity of spiritual sensation. The first comes from Plotinus. After 
pointing out the uselessness of seeking divinity in books alone where it is 
“entombed” more often than “enshrined,” Smith gives Plotinus as his source for 
the sentiment that one is to “seek God within” our “own soul” for God “is best 
discerned by an intellectual touch.”31 This is not allowed to stand on its own 
however, and is buoyed within the same sentence by reference to the First Epistle 
of John (1:1); “we must ‘see with our eyes, and hear with our ears, and our hands 
must handle the word of life.” Smith adds to this that, “the soul itself hath its 
sense, as well as the body” and again within the same sentence goes on to say 
that it is for this reason that David recommends in the Psalm “not speculation 
but sensation” as the means of arriving at an understanding of divine goodness; 
“Taste and see how good the Lord is.”32  
31 Enneads I.2.6 and V.3.17 seem to be the inspiration for Smith’s reference here but as is 
often the case his reference is not exact and does not match the words of the passage so much as 
the likely meaning of it. This tendency will be important later in our discussion of Smith’s use of 
Origen as a source. The phrase, “intellectual touch,” is a key to the way in which spiritual 
sensation is concerned with a blending of the conceptual and the (in some sense) perceptual. 
 
32 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 3; Psalm 34:8. Cf. Smith’s “internal sensating Faculty” for 
the good (Ibid., 138) discussed in 6.1.4.1 below. Also, Douglas Hedley on the influence of this 
opposition to “mere speculation” on Coleridge (Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000], 225, 281).  
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In this way, Smith follows Origen’s hermeneutical approach (as suggested 
by Dillon) but as a late Renaissance Neoplatonist, Smith sees no reason to keep 
his reliance on a pagan philosopher implicit. Plotinus is for Smith a great teacher 
whose limits are overcome by the revelations of scripture but who nonetheless 
supplies a sure and steady guide by supplying the context within which 
scriptural passages can be read in their most literal way possible. Like Origen, 
Smith denies that there is biblical warrant for a vision of divine things with the 
physical eyes but his allegiance to a Neoplatonism open to the possibility of 
noetic sensibility allows him to affirm that these passages are not merely poetic 
devices.  
Smith’s initial presentation of the reality of spiritual sensation rests on 
much the same combination of philosophical plausibility and scriptural warrant 
that Origen relies on. The most significant difference in this regard seems to be 
the added level of expressly methodical concern in Smith. As an early, and in 
some respects uncritical, admirer of Descartes, Smith seeks to offer foundations 
for his theological work in ways that Origen does not, but Smith finds his 
foundations not in modernity, but in Origen’s era. In other words, Smith was 
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urged by his present to recover a past within the tradition of Christian Platonism, 
because this is a living tradition for him.33  
 
4.1.2 Origen as Source 
As has been demonstrated, Smith seems to follow the example of Origen’s 
creative combination of platonic plausibility and allegorical scriptural exegesis. 
This move on its own however only demonstrates that Smith is a Christian 
Platonist. His specific indebtedness to Origen is seen when one considers the 
way in which Origen acts not only as a model but also as a source for Smith’s 
presentation of the spiritual senses. This indebtedness to Origen as source will in 
turn offer support for the preceding argument about Origen as model.  
Several specific elements in the theories of both figures might be discussed 
in this regard. For example, both Origen and Smith suggest that all human 
beings have a natural capacity for spiritual sensation as part of our original make 
up as rational beings. However in our earthly, sinful, fallen, life most people do 
not realize this potential. To actualize one’s spiritual senses requires God’s grace 
as well as personal effort and practice, essentially, moral behavior, philosophical 
33 Saveson has suggested that Smith seems to think of the French Oratory, Descartes and 
Copernican astronomy as manifestations of a generally platonic philosophy.  
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training, reflection, prayer, scriptural study, and other spiritual practices. 34 
Likewise, both ascribe to the spiritual senses the ability to perceive spiritual life 
and spiritual death.35 Both Origen and Smith describe particular spiritual senses 
as taking for their objects various delightful manifestations of the Divine Logos.36 
Finally, both locate the spiritual senses within an inner person as opposed to the 
outer, and both suggest that one’s attention to the external senses must decrease 
in order for the spiritual senses to increase.37 All of these similarities are 
suggestive of Smith’s debt to Origen; however, discussion here will be limited to 
34 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 3, 8, 10-11, 12, 16, 21; Hans Urs von Balthasar, ed. Spirit 
and Fire, trans. Robert J. Daly (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), nos. 637-658, 674.  
 
35 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 4-5, 7; Origen, Cant. Co. 1, in Balthasar, Spirit and Fire, 
nos. 545, 547.  
 
36 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 3 (“we must see with our eyes, and hear with our ears, 
and our hands must handle the word of life”); Balthasar, Spirit and Fire, nos. 539-540, 604-693.  
 
37 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 3, etc.; Balthasar, Spirit and Fire, nos. 519-521, and 536. 
Origen follows St. Paul and platonic convention and Smith follows Descartes and what he takes 
to be the Christian tradition. Cf. John Norris, Reason and Religion, or the Grounds and Measures of 
Devotion Considered from the Nature of God and the Nature of Man, in Cragg, ed., The Cambridge 
Platonists, 157: “. . . the mind sees the divine essence must be totally and thoroughly absolved 
from all commerce with the corporeal senses.” There is an interesting parallel here with the 
philosophical objections raised by opponents of the Hesychast movement in the fourteenth 
century. Like the Greek Humanist Platonists Smith thinks that to suppose one may see God with 
one’s physical eyes is to make a category mistake. See Niketas Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in 
Byzantium: Illumination and Utopia in Gemistos Plethon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 93-124.  
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their common apologetic use of the spiritual senses where Smith makes explicit 
reference to Origen.  
From the very start of his first discourse Smith is eager to show that 
theology has a kind of demonstration that is different from the pure ratiocination 
of the intellect, or the dry presentations of doctrines and proofs in books. For 
example, Smith tells us, “They are not alwaies the best skill’d in Divinity, that are 
most studied in those Pandects which it is sometimes digested into, or that have 
erected the greatest Monopolies of Art and Science.”38 A little later Smith adds, 
“We must not think we have attained to the right knowledge of Truth, when we 
have broke through the outward shell of words & phrases that house it up; or 
when by a Logical Analysis we have found out the dependencies and coherences 
of them with one another.”39 Smith is here framing his presentation of the “True 
38 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 2. Cf. Ralph Cudworth, “. . . as if Religion were nothing 
but a little Book-craft, a mere paper-skill” (“A Sermon Preached before the House of Commons, 
March 31, 1647,” in C.A. Patrides, Cambridge Platonists, 91).  
  
39 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 8. To these quotations can be added: “The knowledge of 
Divinity that appears in systems and models is but a poor wan light” (3). “All Light and 
Knowledge that may seem sometimes to rise up in unhallowed minds, is but like those fuliginous 
flames that arise up from our culinary fire, that are soon quench’d in their own smoke; or like 
those foolish fires that fetch their birth from terrene exudations, that doe but hop up & down , 
and flit to and fro upon the surface of this earth where they were first brought forth; and serve 
not so much to enlighten, as to delude us; nor to direct the wandering traveler into his way , but 
to lead him farther out of it” (3-4). Others like this are found throughout the first “Discourse” and 
indeed throughout the entire Select Discourses.  
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Way” in apologetic terms against a merely logical or intellectual approach to 
philosophy and theology. His opponents in this apologetic are the early modern 
Skeptics, various types of materialists (especially Epicureans), other “atheists,” 
and especially Christian scholastics.  
In the midst of this apologetic Smith repeatedly points to the true method 
as that of a purified life and the awakening of a capacity for spiritual sensation 
which grants knowledge more akin to personal encounter than logical inference. 
This is the different kind of demonstration that Christianity has for Smith, 
proven not in the unaffected intellect calmly accessing the evidence but felt in a 
direct experience of God by the soul. It is in the midst of this apology that Smith 
makes his only direct appeal to Origen. “It is but a thin, aiery knowledge that is 
got by meer Speculation, which is usher’d in by Syllogisms and Demonstrations; 
but that which springs forth from true Goodness, is ???????????????????
??????????, [theioteron ti pases apodeixeos, “a more divine demonstration” or 
“more divine than any demonstration”] as Origen speaks, it brings such a Divine 
Light into the Soul, as is more clear and convincing than any Demonstration.”40 
40 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 4. Without the full context it is difficult to be precise 
about the intended meaning of the phrase from Origen. Cf. Henry More, A Brief Discourse of the 
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Examination of Origen’s works, and the editions of Origen known to have been 
available to Smith, reveals that the “quote” here is most likely a paraphrase taken 
from Contra Celsum I.2. 
In keeping with Smith’s general practice, the phrase is not attributed to a 
specific passage in Origen. Unlike most other quotations from Greek and 
Hebrew, this phrase has not been “Englished” by Smith’s editor.41 Apparently, 
Worthington judged a translation of this passage “was less needful” because of 
the surrounding text. C. A. Patrides translates the phrase, “more sacred than any 
evidence.”42 No edition of the Discourses has offered a specific citation for this 
phrase and the most recent abridged edition of the first “Discourse” offers only 
the suggestion that Smith may have in mind Origen’s Commentary on the Gospel of 
John, Book X, 25, in which Origen, “discourses on the Divine light.”43 This 
True Grounds of the Certainty of Faith in Points of Religion, in Cragg, ed., The Cambridge Platonists, 
147: “This is not to be argued, but by an internal sense to be felt.”  
 
41 Worthington, “To the Reader,” in Select Discourses (1660), iv-v. 
 
42 The Cambridge Platonists (London: Edward Arnold, 1969), 130. “Sacred” is an unusual 
choice for Smith who is much more partial to variations on “divine.” Also, Smith’s larger point is 
that there is a kind of “evidence” for Christianity. It is just not discursive argument.  
 
43 Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, 218 n.378. 
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suggestion however seems to have more to do with the English phrases that 
follow Smith’s quotation from Origen and not the quotation itself.  
According to the online Thesaurus Linguae Graecae??????????????????????
times in Origen’s corpus but this phrase is never given.44 However, a search of 
Origen’s works in the Patrolgia Graeca (Migne) edition also reveals that the phrase 
in fact does not occur in exactly this form in Origen. Furthermore, according to 
Origen’s, Opera Omnia, Lexicum Proprium seu 'Concordances,’ the word ??????????
occurs only once and this phrase is not there.45 Chadwick’s edition has, 
“something divine about him” in this place.46 Similar forms of Smith’s Greek for 
“divine” and “proof/demonstration” do occur in Contra Celsum I.2 however, 
where the same sentiment, though not the exact phrase, is found. Apparently, 
Smith has paraphrased Origen from memory or less-than-exact notes. This is not 
at all unusual for Smith; the majority of his references in the first “Discourse,” 
except for the Bible, are of this sort.  
44 Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, accessed 11 March 2010, http://www.tlg.uci.edu/. 
 
45 Cooperatorum Veritatis Societas, Documenta Catholica Omnia (2006), accessed 30 
October 2008, http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/1004/1001/local_general_index.html.  
 
46 Contra Celsum, col. 00336 (1.31), in Chadwick trans., 30. 
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It should also be noted that although the seventeenth century manuscript 
list of books from Smith’s library donated to Queens’ College Library upon his 
death in 1652 does not include Origen’s Contra Celsum, both Emmanuel (where 
he was a student) and Queens’ (where he was a fellow) had copies in a 1605 
Greek and Latin edition. The Emmanuel volume was removed before 1693 when 
the current copy held there was donated by Sancroft. The volume was in the 
collection for the first year of Smith’s undergraduate studies in the College 
however.47 There was also most likely a copy, of the same edition, at Queens’ 
College when he became a fellow in 1644.48 Moreover, Smith did know the Contra 
Celsum; he references it specifically in his discourse “Of Prophecy.”49 
That Smith intends this passage specifically is indicated most strongly by 
the parallel intensions at work in both texts. In Contra Celsum I.2, Celsus is 
critiqued for trying to apply the criterion of a “Greek proof” to Christianity and 
47 S. Bush, Jr. and C. J. Rasmussen, The Library of Emmanuel College Cambridge 1584-1637 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 146. 
 
48 T. H. Horne, A Catalogue of the Library of The College of St. Margaret and St. Bernard, 
Commonly Called Queen’s College in the University of Cambridge… (London, 1827), 122. The edition 
in both cases was that of David Hoeschelius published in 1605 in both Greek and Latin (on 
alternating pages but with continuous pagination) and copious notes and apparatus. The Queens’ 
copy remains in the Old Library. 
 
49 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 283. Contra Celsum, 7.8.  
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then Origen says, “Moreover, we have to say this, that the gospel has a proof 
which is particular to itself, and which is more divine than a Greek proof based on 
dialectical argument. This more divine demonstration the apostle calls a 
‘demonstration of the Spirit and of power’ – of the spirit because of the 
prophecies and especially those which refer to Christ, which are capable of 
convincing anyone who reads them; of power because of the prodigious miracles 
which may be proved to have happened by this argument among many others, 
that traces of them still remain among those who live according to the will of the 
Logos.”50  
Likewise, Smith appeals to Origen in his own apologetic use of spiritual 
sensation. Immediately after his reference to Origen, Smith continues his attack 
on the “thin speculations” of logicians (both believers and non-believers).51 In 
addition, Origen suggests that the prophets employ the spiritual senses and that 
there is a single spiritual sensibility that takes five forms later in book I at chapter 
forty-eight. Chapters two and forty-eight are thus closely related for Origen and 
50 Origen, Contra Celsum, I.2 (trans., Chadwick), emphasis added to show Chadwick’s 
English for the similar forms of the Greek offered by Smith as a “quotation” from Origen.  
 
51 What I am calling Smith’s “apology” runs the full length of the first numbered section 
of the first discourse (Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 1-13).  
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both play a role in defending the sensible language of scripture from outside 
attack. And, as we will see below, just as Origen relates the spiritual senses to 
prophecy as the means by which revelation is received by human beings, so too 
does Smith.52  
While it would seem from these considerations that the spiritual senses 
are not merely metaphorical for Origen, it remains to be seen if they are rightly 
understood to be five in number or if they are merely so many ways of speaking 
of a single spiritual capacity or “intellectual sense” as Smith puts it.53 In light of 
what Origen says about the inner and outer person however, it would seem that 
he indeed does intend to maintain that there are five distinct spiritual senses. 
This is important because it implies that there is something about the divine 
objects of these senses that could not be captured by a single noetic sense.  
There is however no reason to affirm a strict opposition between one 
spiritual sensibility and five spiritual senses. Indeed, in Contra Celsum I. 48 
Origen suggests, in the midst of his discussion of the connection between the 
demonstration of the Spirit in prophecy and its connection to the five spiritual 
52 See below on Smith’s theory of prophecy.  
 
53 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 3.  
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senses, that there is a single “general divine perception” but that this single 
spiritual sensibility takes many forms, which Origen gives as the five spiritual 
senses.  
Smith seems to be in basic agreement on this point. However, he is far less 
interested in speaking of a full set of five spiritual senses than is Origen. Smith 
moves easily from talking about spiritual sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell, 
to speaking of a single spiritual sensibility, often called an “intellectual touch” 
and occasionally referred to as a sense of the heart.54 Unlike Origen, Smith does 
not put forward a clear theory of five distinct spiritual senses with anything 
approaching consistency in regards to their objects or other particulars, but he 
does consistently speak of the spiritual senses as more than simply one. Divinity 
is best known through a spiritual sensation for Smith that may take a form 
54 Boyd T. Coolman has shown a very similar arrangement in William of Auxerre who 
also poses both a single noetic sense and five spiritual senses as parts of this whole (Knowing God 
by Experience: The Spiritual Senses in the Theology of William of Auxerre [Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2004]). Thus, it is not at all unprecedented within the tradition to 
speak this way. It should be noted however that I am not aware of any direct connection between 
William and Smith.  
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analogous to any of the physical senses, in keeping with Origen’s statement in 
Contra Celsum I.48.55  
It seems probable therefore that Smith has in mind an arrangement very 
much like the one suggested by Origen where a “general divine perception” 
takes many different forms in order that the plentitude of the divine nature may 
be more fully expressed.56 This would help account for the ease with which 
Smith can go from speaking of a single noetic sense, using sensory language as a 
metaphor for knowledge (i.e., intellectual intuition), to multiple senses akin to 
the physical senses with different sensory objects within the spiritual realm (i.e., 
spiritual sight, taste, touch, of etc.).57 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that 
Smith is drawing on Origen’s discussion in the first book of Contra Celsum.  
 
55 For example, Smith speaks of spiritual sight, touch, and taste already on p.3 of the 
“True Way” discourse (1660).  
 
56 And this is exactly what one finds in Smith’s treatment of the divine inspiration in the 
imagination of the prophet. See below.  
 
57 Smith will speak of this sort of variety especially in his discussion of the influx of 
divine revelation upon the imagination in prophecy. However, this also helps to explain the 
otherwise merely poetic appeal to different sensory modes in a “spiritual” key in the “True Way.”  
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4.1.3 Intellectual Intuition and the ‘Spiritual Senses’  
As we have seen, for Smith we come to a natural understanding of divine 
things via the activation of our capacity for spiritual sensation. This power is 
noetic and functions as an intuition of Divine truth. Moreover, this ability is 
affective and captured best by employing the language of sense.58 I have argued 
that what Smith means here is both intellectual intuition and something more 
along the lines of the five spiritual senses as employed by Origen. However, it 
seems that there is a problem with understanding how Smith’s “spiritual sense” 
can be simultaneously intellectual and sensible. At least one commentator has 
tried to get around this issue by interpreting Smith’s discussion in the “True 
Way” discourse as entirely concerned with intellectual intuition simpliciter.  
In his important study of the spiritual senses in Jonathan Edwards, 
William Wainwright argues that spiritual sensation for Smith is a matter of 
“affect-laden intellectual insight or intuition.”59 Drawing on many of the same 
passages discussed above, Wainwright focuses on the obviously intellectual 
58 On the Platonic tradition of affective cognition to the Cambridge Platonists see Susan 
James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 225-52.  
 
59 Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards,” 229.  
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nature of Smith’s talk of spiritual sensation.60 He rightly concludes that the 
spiritual senses are, for Smith, a matter of intellectual intuition with a strong 
“affective dimension.”61  
However, because he ignores the influence of Origen in the “True Way” 
discourse, and because he does not explore the use of spiritual sensation in the 
theory “Of Prophecy”62 at all, Wainwright misses the subtle way in which Smith 
actually sees the spiritual senses as both unitary, as a metaphor for intellection, 
and diverse, on analogy with the five physical senses.63 Moreover, Smith is 
explicit that the “internal sensating Faculty” by which goodness is perceived is 
not a matter of the intellect but the will.64  
While Wainwright is correct in acknowledging that the affections are 
involved in Smith’s account of spiritual sensation in the “True Way” he misses 
60 Ibid., 229-231.  
 
61 Ibid., 231.  
 
62 See section 4.2 below.  
 
63 On the way sensory language for intellection may be analogical and not merely 
metaphorical see Mark T. Mealey, “Taste and See that the Lord is Good: John Wesley in the 
Christian Tradition of Spiritual Sensation” (PhD diss., University of St. Michael’s College, 2006), 
37. Thought is metaphorically referred to with images drawn from sense but in such a way as to 
suggest an analogy between the mind and the faculties of sense.  
 
64 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 138.  
 
 
 
                                                 
222 
 
the possibility that in Smith’s day the emotions (i.e., being “amorous of Divine 
beauty” for example) can be thought of as receptive, like sense. After all, 
Descartes famously argued that the “passions” were a species of sensation.65 
Wainwright is again correct that “Platonists think that reason itself has an 
affective dimension”66 but the emotional response to the intuition of Divine 
things is also perceptual for Smith. It is perceived through a “living sense” in and 
through a truly spiritual life. Wainwright mentions that other “analogies are at 
least as apt” as that between intellection and sense and goes on to include, as an 
example, “our immediate acquaintance with numbers.”67 However, Smith thinks 
that the “true Perfection, Sweetness, Energie, and Loveliness” of the purified soul 
reflecting Divine truth “is ??????????????????????? [neither explicit nor written] 
. . . [and] can no more be known by a naked Demonstration, then Colours can be 
65 This tendency to associate affect with sense begins with Aristotle, can be found in the 
medieval scholastics (e.g., Thomas Aquinas) and continued well into the seventeenth century 
with figures like Descartes and into the eighteenth century with Francis Hutcheson. See Amy M. 
Schmitter, "17th and 18th Century Theories of Emotions," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 15 October 2010, accessed 29 April 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/emotions-17th18th/. Also Susan James, Passion 
and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003).  
 
66 Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards,” 231.  
 
67 Ibid. 
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perceived of a blinde man by any Definition or Description which he can hear of 
them.”68 But what does it mean to have an “immediate acquaintance” with 
numbers or other mathematical objects other than to be brought to a proper 
cognition of them by a demonstration, definition, or description?  
It would seem, therefore, that there is more of the actually sensible going 
on in Smith than Wainwright has allowed. For, our intellectual intuition of divine 
things must remain in this life “but here in its Infancy.” Even the understanding 
of the “true Metaphysical and Contemplative man” must still contend with the 
“Imaginative Powers” that will be “breathing a grosse dew upon the pure Glasse 
of our Understandings” so that at best we intellectually intuit “in a glass 
darkly.”69 That is, the sensible images of our imaginations remain with us while 
we live. The goal remains the pure “affect-laden intellectual . . . intuition” but 
this is a goal we are, here on Earth, only ever approaching; a goal only reached in 
the life of the world to come.  
68 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 15.  
 
69 Ibid., 20, 21.  
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Additionally, Smith speaks of “knowing of the truth as it is in Jesus”70 and 
of the results of his “True Way” as transforming what “was onely Faith” into 
“Vision.”71 Thus, he rather clearly means to say that as well as providing natural 
or rational access to the basics of theology, his “method” is also a means by 
which one comes to realize the truths of revelation for one’s self. By purifying 
one’s mind one comes to see that what Christ and the prophets have revealed is 
real and living truth. What starts out as belief of propositions from without 
becomes the perception of truths from within.  
It is true that intellectual intuition is involved for Smith, but that is not all 
that is going on in his treatment of the “spiritual senses.” For all the 
intellectualism in the “True Way,” the imagination is not, cannot be, completely 
surpassed. To do so would be to take important aspects of the “life” out of 
Smith’s proposed method. Furthermore, the role of the will is far more important 
than merely an affective adjunct to the intellect. In the perception of the Divine 
Goodness it is the will that senses, not the intellect.72 Moreover, as we will see 
70 Ibid., 8.  
 
71 Ibid., 16.  
 
72 Though, to be fair, Smith does not hold to a consistent or firm distinction between 
intellect and will. He tends to see them both simply as activities of the one soul.  
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when we turn to Smith’s discussion of prophecy, the imagination, no less than 
the intellect, plays a key role in the reception of the saving truths of revelation.73  
 
4.1.4 Conclusions along the Way 
John Smith was influenced by the doctrine of the spiritual senses as 
expressed by its first systematic Christian exponent, Origen of Alexandria. Smith 
has been shown to follow Origen’s practice as the basis for his own presentation 
of spiritual sensibility. Whereas Origen relied on Middle Platonism and scripture 
however, Smith relied on Neoplatonism (especially Plotinus) as well as scripture. 
Smith is also indebted to Origen for important elements in the content of his 
doctrine. Both employ spiritual sensibility in a presentation of the means by 
which one comes to a proper theological understanding and Smith makes 
explicit reference to Origen’s apologetics as support for his own. Together this 
twofold influence is suggestive of a conscious appropriation of Origen’s thought 
by Smith.  
73 Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “Moral and Religious Aphorisms,” in C.A. Patrides, #99 
(p.327): “Reason discovers, what is Natural; and Reason receives, what is Supernatural.” On Smith 
on the imagination in “la Communicazione di Dio all’umanita’attraverso Cristo” (the 
communication of God to humanity through Christ) see Mario Micheletti, Il pensiero religioso di 
John Smith platonico di Cambridge (Padova: La Garangola, 1976), 360-85.  
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Although other lines of influence cannot be ruled out with absolute 
confidence, the cumulative case is strong. While Smith follows Origen’s lead only 
briefly by the letter, and even then only as a paraphrase, in spirit Smith’s debt to 
the Alexandrian is clear. Therefore, the Emmanuel College Chapel windows are 
correct. Smith is rightfully thought of as an heir to the legacy of Origen, and 
much of this inheritance is manifest in Smith’s discussion of spiritual sensation.   
 
4.2 The Source of Revealed Theology: Prophecy & the Spiritual Senses 
In addition to the use of these varieties of spiritual perception in 
accounting for natural theological knowledge, Smith employs complex notions of 
spiritual sensation in his presentation of the origin of revealed theology too. For 
this, Smith will allow for only one “way whereby” this “Revealed Truth which 
tend[s] most of all to foment . . . true and real Piety” and that is prophecy.74  
74 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 171; “Of Prophecy,” ch.1. In this section I cite from the 
edition of Williams published in 1859 because of his helpful citations of Smith’s rabbinic sources. 
For corresponding pages in other full editions see the Appendix. See also Sarah Hutton, “The 
Prophetic Imagination: A Comparative Study of Spinoza and the Cambridge Platonist, John 
Smith.” In Spinoza's Political and Theological Thought: International Symposium under the Auspices of 
the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Commemorating the 350th anniversary of the Birth 
of Spinoza, Amsterdam, 24-27 November 1982, edited by C. Deugd, 73-81. (Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1984). Cf. More, A Brief Discourse, 145: “. . . the moral and human certainty of faith 
grounded upon the certainty of universal tradition, prophecy, history, and the nature of things 
delivered, reason and sense assisting the mind in her disquisitions toughing these matters. . . . By 
prophecy I understand as well those divine predictions of the coming of Christ, as those touching 
the Church after he had come.”  
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4.2.1 General Character of Prophecy  
Smith opens his discourse by noting the classic scholastic distinction 
between natural theology and “Revealed Truth” or revealed theology.75 This 
signals a major shift in the Select Discourses to this point. The previous five 
discourses have treated topics in natural theology (“Of the True Way of Method 
of Attaining to Divine Knowledge,” “Of Superstition,” “Of Atheism,” “Of the 
Immortality of the Soul,” and “Of the Existence and Nature of God”). But now, 
with the sixth, Smith’s attention turns to matters dependent “solely upon the 
Free will of God.”76 As Worthington reports on the state of Smith’s papers, and 
as Smith himself reports in the beginning of his discourse “Of the Immortality of 
the Soul,” the plan was to pivot here to discourses on “The Communication of God 
to Mankind through Christ.”77 In order to introduce revealed theology Smith takes 
up much the same task as we have seen above in the case of “The True Way” 
75 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 171. See Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica of St. 
Thomas Aquinas, 2nd revised ed. (1920), trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Online 
Edition, at New Advent.org, ed. Kevin Knight (2008), accessed 30 April 2014, 
http://home.newadvent.org/summa/1001.htm#article1, I 1.1 (First Part, First Question, First 
Article).  
 
76 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 171.  
 
77 Worthington, “An Advertisement,” in Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 294; (1660), 280. 
These Smith did not live long enough to compose; Worthington attempts to make up for them by 
providing some related discourses in the remains of his edition of Smith’s work. 
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discourse. He gives an overview of the way by which one comes to receive 
revelation, which he asserts is only accomplished through prophecy.  
Where “natural truth” is “engraven upon”78 and “folded up in”79 our own 
essences as “participations of the Divine Mind” within the human, “positive 
truth can only be made known to us by a free influx of the Divine Mind upon our 
minds and understandings.”80 In this way Smith contrasts the innatism of the 
78 Cf. Plotinus, Ennead V. 3. 4.  
 
79 Smith’s use of the phrase “folded up in” is reminiscent of the language of Nicholas of 
Cusa. For Cusanus, enfold-unfold (complicare-explicare) are technical terms of art signifying the 
relationship between God, in Whom all things exist qua enfolded, and the multiplicity of creation, 
where things are unfolded qua individuals. If Smith has this connotation in mind, he would seem 
to be suggesting that our native notions of God are enfolded within us. Thus, on this reading we 
are the idea or form of God; perhaps another way of speaking of humanity as made in the imago 
Dei. Interesting as such a speculative reading is, there is (1) no reason to think that Smith had 
read Cusa, and (2) for this metaphor to work one would need to posit real plurality in God (and 
make of the Deity a human creation too). See Christopher M. Bellitto, Thomas M. Izbicki, Gerald 
Christianson, eds., Introducing Nicholas of Cusa: A Guide to a Renaissance Man (New York and 
Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2004), 459-60 and Jasper Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance: 
A Translation and an Appraisal of De Docta Ignorantia, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning 
Press, 1985). Douglas Hedley has made a case for greater partiality on the part of Christian 
theology to “the claims of the imagination” in part on the basis of the imago Dei in his “Homo 
Imaginans and the Concursus Divinus,” in Charles Taliaferro and Jil Evans, eds., Turning Images 
in Philosophy, Science, and Religion: A New Book of Nature (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 114-32, here 132.  
 
80 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 171. Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “Moral and Religious 
Aphorisms,” in C.A. Patrides, #460 (p.331): “Reason is not a shallow thing: it is the first 
Participation from God: therefore he, that observes Reason, observes God.” Since Smith will 
elaborate that the intellect and the imagination are inspired in prophecy it seems clear that he 
includes the imagination in or with the “mind.” On the idea of knowledge of God being placed in 
the mind by God see also Henry More, An Antidote Against Atheism (1652), in Cragg, ed., The 
Cambridge Platonists, Book I Chapter 8, p.177: “For this idea of God being no arbitrarious figment 
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natural with the free gift ad extra of the revealed. Still, in contrast to the radical 
monergism of the Calvinists of his day, “the souls of men are as capable of 
conversing with” this divine disclosure “as they are with any sensible and 
external objects.” Moreover, “there is some analogical way, whereby the 
knowledge of Divine Truth may also be revealed to us.”81 That is, revelation 
takes a form that is analogous to everyday corporeal sensation.  
In fact, Smith is prepared, though he does not develop the idea fully, to 
speak of the “historical truth of corporeal and material things” as “revealed” to 
our understanding.82 To reinforce this notion Smith argues that just as God has 
made us capable of communication with each other so too has God made us 
“capable of receiving any impressions from Himself.” This form of divine 
communication is “originally nothing else but prophetical.”83  
taken up at pleasure, but the necessary and natural emanation of the mind of man.”  Also, on the 
necessity of God from the nature of our knowing, see Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual 
System of the Universe, Chapter V, section 1, in Cragg, Cambridge Platonists, 195-203.  
 
81 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 172.  
 
82 Some contemporary philosophers have spoken in much this same way about 
phenomenal experience as “revealed.” See, Dominique Janicaud, Phenomenology and the 
"Theological Turn": The French Debate (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000).  
 
83 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 172.  
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While the primary purpose of prophecy will be to communicate those 
truths that must be freely given by God, Smith is also quick to acknowledge that 
it can be a means of arriving at natural truths more quickly too. For this reason, 
“Scripture treats, not only those pieces of truth which are the results of God’s free 
counsels, but also those which are most akin and allied to our understandings 
[natural truths], and that in the greatest way of condescension [i.e., 
accommodation] that may be, speaking to the weakest sort of men in the most 
vulgar sort of dialect.”84 In this, Smith is clearly following the well-worn 
scholastic consensus.85 God’s “Truth is content” when expressed in scripture “to 
wear our mantles, to learn our language.” In order that we might understand the 
record of prophecy in scripture “speaks with the most idiotical sort of men in the 
most idiotical way.”86 For this reason, the best way to approach scripture “is not 
rigidly to examine it upon philosophical interrogatories, or to bring it under the 
84 Ibid., 173.  
 
85 See “Accommodation,” in Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological 
Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1986), 19. Also, 
John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 1.13.1, trans. Henry Beveridge, Christian Classics 
Ethereal Library, 2005, accessed 2 May 2014, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.iii.xiv.html. 
 
86 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 173. “Idiotical” here is meant in the now obsolete sense 
of plain, simple, or unlearned not “idiotic” in our contemporary sense.  
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scrutiny of school definitions and distinctions [i.e., scholastic inquiry].”87 Instead, 
one must interpret passages that speak of God sensing, feeling, or moving as 
symbolic of omniscience or omnipresence or the like.88 In the same way, hell and 
heaven too, while spoken of as places are rather to be understood as states of the 
soul instead.89 Thus, scripture speaks of divine things metaphorically in order that 
we might understand, even though the prophet has received the truths so 
recorded in a way analogous to ordinary sensible experience. 
  
4.2.2 Degrees of Prophecy 
While this discourse is primarily concerned with prophecy, that is actually 
not its overall topic. For Smith includes in this discourse discussions of those 
who do not technically count as prophets at all. Some received divine revelation 
in more perfect ways than others. The real topic of the discourse is divine 
inspiration, enthusiasm and illumination and all the varieties of this broader 
87 Ibid., 174.  
 
88 Ibid., 174-6.  
 
89 Ibid., 176-7. Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “Moral and Religious Aphorisms,” in C.A. 
Patrides, #100 (p.327): “Both Heaven and Hell have their Foundation within Us. Heaven primarily 
lies in a refined Temper; in an internal Reconciliation to the Nature of God, and to the Rule of 
Righteousness. The Guilt of Conscience, and Enmity to Righteousness, is the inward state of Hell. 
The Guilt of Conscience is the Fewel of Hell.”  
 
 
                                                 
232 
 
category. As will be made clear below, what Smith means by “inspiration,” 
“illumination,” and “enthusiasm” comes into sharpest focus in his treatment of 
the specifics of each of these degrees of the reception of revelation. Some 
preliminary words of clarification must be made from the start however.  
Unlike the very different meaning of terms such as enthusiasm and 
illumination as employed by some other authors, Smith means to express by 
them that process whereby the individual human soul receives divine revelation. 
Rather than our contemporary meaning of a particularly intense emotional 
interest in someone or something (i.e., “I’ve always been a great ice hockey 
enthusiast”) or even the meaning that one finds in Henry More of an “ill-
regulated or misdirected religious emotion,” especially associated with ecstasy, 
purported prophecy or other inspiration from God, Smith nearly always uses 
“enthusiasm” in its original sense as signifying “supernatural inspiration.”90 
“Inspiration” in this context means for Smith the influence of God, perhaps via a 
mediating angel, upon a person. “Illumination” can call to mind Augustine’s 
90 See the Oxford English Dictionary under “enthusiasm.” On More’s concerns to 
distinguish true from false or “enthusiastic” visions and dreams see Scott, “Visions, Dreams, and 
Discernment,” 215-20. The classic text is Henry More, Enthusiasmus triumphatus, or, a discourse of 
the nature, causes, kinds, and cure, of enthusiasme…and prefixed to Alazonomastix His Observations and 
reply…. (London: J. Flesher, sold by W. Morden, Cambridge, 1656). 
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famous epistemological theory and a whole host of similar uses that arose from 
his influence. Smith, in contrast, usually intends by the word merely an instance 
of inspiration or revelation in the mind. While Smith is happy to use the 
metaphor of light as Augustine did he shows no obvious sign of following the 
great Church Father in specifics.91 In general, therefore, Smith uses terms such as 
revelation, inspiration, enthusiasm, and illumination more or less synonymously 
to indicate the act of communication between God and human beings.  
Smith calls upon the definitions of prophecy by Maimonides and Joseph 
Albo (c.1380-1444) to establish that this communication is effected via the action 
of God upon the imagination and the mind or intellect.92 “’The true essence of 
91 Indeed, Smith’s usage seems to owe more to earlier Greek Patristic and pagan 
philosophical models than to Augustine or the Scholastics. Cf. See R. Crocker, “The Role of 
Illuminism in the Thought of Henry More,” in G. A. J. Rogers, et al., eds., The Cambridge Platonists 
in Philosophical Context, 129-44. For a standard treatment of divine illumination of the 
Augustinian variety see Robert Pasnau, "Divine Illumination," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 4 April 2011, accessed 26 April 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/illumination/. For a more recent perspective 
that challenges the traditional philosophical interpretation see Lydia Schumacher, Divine 
Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2011). Smith tends to employ illumination in ways more like Schumacher’s “intrinsic” 
interpretation of Augustine’s theory than the usual “external” approach found in Pasnau. That is, 
Smith, like Schumacher’s Augustine, thinks of divine illumination as arising within us rather than 
coming from without.  
 
92 Important background for medieval theories of the “inner senses,” including the 
imagination, can still be found in Harry Austryn Wolfson, "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, 
and Hebrew Philosophical Texts," The Harvard Theological Review 28, no. 2 (1935): 69-133. For 
Maimonides in particular see Wolfson’s "Maimonides on the Internal Senses," Jewish Quarterly 
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prophecy is nothing else but an influence from the Deity first upon the rational, 
and afterwards upon the imaginative faculty’” according to Maimonides.93 Rabbi 
Albo agrees, saying, “’Prophecy is an influence from God upon the rational 
faculty, either by mediation of the fancy [imagination] or otherwise.’”94 Smith 
will follow his Jewish sources here and maintain that the grades of revelation are 
distinguished by the relative involvement of the two faculties of the imagination 
and the intellect. Additional specification comes only in the context of Smith’s 
discussion of the various types of this general category of phenomena.  
Review N.S. 25 (1935). His “Isaac Israeli on the Internal Senses” (Jewish Studies: In Memory of George 
A. Kohut 1874-1933, ed. Salo Wittmayer Baron and A. Marx [Alexander Kohut Memorial 
Foundation, 1935], 583-98) and “Notes on Isaac Israeli's Internal Senses,” Jewish Quarterly Review 
51( 1961): 275–287 are also of interest. Part III on “Common Sense, Imagination, and Estimation,” 
in Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind (S. Knuuttila and J. Sihvola, eds. [Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2014], 107-170) gives an excellent overview of the historical developments in this area.  
 
93 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 179. Maimonides would seem to have adopted this view 
from Al-Farabi. See F. Rahman, Prophecy in Islam (London, 1958), 36-45; cited by Dov Schwartz, 
“Mosaic Prophecy in the Writings of a Fourteenth Century Jewish Neoplatonist Circle,” Journal of 
Jewish Thought and Philosophy 2 (1992): 97. Also Heidi M. Ravven, “Some Thoughts on What 
Spinoza Learned from Maimonides about the Prophetic Imagination: Part 1. Maimonides on 
Prophecy and the Imagination,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 no. 2 (2001): 193-214. 
Wolfson has noted that John of Damascus’s suggestion that dianoia includes divination in dreams 
may have led to the “connection between dreams, imagination, and prophecy which we find in 
Arabic and Jewish philosophy” (“Maimonides on the Internal Senses,” 454). However, prophetic 
dreams are also a commonplace in the Hebrew Bible. Moreover, communication between the 
divine and humanity was a common theme in the Ancient Near East generally. See, for example, 
the Gilgamesh Epic (Tablet VII), where Enkidu learns of the displeasure of the Gods in a dream 
(The Epic of Gilgamesh, trans. Andrew George [London: Penguin Classics, 2003], 54-9. 
 
94 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 180.  
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Smith follows the example of biblical and rabbinic tradition in arguing 
that there is a “gradual variety” among those who have received revelations. 
Above all there is the distinction between Moses and the rest of the prophets. 
Moses shares, of course, the status of being a prophet with many others but in 
terms of the quality, “clearness and evidence,” he far exceeds them all.95 The 
other prophets, e.g., Elijah, Isaiah, John the Baptist, rank below Moses as having 
revelations of a similar but less perfect kind. Below these are yet another rank of 
hagiographi, figures inspired by the Spirit of God to write biblical works such as 
the Psalms, Job, and the Song of Solomon, among others. These texts are not 
“prophetic” in the full or proper sense but they are “inspired” by God, and thus 
they represent a lower degree of revelation.96 Finally, at the lowest level of the 
hierarchy of illumination is the Bath Kol, or the “voice of God” heard through the 
corporeal sense of hearing.  
Tellingly, this last degree of revelation is not mentioned in chapter two 
where the others are first introduced. Instead, Smith adds a brief review in what 
95 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 178. Also, Deut. 34: 10. “Evidence” here refers to the 
quality of being evident not data or testimony.  
 
96 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 178-83; 268-71. In addition to Numbers 12: 5-8, Smith’s 
authorities for this division include Maimonides and Joseph Albo.  
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became chapter ten, just before laying out the highest degree of prophetical 
illumination, the Mosaic.97 Smith does note however that Joseph Albo 
“distinguished prophecy into . . . four degrees.” The lowest degree being that in 
which “the imaginative power is most predominant” corresponds to the Bath Kol 
in being most associated with physical perception and thus least intellectual.98 
The next “when the strength of the imaginative and rational powers equally 
balance each other” to the hagiographi. The third, yet again more perfect grade, is 
“when the rational power is most predominant” is associated with the prophets 
in the full sense. Fourth and finally, the most perfect form of prophecy, that 
associated with Moses above all others, is that “in which all imagination ceaseth, 
and the representation of truth descends not so low as the imaginative part, but 
is made in the highest stage of reason and understanding.”99  
97 The ordering of the material, it must be remembered, was done by Worthington after 
Smith’s death. Given the repetition and overall flow of this discourse in particular however it 
seems likely that it was in a very rough state indeed.  
 
98 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 181. Thus, the imagination is perceptual. It is where the 
objects of sense are presented to the understanding. It is between, therefore, the intellect and the 
senses, or as Smith puts it, it is the “middle region of man” (200).  
 
99 Ibid., 183.  
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In endorsing Albo’s hierarchy of prophecy Smith is also making clear his 
commitment to the hierarchy of faculties in the soul following the ordo 
cognoscendi.100 But his true guide is not Aristotle, but, Platonic, as what makes 
these grades hierarchical is their level of conformity to the divine realm of true 
noesis.101  
 
4.2.3 Prophecy Proper  
 As befits his purposes in this discourse Smith spends most of his time on 
what he calls “prophecy proper” or those degrees of divine inspiration that 
involve either a predominance, or the exclusive use, of the rational faculty over 
that of the imagination.102 For most prophets, revelation is received in the 
100 That is from external sense, to the inner faculties of perception, imagination, and 
memory, up to those of judgment and intellect.    
 
101 There is an interesting parallel between Albo’s degrees of prophecy and the four ranks 
of men according to their degree of knowledge and way of life, stemming ultimately from Plato’s 
Divided Line (Republic, 509d-510a), in “The True Way” discourse (1660, 17). We take this up in 
full in chapter five below. 
 
102 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 180. R. J. Scott has offered an important, albeit brief and 
imperfect account of Smith’s theory of prophecy as related to visions and dreams in “Visions, 
Dreams, and Discernment,” 201-33. In so far as Scott tries to draw conclusions about Smith by 
contrasting him with Thomas Aquinas (an unnecessary stand in for Protestant scholastics; Smith 
would be familiar with Thomas too) I think an important aspect of Smith’s thought is overlooked. 
He was resolutely opposed to the schoolmen of his day and to Aristotelians in particular. 
Maimonides and the other rabbinic sources Smith relies on are excepted not because of their 
philosophy but because they speak for the ancient Jewish tradition.  
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imagination as a representation of sensible objects. “The imaginative power . . . 
set forth as a stage, upon which certain visa and simulacra were represented,” as 
Smith phrases it.103 These “apparitions” or “types and shadows” are “symbols of 
some spiritual things.” That is, these presentations in the imagination are 
manifestations of purely “intelligible mysteries” which are seen by the intellect in 
their symbolic reflections. This intellectual intuition is occasioned by the action of 
God upon the intellect in coordination with the influx of images into the 
imagination.104  
103 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 180. Douglas Hedley has pointed to the collegiate 
context that may help to account for this image of the imagination as a “stage” in his Sacrifice 
Imagined: Violence, Atonement, and the Sacred (London and New York: Continuum, 2011), 55-6. He 
reports a 1640 inventory held by the Old Library at Queens’ College that includes a “Colledge 
stage” (56). Hedley has also called attention to the work of I. R. Wright (“An Early Stage at 
Queens’,” Magazine of the Cambridge Society 18 [1986]: 74-83) who notes that Cambridge had been 
a center for drama from the middle of the sixteenth century. In fact, Elizabeth I viewed 
performances in 1564 and “Charles I saw a play at Queens’ in 1632” (Hedley, Sacrifice, 56). 
Moreover, D. F. McKenzie has observed that “Trinity and Queens’ [Colleges] seem to have been 
the only colleges left in which plays were still performed with distinction” by the late 1630s (“A 
Cambridge Playhouse of 1638,” Renaissance Drama 3 [1970]: 270; quoted by Hedley, Sacrifice, 56). 
While it does seem probable therefore that Smith was familiar with the early modern English 
stage, it is worth noting that his Select Discourses contain no overt references to specific plays, 
playwrights, or the like except for his metaphorical use of the stage to describe the imagination. 
Moreover, the imagination, while key to divine revelation through prophecy, is clearly 
subservient for Smith to the intellect. However, since by the time of his appointment as a Fellow 
at Queens’ the Puritans had banned the theater, there may be purely practical reasons for his 
relative silence (cf. Hedley, Sacrifice, 56).  
 
104 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 181. “Images” here should be taken simply to mean the 
objects of the imagination. They are not limited to the visual for Smith as a prophet often “hears” 
divine things too. In principle, any of the five sensory modalities can be represented in the 
imagination.  
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Agent Intellect 
In two places in chapter two “Of Prophecy” Smith makes apparent 
reference to Aristotle’s “active” or “agent intellect”105 in order to account for that 
which impresses the intellect and imagination of the prophet with divine 
revelation.106 Now few concepts have been more influential or more controverted 
in the history of philosophy than Aristotle’s notion of the active intellect.107 
Reading the cryptic references to active and passive intellect in De Anima III 5 in 
the light of Metaphysics XII 5-7 led some commenters to conclude that the active 
intellect is external to the individual human mind. Some, beginning with 
Alexander of Aphrodisias, identified this external active intellect with Aristotle’s 
105 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 179, 185. Also Hedley, Sacrifice, 51-3.  
 
106 On Aristotle’s psychology see De Anima, trans. W. S. Hett with Greek in On the Soul. 
Parva Naturalia. On Breath, Aristotle vol. VIII, Loeb Classical Library 288 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1957); also translated by J. A. Smith in Introduction to Aristotle, 2nd ed. 
rev., ed. Richard McKeon (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 153-247. Also, 
Christopher Shields, "Aristotle's Psychology," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, last modified 23 August 2010, accessed 30 April 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/aristotle-psychology/. On the early reception of 
Aristotle’s psychology see Miira Touminen, The Ancient Commentators on Plato and Aristotle 
(Durham: Acumen, 2009), 158-99.  
 
107 Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 3. On the late ancient context for later Arab Aristotelianism see Josef 
Lossel and John W. Watt, eds., Interpreting the Bible and Aristotle in Late Antiquity: The Alexandrian 
Commentary Tradition between Rome and Baghdad (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).  
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Unmoved Mover or God. Later Arabic philosophers such as Al-Farabi, Avicenna, 
and Averroes continued to view the active intellect as external to the individual 
human mind and singular for all rational beings but as an entity proceeding from 
God rather than identified with God.108  
Maimonides, Smith’s primary reason for bringing up the topic in this 
context, seems to have understood the active intellect to be an emanation from 
God closest to human beings in the celestial hierarchy and thus the point of 
contact between God and the human mind.109 Thus, Maimonides defines 
prophecy as “nothing else but an influence from the Deity first upon the rational, 
and afterwards upon the imaginative faculty, by the mediation of the active 
108 Andrea Falcon, "Commentators on Aristotle," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 8 August 2013, accessed 30 April 2014,  
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/aristotle-commentators/; Sajjad H. Rizvi, 
“Avicenna (Ibn Sina) (c.980—1037),” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (2006), accessed 30 
April 2014, http://www.iep.utm.edu/avicenna/; H.C. Hillier, “Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (1126—1198),” 
in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (2010), accessed 30 April 2014, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/ibnrushd/. See also Sarah Hutton, “The Cambridge Platonists and 
Averroes,” in Anna Akasoy and Guido Giglioni, eds., Renaissance Averroism and its Aftermath: 
Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 197-211. Hutton rightly 
reports that Smith “makes no more than passing reference to the Averroist conception of 
intellectus agens” (202).  
 
109 On this see, Josef Stern, “Maimonides’ Epistemology,” in Kenneth Seeskin, ed., The 
Cambridge Companion to Maimonides (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 107-15. Also, 
Alfred L. Ivry, “The Guide and Maimonides’ Philosophical Sources,” in Seeskin, 58-81; and 
Seymour Feldman, “Maimonides – A Guide to Posterity,” in Seeskin, 324-60.  
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intellect.”110 In contrast, Smith sees the prophetic influence as simultaneously 
intellectual and imaginative, but in general he agrees with Maimonides here. 
However, Smith speaks of “the imagination and mind of the prophet” being 
“made subject wholly to some agent intellect informing it and shining upon it,” 
implying that whereas Maimonides thinks of there being a single active or agent 
intellect (“the active intellect”), Smith thinks that there are many (“some agent 
intellect”).111 Since Smith does not explain just what he means by the use of the 
phrase in this discourse we must turn to his “Of the Immortality of the Soul” 
chapter eight to get a sense of what he might intend here.  
It comes as no surprise that Smith takes up a discussion of Aristotle’s 
psychology in order to address his view on the immortality of soul. For, many, if 
not most, commenters have noted that for Aristotle there can be no such thing. 
Smith is therefore understandably dismissive of the ill-placed praise Aristotle 
receives by “so many” who “take [him] for the great intelligencer of nature, and 
omniscient oracle of truth; though it be too manifest that he hath so defaced the 
110 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 179. Also Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, 
trans. Shlomo Pines, intro. Leo Strauss (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), Part II ch. 36.  
 
111 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 185. My emphasis.  
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sacred monuments of the ancient metaphysical theology by his profane 
hands.”112  
What has caused many to "stumble” with regard to the immortality of the 
soul is the definition that Aristotle gives of soul as “nothing else . . . but an 
entelechia or informative thing, which spends all its virtue upon that matter 
which it informs.” Because Aristotle famously gave a basic definition of soul as 
the form inherent in a living being, it would seem that the soul is mortal just as 
the body. But, Smith continues, “he intended not this for a general definition of 
the soul of man” because Aristotle soon thereafter says that “the rational soul is 
‘separable from the body, because it is not the entelech of any body.’”113 The 
mind, unlike those aspects of the soul that are necessarily connected with the 
body, “’seems to be another kind of soul, and that only is separable from the 
body.’”114  
112 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 107-8. 
 
113 Ibid., 108; citing De Anima II 1. 
 
114 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 109; citing De Anima II 2. Smith cannot resist adding 
that Aristotle is apparently making a little dig at the Platonists and Pythagoreans – what 
imprudence! – who, Smith says, believed in the immortality of all kinds of soul. Interestingly, 
Smith does not deny the truth of such a doctrine.  
 
 
 
                                                 
243 
 
This first problem posed by a common reading of Aristotle resolved to his 
satisfaction, Smith goes on to address the “other difficulty with which Aristotle’s 
opinion seems to be clogged” namely his assertion that the passive intellect is 
corruptible.115 Some have misunderstood Aristotle here to mean by active and 
passive two distinct faculties when in fact, “he means nothing else by his ?????
????????? [passive intellect], but the understanding in potentia, and by his ?????
????????? [active intellect], the same in actu or in habitu.”116 The active intellect, 
therefore, for Smith (if not for Aristotle), is nothing but the potential for thought 
realized. After a brief attack on the argument of Aristotle against Plato’s theory 
of innate ideas117 Smith returns to show once again that when Aristotle 
“distinguisheth between his intellectus agens and patiens, he seems to mean almost 
nothing else but what out ordinary metaphysicians do in their distinction of actus 
and potentia.”118 Thus, there are as many active intellects as there are thinking 
115 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 111; citing De Anima III 5. 
  
116 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 111.  
 
117 Ibid., 111-2.  
 
118 Ibid., 112. Smith’s authority on this point is Simplicius. 
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beings for Smith. In this, he differs from his chief guide to prophecy, 
Maimonides, yet Smith seems not to appreciate, or be bothered by, the fact.  
The apparent explanation for Smith’s lack of concern over his 
disagreement with Maimonides on the nature of the active intellect is to be found 
in Smith’s agreement with the Rambam on the issue as it concerns his discourse 
on prophecy. That is, with regard to prophecy Smith only makes mention of the 
“active intellect” in order to refer to that mind, in act, that is the “immediate 
efficient” cause of “prophetical visions.” On this question, Smith and 
Maimonides are in basic agreement; the immediate cause of prophecy is not God 
directly (exceptional cases such as Moses notwithstanding) but rather an angel.119  
Smith disputes the details of Maimonides’ position on this however, 
saying that he “pretends” it to be a settled issue that “there is no prophecy but 
either in a dream or vision, or by the ministry of an angel.”120 That is, for 
Maimonides all prophets, except Moses alone, received their prophecy from an 
angel. However, Nachmanides argued in the opposite direction that any who 
119 Ibid., 215-6. How this might possibly be so for Maimonides while he also asserts that 
prophecy is mediated by the single active intellect is a matter for Maimonidean scholars. 
 
120 Ibid., 218, 217.  
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“beholds an angel, or hath any conference with one, is not a prophet.”121 
However, Smith argues that Nachmanides has overstepped the bounds of 
tradition in so far as “all antiquity reckoned Zechariah as a prophet” even 
though “all his visions are perpetually represented by angels.”122 
Moreover, the Talmud confirms, in a comparison of Numbers 12: 6 and 
Zechariah 10: 2, that true prophecy has been communicated by angels. This 
opinion is supported by the views of the rabbis Rami, Jehudah, Bechai, and 
Albo,123 but nowhere more convincingly, for Smith (ever the Protestant 
theologian), than in scripture itself.124 In particular, Smith draws our attention to 
Genesis 32: 24, the story of Jacob’s struggle with an angel125 and his subsequent 
prophetic dream of a ladder between Earth and Heaven in Genesis 38: 12.126 In 
this dream of the ladder “we find angels ascending and descending, to intimate 
121 Ibid., 218.  
 
122 Ibid., 219.  
 
123 Ibid., 221-2.  
 
124 Ibid., 222.  
 
125 Ibid., 222-5. Smith cites Hosea 12:4 on the angelic identity of the “man” Joshua 
wrestled with.  
 
126 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 225-6. Cf. John Climacus, The Ladder of Divine Ascent, 
trans. Colm Luibheid and Norman Russell (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1982), 71-292.  
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that this scala prophetica, whereby divine influence descended upon the mind of 
the prophet, is always filled with angels.”127 That prophetic inspiration is 
mediated by angels Smith also asserts on the authority of Philo of Alexandria’s de 
Somniis, St. Jerome, and the New Testament visions of St. Paul (Acts 27: 23).128 
   
Dreams and Visions 
 Having established that prophecy works via the imagination and the 
intellect, often by the mediation of an active intellect or angel, Smith proceeds to 
elaborate on the “two ways, whereby God would reveal Himself to every other 
prophet [besides Moses and the Messiah, who intuit divine truth without 
images] – either in a vision or a dream.”129 In both of these cases “visa and 
simulacra sensibilia” (presentations and images of sensible objects) are “impressed 
[by divine agency] upon [the] common sense or fancy [phantasia, i.e., the 
imaginative faculty].”130 This “common sense” is not described in any way, 
127 Ibid. 
 
128 Ibid., 226-7.  
 
129 Ibid., 183. See Peter Holland, “The Interpretation of Dreams in the Renaissance,” in 
Reading Dreams, ed. Peter Brown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 125-46 on the treatment 
of dreams in Smith’s immediate historical context.  
 
130 Ibid., 184. 
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making Smith’s precise meaning difficult to unravel, but most likely this is a 
reference to the “higher-order perceptual power that emerges from the unity of 
the perceptual capacity of the soul,” a faculty that works in connection with the 
imagination in bringing sensible images to cognitive awareness.131 Smith’s 
theological point here is clear however, even if his philosophy is muddled. It is in 
visions and dreams that the prophet receives revelations as present to his or her 
understanding, though without external objects of sense.  
 Of the two, there is for Smith only a circumstantial difference between a 
vision and a dream. In both, “the representation of divine things by some 
sensible images or some narrative voice must needs be in them.”132 In fact, as 
Maimonides reports of Abraham, a prophet may fall into sleep from a waking 
because the “external senses are bound” or shut up in a vision.133 While 
extraordinary in their power to close off the external senses Smith is quick to 
note, following Rabbi Bechai, that prophetical visions, and presumably dreams 
131 Pavel Gregoric, Aristotle on the Common Sense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
120. My interpretation rests largely on this view being the way Simplicius, an important authority 
for Smith, reads Aristotle. Alternatively Smith is using the phrase as simply a synonym for the 
“fancy” or phantasia.  
 
132 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 184.  
 
133 Ibid., 185. Also Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, Part II ch. 45.   
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as well, are still human visions. The prophet views an image as humans usually 
do and he “saw like a man, and understood things after the manner of men” as 
well.134 
In visions, which are not limited to visual impressions despite their name, 
and in dreams, the prophet “sees” or “hears” spiritual things symbolically in the 
imagination. St. Paul intends just this when he says, “’Now we see ?????????????
????????????—by a glass, in riddles or parables’” by which Smith takes him to  
mean that “the highest illuminations which we have here” in contrast to the 
“constant irradiation of the Divinity upon the souls of men in the life to come.”135  
Smith proceeds in chapter three to give a rather lengthy discussion of the 
distinctions between various types of dreams met with in scripture. His point 
here is simply to note that not all dreams are prophetic, a notion that would seem 
to go without saying except that he acknowledges, with Maimonides, a class of 
dreams that are true but nevertheless not prophetic. These “somina vera” 
Maimonides describes as simply an “admonition or instruction . . . given by God 
134 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 185-6. R. Bechai is almost certainly Bahye ben Asher ibn 
Halawa (1255-1340) and not one of the other Bechai’s also from Spain. See “Bahya (Behai) ben 
Asher ben Halwa,” in The Jewish Encyclopedia (1901-1906), accessed 26 April 2014, 
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/2367.  
 
135 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 185. Cf. Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 21.  
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. . . in a dream.”136 As Smith interprets this out of R. Eleazar and R. Joshua in 
addition to the Rambam, the primary reason such dreams are not counted as 
prophetic owes to the status of the dreamer. The “partakers of them were 
unsanctified men; whereas it is a tradition amongst them [the Rabbis], that the 
spirit of prophecy was not communicated to any but good men.”137  
A true dream sent by God is “much weaker in their energy upon the 
imagination.”138 Whereas a prophetic dream has “strength and force of a divine 
evidence” the somina vera (or ?????????; admonition) are dull and not obviously 
of divine origin. This qualitative difference seems to be connected to a difference 
in the content of the dream as well. A non-prophetic, true dream “ordinarily 
contained . . . something that was ????? [idle, useless], or void of reality.” In 
contrast, as Albo has it, “prophecy is a thing wholly and most exactly true.”139  
 Moreover, Smith lays out the opinion of Philo of Alexandria (20 BCE – 50 
CE) on this topic as related in his de Somniis. In part Smith’s aim here is to further 
136 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 187.  
 
137 Ibid., 187. More on this in chapter five below.  
 
138 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 187.  
 
139 Ibid., 188. Smith backs up this point with the Gemara (Babylonian Talmud) and Albo.  
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expound on his theme but, ever the humanist, he also takes the opportunity to 
correct the Latin translation of Sigismund Gelenius. For Philo the “proper 
character” of a prophetic dream is that it be accompanied by “ecstatical rapture” 
as Smith phrases it. By this he takes Philo to mean little more than that these 
dreams are powerful and leave a deeper impression on the dreamer as being of 
divine origin. Philo speaks of three types of divine dreams that one meets with in 
scripture.  
First, when God addresses the imagination, such as the dreams of Joseph, 
in such a way that the dreamer at first does not know what to make of the 
dream.140 Second, when the reason is moved with the world soul and predicts 
things to come in future, which Philo associates with Jacob’s ladder and Laban’s 
sheep.141 And third, when the soul is moved by itself and the content of the 
dream is clouded in obscurity and in need of an interpreter as in the case of the 
dreams of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar. This last type is thought by Smith to be 
those identified by Plato too which “cannot be understood without a prophet.”142  
140 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 189.  
 
141 Ibid., 190.  
 
142 Ibid., 192. The allusion appears to be to Timaeus 72a. This blending of Judaic and 
Platonic scholarship is a classic example of Smith’s profound breadth of learning. 
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In chapter six “Of Prophecy” Smith asks if actions ascribed to prophets 
should be understood to be real historical events or if they are merely imaginary 
in the sense that visions and dreams are. Following the lead of Maimonides, 
Smith suggests that because “the prophetical scene or stage upon which all 
apparitions were made to the prophet, was his imagination” where the “things 
which God would have revealed . . . were acted over symbolically, as in a 
masque,” that “it is no wonder to hear of those things done which . . . have no 
historical or real verity.”143 What matters is the content of the revelation and not 
whether or not a prophet actually did what is attributed to him or her.  
In this way Smith is able to save Hosea from the untoward act of actually 
marrying the “harlot” Gomer,144 Abraham from the awkwardness of seeing the 
stars during the daytime,145 Jeremiah from various unlikely stories,146 and Ezekiel 
143 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 230. On the question of the “objectivity” of prophetic 
dreams for Maimonides see Leaman, Maimonides, Imagination, and the Objectivity of Prophecy, 69-80. 
“The only objectivity which we can discuss here is the objectivity of the relationship between the 
parable and the state of affairs which as a consequence is made comprehensible to us” (Leaman, 
79).  
 
144 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 230. 
 
145 Ibid., 232.  
 
146 Ibid., 232-4.  
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from actually eating a scroll,147 among others. All such unlikely events as these 
are to be understood to be imaginary or symbolic only. As a general rule, Smith 
proposes, with Abarbanel, that we consider any such story to be imaginary, and 
therefore as signifying something else, unless there is “some positive declaration 
to assure us that they were performed in history.”148 
 
True and False Prophecy 
In chapter four Smith takes up the difference between true and false or 
demonic prophecy. Since prophecy involves the imagination, and false 
enthusiasm involves nothing more than the imagination, it is easy to be mistaken 
about the truth or falsity of a purported prophetic experience. Thus, he sets out 
to “examine the nature of this false light which pretends to prophecy, but is 
not.”149 False prophecy, like the true, is “seated” in the imagination. However, 
whereas for the true prophet the intellect is also involved, the false has only their 
imaginative faculty activated.  
147 Ibid., 235-6.  
 
148 Ibid., 231.  
 
149 Ibid., 194.  
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Smith draws on a threefold categorization by Maimonides to illustrate his 
point. There are, first of all, those who are “wholly intellectual . . . from whence . 
. . ariseth the sect of philosophers, and contemplative persons.” Second, are those 
who experience the “rational and imaginative” together, and these include the 
prophets. Third, there are those who engage the “imaginative only . . . from 
whence proceeds the sect of politicians, lawyers, and lawgivers . . . also the sect 
of diviners, enchanters, dreamers, and soothsayers.”150 These last, of course, are 
in no sense “prophets” for Maimonides, or Smith. In fact, Smith judges that his 
own day is much infected with such “enthusiastical impostors” in matters 
secular and sacred.151 Against the deluded enthusiast and the tradition of the 
Renaissance magi Smith shows nothing but contempt. “This pseudo-prophetical 
spirit, being not able to rise up above this low and dark region of sense or matter, 
150 Ibid., 195.  
 
151 Ibid. Cf. More, Enthusiasmus triumphatus. Also, Michael Heyd, “Be Sober and 
Reasonable”: The Critique of Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries (Leiden: 
Brill, 1995), 92-108, and passim; Frederic B. Burnham, “The More-Vaughan Controversy: The 
Revolt against Philosophical Enthusiasm,” Journal of the History of Ideas 35 (1974): 33-49; Robert 
Crocker, “Mysticism and Enthusiasm in Henry More,” in Henry More (1614-1687) Tercentenary 
Studies, ed. Sarah Hutton, International Archives of the History of Ideas (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1990), 137-55; David W. Dockrill, “Spiritual Knowledge and the Problem of 
Enthusiasm in Seventeenth Century England,” in The Concept of Spirit, ed. David W. Dockrill and 
R.G. Tanner (Auckland: University of Auckland, 1985); and Daniel C. Fouke, The Enthusiastical 
Concerns of Henry More: Religious Meaning and the Psychology of Delusion, (Leiden: Brill, 1997). 
 
 
 
                                                 
254 
 
or to soar aloft into a clear heaven of vision, endeavored always, as much as 
might be, to strengthen itself in the imaginative part: and, therefore, the wizards 
and false prophets of old and later times have been wont always to heighten 
their fancies and imaginations by all means possible.”152 As if to assure his reader 
of his knowledge in this matter Smith calls upon the expertise of the Dutch 
occultist Johann Weyer (1515-1588) who speaks of witches eating “such food as 
they understand from the devil is very fit for” enhancing their imaginations.153  
Divination of this sort has often been mistaken for prophecy by “weaker 
minds” but even the “wiser sort of the heathens have happily found out the 
lameness and delusiveness of it”; one need not be a Christian to discern that 
these are false prophets. For example, Plato addresses such matters in the 
Timaeus, Charmides, and the Phaedrus.154 Following their master’s lead, “the 
Platonists generally seemed to reject, or very much to slight, all this kind of 
152 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 196. We see here the hierarchy of the rational over the 
imaginative or sensible that we met with above. For Smith, as for Origen and Plotinus, to remain 
fixated on the physical world of appearance is to limit ourselves to a view intrinsically beneath 
our proper dignity as rational beings. While in this life sense and imagination are important for 
our cognition they are the lower partner with reason.  
 
153 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 197. Smith knows Weyer as Ioannes Wierus, the author 
of De praestigiis daemonum (Basel, 1563).  
 
154 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 197-9.  
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revelation.”155 The Stoics too would “scarce allow their wise man at any time to 
consult an oracle.”156 From this Smith discerns the general principle that the true 
“prophetical spirit doth never alienate the mind . . . but always maintains a 
consistency and clearness of reason, strength, and solidity of judgment.” 
Moreover, this true spirit “doth not ravish the mind, but inform and enlighten 
it.”157 
In contrast then to the comparatively calm temper of mind occasioned by 
prophecy Smith notes several examples out of antiquity of false prophets 
displaying mania or melancholy among other alienations of the mind. For 
example, the Pythian prophetess, Cassandra the sibyl, and the early Christian 
155 Ibid., 199. Smith mentions only the eclectic Maximus Tyrius (late 2nd century CE) and 
the Neoplatonist Porphyry (c.234-c.305) here. Presumably he is intentionally downplaying 
Platonists such as Iamblichus with their overt embrace of ???????? (theurgy) by mentioning 
Porphyry. On this see Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus 
(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).  
 
156 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 199. Smith cites Arrian of Nicomedia (c.86-c.160), 
Epictetus (c.55-135), Simplicius of Cilicia (c.490-c.560), and Marcus Annaeus Lucanus (39-65) in 
support. On Smith on the Stoics see J. Lagree, “John Smith et le Portique,” in The Cambridge 
Platonists in Philosophical Context: Politics, Metaphysics, and Religion, eds. G.A.J. Rogers, J. M. 
Vienne, and Y.C. Zarka (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 79-92.  
 
157 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 200.  
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heresy of Montanism, all share a wild and unintelligible experience.158 Smith cites 
Clement of Alexandria (150-215), Tertullian (160-220), Eusebius (263-339), and 
Jerome (347-420) against these “abruptions of mind.”159 John Chrysostom (c.347-
407) says it best, “It is the property of a diviner to be ecstatical, to undergo some 
violence, to be tossed and hurried about like a madman. But it is otherwise with 
a prophet, whose understanding is awake, and his mind in a sober and orderly 
temper, and he knows every thing that he saith.”160  
While not as wildly “out of mind” as the false prophets, Smith qualifies 
his argument thus far by noting “that observation of the Jews . . . concerning 
those panic fears, consternations, affrightments, and tremblings, which 
frequently seized upon them, together with the prophetical influx.”161 In 
158 On Montanism generally and the intriguing theory that Montanism was a far more 
wide spread, if not “mainstream” view in the very early Church see Rex. D. Butler, The New 
Prophecy & “New Visions”: Evidence of Montanism in the Passion of Perpetua and Felicitas 
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Univerrsity of America Press, 2006).  
 
159 Ibid., 202.  
 
160 Ibid., 203. Smith cites from the 29th Homily on 1 Corinthians (12: 1, 2) which is given by 
Talbot W. Chambers as “For this is peculiar to the soothsayer, to be beside himself, to be under 
compulsion, to be pushed, to be dragged, to be haled as a madman. But the prophet not so, but 
with sober mind and composed temper and knowing what he is saying, he uttereth all things” in 
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series 1, vol. 12, ed. Philip Schaff, Christian Classics Ethereal 
Library, 2005, accessed 27 April 2014, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf112.iv.xxx.html.  
 
161 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 203.  
 
 
                                                 
257 
 
evidence of the exhaustion, fear, and overall impact of having divine disclosure 
revealed Smith cites the biblical figures of Daniel, Abraham, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, 
Habakkuk, Isaiah, Samuel, Adam, Job, Elijah, and St. John the Divine,162 as well 
as a whole host of rabbinic sources including Maimonides, Albo, Solomon Jarchi, 
Abarbanel, Jonathan the Targumist, and Nachmanides (Moses ben Nachman 
Gerondi).163  
 
Qualifications and Preparation for Prophecy 
 Smith next turns to a discussion of what he calls the “qualifications” 
needed to become a prophet (chapter eight). In doing so he makes clear that not 
just anyone can become a prophet. While the ultimate standard is the free choice 
of God to reveal something to the prophet, this does not happen without due 
preparation of the would-be receiver of this revelation. This is mirrored in the 
“old Heathens” as well as being what Smith takes to be the consensus of 
scripture, the rabbinic tradition, and clear reason. Even the pagan diviners “were 
162 Daniel 10: 8; Genesis 15: 1, 12; Jeremiah 23: 9, 28, 29; Ezekiel 3: 14, 9: 1, 2: 9; Habakkuk 3: 
2; Isaiah 21: 3; 1 Samuel 3: 7; Genesis 3: 8, 9; 1 Kings 19: 11; Job 38: 1; Revelation 1: 10, 4: 1, 6: 1, 8: 5, 
10: 3, 9. 
 
163 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 204-14.  
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wont in a solemn manner to prepare and fit themselves for receiving the influx 
thereof.”164  
 The rabbinic consensus as Smith reports it is that the qualifications 
necessary “to render any one habilem ad prophetandum [able or apt to prophecy] 
are true probity and piety.”165 Maimonides, who is a constant companion for 
Smith’s exploration of prophecy, adds to this consensus a threefold requirement 
of perfection of (1) an “Acquisite or rational” (2) “Natural or animal” and (3) 
“Moral” type. Differences in these three areas account, for Rambam, for the 
degrees of prophecy too. All of this leads Maimonides to his conclusion that “all 
prophecy is the proper result of these perfections, as a form arising out of them 
all, as out of its elements compounded together.”166  
Smith has in view here the Rambam’s infamous theory of prophecy as a 
kind of natural faculty subject to development through the diligent perfecting of 
the moral, physical, and intellectual powers.167 As Leaman has put it, 
164 Ibid., 249. Smith’s source here is Rabbi Albo.  
 
165 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 250. Smith’s Latin appears to have failed him here but 
his meaning is clearly “able or apt to prophecy.”  
 
166 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 251.  
 
167 Ibid., 252.  
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“Maimonides . . . seems to treat [prophecy] as a natural phenomenon.”168 In this, 
Maimonides parts company with much of his own tradition, which Smith is 
quick to point out, by downplaying the role of God in making the prophet.169  
“I know no reason,” asserts Smith in an uncharacteristic use of the first 
person, “to infer any such thing as the prophetical spirit, from the highest 
improvement of natural or moral endowments.”170 Smith is aghast that such a 
learned authority as Maimonides could fail to see the necessity of divine 
inspiration for prophecy. Preparation is one thing, that may make it easier to 
receive a revelation, but God must still send this communication to the prophet. 
Moreover, Smith contends, with a rather more voluntarist view of the divine will 
than is typical for him and the other Cambridge Platonists, that God is fully 
capable to sending this inspiration to anyone God chooses. He is quick to add 
that this is “not likely” that God would so address the mind of one who was ill 
168 Oliver Leaman, “Maimonides, Imagination, and the Objectivity of Prophecy,” Religion 
18 (1988): 69.  
 
169 “This opinion of Maimonides I find not any where entertained, only by the author of 
the book Cosri.” Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 252-3. Leaman points out that the roots of this 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the more curious that Smith chooses this place to insist, as a Protestant Christian might be 
expected, that there is no prophecy without the will of God making it so. Curious, because, as we 
have seen, Smith is very much at home with Neoplatonic emanation. See Leaman, “Maimonides,” 
70-1.  
170 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 253.  
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prepared, but the possibility remains.171 Smith’s attitude toward the idea that 
prophecy is a sort of natural phenomenon is nowhere more clear than it is when 
he begins to take up the topic of the various “schools of prophecy.” He tells us 
that “anciently many were so trained up in a way of school-discipline, that they 
might become candidati prophetiae, and were as probationers to these degrees, 
which none but God Himself conferred upon them”; one may work to become 
prepared but only God grants prophetic inspiration.172 Still, overall, Smith agrees 
with Maimonides that in general a prophet will have true piety, wisdom, an even 
temper of mind full of cheerfulness.173  
 
4.2.4 Mosaic Prophecy 
 Smith comes to his most detailed discussion of Mosaic prophecy in 
chapter eleven. Here, his chief concern is to relate just what it is about the 
prophecy of Moses that makes it the “highest degree of divine inspiration.” In 
171 Ibid., 253.  
 
172 Ibid., 261. The analogy to the running of a school may hint at our author’s sense of 
humor. He was a dean at Queens’ College at the time of writing.  
 
173 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 253-61.  
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this, his most important guide is Maimonides, and drawing on him Smith gives 
us four “characteristical differences” between the Mosaic and other prophecy.174  
 First, unlike the other prophets Moses received revelations while 
completely awake. “Moses was made partaker of these divine revelations per 
vigiliam; whereas God manifested Himself to all the other prophets in a dream or 
vision.”175 This is an important distinction because, as we have seen, lesser 
prophets receive their communications from God in dreams or visions and thus 
within their imaginations. Moses, in contrast, encounters divine truth as an 
intellectual influx.  
 Second, unlike other prophets “Moses prophesied without the mediation 
of any angelical power, by an influence derived immediately from God.” This, 
for Smith is the meaning of the phrase that God spoke to Moses “face to face” but 
he interprets this in a thoroughly intellectual sense. Moses communicates with 
God “face to face” in the sense that God reveals God’s self with “clearness and 
evidence of the intellectual light.” While the others saw in a glass darkly Moses 
174 Ibid., 272.  
 
175 Ibid. 
 
 
 
                                                 
262 
 
sees in a glass clearly.176 That is, where others received divine inspiration by the 
mediation of an angel within the imagination and the intellect, Moses perceived 
by an intellectual intuition implanted directly by God.  
 Third, Moses was “able to understand the words of prophecy, without 
any disturbance and astonishment of mind.” Notice that while the lesser 
prophets received divine revelation in images within the imagination, Moses 
“hears” the Word of God in his mind.177 
 Fourth, Moses, unlike the rest, was able to prophesy when he chose. Other 
prophets were communicated to when God willed it, and they knew not when 
that would be, but Moses seems to have “had free recourse to this heavenly 
oracle at any time.”178  Or so Maimonides would have it; Smith for his part thinks 
that the Rambam “here somewhat hyperbolizeth, and scarce speaks consistently 
with the rest of the Hebrew masters.” All the same, Smith thinks it “most 
176 Ibid., 273. Smith’s source here is Philo of Alexandria.  
 
177 Ibid., 274. The presentations to the imagination of a prophet is not, of course, limited to 
visual images however Smith’s preferred metaphor is visual for lesser prophets and auditory for 
Moses.  
 
178 Ibid., 272. Also, 274-5.  
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probable that he [Moses] had a greater liberty of prophesying than any other of 
the prophets.”179   
 Thus, the “gradus Mosaicus” exceeds all others in prophetic power because 
it is a “clear, distinct, kind of inspiration made immediately upon an intellectual 
faculty in a familiar way.”180 That is, Moses’ greatness lay in his having an 
intellectual understanding of divinity given by God directly. Smith thinks that 
this intensity of prophecy was necessarily short lived (i.e., the life of Moses 
alone) because it was to serve as “the basis of all future prophecy among the 
Jews.” The other prophets aimed primarily to support the prophetically revealed 
law of Moses and to clarify the practical means of observing this law.181 
Moreover, Moses’ prophesy was supported or authenticated by many “signs and 
miracles done in the sight of all the people.” For example, the turning of his staff 
into a serpent, the parting of the Red Sea, and the Bath Kol heard by all the people 
179 Ibid., 275.  
 
180 Ibid., 275. While it may be merely coincidental, the implied reference here to “clear 
and distinct ideas” calls to mind Descartes’ famous epistemological formula.  
 
181 Ibid. 
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at Sinai made sure that Moses’ prophecy would be remembered if not always 
believed.182  
 Smith closes his discussion of Mosaic prophecy with a paragraph that 
reads like the impassioned plea of an excellent preacher, who just happens to 
also be a great scholar too. In contrast to being convinced by miracles and the 
like Smith wishes that we might become acquainted with divine truth through 
“moral arguments” and the inherent reasonableness of the things of God. “I wish 
this . . . way of becoming acquainted with divine truth were better known 
amongst us: for when we have once attained to a true, sanctified, frame of mind, 
we have then attained to the end of all prophecy, and see all divine truth that 
tends to the salvation of our souls in the divine light, which always shines in the 
purity and holiness of the new creature, and so need no further miracles to 
confirm us in it.”183  
Thus, Smith draws his own connection between the “True Way or Method 
of Attaining to Divine Knowledge” with its advocacy of a purified will and mind 
as the preconditions for a proper understanding of divinity and “Of Prophecy” 
182 Ibid., 276. See also, Exodus 7: 10, 14; 14: 26-9; 20: 2-3.  
 
183 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 277.  
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which accounts for the first revelation of saving truths. Divine knowledge 
originates in prophecy but it is in a spiritualized life that we attain the end of 
prophecy for ourselves. And herein lies the explanation for the curious degree of 
similarity between the “True Way” and Mosaic prophecy. Both the greatest of 
the original revelators and the recommended path to appropriate the truth of 
that revelation work by a kind of intellectual intuition. Their difference lies, 
therefore, not so much in method as in chronology.  
Moses is the first in the line of Jewish and later Christian individuals (and 
in more limited ways pagan philosophers too) to have had an intellectual vision 
of divine truth. In this, it seems that Smith subscribes to a version of what Moshe 
Idel has called the “unilinear” theory of the prisca theologia which sees the 
tradition of true theology as beginning with Moses and extending through later 
Jewish prophecy, pagan philosophy, and finally the incarnation of Christ and the 
birth of Christian wisdom.184  
Still, Smith is clearly opposed to the naturalized theory of prophecy he 
encounters in Maimonides, so what are we to make of the strong similarity 
184 Moshe Idel, “Prisca Theologia in Marsilio Ficino and in Some Jewish Treatments,” in 
Michael J. B. Allen, Valery Rees, and Martin Davies, eds., Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His 
Philosophy, His Legacy (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 138-9.  
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between the intellectual intuition of the “True Way” and the purely intellectual 
prophecy of Moses?  
First, to be completely free of images in one’s encounter with divine truth 
is extraordinary in this life. As we saw in our look at the “True Way” our 
intuition is not without the influence of the imagination until the beatific vision 
of heaven. In violation of this natural principle, Moses was granted a direct “face 
to face” revelation of an entirely intellectual kind while he lived. Only the direct 
action of God can overcome the natural necessity of a sensible image in this life. 
This, then is what makes the Mosaic revelation special vis-à-vis the method of 
the “True Way.”  
Second, the intellectual intuition recommended in the “True Way” is not 
entirely “natural” in the usual sense. For, when we turn our purified attention 
within ourselves to see the vestiges of divine truth enfolded there we become 
witness to the primordial revelation of God in our very creation. At root, there is 
nothing that is completely “natural” for Smith, as all things, including especially 
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our capacities for cognition and volition, derive ultimately from a divine 
archetype.185  
Third, building on this, and in keeping with the spirit of his tutor 
Whichcote, natural and revealed theology are not, ultimately, distinct in kind at 
all, but rather in degree. This is why many readers of Smith have suggested that 
he does not so much offer arguments sufficient to convince the unbiased mind as 
he discourses upon what he takes to be the clear conclusions of a pious 
Christian.186 Such a view, however, imports an unnecessary and unwelcome gap 
between philosophy and theology, reason and faith, into its reading of Smith. As 
Tulloch observed, “All our primary and higher knowledge may in a sense be 
called revelation.”187 Smith, maintains a distinction between natural and revealed 
185 Thus, his claims against Epicurus and “Epicureans” throughout the Select Discourses 
([1859], xxvi-xxviii, 14, 17-9, 22, 44-53, 60, 66, 70-9, 83, 85, 104, 139, 375, 412, 452, 482).  
 
186 This tendency would seem to begin with Metcalfe who said, “So implicitly does 
SMITH trust to our intuitive knowledge, that he does not even attempt a proof of so important a 
doctrine as that of the existence of God” (W. M. Metcalf, “Memoir,” in The Natural Truth of 
Christianity: Selections from the “Select Discourses” of John Smith, with an introduction by Matthew 
Arnold, ed. W. M. Metcalfe [London: Alexander Gardner, Paisley, 1882], xli, see also xxviii-xxix).  
 
187 Tulloch, Rational Theology, 2: 175. This sentiment is Augustinian in most of its Western 
(Latin) forms and owes much to the theory of illumination which makes all knowledge a kind of 
revelation. In Smith, this Augustinian sentiment is represented in primarily Greek categories 
borrowed directly from the Neoplatonists and the Alexandrian Fathers. “A central belief, even 
assumption, running through the published work of [Henry] More and his fellow Platonists, is 
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truths, and only the truths of revelation are “saving,” but this distinction does 
not signal the kind of radical difference in kind that many contemporary readers 
will expect. As Smith himself says, “It was a degenerous and unworthy Spirit in 
that Philosophy which first separated and made such distances between 
Metaphysical Truths & the Truths of Nature.”188 In this, he is thoroughly in 
keeping with his fellow Cambridge Platonists.189 
   
4.2.5 Hagiographi and the Bath Kol 
 The last degrees of divine inspiration are those of the “Rauch Hakkodesh” 
or Holy Spirit and the Bath Kol or a voice out of heaven. Neither of these rise to 
the level of prophecy proper but share with that gift the disclosure of the Divine 
Will to humanity. Smith takes up the inspiration of the “Holy Spirit” in chapter 
seven and the Bath Kol in chapter ten.  
that the ultimate goal of both religion and philosophy is a state of mystical and intellectual 
illumination, or ‘deification’” (Crocker, “Illuminism in More,” 130).  
 
188 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 434. Given his open hostility toward Aristotle and his 
causal animosity toward the bulk of the schoolmen, it seems likely that Smith has in view here 
the Aristotelian approach to philosophy and theology perhaps best exemplified in Thomas 
Aquinas, even though he traces the historical roots to the Sophists in opposition to Socrates.  
 
189 Gerald R. Cragg, “Introduction,” in The Cambridge Platonists (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), 16-20; C. A. Patrides, “’The High and Aiery Hills of Platonisme’: An 
Introduction to the Cambridge Platonists,” in The Cambridge Platonists (London: Edward Arnold, 
1969), 8-16; Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, 6-10, 12.  
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 The ruach ha-kodesh or “holy spirit” is characterized as the inspiration of a 
writer of a sacred text. For this reason Smith will also speak of this degree as 
“Hagiographical”. The sacred books of the Hebrew Bible that are not formally 
prophetic are said to have been inspired by this Holy Spirit but without the 
mediation of a vision or dream.190 While the holy writers thus inspired 
“ordinarily expressed themselves in parables and similitudes . . . they seem only 
to have made use of such a dress of language to set off their own sense of divine 
things.” That is, while they express themselves in imagery they do not receive 
their inspiration as images presented to the imagination directly. There is “no 
labour of the imagination in this way of revelation.” Indeed, taking his lead from 
Maimonides, Proclus, Plotinus, and Empedocles, Smith contends that “this 
enthusiastical spirit seated itself principally in the higher and purer faculties of 
the soul.”191  
This raises the difficulty of distinguishing this degree of revelation from 
that of the Mosaic degree of prophecy. That this is distinct from the category of 
“prophecy proper” is clear from the lack of communication in the imaginations 
190 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 238-9.  
 
191 Ibid., 239. The “higher and purer” faculties are those of cognition and conation.  
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of the hagiographi. However, as a more purely intellectual disclosure, this 
“Spiritus Sanctus” would seem to bear a strong similarity to the prophecy of 
Moses. The distinction would seem to rest simply on the authority of the Jewish 
tradition of dividing the “Old Testament” books according to the Torah (from 
Moses), the Prophets (from the other prophets), and the Writings (from the 
hagiographi).192 The only other distinguishing mark that separates these from the 
prophecies of Moses is the subject matter involved. Those inspired by the Holy 
Spirit speak, and sometimes sing, with deep wisdom but not of matters given in 
a “visum propheticum.”193  
Prophets, it must be remembered, do not always receive inspiration of the 
same degree. When they are inspired to write songs for example they are merely 
inspired by the Holy Spirit and not prophesying.194 In fact, the writing of songs 
“was not the proper work of God himself, but the work of the prophet’s own 
192 The hagiographic writings include: Ruth, Psalms, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Canticles, 
Lamentations, Daniel, Esther, Ezra, and the two books of Chronicles.  
 
193 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 244. In his attempt to remain true to his sources on 
Jewish antiquity and tradition Smith seems to strain to make this degree fit his Neoplatonist 
inspired sense of what constitutes higher and lower levels of revelation. He should, I think, view 
this more purely intellectual variety as like the Mosaic degree of prophecy in essentials. And 
perhaps he would, if it were not for the authority of the tradition that none were greater or even 
equal to Moses.  
 
194 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 245.  
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spirit.”195 In this, the hagiographer has a higher degree of independence in what 
she or he relates to others under divine inspiration. They are free to compose 
imagery of their own to illustrate the divine wisdom they receive without 
images.196  
 The “lowest degree of revelation among the Jews . . . was their . . . Bath 
Kol, filia vocis, which was nothing else but some voice which was heard as 
descending from heaven, directing them in any affair as occasion served: which 
kind of revelation might be made to one, as Maimonides tells us, that was no 
way prepared for prophecy.”197 This phenomenon Smith is more interested to 
relate out of the New Testament than the Old. He cites as examples the voices 
heard in John 12: 28-9, Matthew 3: 17, and 17: 5-6.198 This Bath Kol is external and 
perceived by the corporeal senses. It has more of the miracle about it than the 
prophetic revelation in this respect. This externality, and the potential for 
195 Ibid., 245.  
 
196 Ibid., 246.  
 
197 Ibid., 268.  
 
198 Ibid., 270-1.  
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empirical observation by many people, makes it less authentic for Smith than true 
prophecy which is a “divine inspiration into the mind of the prophet.”199  
  
The End of Jewish and Christian Prophecy 
 As a kind of colophon to his discourse on prophecy Smith takes up in 
chapter twelve a discussion of the “period of time it was in which this 
prophetical spirit ceased, both in the Jewish and the Christian church.”200 This is 
important because it signals (and this is otherwise not obvious from his 
descriptions of prophecy) that the period of divine revelation has in fact ended. 
In making this clear Smith is standing in solid opposition to those who would 
argue for a whole host of non-biblical prophecy, up to and including those 
produced in his own day.201  
 Since the Bible is silent on this issue, as one would expect, it being a record 
of prophetic utterances, Smith turns to “such histories as are like to be most 
199 Ibid., 271. Again, there is a difficulty in consistency here. Speaking as he does of the 
contrast between the Bath Kol and prophecy would include those inspired by the Holy Spirit 
among the prophets. However he is at pains to keep that degree separate from “prophecy proper” 
as we have seen above.  
 
200 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 278.  
 
201 On the “influence of the non-Biblical vernacular prophetic traditions in early modern 
England” see Tim Thorton, Prophecy, Politics and the People in Early Modern England (Woodbridge: 
Boydell & Brewer, 2006), esp. 1-13, 53-98.  
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authentical in this business.”202 While Justin Martyr suggests that John the Baptist 
was the last Jewish prophet, Clement of Alexandria is a much better guide, as he 
argues that the line of prophets ends with Malachi. Clement’s case is stronger 
because he speaks “with the consent of all Jewish antiquity.”203 Thus, Smith dates 
the end of Jewish prophecy to time of the Second Temple, the sixth or fifth 
centuries BCE.204 At this time the Jews were left with only the Bath Kol remaining 
for a brief time after.205 “This cessation of prophecy determined as it were all that 
old dispensation wherein God had manifested Himself to the Jews under the 
law, that so, by its growing old and thus wearing away, they might expect that 
202 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 278.  
 
203 Ibid., 279. Smith’s authorities here are the Babylonian Talmud, Maimonides, and 
others (279-80).   
 
204 Smith cites the “Corsi,” R. Jehuda, and R. Abraham ben Dior to the effect that 
prophecy remained for only about forty years after the beginning of the Second Temple. Smith, 
Select Discourses (1859), 280. The “Corsi” appears to be the Kitab al Khazari (or Kuzari) of Judah 
Halevi (c.1075-1141). If so, Smith must have worked with a Hebrew translation as the first Latin 
edition dates to 1660, well after his death. On Halevi see, Diana Lobel, “Taste and See That the 
Lord is Good: Halevi's God Revisited,” in Jay M. Harris, ed., Be’erot Yitzhaq: Studies in Memory of 
Isadore Twersky, 161-78 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), and Between Mysticism 
and Philosophy: Sufi Language of Religious Experience in Judah Ha-Levi's Kuzari (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2000). Rabbi Abraham ben David, or ben Dior (c.1125-1198), is 
known to Smith as an anti-Aristotelian Talmudist. See Isadore Twersky, Rabad of Posquières: A 
Twelfth-Century Talmudist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962).   
 
205 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 280.  
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new dispensation of the Messiah, which had been promised so long before, and 
which should again restore this prophetical spirit more abundantly.”206  
Thus, with the coming of Jesus Christ, or more precisely the sending of the 
Holy Spirit among the early Church, the gift of prophecy was renewed.207 On the 
basis of the testimony of Eusebius, Justin Martyr, and Origen, Smith concludes 
that prophecy came to an end in the Christian Church in the second century 
CE.208  
  
4.3 The “True Way,” Prophecy and the Spiritual Senses 
In this chapter we have seen that John Smith makes consistent appeal to 
what we have identified as the spiritual senses in his theory of the source and 
methods appropriate for coming to theological understanding. In particular, 
Smith sees natural knowledge of divinity, as well as the appropriation of 
revealed truth, as a matter of intellectual intuition, but never completely 
206 Ibid., 281.  
 
207 Smith finds prophetic proof of this in the words of Joel 2: 28. Early Christian prophecy 
is attested to by Acts 2: 17; Revelation 19: 10; John 8: 39; Ephesians 4: 8; and Acts 19: 2. Smith, 
Select Discourses (1859), 281.  
  
208 Ibid., 282-3. This dating, Smith remarks, is convenient for dismissing the Montanist 
heresy since by its rise in the late second century prophecy is said to have already ceased. 
However, Smith also cites Origen (apparently approvingly) to the effect that prophecy was 
simply rare after the second century (Ibid., 283). Origen, Contra Celsum 7. 8.  
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separated from sensible images in the imagination. Implicitly dismissing as 
wrongly oriented for its task the physically sensible approach of Aristotelian 
(cosmological) natural theology from the start, Smith recommends the path of 
moral and spiritual purification leading to affective intellectual intuition with the 
remains of sensible images while we live. We appropriate Divine truths via our 
intellect, which gives symbols to our imaginations, when we begin to taste the 
sweetness of divinity in Christ and we appreciate this transformation sensibly in 
our reformed lives as well.  
Moreover, Smith argues that revealed knowledge of God involves the 
perception of implanted images in the imagination as well as communication 
with the human intellect. The most basic form of this revelation is purely sensible 
in the Bath Kol or voice of God heard miraculously in prophetic times. Others are 
inspired by the Ruach Hakodesh or Holy Spirit with the revelation of the Divine 
Will to the intellect of psalmists, poets, and sages. To the prophets are given 
influxes of divine truth in the form of images made present in the imagination 
and ideas in the intellect by the ministrations of an angelic messenger. Finally, 
with Moses and Jesus Christ alone does God give a purely intellectual revelation 
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“face to face” in the sense of “mind to mind.” Thus, what begins in sense, reaches 
new heights in imagination, and is perfected in intellect.209  
The content of true religion was thus given to external sense by the 
miracle of the voice of God, to the inner, spiritual, senses of the imagination by 
angelic deposition, and the intellect as immediate intuition by the Divine Mind 
itself. The content of these revelations then became the content of faith, first 
assented to by clear minds,210 appreciated in purified symbols in the 
imagination,211 and made sensible in the external world in the life of the “true 
and sober Christian who lives in Him who is Life it self, and is enlightened by 
Him who is the Truth it self.”212  
 
 
209 Perfected in our earthly life for Moses and for the rest hereafter.  
 
210 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 16.  
 
211 Ibid., 3, 8-9, 15, 21. One looks in vain for a post-Kantian understanding of the faculties 
of the soul. While clearly separate from the external senses, the mind, for Smith, is not without a 
power of representation.  
 
212 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 21. He alludes to the Gospel of John 14: 6: “Jesus saith 
unto him, I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me” and to 
First John 2: 20: “But ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things” (KJV).  
 
 
                                                 
    
CHAPTER 5: SPIRITUAL SENSE AND SPIRITUALITY 
 
But he was alwaies very urgent upon us that by the 
Grace of God and the help of the mighty Spirit of 
Jesus Christ working in us, we would . . . labour after 
Purity of heart, that so we might see God.1   
 
 
John Smith’s Select Discourses are saturated with a rational piety that is 
virtually unknown today, and was an innovation, or recovery, in his own time. 
In chapter four we saw the first example of his rationalism in the form of his 
Christian Platonist account of the source and methods of theology. In chapter six 
we will see how he attacked the central doctrines of natural theology; above all, 
the immortality of the soul and the nature and existence of God. In this chapter 
we explore the role of spiritual sensation in the life of the Christian as Smith 
understood it. First, we look back to the acquisition of theological understanding 
to focus more specifically on the preparation and purification Smith thought was 
essential to that task. Second, the practice of the Christian religion as he taught it 
is explored. In both respects, Smith calls upon the spiritual senses as an essential 
component of his account.   
1 Simon Patrick, “A Sermon Preached at the Funeral of Mr John Smith . . . ,” in John Smith, 
Select Discourses (1660), 510.  
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5.1 Purification and Theological Understanding 
As we saw in chapter four, theological understanding has two sources for 
Smith. Specifically Christian theological knowledge originates in prophecy and 
the life of Christ both of which are perceived spiritually. Natural theology arises 
from intellectual intuition. In both of these cases however Smith asserts that 
preparation is necessary. Those who would be theologians, and Smith thinks that 
all Christians should be divines, must first become purified in their conduct and 
their intellect.  
 
5.1.1 Preparation for Prophecy 
  Following the rabbinic consensus, especially Maimonides, and the 
wisdom of the philosophers Smith argues in chapter eight of his discourse “Of 
Prophecy” that there are “several qualifications that . . . render a man fit for the 
spirit of prophecy.”2 This is important for his conception of theology generally 
because he is suggesting that such knowledge is practical or experiential even in 
its origins. Moreover, this practical, experiential, basis is best expressed in terms 
of the leading of a spiritual life free from obstacles to prophecy. To be a prophet, 
2 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 249.  
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and thus to be the medium by which divine revelation is passed on to the people, 
involves, first of all “true probity and piety.”3 That is, the would-be prophet must 
be morally pure and inwardly religious. Smith is vague on just what constitutes 
moral purity but the overall sense is that it means essentially being self-
disciplined, temperate, and not given to sensual indulgence. The whole person of 
the prophet is sanctified; will and outward behavior as well as mind and inward 
temper.  
The building up of the heart and mind typically involves a great deal of 
study and effort on the part of the candidate to prophecy. Indeed, Smith speaks 
often of prophecy as being in some ways akin to the conferral of degrees upon 
students in a collegiate setting.4 Still, it is not through study or the natural 
perfection of human faculties that one becomes a prophet. Without the special 
intervention of God to inspire the imagination and intellect there is no true 
prophecy.5 
  
3 Ibid., 250.  
 
4 Ibid., 261-7. 
 
5 Ibid., 253.  
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5.1.2 Spirituality and Exegesis 
 An understanding of the preparations needed for true prophecy is critical, 
for Smith, to rightly interpreting scripture. For example, since “’The spirit of 
prophecy dwells not with sadness, but with cheerfulness’” King David was 
denied the prophetic vision while he was full of “sorrow and grief in mind, upon 
reflection of his shameful miscarriage in the matter of Uriah.”6 In his dejected 
state David lost that “free spirit” that is the “temper of mind” most conducive for 
receiving prophetic inspiration. Knowing this makes one able to rightly interpret 
the fifty-first Psalm as a prayer asking for “the restoration” of the precondition 
for prophecy.7 
 Moreover, by understanding how the prophets received their revelations 
via the inspiration of their imaginations and intellects, or how they perceived 
divine things by their spiritual senses, one is able to interpret “prophetical writ” 
profitably.8 It is only in this context that Smith’s rules for exegeting prophetic 
passages of scripture are intelligible. For example, his first rule is that reports of 
6 Ibid., 256. On David, Uriah and Bathsheba see 2 Samuel 11: 3-11, 12: 9-10, and 1 Kings 15: 
5.  
 
7 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 256-7. On this, Smith follows Jarchi, Abenezra, Kimchi, 
and the “Talmudists” generally (257).   
 
8 This is the topic of the final chapter (13) of the discourse “Of Prophecy” in Smith, Select 
Discourses (1859), 284-95.  
 
 
                                                 
281 
 
divine revelation be understood to be inspired by God but not dictated word for 
word. “He imprinted such a clear copy of His truth upon them . . . that it became 
their own sense . . . so . . . they were able to deliver and represent it to others, as 
truly as any can paint forth his own thoughts.”9 Only if one understands that the 
prophetic inspiration takes the form of a spiritual perception, in the imagination, 
does this not lead immediately to the idea that the prophets simply “make it up” 
themselves; a notion that Smith is absolutely opposed to just as much as he 
opposes a fundamentalist account of the origins of the letter of the biblical 
record.  
 Additionally, one looks in vain for “a constant, methodical contexture of 
things carried on in a perpetual coherence” in prophetic scripture. Indeed, if one 
were to find too closely consistent and logical a report that would be evidence, 
for Smith, that it was “a human and artificial contrivance rather than any 
inspiration.”10 This is, again, because of the nature of the prophetic experience 
itself. Specifically, the prophet receives images simply as they come and not 
9 Ibid., 284.  
 
10 Ibid., 289.  
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necessarily (or typically) in (chrono)logical order.11 Thus, Smith’s second rule for 
reading prophetic scripture rests on the understanding of the experience of 
inspiration as imaginative rather than discursive.  
 The third, and final, rule for reading prophecy is that “no piece of 
prophecy is to be understood of the state of the world to come, or the mundus 
animarum [world of souls]: for, indeed, it is altogether impossible to describe that, 
or comprehend it in this life . . . therefore, all divine revelation in scripture must 
concern some state in this world.”12 This is so, for Smith, because of the limits of 
our human capacities to receive divine truth. The “state of blessedness in heaven, 
it is major mente humana [greater than the human mind], much more is it major 
phantasia [greater than the imagination].”13 Some things are simply not 
communicable to human faculties of intellect or imagination, and since these are 
the means by which prophetic inspiration is accomplished, eschatology must 
remain mysterious to us, because of the limits of our spiritual senses.14  
11 Ibid., 290.  
 
12 Ibid., 291.  
 
13 Ibid., 293.  
 
14 In this, Smith is on solid scriptural (cf. Isaiah 64: 4; Matthew 11: 13), rabbinic (“Gem. 
Berachoth, cap. V. fol. 36 A.”), but not Patristic grounds. Apparently, Smith has no room here 
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 Likewise, Smith recommends as his method of discerning true from false 
prophets a clear understanding of the role of the mind as well as the imagination 
in the perception of true divine communication.15 The false, either demonic or 
simply overly “enthusiastical,” prophet speaks of images disclosed to their 
imaginations but at the expense of reason. This alienation of the intellect does not 
occur, for Smith, in true prophecy and in knowing this to be an aspect of the 
experience of inspired authors one can rightly discern divine revelation from 
those “impostures” that would otherwise easily delude us. In this way, again, 
Smith calls for the use of an understanding of the nature of prophecy as 
involving the spiritual senses, both intellectual and imaginative, in the spiritual 
formation and exploration of his readers.  
 Of more immediate concern for the right interpretation of scripture are the 
remarks Smith makes in the “True Way” discourse to the effect that the inner 
even for an apophatic (non)glimpse of heaven as one finds in Pseudo-Dionysius (The Celestial 
Hierarchy, in Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibheld [New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 
1987], 143-91). Moreover, this contrasts sharply with the all-too-eager voices of others in Smith’s 
period who give sometimes elaborate depictions of heaven and hell (above all, John Milton’s 
Paradise Lost [1667] and Paradise Regained [1671]). See Elizabeth A Herman, “World Without End: 
Conceptions of Heaven in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Protestant England,” PhD 
Dissertation (Yale University, 2012) and Philip C. Almond, Heaven and Hell in Enlightenment 
England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 81-110, 144-61.  
 
15 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 183-202.  
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state of one’s soul is both informed by scripture and enables one to rightly 
understand what is contained therein. For, while “Divinity” is best understood to 
be a “Divine life” rather than a “Divine Science” and while the best knowledge of 
such things comes in the form of a “Christ-like nature,” still one can only come to 
any knowledge of specifically Christian truth through scripture.16 Only by an 
initial acquaintance with Christ in the New Testament (and proleptically in the 
Old) does one begin to conform to the “life and practice” in which alone one may 
come to an appreciation of the “inward beauty, life and loveliness in Divine 
Truth.”17  
 The contrast to the educational practices of contemporary theology 
departments is illustrative here. Whereas Smith is recommending, with the 
Patristic and medieval Christian tradition as well as the Greek philosophers, that 
one first purify one’s behavior, heart, and mind and only then take up and read 
scripture with renewed spiritual eyes to see with, today students are introduced 
16 Ibid., 2, 8. 
 
17 Ibid., 8-9.  
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to the letter of the biblical text and only then to the spiritual practices, traditions, 
and modes of thought necessary to find living Divine truth in it.18  
 
5.1.3 The “True Way” as a Spiritual Path 
Finally, it should be remembered that it is a process of moral and 
intellectual purification that Smith recommends as the prolegomena to 
theological understanding.19 As we have seen, Smith insists repeatedly that 
divinity is a practical, living enterprise. Because divinity has to do with things of 
“Sense & Life” it requires “Sentient and Vital faculties.”20 These “faculties” are 
the intellect purified of its attachments to the body and to physical matter. By 
removing our attention from what is “beneath” us it becomes possible for us to 
return our focus on first ourselves as spiritual beings and ultimately on God.  
18 Such, at least, was my early training in theology and I suspect that this is fairly 
standard in Protestant institutions today. See Glenn T. Miller, Piety and Profession: American 
Protestant Theological Education, 1870-1970 (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2007) and 
“Education: Seminaries and Theological Education,” in Encyclopedia of Religion in America, ed. 
Charles H. Lippy and Peter W. Williams (La Jolla, CA: Granite Hill Publishers, 2010), 663-72.  
 
19 As does Henry More as well. See his “The Purification of a Christian Man’s Soul,” in 
The Cambridge Platonists, ed. C.A. Patrides (London: Edwin Arnold, 1969), 200-12. Cf. Christopher 
A. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light We Shall See 
Light (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 87-90.  
 
20 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 2.  
 
 
 
                                                 
286 
 
In this way, the intellectual intuition that we cultivate, even as it is the free 
gift of divine grace, becomes the means by which we arrive at spiritual experience 
and understanding. In this, Smith relies on Plotinian Neoplatonism and scripture 
to affirm that “Every thing is best known by that which bears a just resemblance 
and analogie with it.”21  
At the same time however this supra-sensible encounter with our purified 
selves as imago Dei and with the Divine Original is also the goal of our spiritual 
lives. This is why “our Saviour hath in his Beatitudes connext Purity of heart 
with the Beatifical Vision.”22 The intellectual intuition that puts us in contact with 
God also provides the blessed rest and fulfillment that makes one seek the 
Divine in the first place.  
 
5.2 The Practice of the Christian Religion 
Smith did not live to complete his intended discourses on the 
“Communication of God to Mankind in Christ” leaving only the preliminary 
21 Ibid. Also Ennead I.8.1., and Proverbs 10 (“the fear of the Lord is the beginning of 
wisdom”).  
 
22 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 2. 
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work “Of Prophecy” to be published by Worthington under that heading.23 In 
order to make up for this loss, Smith’s editor published an additional four 
discourses given in “Some Chappell-Exercises.”24 These were not originally 
intended to be included in the work but they help to round out our appreciation 
of Smith’s theology by discussing justification (“A Discourse Treating of Legal 
Righteousness, Evangelical Righteousness, or the Righteousness of Faith” and 
“The Shortness and Vanity of A Pharisaick Righteousness”), sanctification (“The 
Excellency and Nobleness of True Religion”) and eschatology (“The Excellency 
and Nobleness of True Religion” and “A Christians Conflicts with, and 
Conquests over, Satan”). This section presents Smith’s views on these topics as 
related to the spiritual senses.25 
 
5.2.1 Smith’s Practical Christianity 
 Rather than setting forth dogma when it comes to the particulars of the 
Christian religion, Smith emphasizes practice and experience. Still, he is a 
23 Ibid., 280.  
 
24 Ibid., 281.  
 
25 This limit is important to bear in mind. I have not tried to offer a definitive assessment 
of Smith’s theology overall, but only those ways in which he employs the spiritual senses as 
developed in chapter two above.  
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product of his time. Like Calvin and his English followers among the Puritans, 
Smith addresses questions of high importance about justification, whether it is by 
works or by faith, sanctification, if it is sudden or gradual, permanent or 
temporary, and the fate of humanity in the eschatological future. These were 
some of the dominant points of theological disputation in the early seventeenth 
century, and Smith, as a teacher and a divine, could not have passed them by 
without comment.26 However, while the scholastics, both Protestant and 
Counter-Reformation Roman Catholic, sought to lay out ever more precious 
definitions of doctrines Smith pointed to practical and experiential Christian 
living. “If any . . . will doe his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.”27 
  
5.2.1.1 Justification 
 In his discourse on “Righteousness” Smith begins by rehearsing his 
account of theological knowledge. “There is a Divine and Spiritual sense which 
only is able to converse internally with the life and soul of Divine Truth.”28 Right 
26 See chapter three above and Michael A. G. Haykin and Mark Jones, eds., Drawn Into 
Controversie: Reformed Theological Diversity and Debates Within Seventeenth-century British 
Puritanism (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011). 
 
27 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 9; quoting John 7: 17 (KJV).  
 
28 Ibid., 286.  
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relation with God (“converse”) requires therefore (1) a spiritual sense, and (2) an 
inward orientation. Only an elevated “sense” can convey our communion with 
God because it is only by a living faculty that one can appreciate “Divine 
wisdome” which is a “Tree of life to them that find her, and it is only Life that can 
feelingly converse with Life.”29 Indeed, the “Principles of our Christian Religion . . 
. is an Influx from God upon the Minds of good men.”30 This is, for Smith, the 
“great designe and plot of the Gospel, to open and unfold to us the true way of 
recourse to God; a Contrivance for the uniting of the Souls of men to him, and 
the deriving a participation of God to men, to bring in Everlasting righteousness, 
and to establish the true Tabernacle of God in the Spirits of men.”31  
These ends were anticipated by “the Law” of the Hebrew Bible but the 
Gospel has the great advantage that it “so clearly unfolds the Way and Method 
of Uniting humane nature to Divinity.”32 That is, in the Christian Gospel is 
revealed the means by which true communion with God, and thus true 
29 Ibid. 
 
30 Ibid., 287.  
 
31 Ibid., 288.  
 
32 Ibid. 
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righteousness, is to be achieved. The primary difference between the Old Law 
and the New Gospel then for Smith is that under the Law attention is external, 
“Moral, Judicial & Ceremonial,” but the Gospel transforms from within, making 
one anew with a living sense of God through an approximation to the Divine 
(deification).33  
Following standard Protestant readings of St. Paul, Smith relates the 
merely “external,” “legal righteousness” of the Jewish religion.34 Of particular 
importance for us is his association of the Jewish Law with the “External 
Senses.”35 The spiritually sensible nature of divine revelation notwithstanding 
the Jews are portrayed here as reliant for their point of contact with God on a 
33 Ibid., 289. Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “The Manifestation of Christ and the Deification of 
Man,” in C.A. Patrides, 62-76. Also, Douglas Hedley, Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 190. More on this in the discussion of 
sanctification below.  
 
34 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 288-307. Here, Smith uses his extensive reading in 
Jewish sources to back up an uncharacteristically polemical attack on the supposed failings of 
Judaism. Reconciling this with his praise and dependence on the same Jewish sources in other 
places is an important task that is yet to be taken up. On the reading of Jewish texts by Christians 
in the medieval period see Deeana Klepper, The Insight of Unbelievers: Nicholas of Lyra and Christian 
Reading of Jewish Text in the Later Middle Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2007). On Christian interpretations and uses of Jewish texts and rituals in the early modern 
period see Yaacov Deutsch, “’A View of the Jewish Religion’ – Conceptions of Jewish Practice 
and Ritual in Early Modern Europe,” Archiv für Religionsgeschichte 3 (2001): 273-95 and Allison P. 
Coudert and Jeffory S. Shoulson, eds., Hebraica Veritas? Jews and the Study of Judaism in Early 
Modern Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).  
 
35 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 291.  
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Law given to them from without, and thus received as other, via the external, 
physical, senses. One reads, hears, or sees the Jewish Law with physical eyes and 
ears. Moreover, the performance of these laws are merely formal for Smith too.36 
In language strikingly similar to Luther’s against the “works righteousness” of 
the Roman Catholic Church, Smith speaks of Jewish religion as little more than a 
system of earning merit through outward conformity with the Law.37 Thus, he 
thinks it clear that Judaism, at least in the form known by St. Paul if not also in 
his own day, is a “Lean and Spiritless Religion.”38 
Over against the “Jewish” approach of earning merit through external 
observance of the Law, or “Legal Righteousness,” Smith sets up what he calls 
“Evangelical Righteousness” or “the Righteousness of Faith.”39 Essentially, the 
difference is this: “That the Law was the Minstery of death, and in it self an 
36 Smith echoes much of the argument we are rehearsing here in his discourse on “The 
Shortness and Vanity of A Pharisaick Righteousness” (Select Discourses [1660], 349-72). However, 
in this additional discourse Smith associates “Jewish” legalism most strongly with what he 
elsewhere calls “superstition.” For that reason, we will look at this discourse in chapter six when 
we take up his arguments against the two natural enemies of religion, superstition and atheism. 
 
37 Ibid., 297-307. Cf. Martin Luther, "Two Kinds of Righteousness," in Martin Luther: 
Selections from his Writings, ed. John Dillenberger (New York: Anchor Books, 1961).  
 
38 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 303.  
 
39 Ibid., 308-25. 
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External and Liveless thing, neither could it procure or beget that Divine life and 
spiritual Form of Goodness in the Souls of men, which God expects from all the 
heirs of Glory, no that Glory which is only consequent upon a true Divine life. 
Whereas on the other side the Gospel is set forth as a mightly Efflux and 
Emanation of life and spirit freely issuing forth from an Omnipotent source of 
Grace and Love, as that true God-like vital influence whereby the Divinity 
dreives it self into the Souls of men, enlivening and transforming them into its 
own likeness, and strongly imprinting upon them a Copy of its own Beauty and 
Goodness: Like the Spermatical virtue of the Heavens, which spreads it self 
freely upon this Lower world, and subtily insinuating it self into this benumbed 
feeble earthly Matter, begets life and motion in it. Briefly, It is that whereby God 
comes to dwell in us, and we in him.”40 Thus, evangelical righteousness makes one 
inwardly God-like so that we may experience our Divine origin within ourselves, 
that is, in our hearts and minds via a spiritual perception of God in ourselves as 
40 Ibid., 308-?????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????logos spermatikos; ratio 
seminalis) in Second Apology, 8, 10, 13. See also Leslie William Barnard, St. Justin Martyr: The First 
and Second Apologies (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1997), 15-6, 89, 100, 159, 196-200.  
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imago Dei and present to ourselves as the Spirit that enlivens and transforms us in 
grace.41   
Concern for outward merit and reward, on the other hand, blinds one to 
the “light of Divine grace and bounty.”42 Thus blinded, the legally minded can 
only appreciate the “dead letter” of the Law as being of an “External 
administration” and thus alien to oneself whereas the Gospel is “Intrinsecal and 
Vital” and thus more truly one’s own.43 The Gospel is “God’s imprinting his 
Mind and Will upon mens hearts” so that it may become “living Laws written in 
the living Tables” thereof.44 The knowledge that results is primarily practical 
rather than theoretical in the sense that it fuels the righteous living of the true 
and good Christian. Smith’s Platonism does not lead to the withdrawal from the 
world but rather a reformation of one’s being in the world.  
Where his Antinomian contemporaries, such as John Eaton, as well as 
more orthodox Calvinists and Lutherans were wont to emphasize the free gift of 
41  Cf. Bonaventure, Itinerarium in mentis Deum, 4. Here Bonaventure introduces his 
spiritual senses in the context of contemplation of God in the imago Dei reformed by grace.   
 
42 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 310.  
 
43 Ibid., 311.  
 
44 Ibid., 316.  
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God’s justification of sinful humanity, Smith readily acknowledges that this must 
be coordinated with the true state of affairs.45 That is, God does not judge one 
acceptable without one actually being so.46 In this, Smith is rejecting one of the 
fundamental issues separating the Reformed from Roman Catholicism. Clearly, 
then, Smith’s reading in the Christian Platonist tradition, including the Greek 
Fathers more so than the Latin, served to overcome his Puritan context in early 
seventeenth century Emmanuel and Queens’ after Parliamentary supervision 
under the guidance of the Westminster Assembly.47  
In essence, Smith has embraced a view of justification much like 
synergistic processes advocated by Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox 
theologians. This is nowhere more clear than in his insistence, against the views 
45 Dewey D. Wallace, Jr., Puritans and Predestination: Grace in English Protestant Theology, 
1525-1695. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 114. Lutherans and 
Calvinists traditionally view justification as a forensic matter of justification being “imputed” by 
God for the sake of Christ’s paying of the penalties owed by the believing sinner. See Alan C. 
Clifford, Atonement and Justification: English Evangelical Theology, 1640-1790: An Evaluation (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990). A classic expression of this notion is John Owen, Doctrine of Justification by 
Faith (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1965), also available from Christian Classics 
Ethereal Library, 2005, accessed 7 May 2014, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/owen/just. 
 
46 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 325.  
 
47 See chapter three above.  
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of Luthereans,48 that justification and sanctification are part of the same process 
of becoming deiformed or Christ-like. “God’s justifying of Sinners in pardoning and 
remitting their sins carries in it a necessary reference to the sanctifying of their Natures; 
without which Justification would rather be a glorious name then a real privilege to 
the Souls of men.”49 In this Smith anticipates the views of John Wesley and looks 
back to those of the Greek Fathers and Anglicans like Lancelot Andrewes.50  
The righteousness carried by the Gospel finds its roots in the hearts of 
Christians via faith. In this, Smith is no less Reformed than the hottest sort of 
Puritan. Faith, for him, is the “powerful Attractive which by a strong and divine 
Sympathy draws down the virtue of Heaven into the Souls of men, which 
48 This is clearly expressed in the classic Lutheran formula “simul justus et peccator.” See 
Philipp Melanchthon’s Apology of the Augsburg Confession 2.38-41 (in The Book of Concord: The 
Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert, eds., 
[Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000]). For a more recent, and more consistent with Eastern 
Orthodoxy, reading of Luther see Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, eds., Union with Christ: 
The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998).  
 
49 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 329.  
 
50 John Wesley, “The Scripture Way of Salvation,” Sermon 43, in The Sermons of John 
Wesley, ed. Thomas Jackson (1872), in John Wesley Sermon Project, ed. Ryan N. Danker and George 
Lyons (1999-2011), accessed 9 May 2014, http://wesley.nnu.edu/john-wesley/the-sermons-of-john-
wesley-1872-edition/. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 4. 38 (Anti-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1, ed. Philip Schaff, 
Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2005, accessed 9 May 2014, 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf01). Lancelot Andrewes, “A Sermon of Justification,” 
(Whitehall, 23 November 1600), in Project Canterbury, Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology, 
Lancelot Andrewes Works, Sermons, Volume Five (104-126), transcribed by Marianne Dorman (2003), 
accessed 9 May 2014, http://anglicanhistory.org/lact/andrewes/v5/misc5.html.  
 
 
 
                                                 
296 
 
strongly and forcibly moves the Souls of good men into a conjunction with that 
Divine goodness by which it lives and grows.”51 Justification is thus 
accomplished by union with God in Christ and this union is faith.  
Smith agrees with monergists that faith itself comes from God. “This is 
that Divine Impress that invincibly draws and sucks them in by degrees into the 
Divinity.”52 And it is by faith as “something in the hearts of men which, feeling 
by an Occult and inward sensation the mighty insinuations of the Divine 
goodness, immediately complies with it; and being first begotten and enlivened 
by the warm Beams of that Goodness, it alwaies breaths and gasps after it for its 
constant growth and nourishment.”53  
Still, while the initiative is first God’s we are not without a role to play in 
the process. For we are persuaded by the goodness and loveliness of God to fly 
away from our previously “benummed Minds.”54 Smith argues that we “should 
51 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 333.  
 
52 Ibid. 
 
53 Ibid. This is a fine expression of the Calvinist notion of irresistible grace and the 
permanence of true conversion, faith, and justification. See for example, John Calvin, on John 6: 
41-5, in Commentary on John, Vol. 1, trans. William Pringle, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 
2005, accessed 7 May 2014, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/calcom34.xii.vii.html.  
 
54 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 336.  
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work out our salvation in the most industrious manner, trusting in God as one 
ready to instill strength and power into all the vital faculties of our Souls.” The 
goal of such labor is nothing less than building up a capacity to “apprehend that 
for which also we are apprehended of Christ Jesus.”55 Thus, justification by faith 
involves the perception of God as goodness, beholding “Moses-like” the divine 
“glory shining thus out upon us in the face of Christ” that we should receive “a 
Copy of that Eternal beauty upon our own Souls, and our thirstie and hungry 
spirits would be perpetually sucking in a true participation and image of his 
glory.”56 In Christ, perceived through faith, one comes to a vision of the Good.57 
In faith, “we shall goe on from strength to strength until we see the face of our 
loving, and ever-to-be-loved, God in Sion.”58  
In a process very much like that recommended in the “True Way” 
discourse, Smith argues that we come to the confirmation of our justification 
before God. We apprehend by an intellectual intuition the true, beautiful, nature 
55 Ibid., 337. Smith is alluding to Philippians 3 and 1 Corinthians 13:12.  
 
56 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 336.  
 
57 Cf. Plato, Republic, VII (514-520d) and Psalm 34: 8.  
 
58 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 338.  
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of God as Goodness and thereby “we live in Christ, and . . . he lives in us.”59 For 
Smith, then, accompanied by a living sense of the sweetness of God and an 
image of the beauty of Christ in our (reformed) souls, we come to be 
transformed; declared just and made so too.  
 
5.2.1.2 Sanctification 
 As we have seen, for Smith, justification comes hand in hand with 
sanctification. There cannot be one without the other. Nevertheless, Smith 
addresses sanctification explicitly in “The Excellency and Nobleness of True 
Religion,” since, the religious life is synonymous with becoming deified.60  In 
eleven short chapters Smith presents an account of the origin of religion61 as well 
as its nature,62 properties,63 progress,64 and end.65 Of these it is the discussion of 
59 Ibid., 339.  
 
60 Ibid., 377-451.  
 
61 Ibid., 380-4. To the account that we have already seen in chapter four above this section 
adds a reference to what Calvin called the semen religionis. “Religion is an Heaven-born thing, the 
seed of God in the Spirits of men” (Ibid., 381). Cf. Henry More, “That this Word of God, which is 
the Seed of the Soul, is a living and everlasting Word” (“The Purification of a Christian Man’s 
Soul,” in C.A. Patrides, 209). See also Paul Helm, "John Calvin, the Sensus Divinitatis, and the 
Noetic Effects of Sin," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 43 no. 2 (1998): 87–107.  
 
62 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 385-92.  
 
63 Ibid., 392-439. 
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the nature and properties that most clearly bear upon Smith’s employment of 
spiritual sensation.  
 In describing the nature of the “Nobleness of Religion” Smith stresses that 
it is in opposition to the “narrow prison of Sensual and Corporeal delights.”66 He 
goes so far as to cite, approvingly, the saying of Porphyry’s that Plotinus 
“seemed ashamed of being in the body.”67 Whereas “Wicked men bury their 
Souls in their Bodies,” the religious man rises above such merely physical things 
to converse with the eternal and divine.68  
Additionally, the religious person lives a life that is consist with reason; 
“he lives at the height of his own Being.”69 This “height” is intellectual and not 
64 Ibid., 439-43.  
 
65 Ibid., 443-51.  
 
66 Ibid., 386.  
 
67 Ibid. Porphyry, “On the Life of Plotinus and the Order of His Books,” in Plotinus, 
Porphyry on Plotinus, Ennead I, trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1966), 3.  
 
68 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 386.  
 
69 Ibid., 387.  
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conative as in most accounts of synderesis.70 Moreover, Smith has nothing but 
disdain for the notion that “Religion should extinguish Reason” because 
“Religion makes it more illustrious and vigorous.” Indeed, “they that live most 
in the exercise of Religion, shall find their Reason most enlarged.”71 
Finally, the “good man,” for this is simply another way of naming the 
person “informed by True Religion,” is raised into an intimate communion with 
God.72 In so doing, the religious man “moves in a larger Sphere then his own 
Being, and cannot be content to enjoy himself, except he may enjoy God too, and 
himself in God.”73 
Thus, the nature of true religion is, for Smith, totally in keeping with the 
etymology of “religion,” coming as it does from the Latin, religare (“to bind 
together”). Religion, then, is the process of being united to the Divine and this 
communion is accomplished through and accompanied by “an inward sense of 
70 See, for example, Tobias Hoffman, “Conscience and Synderesis,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brain Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 255-64; and R. A. 
Greene, “Whichcote, the Candle of the Lord and Synderesis,” Journal of the History of Ideas (1991): 
617-44. 
71 Ibid., 388.  
 
72 In contrast, the “more feeling and comfortable sense” of Divine goodness that is 
available in true religion is lacking for “Wicked men” for whom “God is not present” (Ibid., 391).  
 
73 Ibid., 389.  
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Divine sweetness.”74 That is, the exercise of religion itself involves a spiritual 
sensation of the delectable nature of God.  
 Smith discusses seven properties or effects of the nobleness of religion. 
Most of these are primarily moral. For example, the first property and effect is 
“That it widens and enlarges all the Faculties of the Soul, and begets a true Ingenuity, 
Liberty and Amplitude, the most free and Generous Spirit, in the Minds of Good men.”75 
However, even with this emphasis on the purification and restoration of the will 
Smith addresses the noetic effects of religion often too. For, in “being purified 
and spiritualliz’d” the soul becomes not just morally better but also “more and 
more” remade “into the glorious Image of God.”76 Indeed, Smith speaks directly 
of ?????? (theosis) or deification as the result of growth in religion.77 As the 
perversions of self-love and self-will pass away “the Spirit of true Religion” 
74 Ibid., 391. Also an “inward touch” (Plotinus, Ennead VI.1.9).  
 
75 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 393.  
 
76 Ibid., 403. Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “Moral and Religious Aphorisms,” in C.A. Patrides, 
#798 (p.333): “Reverence God in thyself: for God is more in the Mind of Man, than in any part of 
this world besides; for we (and we only here) are made after the Image of God.” On the imago Dei 
in the Renaissance see Charles Trinkaus, In our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian 
Humanist Thought, 2 vols. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995). 
 
77 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 407. Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “Moral and Religious 
Aphorisms,” #248 (p.329): “We Worship God best; when we Resemble Him most.”  
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steers and directs “the Mind and Life to God, makes it an Uniform, Stable and 
quiet thing.”78  
 This process of deification is accompanied, for Smith, with contentment, 
joy, and pleasure.79 “Religion is no sullen Stoicisme or oppressing Melancholie . . . 
but it is full of a vigorous and masculine [i.e., active] delight and joy.”80 This is so 
because true delight and joy are the result of “some discerning Faculty with its 
proper Object” and the “proper Objects for a Mind and Spirit are Divine and 
Immaterial things.”81 That is, the soul delights in the intellectual intuition of the 
Divine made ever clearer through the process of becoming a better image of, and 
home for, God.82  
 Implicitly drawing on the analogy of the sun and the Allegory of the Cave, 
Smith suggests that “There is an Inward sense in Mans Soul, which, were it once 
awaken’d and excited with an inward tast and relish of the Divinity could better 
78 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 406.  
 
79 Ibid., 412.  
 
80 Ibid., 416-7.  
 
81 Ibid., 416.  
 
82 See Ibid., 408 on the “Good man” as a “Tabernacle” wherein the “Divine Shechinah” 
resides (Hebrew: “divine presence,” associated especially with the Temple).  
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define God to him then all the world else.”83 Here again, we see the spiritual 
sense of the soul playing the critical role of bridging the divide between 
discursive reason and the actuality of the Divine presence.  
A “sincere Christian” is one that “tasts and sees how good and sweet the 
Lord is” and this fills her with joy, peace, and hope.84 The good or religious 
person “views” eternity “transacted upon the inward stage of his own Soul.” By 
“reflecting upon himself he may behold a Heaven opened from within, and a 
Throne set up in his Soul, and an Almighty Saviour sitting upon it, and reigning 
within him.”85  
 Like Origen and the Cappadocian Fathers before him, Smith understands 
the process of deification as an unending one.86 His inspiration for this view, 
83 Ibid., 426-7. Cf. Ibid., 434-5.  
 
84 Ibid., 427. Smith is here referencing Psalm 34: 8 and Romans 15.  
 
85 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 428. Cf. the “Infant-Christ . . . formed in his Soul” Ibid., 
21. Also, Douglas Hedley, Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 175 on the role of morality in Smith’s implicit Christology.   
 
86 The notion would seem to be implicit in Origen’s (supposed) doctrine of the apotheosis 
of all souls (see De Principiis, 3.4.3 in P. Koetschau, ed. [Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1913], trans. G.W. 
Buttwerworth, [London: SPCK 1936; reprinted Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973]). The doctrine 
of epectasis (roughly “perpetual deification”) is especially associated with Gregory of Nyssa. See 
his Life of Moses 2.225-30 (in Gregory of Nyssa, trans. Abraham Malherbe and Everett Ferguson  
[New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1978]). Also, Rowan Williams, The Wound of 
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however, is as much pagan as Patristic. Smith sees in Plotinus’s “flight of the 
alone to the alone” an example of just this sort of unending growth in union with 
the Divine.87 The soul is alone for Smith in the sense that it is centered upon itself 
and acts freely not in the sense of being isolated from others. And this ever 
expanding conformity to, and apprehension of, God Smith equates with Heaven. 
For, “Heaven is not a thing without us, nor is Happiness any thing distinct from 
a true Conjunction of the Mind with God in a secret feeling of his Goodness and 
reciprocation of affection to him, wherein the Divine Glory most unfolds it 
self.”88 
  
Knowledge: Christian Spirituality from the New Testament to St John of the Cross (London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1990), 57-8.  
 
87 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 423; citing Plotinus, Ennead VI. 9. 11. Smith gives the 
Greek and his text (perhaps translated by Worthington) gives also “flight of the Soul alone to 
God alone.” On the connection between Plotinus on this point and Gregory of Nyssa and others 
see, Kevin Corrigan, “’Solitary’ Mysticism in Plotinus, Proclus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Pseudo-
Dionysius,” The Journal of Religion 76 no. 1 (1996): 28-42. Far from being an example of the 
stereotypical “character of pagan mystical thought: self-absorbed, solitary, narcissistic, and 
world-renouncing” (28) Corrigan reads Plotinus as having a “pronounced affinity” with Proclus, 
as we would expect, but also Gregory of Nyssa and Pseudo-Dionysius too (30). For “’To be alone’ 
in the sense of ‘solitary,’ ‘isolated,’ or ‘abandoned’ in Plotinus means to be in, or to belong to, 
something else (‘to be of it’) so that one is alienated (allotrion) from oneself. To be ‘in oneself,’ by 
contrast, is to be ‘alone’ in a different sense, that is, self-gathered and self-dependent” (32). This is, 
I think, also Smith’s meaning here.  
 
88 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 410.  
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5.2.1.3 Eschatology 
 The final aspect of the excellency and nobleness of religion discussed by 
Smith is the “Terme and End of it.”89 And this end is “nothing else but Blessedness 
it self in its full maturity.” However, he is uncharacteristically shy about 
explaining this particular of his topic; “yet I may not here undertake to explain, 
for it is altogether ?????????? [something inexpressible], nor can it descend so 
low as to accommodate it self to any humane style.”90 Still, following the author 
of the First Letter of John, Smith is not content to leave this topic without giving 
“some glimpse of it” for “??????????? ???????, we shall be like him, for we shall see 
him as he is.”91 Notice that the eschaton is simply the perfection of the progress of 
the spiritual senses and the process of deification that marks the religious life at 
all its stages.  
 Still, the end of true religion is difficult to apprehend and we cannot know 
what there “may be from God upon Souls in Glory, that may raise them into a 
state of Perfection surpassing all our imaginations.”92 However, it will be 
89 Ibid., 444.  
 
90 Ibid. 
 
91 Ibid., citing 1 John 3: 2.  
 
92 Ibid., 445. Notice the role of the imagination in anticipating the beatific vision.  
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enjoyable in the highest degree, not despite the loss of our bodies as the 
Epicureans argue, but in part because of it.93 Likewise, the happiness of the soul 
is more than Stoic apathy too; it is not merely the elimination of disturbances but 
the presence of something truly wonderful.94  
 Smith is clear that the heavenly end of the true Christian is something to 
be only anticipated while in our earthly lives and bodies. Yet, he is also adamant 
that Heaven and Hell are characters of the souls of human beings, and not 
“places” or “containers” for them. “Hell is rather a Nature then a Place: and Heaven 
cannot be so truly defined by any thing without us, as by something that is within 
us.”95 That is, Heaven and Hell are states of the soul. Moreover, “the Devil is not 
onely the name of one particular thing, but a nature” and “it is the difference of a name 
rather than any proper difference of natures that is between the Devil and Wicked 
93 Cf. K. E. Kirk, The Vision of God: The Christian Doctrine of the Summum Bonum (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1966), 33-4, 67, 386, 480-7.  
 
94 Ibid. 
 
95 Ibid., 446-7. Cf. the contemporary, popular work of Andrew Farley, Heaven is Now: 
Awakening Your Five Spiritual Senses (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2012).  
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men. Wheresoever we see Malice, Revenge, Pride, Envy, Hatred, Self-will, and Self-
love, we may say Here, and There is that Evil spirit.”96 
The good, religious, person will have a foretaste of the Heavenly bliss in 
as much as they attend to divine things. Likewise, the foolish, bodily minded 
person will find themselves so consumed in the realm of death and despair that 
they too can be said to taste of Hell in this life.97 Thus, “the Tyranny of the Devil 
and Hell is not so much in some External things, as in the Qualities and Dispositions 
of mens Minds.”98  
Interestingly, Smith opposes the theory put forward by Augustine, and 
accepted by many Western theologians, of the inheritance of original sin from 
Adam and Eve. “I fear the grounds of most mens Misery will prove to be a 
second fall, and a Lapse upon a Lapse . . . It will not be so much because our First 
parents incurred God’s displeasure, as because we have neglected what might 
have been done by us.”99 
96 Smith, Select Discourses (1660)., 463.  
 
97 Cf. Ibid., 462-9.  
 
98 Ibid., 464.  
 
99 Ibid., 449-50.  
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 Above all it is the “Unreasonableness or the smothering and extinguishing 
the Candle of the Lord within us” that has “no piece of Religion, nor 
advantageous[ness] to it.”100 Yet, what Smith fears most is that speculation about 
our ends might “exercise mens Wits” more than it causes them to “reform their 
lives.”101 For all his emphasis on the mystical experience of suprasensible union 
with the Divine, Smith’s religion remains eminently practical and directed at 
leading a moral life here and now. His otherworldliness, constantly contrasting 
“religion” and “goodness” with the body and the physical senses, serves not an 
escapist retreat from the world but a transformed orientation to living a life in it. 
Smith’s religion is one that remains in the world but avoids being of the world.102  
As he closes this discourse on the excellency of religion: “Let us therefore labour 
to purge our own Souls from all worldly pollutions; let us breath after the aid 
and assistance of the Divine Spirit, that it may irradiate and inlighten our Minds, 
that we may be able to see Divine things in a Divine light: let us endeavor to live 
100 Ibid., 448. The “candle of the Lord” is a well-known, often-used, phrase among the 
Cambridge Platonists to indicate the divine nature of human reason. Its source however is 
biblical, Proverbs 20: 27.  
 
101 Ibid., 449.  
 
102 Romans 12: 2.  
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more in a real practice of those Rules of Religious and Holy living commended to 
us by our ever-Blessed Lord and Saviour: So shall we know Religion better, and 
knowing it love it, and loving it be still more and more ambitiously pursuing 
after it, till we come to a full attainment of it, and therein of our own Perfection 
and Everlasting Bliss.”103  
  
5.3 The Spiritual Senses and Making Sense of Spirituality 
  
Largely on the basis of his account of the origin of theological 
understanding, Smith argued for a rational faith expressed in inner reflection, 
moral purity, and deification. In so doing he made intellectual intuition and the 
imaginative reception of symbols of the divine central to the life of true Christian 
piety. Smith’s use of what we have identified as the spiritual senses tradition was 
therefore both descriptive and prescriptive.  
For Smith, only those who have been transformed through purification of 
their affections, intentions, and thoughts are capable of perceiving divine things. 
There can be no disinterested theologian for Smith. The ways of purification, 
illumination, and union are how he accounts for the fact that divines and 
103 Ibid., 451.  
 
 
 
                                                 
310 
 
prophets have had theological understanding even as he recommends this same 
path to his reader if they would seek to know God.104  
Conspicuous in its absence in the Select Discourses are references to prayer, 
worship, and liturgy. Smith makes no mention of the sacraments, not even 
baptism. There is never more than passing mention of prayer.105 However, if by 
“prayer” one includes contemplation, then Smith clearly echoes the patristic 
wisdom summarized by Evagrius Ponticus, "If you are a theologian, you will 
pray truly. And if you pray truly, you are a theologian."106   
104 Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “Moral and Religious Aphorisms,” in C.A. Patrides, #169 
(p.328): “Religion begins in Knowledge; Procedes in Practice; and Ends in Happiness.”  
 
105 Patrick records that Smith did pray (“Funeral Sermon,” 515) but Smith does not speak 
of it in a positive way in his Select Discourses. His references to prayer are always negative, 
showing what not to do. 
 
106 Chapters on Prayer, 61; PG 79: 1180B; in Evagrius Ponticus: Practikos and On Prayer, trans. 
Simon Tugwell (Oxford: Oxford University Faculty of Theology, 1987), quoted in Evagrius 
Ponticus: Ad Monachos, trans. with comm. Jeremy Driscoll, ACW 59 (New York: Mahwah, NJ: The 
Newman Press, 2003), 339. “Prayer” here is a form of knowledge as well as spiritual practice.  
 
 
                                                 
    
CHAPTER 6: SENSE, SYSTEM, AND APOLOGETICS 
 
To this point we have seen that, like the long Christian tradition before 
him, Smith employed the spiritual senses of the soul in his account of theological 
knowledge, both natural and revealed, as well as in his description of the 
spiritual life. In this chapter we show how Smith looks to the spiritual senses in 
his natural theology and how this consistent reliance helps to draw his thought 
together into a unified whole. It is, in part, by using the concept of spiritual sense 
that Smith presents his readers with a systematic theology. Moreover, this system 
is intended to offer a critique of early modern naturalism and an apology for 
traditional Christian Platonism.  
The first five of the Select Discourses form a unified whole, relating John 
Smith’s natural theology.1 Of these only two treat positive doctrines as such; 
discourse four, “Of the Immortality of the Soul,” and discourse five, “Of the 
Existence and Nature of God.” However, these are prefaced by discourses upon 
“The True Way or Method of Attaining to Divine Knowledge,” “Of 
Superstition,” and “Of Atheism.” With these first three discourses, Smith sets the 
1 John Worthington, “To the Reader,” in John Smith, Select Discourses (1660), v; “An 
Advertisement,” Ibid., 280.  
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scene for his arguments for the immortal soul and God, which together constitute 
the first two of his three “great principles of religion.”2  
  
6.1 Smith’s Natural Theology 
As we saw in chapter four above, Smith’s “True Way” discourse is 
concerned with the epistemology and methodology of theology. Drawing on 
biblical, Patristic, and ancient philosophical sources, Smith argues for a form of 
emotionally charged, and partly imaginary, intellectual intuition as the means by 
which one comes to know divine things.3 After establishing this, Smith goes on 
to discuss what he takes to be the two primary challenges to true, natural and 
revealed, religion: superstition and atheism.  
 
6.1.1 Superstition 
The first of these “Anti-Deities” taken up by Smith is superstition, which he 
defines as “that Temper of Mind which the Greeks call ????????????? . . . an 
overtimorous and dreadfull apprehension of the Deity.”4 Indeed, following Hesychius 
2 The third is the “communication of God to mankind through Christ” or revealed 
theology, which we have explored in chapters four and five above.   
 
3 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 1-21.  
 
4 Ibid., 26. 
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(5th century CE) Smith argues that ????????????? is synonymous with ???????? 
or fear of the Gods.5 This mistaken affective orientation to the Divine makes one 
think of God as “dreadfull and terrible,” “rigourous and imperious,” “austere 
and apt to be angry, but yet impotent and easy to be appeased . . . by some 
flattering devotions, especially if performed with sanctimonious shewes and a 
solemn sadness of Mind.”6 By understanding God as something external and 
negative the superstitious person does not apprehend the “Goodness of God” 
and this leads him or her to “attribute their [own] impotent passions and 
peevishness of Spirit to him.”7 That is, having an incorrect notion of God 
prompts the superstitious to create and then project their own weaknesses on to 
this idolatrous notion.8  
Citing Porphyry, Smith claims that superstition leads to the urge to “bribe 
the Deity” and this he finds in the rites of “the Jews” as well as nominal 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Ibid. 
 
7 Ibid., 27.  
 
8 Smith’s point here is that a moral and psychical failing on the part of some people leads 
to the creation of false deities, such as the “superstitious” one that is feared and prompts efforts 
at appeasement. In this regard, his theory of a form of  bad or false religion is strikingly similar to 
Freud’s theory of religion in toto. See Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. W.D. 
Robson-Scott (London: Hogarth Press, 1928).  
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Christians.9 This form of superstitious religion Smith especially associates with 
what he elsewhere calls “Pharisaick Righteousness.”10 In this stereotypical 
account of Jewish righteousness by works under the law Smith contrasts the 
“Pharisee” who by a “bare External appearance of Religion” pretends to have 
earned “true Blessedness.”11 And like all forms of superstition, the “Pharisaick” 
are fueled by a mistaken sense of God, lacking in an apprehension of the divine 
goodness that fosters love not servile fear.12  
Smith recognizes grades of superstition.13 Indeed, against Plutarch he 
argues that polytheism, which he equates to daemon worship, is but “one 
branch” of superstition rather than the sum total thereof.14 Others are driven to 
superstition by strong apprehensions of their own guilt, which they project as 
9 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 29. On Jewish “superstition” Smith is following Plutarch, 
but only so far as their rites and ceremonies are concerned.  
 
10 Ibid., 349-72.  
 
11 Ibid., 353.  
 
12 Ibid., 361-6. 
 
13 Ibid., 29.  
 
14 Ibid., 30. The relationship is rooted in the common origin of both in fear.  
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divine judgment upon themselves.15 Still others, are brought to fear and thus 
superstition by a lack of understanding of the forces of nature that makes them 
seek out a divine agent both quick to anger and easy to appease.16 Thus, fear 
reinforces mistaken notions that support rites and rituals which again fuel 
further superstitious ideas. Sometimes the process leads to “Magick and 
Exorcismes, other times into Pandanticall Rites and idle observations of Things and 
Times.”17 The pious person is a friend of God while the superstitious is a 
flatterer, being of a “base and slavish” temperament.18 Unlike his fellow 
Cambridge Platonist Henry More, who would make much of stories of ghosts 
and the like as evidence against a purely materialist philosophy, Smith dismisses 
talk of “Spectres and frightfull Apparitions of Ghosts and Mormos” as examples of 
the delusions of “weak minds.”19  
15 Ibid., 31. 
 
16 Ibid., 31-2. Here, Smith is implicitly dismissing the so-called “God of the gaps.”  
 
17 Ibid., 32.  
 
18 Ibid., 34, 33.  
 
19 Ibid., 32. On More’s occultism see A. Rupert Hall, Henry More and the Scientific 
Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 82-103, 128-45. “Mormos” is a 
reference to Mormo a spirit that bit misbehaving children in Greek mythology. It has essentially 
the meaning of our “bogeyman.”  
 
 
 
                                                 
316 
 
Smith’s discussion of superstition is eminently practical in orientation. In 
this respect, his discourse here is as much concerned with “spirituality” as 
anything else. In fact, it is not immediately obvious that it plays any clear role in 
Smith’s natural theology at all. However, his concern here is, above all, with a 
kind of “false piety” which makes an appreciation of theology, even natural 
theology, impossible. That is, unless one is prepared to let go of her or his 
emotionally charged attachments to a basically wrong-headed notion of God one 
cannot fully see the truth of what Smith has to offer about the immortal soul or 
the existence and nature of the true Deity.20 Most importantly, Smith’s inclusion 
of this bit of spiritual wisdom in a prolegomena to his natural theology indicates 
to us that he does not fully separate the two. The end of natural religion and 
revealed truth is one and the same; union with God as the Supreme Good.  
 
6.1.2 Atheism 
 In much the same vein, Smith takes up his discourse “Of Atheism” in 
order to demonstrate the practical roots and errors of not believing in God. In 
20 Ibid., 36; Superstition, like the darkness in the prologue to the Gospel of John, 
“comprehends not the true Divine good that ariseth to the Souls of men from an internall frame of 
Religion” (Ibid.).  
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fact, he argues that superstition and atheism are closely related and deeply 
similar in that “as Superstition is engendered by a base opinion of the Deity as 
cruell and tyrannicall . . . so also is Atheism.”21 No less an authority than Plato is 
brought to bear on this point, who suggests in The Laws that there are three 
temperaments toward God: total atheism, partial atheism (the denial of 
providence or what we might call Deism), and the superstitious “perswasion . . . 
that they [the Gods] are easily wone by sacrifices and prayers.”22  
Moreover, it is superstition that opened the way for atheism in that “it 
could not so easily have banish’d the Belief in a Deity, had not that [superstition] 
first accused and condemn’d it as destructive to the Peace of Mankind; and 
therefore it [atheism] hath alwaies justified and defended it self by Superstition.”23 
Drawing on Simplicius and Dionysius Longinus, Smith sums up these two “anti-
deities”:  
21 Ibid., 42.  
 
22 Ibid., 34. Referencing Plato, ????? (de Legibus), 10; Laws, 885a-e, trans. A.E. Taylor, in 
The Collected Works of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 1440-1.  
 
23 Ibid. In this one is immediately reminded of the “New Atheists” of our own time 
(Dawkins, Dennett, Harris, etc.) whose attacks on theism are nearly always directed at the 
grossest sorts of anthropomorphism in religion (thus “superstition” by Smith’s standards). On 
this see Terry Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2009).  
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If the Superstitious man thinks that God is altogether like himself . . . the 
Atheist will soon say in his heart, There is no God; and will judge it not 
without some appearance of Reason to be better there were none . . . .24  
 
Smith notes that the great epicurean poet Lucretius (first century BCE) rejected 
the Gods, in part, because of the monstrous superstition that they were appeased 
by Agamemnon’s sacrifice of his daughter Iphigenia.25  
 
6.1.2.1 Epicureanism  
His train of thought having brought him to the Epicurean school of 
philosophy in the supportive example of Lucretius, Smith next takes up an 
extended discussion of the “secret Atheists of the Epicurean sect.”26 For Smith, 
Epicurus and his followers were too careful to admit their atheism but neither 
can they hide it since “when they would seem to acknowledge a Deity, [they] 
could not forget their own beloved Image which was always before their eyes; 
and therefore they would have it as careless of any thing but its own pleasure 
24 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 43. Quoting Psalm 14: 1 “The fool hath said in his heart, 
There is no God.” 
 
25 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 45. Also, Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, I.80-101, in The 
Nature of Things, trans. A. E. Stallings, intro. Richard Jenkyns (London: Penguin, 2007), 5-6. 
 
26 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 46.  
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and idle life as they themselves were.”27 Thus, the Epicureans fell in with the 
“Anthropomorphitae.”28  
 Smith sets out to relate the contours of the epicurean school out of 
Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura but in actuality relies seldom on this source.29 After 
demonstrating that Lucretius is a faithful follower of Epicurus on the basis of his 
“prologue” in praise of the master of the Garden, Smith notes that the poet 
argues that superstition has arisen from observations of nature. The mysteries of 
the natural world have led people to imagine Gods that might be appeased. For 
this reason, says Lucretius, he seeks to unfold the secrets of nature so that 
superstition may be put away. This, Smith interprets as a challenge to the 
doctrine of creation, and thus upon the nature and existence of God.30    
27 Ibid. 
 
28 Ibid., Just who these “athropomorphites” might be, in addition to the Epicureans, is 
unclear. However, the tendency toward anthropomorphism has a long history both within and 
outside of Christianity. Smith may have in mind, no doubt among others, the fifth century 
Christian heresy of Audianism. See Theodoret of Cyrus, Ecclesiastical History, IV.9, "Of the heresy 
of the Audiani," in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff, series 2, vol. 3, in Christian 
Classics Ethereal Library, 2005, accessed 12 May 2014, 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf203.iv.viii.iv.ix.html. 
 
29 While Smith does clearly know Lucretius, he relies much more consistently on anti-
epicurean sources from Cicero and Plutarch.  
 
30 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 46.  
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 This attack upon the notion of the divine creation, and sustaining, of the 
world is rooted in the atomic physics of Epicurus and his school. Smith pokes 
fun of the lack of originality in Epicurus by calling his school merely the “foster-
father” of atomism; Democritus gets credit, or more accurately blame, for being 
the “father” of this form of physics.31 Nevertheless, Epicurus’s “master-notion” is 
laid out by Smith as the familiar summary of atoms and the void (“empty 
space”). He remains somewhat vague on the particulars of Epicurus’s theory at 
first, suggesting that his audience could be expected to know the basics. Smith’s 
full understanding of Epicurean philosophy does not come into view until his 
digression on it comes to a close.  
 Description gives way to apologetic argument as Smith offers a version of 
the design argument against the epicurean view that the complexity of nature is 
the result of mere chance.32 Even Aristotle, he admits begrudgingly, had to 
recognize the need for a First Mover. If Aristotle, who is himself no friend to 
31 Ibid., 47. Smith is being a bit snarky here. He wants to dismiss the view as 
fundamentally wrong-headed but also heaps scorn on Epicurus for not coming up with the idea 
himself. He may also be taking this up from other ancient sources as it was a common criticism of 
Epicurus.  
 
32 Ibid. 
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religion for Smith, can admit of God then what gross errors must be at play in the 
philosophy of Epicurus?33  
 Even if one were to grant, against Aristotle and good sense, that material 
nature has the power of motion itself, there remains the problem of persistence 
over time for Epicurus. If, merely by chance, things come together to form 
complex new forms, what keeps them from immediately falling apart again if not 
a Divine influence over the whole?34 Moreover, from whence does the order we 
so clearly observe in nature come? Smith is clearly doubtful that atoms, void, and 
the “swerve” are enough to account for the radical coincidences represented by 
trees, hills, and human beings.35  
More importantly, even if Epicurus is correct about physics, his 
theological conclusions are not borne out. While Smith does not subscribe to 
Epicurean physics, he does agree that one’s study of nature rests on empirical 
observation. Science begins with the physical senses but requires interpretation 
by an incorporeal soul. In order to embrace the epicurean denial of providence, 
33 Ibid., 48.  
 
34 Ibid. 
 
35 Ibid., 48-9. 
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which amounts to atheism for Smith, one must be morally and spiritually 
disposed toward this view by attachment to matter and the objects of physical 
sense.36 That is, in order to find atomic physics compelling on theological issues, 
such as the nature of God’s relationship to the world, one must first be the type 
of sensualist that has his or her reason so tangled with physical sense that they 
cannot come to a knowledge of first principles.37  
 Thus, the Epicurean is so far from the “True Way” of coming to a proper 
understanding of metaphysical truth that Smith thinks it unworthy, even if some 
truth may be had by it in the realm of physics. Moreover, he is doubtful that 
anyone can be so completely ignorant of the true nature of God as would seem to 
be required to assent to a system that is entirely “natural” like the Epicurean 
philosophy. For there is “a Natural Sense of God that lodges in the minds of 
[even] the lowest and dullest sort of vulgar men.”38 This natural sense of God 
would appear to be similar to what Calvin calls the sensus divinitatis in that both 
work “like a natural instinct antecedent to any mature knowledge” providing 
36 Ibid., 49.  
 
37 Ibid., 17.  
 
38 Ibid., 49-50. 
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grounds to know that there is a Deity.39 However unlike the Reformer’s version 
of the spiritual senses, Smith thinks of this sense of God as also functioning as a 
kind of innate knowledge, “being indeed the First principle of” mature or 
experiential knowledge.40  
 Clearly then, Smith is concerned to combat what he takes to be the errors 
of Epicureanism. However, it might justly be wondered why he, or anyone, 
would see in this ancient school of thought a living challenge to “true religion.” 
Smith makes much of it because in his day Epicureanism was on the rise across 
Europe and at home in England. Worthington tells us, in a reference to Hobbes 
among others, that Smith “lived not to see Atheism so closely and craftily 
insinuated, nor lived he to see Sadduceism and Epicurism so boldly owned and 
industriously propagated, as they have been of late.”41 Still, this renewal of 
Epicurean principles was only relatively more frequent and more bold in the 
39 Ibid., 50. See also Paul Helm, "John Calvin, the Sensus Divinitatis, and the Noetic 
Effects of Sin," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 43 no. 2 (1998): 87–107. 
 
40 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 50. Smith sides with the Stoics in calling this “sense” a 
kind of “momentum toward God” (??????????????????, reading ???? for ?????) rather than 
Plutarch’s “cognition of God” (???????????). See also R. J. Hankinson, “Stoic Epistemology,” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Stoicism, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 59-84.  
 
41 John Worthington, “To the Reader,” in Smith, Select Discourses (1660), xx. The reference 
to the Sadducees (known primarily from the New Testament and Josephus) is another way of 
referring to those who deny the immortality of the soul, resurrection, and final judgment.  
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years after Smith’s passing. For already in the mid-fifteenth century there were 
printed editions of Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura beloved by Humanists across 
Europe, including Erasmus and Thomas More.42 Diogenes Laertius too was 
published in 1472, bringing his account of the Lives and Opinions of Eminent 
Philosophers, including Epicurus, to a wide public.43 At the very end of the 
sixteenth century, Giordano Bruno came under the suspicion that would 
ultimately lead to his death by fire in the Campo de' Fiori in part because of his 
embrace of epicurean principles.44  
 By the time of the publication of Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy 
in 1641, Pierre Gassendi was already working toward his own system of 
Christian Epicureanism.45 In his contribution to the Objections and Replies 
42 See Stephen Greenblatt, The Swerve: How the World Became Modern (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2011), 219-63, and Eugene O’Connor, “Introduction,” in The Essential 
Epicurus: Letters, Principal Doctrines, Vatican Sayings, and Fragments, trans. Eugene O’Connor 
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1993), 14-5.  
 
43 Ilario Tolomio, "Editions of Diogenes Laertius in the Fifteenth to Seventeenth 
Centuries," in G. Santinello et al. eds., Models of the History of Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), 
1: 154ff. 
 
44 Ingrid D. Rowland, Giordano Bruno: Philosopher/Heretic (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2008), 214.  
 
45 Saul Fisher, "Pierre Gassendi," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta, last modified 18 November 2013, accessed 20 May 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/gassendi/. Also, David K. Gildden, “Hellenistic 
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published along with the Meditations, Gassendi offers significant criticism of 
Descartes’s view of the self as mental and therefore non-corporeal.46 Thomas 
Hobbes too in his Objections raises the notion that the mind is merely a kind of 
movement of a body.47 By the 1640s, Walter Charleton (1619-1707), a friend of 
Hobbes, had begun to bring explicitly Epicurean philosophy to England, notably 
in the form of adaptations of the work of Gassendi.48  
 Thus, Epicureanism, or at least a form of physicalist naturalism at least 
nominally similar to that ancient school, was a living possibility among the 
intelligentsia of Europe. In so far as this entailed a denial of divine providence, 
the immortality of the soul, or the existence and nature of God, the presence of 
Background for Gassendi’s Theory of Ideas,” Journal of the History of Ideas 49 no.3 (1988): 405-424. 
Gildden highlights in particular the way that Gassendi’s philosophy was translated into English 
without making his dependence on ancient thinkers as clear as they might otherwise have been. 
This, may well have helped to spread Epicurean notions without the negative baggage of the 
name in early modern England. Smith knew at least Gassendi’s Epistolica exercitatio, in qua 
principia philosophiae Roberti Flvddi medici reteguntur (Paris: Sebastian Cramoisy, 1630). See Saveson, 
“Catalogue,” 29.  
 
46 Fifth Objections, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, trans. (Cambridge University Press, 1985), 2: 179-277.  
 
47 Fourth Objections, in Philosophical Writings, 2: 138-78.   
 
48 Charleton was physician to Charles I during the Civil War. It is possible that this 
helped to fuel hostility on Smith’s part to Epicurean ideas, being, as they were, associated with 
the Royal Court. Robert Kargon, “Walter Charleton, Robert Boyle, and the Acceptance of 
Epicurean Atomism in England,” Isis 55 no. 2 (1964): 184-92. 
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Epicurean philosophy signaled the spread of atheism for Smith. Thus, Smith 
responded much like Henry More in his Treatise of the Immortality of the Soul, and 
the Antidote against Atheism.49  
  
6.1.2.2 The Spiritual Effects of Atheism 
Following Plutarch, Smith sets two further points before his reader 
concerning atheism. The first, that while superstition is “unlovely” it is still “more 
tolerable then Atheism.”50 This is because atheism offers “the greatest violence to 
mens Souls that may be” in weeding out the roots of our innate notions of God.51 
That is, while superstition may lead to false religion, that is still to be preferred to 
no religion at all. Second, Smith avers that atheism is a “most ignoble and 
uncomfortable thing” in itself.52 Here he is turning the great virtue of the 
49 Worthington, “To the Reader,” xxii. Henry More, The Immortality of the Soul, So farre 
forth as it is demonstrable from the Knowledge of Nature and the Light of Reason (London, 1659), and An 
Antidote Against Atheism, Or an Appeal to the Natural Faculties of the Mind of Man, whether there be 
not a God (London, 1653; enlarged 2nd ed., with appendix, London, 1655).  
 
50 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 51. 
 
51 Ibid., 52. The agricultural metaphor is Smith’s (“pulling up . . . which have spread their 
Roots”).  
 
52 Ibid. Here he follows Plutarch and Cicero against “Colotes the Epicurean” (c.320-c.268 
BCE).  
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“Epicureans,” namely pleasure, against them by suggesting that attending to 
merely physical pleasures is not nearly as enjoyable as one might expect.53 For 
one thing, one cannot achieve the “Highest Happiness,” communion with God, by 
way of a “corporeal touch.”54 This is in contrast, of course, to the “Intellectual 
touch” by which Smith teaches we may come to know God in the “True Way” 
discourse.55 In addition, a rightly spiritual enjoyment of the eternal things of God 
is everlasting, whereas physical enjoyment is a fleeting, momentary matter at 
best.56 Above all however, Smith’s objection to Epicurean hedonism is basically 
aesthetic and moral. “I dare say that all those that have any just esteem of 
humanity, cannot but with a noble scorn defy such a base-born Happiness as this 
is, generated onely out of the slime of the earth.”57 To Smith, it is simply repellent 
53 From the context here and elsewhere it is clear that Smith follows most ancient, 
medieval and early modern critics of Epicureanism in thinking of it as a school of pure hedonism 
in the positive sense rather than the more accurately negative hedonism of Epicurus and 
Lucretius that seeks to avoid disturbance (ataraxia). Eugene O’Connor, “Introduction,” 9-14.   
 
54 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 52.  
 
55 Ibid., 3.  
 
56 Ibid., 52-3.  
 
57 Ibid., 53. One wonders what Smith would make of modern evolutionary science with 
its theory that all life arose out of just this “slime of the earth.” Given his friendly embrace of 
Platonic and Cartesian dualism, I suspect that Smith would not resist our science, provided that 
room remains for the immaterial soul. 
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and beneath the dignity of human beings made in the imago Dei to think that we 
are merely “dust,” fine particles of lifeless matter.  
 
6.1.2.3 Materialist Naturalism 
 Late in his discourse on atheism Smith refers in passing to a central 
doctrine of Epicureanism as itself being the take-home point for atheism in 
general. Namely, he equates the atomic materialism of the Epicureans with the 
whole “portion of Atheism.”58 In so doing he confirms what his reader must 
suspect from the outset; that “atheism” is essentially identical to materialist 
naturalism. Epicureanism is atheistic for Smith because it is reductively 
materialistic (all is merely atoms and the void) and entertains only natural causes. 
Likewise, atheism is epicurean in so far as it leaves no room for spiritual 
substance and action. Against this Smith suggests (with the Stoics) that in order 
to account for the world one must admit both God and providence.59 “Remove 
God and Providence out of the world, and then we have nothing to depend upon 
58 Ibid., 53.  
 
59 In addition to the Stoics we might add also the Puritans, always keen to stress divine 
providence, as well as those natural theologians, such as Thomas Aquinas, who have argued 
from the “governance of the world” to the existence of God.  
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but Chance and Fortune.”60 Such a world is both physically impossible and 
psychologically intolerable for Smith.61  
 
6.1.3 The Immortal Soul 
In his discourse on the “Immortality of the Soul” Smith makes four 
arguments; two negative against Epicureanism, and two positive, all drawing on 
Platonism. He concludes his discussion with the additional resolution of two 
potential difficulties in accepting the immortality of the soul; one from Aristotle 
directly, and the mind-body problem.  
While he goes on to give what he takes to be solid rational grounds for 
admitting the immortality of the soul, Smith opens by apologizing for taking up 
the notion in the first place. The Epistle to the Hebrews lays out the principal 
doctrines of religion, which are (1) that God exists, (2) that God rewards those 
who seek Him, and (3) the communication of God to humanity through Christ. 
To this second principle, Smith adds the immortality of the soul as a necessary 
accompaniment, in a classic display of his erudition, on the authority of Ficino, 
60 Ibid., 54.  
 
61 Ibid., 54-5. 
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Simplicius, Jewish tradition, the New Testament, the Delphic Oracle, Plutarch, 
Cicero, and Clement of Alexandria.62 Thus, both scripture and reason show these 
three (or four) principles to be the foundations of true religion. And since the 
chief natural way to know God, for Smith, is by first knowing the soul, he begins 
his discussion of natural theology with the immortal soul.  
Having given sufficient reason to take up a topic that he otherwise takes 
to be uncontroversial among any one he respects Smith next offers three 
premises upon which his arguments about the soul will rest. An appreciation of 
the argumentative force of Smith’s discourse rests profoundly on keeping these 
premises in mind. Without them, his arguments may seem to beg the question, 
making him seem more a casual apologist than philosophically astute theologian.  
Smith’s first premise, if it can be so called, is that the immortality of the 
soul does not, properly speaking, require demonstration at all. It is, suggests 
Smith, an entirely natural notion that has been accepted by “all Nations” across 
history. In an utterly pragmatic (even democratic) bit of reasoning Smith offers 
62 Ibid., 60-2. Ficino is, perhaps, the intent of Smith’s reference to “a novel” or new 
“Platonist writing a Summary of Plato’s Divinity” who “intitles his book, De Deo & Immortalitate 
Anima” (60).  Cf. Marsilo Ficino, Theologica Platonica: De Immortalitate Animorum, in Platonic 
Theology, trans. Michael B. Allen, ed. James Hankins, 6 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2001-2006).  
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that the immortality of the soul has been accepted even by the most “Idiotical 
sort of men” and only a few “unskilful Philosophers” have questioned it.63 
The second premise goes to the very heart of Smith’s approach to theology 
and philosophy. In order to rightly understand his arguments, he suggests that 
one must already have had “converse” with their own soul.64 That is, in order to 
appreciate the truth of what he will argue one must be able to recognize his 
demonstration as reflecting what one has already come to know by first-hand 
experience. Only one who has thus seen has eyes to see the truth of his case. To 
this extent, Smith has established as a premise for his arguments the reality of the 
spiritual perception of the imago Dei he sets out as the defining characteristic of 
his theological epistemology in the “True Way.”65 
The third and final premise is more directly philosophical, and thus 
absolutely essential to the arguments that follow if one is looking for reasoning 
that is apt to convince the skeptic. Smith asserts that no substantial and 
63 Ibid., 63.  
 
64 Ibid., 65-6.  
 
65 Ibid., 1-21.  
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indivisible thing ever perishes.66 This premise has the great strength that even his 
opponents, the Epicureans, grant its truth, for it is on this basis that they argue 
for the eternity of atoms.67 Moreover, this principle is supported by Smith’s allies, 
above all Plato and Plotinus, but even Aristotle too.68 
  
6.1.3.1 Arguments against the Epicureans 
 Smith’s first formal argument, actually a set of related arguments, is that 
the soul is not corporeal, directed against Epicurean philosophy which argues 
that, like everything else, the soul is simply a collection of atoms. He is thus 
attempting to reason to a position consistent with his third premise, which even 
his opponents grant, that what is indivisible cannot pass away. Smith’s approach 
is a form of informal reductio ab absurdum wherein he shows that the Epicurean 
position is inconsistent with known facts and thus false.69  
66 Ibid., 66-8. Ben Lazare Mijuskovic calls this the “simplicity” argument and he traces it 
through its Platonic roots to Kant in The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments (The Hague: Martinus 
Mijhoff, 1974).  
 
67 Ibid., 66. Note that Smith again is taking up this ancient school of philosophy as a living 
threat to the fundamental principles of religion.  
 
68 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 66-8.  
 
69 Ibid., 69. While the success of Smith’s argument rests upon the degree to which he finds 
actual absurdities in the thesis of his opponents for our purposes we are interested primarily in 
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 The Epicurean theory, as Smith knows it, is that the soul is a corporeal 
entity and that just as the body passes away at death so too therefore does the 
soul.70 This is the basis for the famous Epicurean argument against the fear of 
death. As Epicurus himself puts it in his Letter to Menoceus, “Death . . . is 
nothing to us, since while we exist, death is not present, and whenever death is 
present, we do not exist.”71 Thus, for the Epicurean the material soul necessitates 
the mortality thereof and this is why Smith seeks to show that the soul is 
immaterial as an essential step toward his demonstration of the soul’s 
immortality. Moreover, regardless of attempts at terminological refinement, the 
Epicurean principle remains; the soul is a body.72  
 Smith asks immediately however how one can arrive at a rational soul 
from mere body. The solution offered by Epicurus, here represented above all by 
Lucretius, is that like all other phenomena in the cosmos rationality is the result 
what he argues and not if he is fair to the Epicurean view. See Mijuskovic, Achilles, 23-7, 63-5 for 
an account of Smith’s argument that places it within the history of such arguments.  
 
70 Ibid., 69. See also James Hankins, “Lucretius’s Arguments against Immortality in De 
Rerum Natura, III, 425-829,” in The Rebirth of Platonic Theology, edited by James Hankins and 
Fabrizio Meroi (Florence: Olschki, 2013), 148-51.  
 
71 Epicurus, “Letter to Meoeceus,” 125, in The Essential Epicurus, trans. with intro. Eugene 
O’Connor (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1993), 63.  
 
72 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 70.  
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of atoms in motion through the void of empty space.73 But this account raises 
many difficulties, including the question of the origin of motion.  
 Smith notes that there is nothing in the definition of body that necessitates 
motion. Something may be extended in space without also being subject to 
motion. Thus, it would seem that some explanation is required to account for the 
movement of atoms. In a convenient truce with his sometime enemy Aristotle, 
Smith brings the Peripatetic principle “that Motion cannot arise from a Body” 
alone to bear against the Epicurean physics.74 Epicurean physics seems therefore 
to require an efficient cause to set the system in motion that is expressly ruled 
out by that very system.  
 In addition to this deep flaw in Epicurean physics, there is the more 
specific matter of the origin of perception. For even a bodily Epicurean soul must 
be able to perceive, that being one of the essential tasks of a soul.75 Lucretius 
suggests motion as an explanation of perception. However, at best the motions of 
bodies can produce the variety of objects various in magnitude, position, figure, 
73 Ibid., 71.  
 
74 Ibid., 71. Smith’s reference is to Aristotle’s De Caelo (On the Heavens) but the principle is 
ubiquitous in his philosophy.  
 
75 Ibid., 72.  
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and motion that makes up the objects of perception (the “phanomena,” or as the 
Epicureans call them, “eventa”).76 But to perceive is to sense these phenomena; to 
have them as objects. Thus, this power cannot come from these bodily 
phenomena themselves any more “then Vision can rise out of a Glasse.”77 That is, 
bodies and their interactions are what is seen (i.e., objects) and at most that by 
which we see (the sense organs, etc.) but in no way are bodies to be identified 
with our act of seeing.  
Additionally, appeals to infinitesimally small “corpuscular” bodies 
(atoms) are no help to the Epicurean cause either. Atoms themselves do not have 
the power of sense, and therefore, argues Smith, neither can any combination or 
motion thereof. This otherwise curious denial of the possibility of what today 
would be called “emergent properties” rests on the principle, well attested by 
both Platonists and Aristotle, that an effect cannot have something that was not 
given it by its cause.78 Therefore, atoms in motion cannot account for perception.  
76 Ibid., 72.  
  
77 Ibid.  
 
78 Ibid., 73.  
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As supplementary support for this conclusion Smith notes the apparent 
difficulty that even Lucretius seems to have in holding to the theory of the 
corporeal soul.79 Taking his lead from Plotinus, Porphyry, and Plutarch, Smith 
adds that interactions of atoms cannot be sensitive to their own motions because 
that would be like musical instruments hearing their own vibrations. Sensation is 
not motion or impressions caused by motion but the recognition of those motions 
by a faculty of a different sort altogether.80  
Moreover, even if it were possible sense perception alone would be 
insufficient to account for knowledge. If sense were all that one had we could not 
know some rather important things. For example, we could not know that we 
know.81 Judgment is needed to make sense of sensory information as well but 
this is accomplished via innate ideas already contained in the reasoning faculties 
79 Ibid., 73-5.  
 
80 Ibid., 76. Alan Gabbey has suggested that it may have been Smith, rather than 
Cudworth or More, who first took up the attack upon “mechanical religion.” “Cudworth, More 
and the Mechanical Analogy,” in Philosophy, Science, and Religion in England 1640-1700, ed. 
Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft, and Perez Zagorin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 109-27, here 121, 127 n.50. See also Simon Patrick, The Parable of the Pilgrim (London, 1688), 
195, 204, 210; cited by Gabbey (127 n.50).  
 
81 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 77. Smith adds this additional bit of argument because 
sense perception does indeed involve the body and that gives a degree of plausibility to the 
Epicurean theory. 
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of the soul.82 Thus, along with Aristotle, Smith argues that judgment and reason 
are not faculties or powers of sense. They are how we are able to distinguish 
between hallucinations and proper perceptions, and thus they are not themselves 
perceptual.  
In addition, if there is no higher principle of knowledge than sense one 
could not know, for example, that the sun is actually much larger than it appears 
because an understanding of that sort rests on immaterial mathematical 
reasoning.83 Pure empiricism therefore is not enough even for an accurate 
apprehension of the physical world. Thus, Smith concludes, there is a more noble 
power in the soul that judges and reasons upon the data provided by sense and 
this cannot be a body. In this way, Smith argues, to his own standards of proof, 
that there is at least a higher aspect of the soul that is immaterial and thus 
immortal.  
Three particulars follow from these arguments. First, the mental faculty by 
which we discern and judge is not a body and must therefore remove itself from 
82 Ibid., 70. 
 
83 Ibid., 79. 
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bodily concerns to “nakedly discern truth.”84 This is in keeping with Smith’s 
generally ascetic approach to spiritual aesthetics as we have seen in chapters four 
and five above.  
Second, we must have a faculty that “collects and unites all the 
Perceptions of our several Senses, and is able to compare them together: 
something in which they all meet as in one Centre” for as Plotinus suggests 
“That in which all those several sensations meet as so many Lines drawn from 
several points in the Circumference and which comprehends them all, must 
needs be One.”85 While Smith does reference Aristotle’s de Anima in his 
discussion of this unitive sense faculty he does so only to back up the general 
principle “That must be one that judges things to be diverse.”86 Curiously, Smith does 
84 Ibid., 80.  
 
85 Ibid., 82. Smith cites Ennead IV.7.6 but the idea originates with Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, De Anima, 8-13 (A.P. Fotinis, The De anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias [Washington, 
D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), cited in Plotinus, Ennead IV, trans. Armstrong, vol. IV, 
355, n.1. Mijuskovic suggests an anticipation of Kant in Smith’s argument “that only an 
immaterial simple can serve as a ‘transcendental’ condition for the unity of consciousness” 
(Achilles, 65). However, Smith’s reason for bringing this up is not epistemological but rather to 
shore up his case against Epicureanism by suggesting that the simple (indivisible) soul is also 
immaterial. After all, the Epicurean atom too is indivisible (and thus eternal in its own way).   
 
86 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 82; translating from Aristotle, De anima, 3.2.  
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not name this faculty the ????? ???????? or sensus communis, but it is clear that 
this is the faculty he has in mind.87  
Smith’s third particular is that remembering and predicting (“Prevision”) 
cannot be bodily processes. Essentially, he is asking what could possibly unite 
the past, present, and future together as our mental faculties do if they were not 
in some sense participants in eternity themselves?88 If conversant with eternity, if 
only in its shadow cast upon memory, present awareness, and prescience, then 
surely the soul has no truck with the body and is itself immortal.  
Where this first argument prominently displays Smith’s Platonism, his 
second against the Epicureans demonstrates his knowledge of the new science of 
his day. Essentially, his argument is that the body and soul can act without each 
other.89 There are actions that arise without any mental effort or attention and 
there are those that are deliberate and against bodily demands, as when we delay 
eating even when feeling hungry.  
87 However, given the relative paucity of explicit uses of the phrase in Aristotle, its 
absence in Smith is perhaps not surprising. Still, the label would have made for much more 
readable prose in Smith’s discussion.  
 
88 Ibid., 82-3.  
 
89 Ibid., 85.  
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Spontaneous bodily actions, including emotional reactions without 
external causes, originate in the body but are felt by the soul. For this reason 
there must be a close connection or relation between the soul and the body. The 
“machina” of the body cannot perceive and so there must also be an immaterial 
soul for that purpose.90 However, most bodily motions are unconscious, what we 
would call “autonomic functions” that we do not perceive or initiate such as 
breathing, heart beating, pupil dilation, etc. All of this leads Smith to conclude 
that the body and soul must be distinct things.  
The parallel to Descartes here is very strong. Both argue that body is 
primarily defined by extension and soul primarily by active mental functions.91 
Descartes calls these mental events “thought” while Smith maintains distinctions 
like perception, judgment, reasoning, and the like but their points are the same. 
Body occupies space and cannot actively respond to the world, soul (or mind) 
does not occupy space and can actively respond to the world in perception, 
judgment, and intellection.92  
90 Ibid., 87.  
 
91 Mijuskovic calls this the “simplicity” argument and he traces it through its Platonic 
roots to Kant in The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments (The Hague: Martinus Mijhoff, 1974).  
92 Descartes, Meditations, 6, in Philosophical Writings, 2: 50-62.  
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Smith also follows Descartes and other contemporary natural 
philosophers in arguing that the human body operates through various material 
forces carried by spirits, blood, and humors throughout our anatomy. Many of 
these processes are basically hydraulic or pneumatic in character and they 
represent the ways one part of the body can influence the others and how 
physical motions can lead to emotional passions too.93 Like Descartes, Smith is 
arguing that the body operates like a machine but something additional is 
needed to come to an awareness of these mechanical actions. This something 
more, is, for Smith, the soul.  
Smith also brings up volitional acts as evidence of the superiority of the 
soul over the body. Not only are they distinct, as we can see from the fact that we 
are not always conscious of subtle bodily motions, but the soul is able to dictate 
to the body which actions it will take.94 The soul becomes aware of bodily needs 
(showing, again, that the soul is not the body) but the soul, or more precisely the 
93 See Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, in Philosophical Writings, 1: 328-404. Also, Gert-Jan 
Lokhorst, "Descartes and the Pineal Gland," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward 
N. Zalta, last modified 18 September 2013, accessed 16 May 2014,  
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/pineal-gland/. Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 
86-9.  
 
94 Ibid., 88-91.  
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will, can postpone or deny these actions (showing that the soul is in control). 
Displaying little interest in the ordering of the faculties that had so dominated 
scholastic psychology and would come to prominence again in modern 
philosophy, Smith is content to merely note the understanding and the will as 
vital powers and therefore carried out by the soul.  
Furthermore, the soul is free from astral or astrological influences for 
Smith as well. Just as he dismisses other forms of occult science (witchcraft, etc.) 
as superstitious nonsense, Smith has no time at all for astrology, at least when it 
comes to predicting the course one’s soul might (or must) take.95 Along these 
same lines, Smith is dismissive of Lucretius’s view that all motion, including 
human action, originates in an initial “Motion of declination” or what Greenblatt 
has recently (and famously) called a “swerve.”96 For, the purely physical 
95 Ibid., 89. Smith was clearly interested in astronomy and so he would most likely not be 
opposed to what is called “natural astrology” but only “judicial astrology” which sought to 
discern the inclinations of the heart and fate. In this he is a bit unusual for his day but less so 
among Puritans; Calvin had written against astrology in An admonicion against astrology iudiciall 
and other curiosities, that raigne novv in the vvorld, trans. G.G. (London, 1561). 
 
96 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 90. The theory is given by Lucretius in De Rerum Natura 
2.215-24. Atoms moving through an infinite void “swerve a little” and thus start off the chain of 
collisions that leads to more complex objects like rocks, trees, and human souls. Without this 
“change of course” atoms would simply fall in a straight line and never meet. Lucretius, The 
Nature of Things, 42. Greenblatt’s The Swerve, documents the rediscovery of Lucretius’s poem and 
the change in course this helped to inspire in the early modern period (toward the modern 
secular world of today).  
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interaction of bodies according to mechanical laws leaves no room for the 
exercise of free will. By introspection he thinks that we can see clearly that our 
souls are not constrained by the “rigid laws of Matter” and in so noticing we 
apprehend our souls to be immaterial. Our soul, says Smith in a remarkable 
passage from one so soon to come to bodily death, “feels it self able to preserve it 
self from the forrein force of Matter, and can say of all those assaults . . . as the 
Stoick did, all this is nothing to me, who am yet free and can command within, 
when this feeble Carkass is able no longer to obey me; and when that is shattered 
and broken down, I can live any where else without it; for I was not That, but liad 
onely a command over It, while I dwelt in it.”97 
 
97 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 91. Clearly then Smith subscribes to a view not unlike 
that of Descartes, and arguably Plotinus, whereby personal identity is associated with soul/mind 
and the body is essentially something that this spiritual substance has and inhabits (like a ghost 
in a machine). Eyjolfur Emilsson has argued to the effect that Plotinus was essentially a Cartesian 
on the issue of the mind and body (Plotinus on Sense-Perception [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008]; “Plotinus and Soul-Body Dualism,” in S. Everson, ed., Psychology, 
Companions to Ancient Thought, vol. 2 [Cambridge, 1991]) and John Dillon has argued that 
Plotinus was the first Cartesian (“Plotinus, the First Cartesian?,” Hermathena 149 [1990]: 19-31). 
While this has been challenged ably by Donald L. Ross (“Plotinus, the First Cartesian?,” 
Hermathena 169 [2000]: 153-67) it is clear that Smith thought this to be the case. Or, more 
accurately, that both Plotinus and Descartes had, in this respect, discovered the “true religion” he 
associates with the ancient philosophers, essentially the prisca theologia of the Renaissance 
Platonists.  
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6.1.3.2 Platonic Arguments 
With his third argument Smith turns his attention away from the 
Epicureans and seeks to offer a positive demonstration of the immaterial nature 
of the soul by a consideration of the power of mathematical reasoning. In classic 
Platonic fashion Smith uses mathematics as his prime example of those functions 
of the soul that do not depend or even relate to the body at all.98 Mathematical 
notions, in particular basic concepts in geometry such as the point, line, plane, 
equality, symmetry, and divisibility, are contained within the soul but crucially 
they cannot be “buried in Matter.”99  
In fact, our mathematical reasoning can easily perform operations that 
when attempted in the physical world are impossible. For example, in geometry 
it is an easy thing to divide an arch into as many parts as may be without losing 
any of the arch in the process but when one tries to cut a physical object of that 
shape some material must be lost in the cutting.100 We also find that “in these 
98 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 93.  
 
99 Ibid. 
 
100 Ibid., 93-4. A far more typically erudite example comes in the form of a reference to the 
doubling of the cube, supposed to have been asked of the Delians by the Delphic Oracle who 
consulted Plato who interpreted the task as an indication that they should study mathematics to 
purify their minds. While Smith has his story a bit mixed up (he reports Athenians rather than 
Delians) the important point is that by the use of the geometers tools, a compass and straightedge, 
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Geometricall speculations . . . our Souls will not consult with our Bodies,” thus 
the mental substance performing these tasks cannot be a body. Moreover, as St. 
Augustine (“Austin”) argued some “Archetypal Ideas” are present in our souls 
such as quantity which we employ in making judgments about sense objects but 
which are not themselves the product of any sensible experience. These 
immaterial notions therefore “must needs be immediately ingraven upon an 
Immaterial Soul.”101  
 For his fourth and final argument Smith looks to the fourth degree of 
knowledge he first introduced in the “True Way” discourse. Borrowed from 
Proclus, and ultimately Plato, Smith divides all human knowers into four 
degrees. The lowest rely on “Sensible impressions” alone. The second, achieves a 
“Miscellaneous kind of knowledge arising of a collation of its Sensations with its 
own more obscure and dark Idea’s.”102 Third, is the level of “Discourse and 
Reason” including mathematical knowledge. Finally, the fourth level involves 
the “naked intuition of Eternal Truth which is alwaies the same” such as “the 
alone the doubling of a given cube cannot be done. Smith’s likely source here is Plutarch who 
related the story several times, but it was also a geometrical commonplace.  
 
101 Ibid., 94. Smith is referencing De Quantitate Animae, 13.22-14.23.  
 
102 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 96-7.  
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Archetypall Idea’s of Justice, Wisdome, Goodness, Truth, Eternity, Omnipotency, and 
all those Morall, Physicall, or Metaphyisical notions, which are either the First 
Principles of Science, or the Ultimate complement and final perfection of it.”103 
Being the home of such immaterial and eternal principles, the soul too is not a 
body and thus immortal.  
Interestingly, rather than leave his argument in the capable hands of the 
Platonists alone Smith draws on Cartesian distinctions as well to further support 
his cause. This is not all that surprising, given that Smith read Descartes as, 
essentially, a Christian Platonist rather than the harbinger of secularism that he 
became to Henry More and Ralph Cudworth. Smith reports that self-reflection 
shows that we know our soul better than we know our body just as Descartes 
had argued in the Second Meditation.104 Indeed, while unnamed, Smith’s words 
could just as easily be Descartes’s own: “the notions which we have of a Mind, 
i.e. something within us that thinks, apprehends, reasons, and discourses, are so clear 
103 Ibid., 97. While Smith’s stated source here is Proclus’s commentary on Plato’s Timaeus 
(76A-F) the degrees match the Divided Line (Republic, 509D–513E) too. See In Platonis Timaeum 
Commentarii, ed. E. Diehl (Leipzig, 1903-1906).  
 
104 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 98. Cf. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, 2, in 
Philosophical Writings, 2: 16-23. We know from the list of works donated by Smith upon his death 
that he owned a copy of the Meditations on First Philosophy, almost certainly in the original Latin. 
See Saveson, “Catalogue,” 17.   
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easily conceive that if all Body-Being in the world were destroyed, yet we might 
then as well subsist as now we doe.”105 Moreover, the “Immediate motions” of the 
mind (i.e., thoughts) do not involve extension or divisibility as corporeal things 
do. Thus, the mind is immaterial and what is immaterial cannot pass away. 
Therefore, the mind is immortal.106  
Being immaterial, the mind intuits immaterial intelligible things, such as 
wisdom, power, eternity, goodness, justice, mercy, etc., without the involvement 
of the body. And since these Ideas are eternal so too must be the mind that 
perceives them. In fact, in an anticipation of his arguments for the existence of 
God, Smith suggests that all these intelligibles converge in our understanding in 
a “greater Oneness” or “Unity.”107 That is, the realm of the multiplicity of 
unchanging intelligibles (i.e., Plato’s Forms) are intuitively known to proceed 
from a higher Unity, which, like Plotinus, Smith identifies with the Good itself.108  
105 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 98.  
 
106 Ibid. Cf. Descartes, Meditations, 6, in Philosophical Writings, 2: 50-62.   
 
107 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 99. 
 
108 Ibid.  
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Plotinus’s “sober ecstasies” provide further, experiential proof that the 
soul (or mind) is superior to and distinct from body of any kind.109 However, 
Smith is quick to offer a word of caution on our human capacity to achieve pure 
or perfectly clear knowledge of “true Being.”110 The limit placed on the 
understanding even of an immaterial soul is a residual multiplicity. Just as in the 
“True Way” Smith suggests that a purely intellectual intuition, without any 
imaginative aspects, is not to be expected in this life, so too in this his retelling of 
the Allegory of the Cave are we to hold out as an ideal the perfected intuition of 
the One even as our knowledge is accompanied by (ever more purified) 
images.111 Indeed, only a very few will be capable of the degree of abstraction 
from material images to proceed very far on this scale of perfection in 
intellection.112 Still, only our “highest speculations” will give to us a “true sense” 
of divine goodness. This intellectual intuition is apprehended by the “Intellectual 
eye” alone as God grants a perception of God’s own Goodness. But, God would 
109 Ibid., 100. Smith is calling attention to Ennead IV.8.1 and also Proclus’s In Platonis 
Timaeum Commentarii, ed. E. Diehl (Leipzig, 1903-1906), II.  
 
110 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 101. 
 
111 Plato, Republic, 7, 514a- 521d.  
 
112 Ibid. 
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not raise up the mind to “such Mounts of Vision, to shew it all the glory of that 
heavenly Canaan flowing with eternal and unbounded pleasures, and then 
tumble it down again into that deep and darkest Abyss of Death and Non-
entity.”113 The allusion here to the view of the Promised Land by Moses from 
Mount Nebo is especially important since it is to the prophet to whom all 
theological knowledge is first revealed.114 Smith is essentially arguing that God 
would not reveal such anticipations of eternity to the minds of prophets and 
philosophers unless the soul truly were immortal.  
Smith’s argument is experiential but not in the democratic sense common 
in contemporary philosophical arguments. He does not say that we all have an 
experience of x, therefore y. Instead, his claim is that since sages like Plotinus and 
prophets like Moses have had the experience of intuiting eternal truths, therefore 
the human soul is immortal. The logic is participatory; in these extraordinary 
men and their experiences we gain proleptic insight into the common fate of all. 
In this respect, Smith’s argument here mirrors the effect of the incarnation of the 
Logos in Christ, who is for Smith above all a prophet, teacher, and in that sense, 
113 Ibid., 103. 
 
114 Numbers 27: 12-4; Deuteronomy 3: 23-8.  
 
 
 
                                                 
350 
 
savior.  Thus, Smith’s final “natural” argument for the immortality of the soul 
rests on an ultimate convergence of the rational and the revealed in intuition; 
reason and revelation transformed into a living sense.115 
 
6.1.3.3 Other Difficulties 
 Having given his arguments for the immortality of the soul Smith 
proceeds to clear up two potential remaining obstacles. First, in chapter eight, he 
discusses Aristotle’s view on the immortality of the soul. On the strength of a 
brief reference in De Anima 2.1 Smith concludes that for Aristotle the “Rational 
Soul” (the only sort of “soul” that concerns Smith) is “separable from the Body . . . 
because it is not the Entelech [actuality] of any Body.”116  
115 It should be noted however that Smith is arguing for a view of the immortal soul 
arguably more consistent with late antique philosophy than Christian scripture. For Smith, as for 
the Neoplatonists, the soul is immortal by its very nature. There is no question here of God’s 
additional grace in making the soul immortal, nor does Smith entertain the orthodox Christian 
doctrine of the resurrection of the body at the final judgment. Indeed, in mentioning such a view 
his proof text in opposition is Plotinus (Ennead IV.7.10) to the effect that what is divine is also 
necessarily immortal (103-4). Still, Smith reads this as entirely consistent with scripture. On the 
philosophical issues involved in the doctrine of the resurrection see Georg Gasser, ed., Personal 
Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010). I assess some 
of the essays in my review, “Personal Identity: How do we Survive Our Death?,” The Heythrop 
Journal 54, Issue 20 (2013): 330-1. 
 
116 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 107. Smith’s text offers this citation, Aristotle, De Anima, 
2.1, however in this place Aristotle makes much more strongly the opposite point that the soul 
cannot be separated from the body. His only real concession to Smith’s agenda is to note that 
there might be beings (presumably non-human) for which the soul is not the actuality of a body. 
Either Smith is being deliberately cheeky with his scholarship here or he is following the lead of 
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 The second difficulty to clear Smith addresses in chapter nine is a variety 
of the mind-body problem that was to become a pressing issue in Smith’s day 
and even more so thereafter.117 Against the objection to the immaterial soul 
raised on account of the relationship between the soul and the body in 
perception and motion Smith argues that this relationship amounts to merely a 
mutual relation between them. That is, “the Sympathy of things is no sufficient 
Argument to prove the Identity of their essences.”118 Basically, his argument is 
that just because the body affects the soul and the soul directs the body does not 
necessitate that they are of the same kind of substance. In support of this view 
Smith brings in considerations drawn from Plotinus to the effect that the close 
relationship between soul and body is entirely to be expected for “to make such a 
Complex things as Man is, it was necessary that the Soul should be so united to 
the Body as to share its passions and infirmities so far as they are void of 
an unnamed (Platonic) commentator. On Aristotle’s definitions of “soul” see Thomas Kjeller 
Johansen, “Circumscribing the Soul: De Anima 1.1 and 2.1,” in The Powers of Aristotle's Soul 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9-33.  
 
117 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 112-7. See also Robinson, Howard, "Dualism", The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 3 November 2011, accessed 
26 May 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/dualism/ and Richard E. Aquila, 
“The Content of Cartesian Sensation and the Intermingling of Mind and Body,” History of 
Philosophy Quarterly 12 no.2 (1995): 209-226.  
 
118 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 113.  
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sinfulness.”119 Led by Proclus’s notion of “a spiritual kind of vehicle” 
transporting information back and forth between the soul and body, Smith takes 
up a rather lengthy discussion of the psycho-physiology of the passions 
obviously indebted to Descartes.120  
 Almost certainly drawing on his French copy of The Passions of the Soul, 
although he makes no explicit mention of it here, Smith notes that the point of 
contact and interaction between the soul and body has been discovered by a “late 
sagacious Philosopher.”121 No longer concerned with mere “sympathy” between 
the soul and the body, Smith describes the location of this interaction as “that 
part of the Brain from whence all those Nerves that conduct the Animal spirits 
119 Ibid., 114; citing Plotinus, Ennead IV.8.1.  
 
120 On Proclus’s “vehicles”, Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 115. See Proclus, In Platonis 
Timaeum Commentarii, III 236.31ff. and The Elements of Theology, § 207–210, in ed. E. R. Dodds, 2nd 
ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, reprinted 2005), 181-5. For discussion, see Christoph Helmig 
and Carlos Steel, "Proclus,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last 
modified 14 May 20122, accessed 16 May 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/proclus/. 
 
121 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 115-6. Saveson’s “Catalogue” of Smith’s library reports 
a copy of “Cartesius de passionibus. Gallice.” (17). This is most likely a reference to the French 
edition of The Passions of the Soul published in Paris (1649 or 1650), Amsterdam (1650), or Rouen 
(1651). While neither myself nor Saveson found the volume in the Old Library at Queens’ I think 
it most likely that Smith’s was an early edition from Paris; all the more reason to note that it is 
“Gallice” in the donation manuscript. On Descartes’s theory of mind-body interaction via the 
pineal gland see Gert-Jan Lokhorst, "Descartes and the Pineal Gland.” 
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up and down the Body take their first Original.”122 This seems plausible for 
Smith because, “we find all Motions that first arise in our Bodies [i.e., sensations], 
to direct their course straight up to that . . . and there only to be sensated.” 
Likewise, it is from this location in the brain that “all the imperate motions of our 
Wills issuing forth from the same consistory.”123 In other words, Smith accepts 
the (notoriously bad) Cartesian explanation that the mind and body interact in a 
specific location within the brain. The body is used for perception and operated 
like a great machine by the soul from this location “in some mysterious way.”124 
While (understandably) fuzzy on the details, Smith has the confidence of an early 
adopter that it is from this mysterious bodily throne that the animal spirits are 
registered and manipulated as a puppeteer pulls upon the strings.125 How, one 
wonders, it could escape his notice that an immaterial, and thus non-spatial, soul 
could not interact in these ways with a material, and thus extended, body 
remains unknown. Perhaps, and this is speculation upon a lack of evidence, 
122 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 116.  
 
123 Ibid. 
 
124 Ibid.  
 
125 Ibid., 116-7. Smith even speaks of nerves as “Chords” that once pulled make the 
muscles move (117).  
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Smith was groping after a notion of extended spirit such as we meet in Henry 
More.126 However, if that were the case, surely Smith would tell us, since More’s 
correspondence with the “sagacious philosopher” must surely have been an 
important enough event to warrant notice.127  
The sympathetic reader may wish that Smith had kept his discussion of 
the mind-body issue limited to his distinction between sympathy and identity. 
Nevertheless, having presented arguments against materialist naturalism 
(Epicureanism), for Platonic-Cartesian dualism, and clearing away two 
remaining issues, Smith had demonstrated to his own satisfaction the 
immateriality, and therefore immortality, of the souls of human beings.  
Most importantly for our purposes is the fact that in his arguments Smith 
leans heavily on the spiritual senses he developed in his treatments of the source 
and methods of theology as well as the rational piety he recommended to 
Cambridge scholars and rustic country folk alike. The reason for the denial of 
126 See John Henry, "Henry More," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta, last modified 22 August 2012, accessed 16 May 2014,  
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/henry-more/. 
 
127 See Rene Descartes, Correspondance avec Arnauld et Morus : Texte latin et traduction, 
Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques, ed. Geneviève Lewis (Paris, 1953) and Rene Descartes, The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. III: The Correspondence, ed. John Cottingham, Dugald 
Murdoch, Robert Stoothoff, and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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immortality is that some have not experienced their own souls. As Smith states in 
his second premise to the arguments for the immortality of the soul, one must be 
able to recognize the truth of what he says within oneself. Even where he offers 
his most philosophically rigorous arguments, Smith relies on his reader “seeing” 
the truth thereof by intuition. His demonstrations are like a narrative of a 
geometrical proof, guiding his reader to the realization of his conclusion for 
themselves.   
 
6.1.4 The Existence and Nature of God 
Smith’s discourse on the “Existence and Nature of God” is a curious text. 
Unlike countless other attempts to demonstrate the Deity then and now, Smith’s 
arguments do not rest on observations about the world outside us. Rather, Smith, 
predictably, perhaps, looks within the soul for his evidence. In the process he 
presents two arguments, both thoroughly psychological. Moreover, Smith does 
not rest content with showing simply that there is a God. Rather, he seeks to 
show as much of the nature of this God as can admit of rational argument too.  
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6.1.4.1 The Argument from Self-Reflection 
 The first of Smith’s arguments for the existence of God is less an argument 
than an invitation to reflect upon one’s own soul with him. For, the best way to 
know that there is a God is by reflecting on the soul within where God is 
pictured. Importantly, Smith weeks “not so much [to] demonstrate That he is, as 
What he is.”128 Thus, his arguments for God’s existence are not of the type most 
commonly seen in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Smith does not 
even try to offer irrefutable logical proofs. Instead, he follows the lead of Plato 
and Plotinus in suggesting that “we may best learn from a Reflexion upon our 
own Souls.”129 
 Introspection is the way to know that there is a God and also who this 
God is because it is in the immortal, incorporeal soul of the human being that 
God has left the greatest imprint of God’s self. Smith’s metaphor is of the soul as 
128 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 123. Here Smith is drawing on the Platonic image of the 
soul as a mirror that was central to medieval treatments of the spiritual senses such as one finds 
in Bonaventure’s Itinerarium mentis in Deum, 4. On spiritual vision as like a flawed mirror in this 
earthly life see Dallas G. Denery II, Seeing and Being Seen in the Later Medieval World: Optics, 
Theology and Religious Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 101-13, 169-70, esp. 
106. See also Douglas Hedley, Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 109.  
 
129 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 123.  
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a statue where “the lovely Characters of Divinity may be most easily seen and 
read of all men within themselves.”  
His example is illustrative here; the great “Statue of Minerva” (Athena) in 
the Parthenon on the Acropolis in Athens.130 As the famous icon of the Goddess 
of Wisdom made Her present to the Athenians, so too does the Divine Image in 
the soul make present the one God. But whereas Minerva was crafted by the 
human hands of Phidias, the “Impresse of Souls is . . . nothing but God himself, 
who could not write his own name so as that it might be read but onely in 
Rationall Natures.”131 As supremely rational, God can only properly be depicted 
in similarly rational images like the soul of human beings. Thus, “whenever we 
look upon our own Soul in a right manner, we shall find an Urim and 
Thummim,” the instruments of ancient Israelite divination “by which we may 
ask counsel of God himself.”132  
Explicitly drawing on his arguments on the immortality of the soul, Smith 
suggests that the “dismall and dreadfull thoughts” of our own mortality darkens 
130 Ibid., 124. 
 
131 Ibid. 
 
132 Ibid. 
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our ability to see beyond “the compass of corporeal dimensions” of time and 
space.133 Those who do not know themselves to be immortal souls – images of the 
Eternal God – cannot apprehend the Deity where God has placed “the most clear 
and distinct copy of himself.”134 This blindness is both caused by, and occasions, 
the “black Opinions of Death and the Non-entity of Souls (darker then Hell it 
self)” and causes one to “shrink up the free-born Spirit which is within us.”135 
When our souls are properly attuned they are instead “dilating and spreading” 
themselves “boundlessly beyond all Finite Being” to the intellection of the 
unlimited Forms.136  
When removed from the limited realm of the corporeal – where things 
come to be and pass away; a kingdom of death – the soul sees “beyond Time and 
Matter” and “finds no more ends nor bounds to stop its swift and restless 
motion.” Ascending ever more into the “????????????” (divine darkness) the 
133 Ibid. 
 
134 Ibid., 125.  
 
135 Ibid., 124. Smith is describing the hopelessness of nihilism.  
 
136 Ibid., 124-5.  
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soul becomes “swallowed up in the boundless Abyss of Divinity.”137 When we 
“rest and bear up” ourselves on the contemplation of the “Immaterial centre of 
Immortality within” we find ourselves able to proceed from “self-reflexion into 
the contemplation of an Eternall Deity.”138 We are able to spiritually perceive 
God in and through viewing God’s image in ourselves.139  
While there is a copy of God’s “Perfections in this conspicable and 
sensible World” we must have “some interpreter within” in order to perceive 
it.140 We best understand “that copie which we find” in the “externall 
appearances” of the universe when we compare it to the “copie which we find of 
them within our selves, with that which we see without us.”141 Thus with 
unnamed “Schoolmen” Smith distinguishes between the “Vestigia Dei” found in 
137 Ibid. Smith cites Pseudo-Dionysius on the notion of “divine darkness” here. Cf. 
Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical Theology, 997A-1001A, in  Paul Rorem, trans., Pseudo Dionysius: 
The Complete Works (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1988), 135-7.  
 
138 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 125.  
 
139 Cf. Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis in Deum, chs. 3 and 4. Unlike Bonaventure, 
however, Smith makes no reference here to the necessity of grace to overcome the epistemic 
obstacle posed by original sin. In this, Smith demonstrates his more “Eastern” style of theology; 
Augustine’s theory of original sin is a very limited influence on him. Though, not absent (cf. 
Smith, Select Discourses [1660], 136; “Ever since our Minds became so dim-sighted . . . .”).  
 
140 Ibid., 125.  
 
141 Ibid., 126.  
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external sensible theology and the “Faciem Dei” found in internal symbolic 
theology when reflecting on the Image of God in one’s own soul.142 Thus, coming 
to know one’s self most truly presents one with the intuition of God.  
 This introspection does more than simply suggest to us that there is a 
God. It also leads us, Smith says, to a knowledge of the Divine unity, 
omniscience, omnipotence, love, goodness, eternity, omnipresence, and freedom. 
For example, when we reflect on our own “Idea of Pure and Perfect Reason” in 
addition to knowing that we do not measure up to it, we notice that this notion 
“points us not . . . This or That Particular, but something which is neither This or 
That, but Totall Understanding.”143 Thus there is a “One Infinite source of all that 
Reason and Understanding” in which our finite minds participate.144  
142 Ibid., 126.  
 
143 Ibid., 126, 127. Cf. Descartes, Meditations, 2.  
 
144 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 128. Smith connects this argument to the “old 
??????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
of all “Particularities and Numbers” (Ibid.). He is referring to the Pythagorean and Platonic One. 
Cf. Deirdre Carabine, “A Thematic Investigation of the Neoplatonic Concepts of Vision and 
Unity,” Hermathena No. 157 (1994): 43-56.  
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Smith argues in very much the same way for the rest of the divine 
attributes classically associated with theism.145 The key service provided by the 
knowledge of the soul’s immortality, from a philosophical perspective, would 
seem to be that it removes the tendency to place boundaries on our thought, 
opening the way to the contemplation of our basic concepts in a pure, and thus 
eternal and infinite, sense. These notions (such as reason) lead to the idea of their 
perfection and source in God Who is these very Perfections. Thus from our 
rationality we are lead to intuit the unity and omniscience of God.146  
  
6.1.4.2 The Argument from Morality 
 The second of Smith’s arguments for the existence of God is recognizable, 
even today, as a live strategy in the philosophy of religion. For here he argues 
that the motion of our wills toward supreme and infinite goodness suggests that 
145 It is well worth noting that Ralph Cudworth coined the English term “theist” in his 
True Intellectual System of the Universe (London, 1678) , I. 4. IV 
 
146 From these basic notions Smith goes on to “deduce” five additional things about the 
Divine Nature. 1. “That all Divine productions or operations that terminate in something without Him, 
are nothing else but the free Effluxes of his own Omnipotent Love and Goodness,” (140) 2. “That that 
Almighty Wisdome and Goodness which first made all things, doth also perpetually conserve the govern 
them,” (144) 3. “That all True Happiness consists in a participation of God arising out of the assimilation 
and conformity of our Souls to him,” (147) 4. That the “Notion of the Divine Justice and scope whereof 
is nothing else but to assert and establish Eternal Law and Right,” (151) 5. “That seeing there is such 
an Entercourse and Society as it were between God and Men, therefore there is also some Law between 
them, which is the Bond of all Communion” (154).  
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there is, in fact, a Supreme Good. And that, every good Christian Platonist at 
least, knows to be God.  
 Smith begins by observing that human beings are perpetually restless. We 
crave “some Supreme and Chief good” and we “will not be satisfied with any thing 
less then Infinity it self.”147 We find nothing in the corporeal world to be 
ultimately satisfying. This is why even “when men most of all flie from God, 
they still Seek after him.”148 As Augustine put it, “our hearts are restless” until 
they rest in God.149 
 All this suggests, for Smith, that God is this Supreme Good that we seek. 
But the finding is an aesthetic experience more than an intellectual one. “He is 
not onely the Eternal Reason, that Almighty Mind and Wisdome which our 
Understandings converse with; but he is also that unstained Beauty and Supreme 
Good which our Wills are perpetually catching after: and wheresoever we find 
true Beauty, Love and Goodness, we may say, Here or there is God.”150 Moreover, 
147 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 135. 
 
148 Ibid., 137.  
 
149 Confessions, I.1: “. . . inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te.”  
 
150 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 137. 
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just as our minds cannot apprehend God without some “primitive” intuition 
thereof, so too do our wills need a “latent sense” of God “whereby they can tast 
and discern how near any thing comes to that Self-sufficient good they seek 
after.”151 Thus, Smith posits an “internal sensating Faculty” that is distinct from 
outer sense and the intellect and is attuned to goodness. It is by this faculty that 
one comes to know God as the Supreme Good.152  
   
6.2 The Unity of Natural & Revealed Theology 
 This chapter has demonstrated how Smith’s natural theology relies on just 
the same sorts of spiritual senses as his revealed theology. Just as one comes to be 
a prophet via intellectual intuition so too does the theologian come to know the 
immortality of her or his own soul. Just as moral purification is required to 
appropriate the truths of revelation for oneself, so too does one come to 
appreciate that there is a God. Smith does not offer extensive, logical, arguments 
for the immortal soul or the existence and nature of God, not because he cannot 
do so, but because to do so would be to distort the very things he wishes to 
151 Ibid., 138. Cf. Henry More’s “Boniform Faculty,” which is also distinguished from the 
intellect. An Account of Virtue (Enchiridion Ethicum), ch.4, in Cragg, The Cambridge Platonists, 265, 
267.  
 
152 Following Plotinus and Simplicius, Smith thinks that “the Good” is the preeminent 
name for contemplating God, above Being and even the One (Smith, Select Discourses [1660], 139).  
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demonstrate. Only in the living apprehension of divine truth can that truth be 
properly appreciated. To reduce divinity to a series of discursive arguments 
would be, for Smith, to cease to speak of the Divine. All “things of Sense & Life 
are best known by Sentient and Vital faculties,” and “he that wants true Vertue, 
in heavn’s Logick is blind, and cannot see . . . .”153  
 The only way to be convinced of the truth of the Christian religion, as 
Smith understands it, is to “taste and see” the goodness, beauty, and truth 
thereof for oneself. This capacity is both natural to us as rational creatures made 
in the image of God, and the result of God’s grace freely given to all. The 
spiritual senses are, for Smith, both natural and supernatural. Natural in the 
sense that they are proper to our true nature and present in all to one degree or 
another. Supernatural in the sense that they are the result of the free influx of the 
Spirit of God in us.154 Thus, his arguments against superstition and atheism make 
153 Ibid., 2, 4.  
 
154 Mark T. Mealey has suggested that Smith is far more a Platonist than a Christian 
(“Taste and See that the Lord is Good: John Wesley in the Christian Tradition of Spiritual 
Sensation” [PhD diss., University of St. Michael’s College, 2006], 25-6). However, this raises more 
difficulties than it clears. First, it presupposes that one can only be one or the other. One need 
look no further than Augustine to see the mistaken assumption in that conclusion. Second, it 
suggests that a concern for “doctrine” in the sense of creedal orthodoxy is the standard by which 
one ought to judge the “Christianity” of an author. Moreover, Smith is no less “biblical” in his 
theology for all his love of Platonism. Only, again, if one assumes from the start a contradiction 
between the Platonic and the Biblical traditions does he look more like a Platonist than a 
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appeal, not so much to demonstrations of their errors in logic, as to the great 
benefit to the soul of following the true path of the clear minded, yet passionate, 
Christian Platonist. And above all, in every argument that Smith makes, he 
appeals to the spiritual sensation, by his reader, of what he is discoursing upon. 
Whether it is by intellectual intuition, a conative sense of the Good, or the 
imaginary visions of the prophets, one must “see” and “hear” the truth, “taste” 
and “smell” the goodness, and “touch” the eternal being of one’s soul 
continually remade in the image of God. It is in and through the repeated appeal 
to varieties of the spiritual senses, therefore, that Smith’s theology forms a 
systematic whole.  
  
 
Christian. Rather, Smith is a thoroughly Christian Platonist in the mold of Origen before him (cf. 
Mealey, “Taste and See,” 45). On the combination of Platonism and Christianity in another early 
modern figure usually thought to lean in a fideist direction see Bernard Wills, “Pascal and the 
Persistence of Platonism in Early Modern Thought,” The International Journal of the Platonic 
Tradition 6 (2012): 186-200.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
    
 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
  
This final chapter rehearses the results of our exegetical work above. In so 
doing it sets out the ways in which John Smith employs the spiritual senses in his 
theology. The chapter also looks ahead to avenues for future research by tracing 
his influence on selected figures in the centuries since his death in 1652.  
  
7.1 Smith’s ‘Spiritual Senses’ 
Smith developed two basic sorts of “spiritual sense” in the Select 
Discourses. The first, and most common, is a kind of intellectual intuition 
(cognition as “sense”) which Smith employed in his accounts of the source and 
method of divinity, spirituality, and as a central bit of argument in his systematic 
theology. As it was for the other Cambridge Platonists, religion is an eminently 
rational matter for Smith. But this rationality is not of the cold, distant, 
calculating kind. Rather, like Plato’s philosopher rapt in the vision of the Good, 
religious reason is a matter of personal encounter with the Author of all truth. 
Knowing God is more like vision than data processing.  
Second, and far too often ignored, Smith made frequent appeal to the 
imaginative perception of divine truths in the same range of accounts. For all his 
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emphasis on the rationality of religion Smith is equally clear about the positive 
role played by the purified and inspired imagination. Through sensible images, 
above all the Image of God that is the human soul, one engages with Divine 
Realities with all one’s heart as well as all of one’s mind.  
These two forms of spiritual intuition are what the “spiritual senses” are 
for Smith. Where many have emphasized either a metaphorical or an allegorical 
form of spiritual sensation he combines the two. Some spiritual sensation is a 
matter of sense-like intellection. But some spiritual sensation is far more literally 
“sensible” as it functions in and through the human capacity to make present 
images that are not (and in this case cannot be) also present to the physical 
senses.  
However, as argued above, the uses to which he puts there spiritual sense 
are far more telling.1 For Smith brings his varieties of spiritual sensation to bear 
in order to give an account of other, larger, considerations. That is, Smith uses 
the spiritual senses to explain himself on the nature of theology and spirituality. 
Because he often uses intellectual intuition and the imagination to account for 
1 See chapters two, four, five, and six above.  
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other key aspects of his theology, just as his predecessors in the tradition did, the 
best way to summarize his doctrine is to review the functions it performs.2  
 
7.1.1 Source & Method 
Smith made consistent appeal to the spiritual senses in his theory of the 
source and methods of theology. Even as his contemporaries were searching the 
globe and reforming science and philosophy he too searched for an experiential 
foundation for divinity. Natural knowledge of the Divine, as well as the 
appropriation of revealed truth, is a matter of intellectual intuition. However, 
this “intellectual touch” is never completely separated from sensible images in the 
imagination too. For Smith, one appropriates Divine truths via the intellect but 
this also gives symbols to the imagination by which one begins to taste the 
sweetness of divinity in Christ for example. This signifies that whereas later 
modern philosophy (especially Kant), and medieval Aristotelianism, maintained 
rather strict borders between sensible and intellectual faculties, Smith does not 
do so. It would be anachronistic to hold him to Kantian standards of course but 
he did know the late scholastic perspective on this issue and simply rejects it as 
2 See chapter two above.  
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unfit for divine philosophy (i.e., theology). Instead of the clear categories and 
distinctions of his scholastic forbearers and their early modern imitators, Smith 
appeals to an older, Platonic aesthetic that sees perception and feeling as central 
to thought and that views intellection as essentially sense-like. In this Smith 
anticipates the Romantics with their insistence that imagination and feeling are 
mediums of divine relation. As Descartes based his metaphysics on the 
immediate intuition of the thinking self, Smith rooted his theology in the 
immediate intuition of the soul as imago Dei. Smith, as a late Renaissance figure, 
thus stands between medieval sense and modern sensibility. 
Revealed knowledge too involves the perception of images implanted in 
the imagination by God (mediated by angelic beings) as well as communication 
with the human intellect in prophecy. To some was given a purely sensible 
revelation in the form of the Bath Kol or voice of God heard miraculously in 
prophetic times. Poets and sages were inspired by the Ruach Hakodesh or Holy 
Spirit in intellect so that their psalms sing God’s own self-praise and their 
wisdom echoes the Divine Logos in and through human hearts and voices. 
Prophets received influxes of divine truth in images revealed to the imagination 
and ideas to the intellect, all by the mediation an angelic messengers. And for 
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Moses and Jesus Christ alone, God gives a purely intellectual revelation “mind to 
mind.” 3 Thus, what begins in sense, reaches new heights in imagination, and is 
perfected in intellect.4  
 
7.1.2 Spirituality 
Developing his account of theological understanding further, Smith 
argued for a rational faith expressed in inner reflection, moral purity, and 
deification. In so doing he made intellectual intuition and the imaginative 
reception of symbols of the divine central to the life of true Christian piety. This 
way of purification, illumination, and union is how Smith accounts for the fact 
that divines and prophets have had theological understanding even as he 
recommends this same path to his reader if they would seek to know God. Only 
one who has been transformed through purification of his or her affections, 
intentions, and thoughts is capable of perceiving divine things, either 
3 Perfected in his earthly life for Moses and for the rest hereafter. Theological knowledge 
for non-prophets too begins in sense with the reading of scripture and the hearing of sermons, etc. 
It proceeds in imagination through the lovely images of the reformed soul and the graciousness 
of Christ. And it reaches perfection in the intellectual vision of the Good.  
 
4 See chapter four above.  
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intellectually or imaginatively. Thus, there can be no disinterested theologian for 
Smith. For him the spiritual senses are both descriptive and prescriptive.5  
  
7.1.3 System 
Perhaps most unexpectedly, given the role of the spiritual senses in 
revelation, Smith’s natural theology too relies on just the same sorts of spiritual 
perception. Just as one comes to be a prophet via intellectual intuition so too does 
the natural theologian come to know the immortality of her or his own soul. Just 
as moral purification is required to appropriate the truths of revelation for 
oneself, so too does one come to appreciate that there is a God.  
Smith does not offer extensive logical arguments for the immortal soul or 
the existence and nature of God, not because he cannot do so, but because to do 
so would be to distort the very things he wishes to demonstrate.6 Only in the 
living apprehension of divine truth can that truth be properly appreciated. To 
5 See chapter five above.  
 
6 This is not to say that Smith is without philosophical refinement however. He most 
likely precedes, and may have contributed to, similar arguments in the other Cambridge 
Platonists (especially Cudworth and More). He also clearly anticipates arguments for the unity of 
the judgments of consciousness. For a sense of the sophistication of Smith’s arguments in a 
philosophical perspective see Ben Lazare Mijuskovic The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments (The 
Hague: Martinus Mijhoff, 1974), esp. 23-7 and 63-5.   
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reduce divinity to a series of discursive arguments would be, for Smith, to cease 
to speak of the Divine, for all “things of Sense & Life are best known by Sentient 
and Vital faculties,” and “he that wants true Vertue, in heavn’s Logick is blind, 
and cannot see . . . .”7  
 The only way to be convinced of the truth of the Christian religion, as 
Smith understands it, is to “taste and see” the goodness, beauty, and truth 
thereof for oneself. This capacity is both natural to us as rational creatures made 
in the image of God, and the result of God’s grace freely given to all. The 
spiritual senses are then both natural and supernatural for Smith. Natural in the 
sense that they are proper to our true nature and present in all to one degree or 
another. Supernatural in the sense that they are the result of the free influx of the 
Spirit of God in us.  
In every argument that Smith makes, he appeals to the spiritual sensation, 
by his reader, of what he is discoursing upon. Whether it is by intellectual 
intuition, a conative sense of the Good, or the imaginary visions of the prophets, 
one must “see” and “hear” the truth, “taste” and “smell” the goodness, and 
“touch” the eternal being of one’s soul continually remade in the image of God. It 
7 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 2, 4.  
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is in and through the spiritual senses, therefore, that Smith’s theology forms a 
systematic whole and offers an account not just of God but of one’s true self as 
well.8  
   
7.2 The Legacy of a Living Library 
It is easily overlooked that Smith was among the first members of the 
group we know as the Cambridge Platonists. As such, he was in a position to 
influence not only his contemporaries but those who would follow after him well 
into the twentieth century and beyond. In this concluding section I offer a broad, 
but highly selective, overview of the reception, and influence, of John Smith’s life 
and work.9 It marks more of a call for future research than as an authoritative 
presentation of Smith’s legacy. 
 
8 See chapter six above.  
 
9 This section began as a paper, “John Smith's Lasting Influence: The Transatlantic 
Reception of a 'Living Library'” read at the “Revisioning Cambridge Platonism: Reception and 
Influence” workshop at Clare College, Cambridge, 1 June 2013. My presentation there as here is 
necessarily selective. Mention could also have been made of Smith’s influence upon John Howe, 
Samuel Hartlib, John Worthington, Lord Hailes, Henry Scougal, Matthew Arnold, and John 
Tulloch, among many others.  
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7.2.1 Immediate Reception 
Smith is closely associated with Benjamin Whichcote among the 
Cambridge Platonists for the good reason that he was his student. Less well 
appreciated is the likely role that Smith played in recording the work of his 
mentor. If Samuel Salter’s reports can be trusted, Smith took down many of 
Whichcote’s sermons, thus preserving his work for eventual publication.10  The 
degree of collegial cooperation, if any, between them must remain a matter of 
(irresistible) speculation for lack of clear records. But it may be that their 
relationship was collaborative in the way that professors and advanced graduate 
students often are in our time. In any case, there is a close affinity between many 
arguments and even phrases used by Whichcote and Smith.11 
Smith was almost certainly an influence on the most prominent 
Cambridge Platonists, Cudworth and More. Alan Gabbey has suggested that it 
may have been Smith, rather than Cudworth or More, who first took up the 
attack upon “mechanical religion.”12 Still Smith’s importance for them is less a 
10 Samuel Salter, “Preface to this New Edition,” in Benjamin Whichcote, Moral and 
Religious Aphorisms, enlarged edition by Samuel Salter (London: J. Payne, 1753), xvii-xviii.  
 
11 Many of these have been noted above.  
 
12 “Cudworth, More and the Mechanical Analogy,” in Philosophy, Science, and Religion 
in England 1640-1700, ed. Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft, and Perez Zagorin (Cambridge: 
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matter of shared doctrines but of a general approach to philosophy and 
theology.13  Thus, Smith’s spirit, if not the letter of his work, can be clearly seen in 
the ease with which Cudworth and More see reason and religion as compatible if 
not ultimately identical. This comfort with philosophical religion, and the 
“philosophy of religion,” a phrase coined by Cudworth, can be seen in Damaris 
Masham’s correspondence with John Locke as well.  
Masham, Cudworth’s daughter, discussed the “power of reason to attain 
knowledge of God” with the great empiricist drawing from Smith’s Select 
Discourses in so doing.14 In addition, unlike Whichcote (often called the 
“founder” of the movement) it is in Smith, More, and Cudworth that references 
to Plotinus appear on the scene in mid-century Cambridge, suggesting at least a 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 109-27, here 121, 127 n.50. See also Simon Patrick, The Parable 
of the Pilgrim (London, 1688), 195, 204, 210; cited by Gabbey (127 n.50). 
13 As D.C. Gilman, H.T. Thurston, and F. Moore (eds., New International Encyclopedia  
[New York: Dodd, Mead, 1905]) have aptly put it (under “Smith, John”). 
 
14 Sarah Hutton, “Debating the Faith: Damaris Masham (1658-1708) and Religious 
Controversy,” in Debating the Faith: Religion and Letter Writing in Great Britain, 1550-1800, edited 
by A. Dunan-Page and C. Prunier (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 165. See also John Locke, The 
Correspondence of John Locke, edited by E. S. de Beer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 2: 485 
(letter 684), 488 (letter 687), and 500 (letter 696).  
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mutual affinity for the great Neoplatonist if not a causal influence between them 
on each other.15  
 
Queens’ College Library  
Upon his death in 1652 the impressive collection of books that Smith had 
collected, primarily from Continental authors and presses, was left to the Library 
of Queens’ College. The only record of his collection as it existed in his lifetime is 
a manuscript list of the volumes accepted by the College which lays out the 
nature of the bequest as well.16 As we have seen above, this list is of central 
importance but it does not, unfortunately, record the complete contents of 
Smith’s library. Only those volumes that the librarian thought worth adding to 
the College collection are now known.  
Suspicious in their absence are editions of the works of many of the great 
Platonists Smith clearly knew well. Of the antique Platonists Smith’s collection is 
only known to have included Plato’s Timaeus, Proclus’s Platonic Theology, 
Porphyry’s works against killing and eating animals (De abstinentia ab esu 
15 C.A. Patrides, The Cambridge Platonists (London: Edward Arnold, 1969), 17-8.  
 
16 Queens’ MS 47, Queens’ College Donation List (17th century), digital copy available at 
http://issuu.com/03776/docs/qunsdonors, accessed 4 April 2014 
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animalium and De non necandis ad epulandum animantibus), and Iambilchus’s Vita 
Pythagorae and his Exhortation to the Study of Philosophy (Protrepticae Orationes ad 
Philosophiam).17 Nevertheless, Smith’s known collection is remarkably broad in 
the range of interests it reveals in its collector; history, geography, languages, 
mathematics, philosophy, religion, and science all mingle together in the sort of 
eclectic mélange one would expect from a late Renaissance scholar.  
Significantly, Smith’s bequest is still remembered among the very most 
important of the early contributions to the academic life of the College and it 
marked a vast improvement in the Library’s holdings at the time; a poor 
substitute for the loss of the “living library” at such a young age, but an abiding 
consolation in the immediate aftermath of his untimely death and a significant 
contribution to the scholarly life of the College ever since.18  
 
17 J.E. Saveson, “Catalogue of the Library of John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist,” in 
“Some Aspects of the Thought and Style of John Smith the Cambridge Platonist” (Ph.D. thesis, 
Fitzwilliam House, Cambridge University, 1955), Appendix with separate pagination (1-78). 
 
18 See Tim Eggington, "The Advancement of Learning" at Queens' College in the 17th 
century,” Exhibition, Queens’’ College Old Library, Michaelmas term 2012, accessed 27 May 2014, 
http://www.queens.cam.ac.uk/bookcollecting, and “Living Library' of John Smith (1618-52),” 
Exhibition, Queens’ College Old Library, Michaelmas term 2013, accessed 27 May 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.638144929550814.  
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Simon Patrick and Latitudinarianism  
The Cambridge Platonists have long been closely associated with the so-
called Latitudinarian movement.19 The latitudinarians were members of the 
Church of England who nonetheless viewed specific doctrines (especially 
Calvinist predestination), liturgical practices, and polities as of minor importance 
compared to what C.S. Lewis called “mere Christianity.” Smith’s relation to the 
“new sect of latitude men” is nowhere more clearly seen than in the case of his 
eloquent eulogizer, and first observer of this liberal movement, Simon Patrick.20  
Patrick, who eventually went on to become bishop of Ely among other 
high offices in the Church, began his studies as a sizar at Queens’ within weeks 
of Smith’s appointment as a Fellow there in 1644. While Smith was not Patrick’s 
tutor, the two did study closely together during the latter’s student days and 
19 Indeed, several figures such as Whichcote, John Wilkins, and Simon Patrick, overlap 
the standard lists of both groups; depending on whom one includes in each, somewhat 
anachronistic “group” or “movement.”  
 
20 S[imon].P[atrick]. A Brief Account of the New Sect of Latitude-Men (London, 1662). Also, 
“A Sermon Preached at the Funeral of Mr. John Smith, late Fellow of Queens College in 
Cambridge, who departed this Life Aug. 7. 1652. And Lyes Interred in the Chappel of the Same 
College. With a Short Account of his Life and Death,” in Select Discourses (1660), 481-526, and 
“The Autobiography of Symon Patrick,” in The Works of Symon Patrick: Including His 
Autobiography, vol. 9. Alexander Taylor, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1858). Also, J. Van 
den Berg, “Between Platonism and Enlightenment: Simon Patrick (1625-1707) and His Place in 
the Latitudinarian Movement,” Dutch Review of Church History 68 no. 2 (1988): 164-79.  
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they remained close friends when Patrick joined Smith as a Fellow. In his 
Autobiography Patrick speaks with obvious affection for Smith. In particular, 
Patrick credits Smith with helping him to “remove doubts” he had in “certain 
religious subjects” that never again troubled him.21 It may be safely assumed that 
this theological mentorship played a significant role in establishing Patrick on 
the trajectory toward his long career as a cleric in the Church of England.   
In Smith, Patrick found a role model for the central place of morality in 
religious piety over ritual or doctrine that came guide the latitudinarians. 
Comparing his departed master to Socrates, Patrick remarks “that he could say 
nothing about the Gods and such like . . . but . . . he was continually busied and 
imployed; instructing of their Youth, amending of their Manners and making 
them truly virtuous . . . Such an one was the party deceased.”22 And “he was 
always very urgent upon us that by the Grace of God . . . we would endeavor to 
purge out the corruption of our Natures and . . . to labor after Purity of heart, 
that so we might see God.”23 Likewise from Smith, Patrick learned to trust in 
21 Henry Griffin Williams, “Memoir of the Author,” in Select Discourses (1859), x.  
 
22 Patrick, “Funeral Sermon,” 491-2.  
 
23 Ibid., 510.  
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human reason as a guide in all things religious. “If he was not a Prophet like 
Elijah, yet I am sure he was . . . an Interpreter of the Spirit.”24  
Thus, it can scarcely be imagined that Smith’s rational religion, containing 
as it did a latitudinarian’s appreciation for adiaphora, did not have a major 
impact on Patrick. While he is but a single well-known latitudinarian, Smith’s 
impact on this significant movement in late seventeenth and eighteenth century 
Anglicanism is certain and worthy of specialized research.  
  
Mathematics at Cambridge 
One of the less well known influences of Smith was on the development of 
mathematics at Cambridge. As we have seen in chapter three above, he began 
teaching mathematics in a university lectureship founded by John Wollaston in 
1648. In this capacity Smith may have taught Isaac Barrow, the discoverer of the 
fundamental theorem of calculus who became the first Lucasian Professor of 
Mathematics in 1663. Barrow, of course, was famously a teacher of Isaac Newton 
who would finish his work toward calculus as well as taking up optics like 
Barrow and the study of prophecy like Barrow and Smith (albeit in less orthodox 
24 Ibid., 484. 
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ways than his teachers). The connection is not absolutely sure for lack of good 
records about the teaching of mathematics at Cambridge in the seventeenth 
century but it is very likely that Smith (as well as Cudworth and More) stands 
among those “giants” upon whose shoulders’ Newton stood.25  
 
Early Colonial America 
The still relatively new phenomenon of publishing philosophical and 
theological works in English helped Smith’s influence spread across the North 
Atlantic to the British colonies of New England and Virginia. Review of the 
library catalogues of the extant colonial colleges of America (now basically the 
Ivy League universities) shows that they all have seventeenth century copies of 
Smith’s Discourses (Harvard, William & Mary, Yale, Princeton, UPenn, Columbia, 
Brown, Rutgers, and Dartmouth). Smith and the other Cambridge Platonists 
were well known, if not always approved, in colonial Boston, New York, 
Philadelphia and Charleston. In fact, by the early eighteenth century Smith 
25 Mordechai Feingold, “Isaac Barrow: Divine, Scholar, Mathematician,” in Before Newton: 
The Life and Times of Isaac Barrow (Cambridge University Press, 1990) and “Isaac Barrow and the 
Foundation of the Lucasian Professorship,” in Kevin C. Knox and Richard Noakes, eds., From 
Newton to Hawking: A History of Cambridge University’s Lucasian Professors of Mathematics 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
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formed a key part of the inspiration for a divine working on the frontier of 
European settlement in western Massachusetts named Jonathan Edwards.  
 
7.2.2 Eighteenth Century Reception 
While Smith’s memory continues today mostly as an ancillary curiosity or 
source of contextual (or rhetorical) leverage for the study of the more famous 
Cambridge Platonists, Ralph Cudworth and Henry More especially, in the more 
immediate aftermath of his brief career, Smith exerted a profound influence on 
many divines.26 This was especially the case in the eighteenth century on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Of particular interest here is a deep affinity between 
Jonathan Edwards and John Wesley on the “spiritual senses” and way both drew 
upon Smith for their theories.   
 
 
 
 
 
26 On the general state of Platonism in eighteenth century England see part IV in 
Platonism and the English Imagination, ed. Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 181-98.  
 
 
                                                 
383 
 
Jonathan Edwards 
Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) is “widely acknowledged to be America's 
most important and original philosophical theologian.”27 He was born into a 
family of Congregational ministers in East Windsor, Connecticut in 1703. In 1716 
Edwards enrolled at Yale where he read Newton, Locke, Malebranche, and the 
Cambridge Platonists. After briefly ministering to congregations in New York 
and Bolton, Connecticut, Edwards returned to Yale where he completed his 
Master of Arts and became senior tutor in 1724. He was chosen to succeed his 
grandfather as minister of the church in Northampton Massachusetts in 1725 
where he oversaw and commented definitively on the religious revivals of 1734 
and 1740–41, the latter of which came to be known as the “Great Awakening.” 
Edwards' defense of the revivals, and criticisms of its excesses, culminated in his 
first major treatise, the Religious Affections in 1746.28  
27 William Wainwright, "Jonathan Edwards," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, last modified 3 October 2012, accessed 27 May 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/edwards/.  
 
28 Jonathan Edwards, A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections, in Three Parts, Christian 
Classics Ethereal Library, 2006, accessed 27 May 2014, 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/edwards/affections.toc.html. See also the critical edition in The Works of 
Jonathan Edwards, gen. eds. Perry Miller (vols. 1–2), John E. Smith (vols. 3–9), and Harry S. Stout 
(vol. 10–26) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957-2008). 
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Disputes over qualifications for church membership (Edwards called for 
public profession of saving faith, unlike his more laxed grandfather) led to his 
dismissal from his ministry in 1750. Instead of accepting offers to preach 
elsewhere in North America and Scotland, Edwards took up work at the Indian 
mission at Stockbridge where he had charge of two congregations, supervised a 
boarding school for Indian boys, and completed his last major works.29 Edwards 
was appointed President of the College of New Jersey (now Princeton) in 1757 
but died from complications arising from a smallpox inoculation on 22 March 
1758, less than five weeks after taking up the post.   
As Wainwright has demonstrated, Edwards’s writings stress two themes 
above all, “the absolute sovereignty of God” and the “beauty of God's 
holiness.”30 Divine beauty is discussed “in accounts of God's end in creation, and 
of the nature of true virtue and true beauty.”31 Divine creation “manifest[s] a 
holiness which consists in a benevolence which alone is truly beautiful. Genuine 
29 Freedom of the Will (1754), Original Sin (1758), End of Creation and True Virtue (both 
published posthumously in 1765), in The Works of Jonathan Edwards. 
 
30 Wainwright, "Jonathan Edwards." Divine sovereignty is most clearly defended in 
Edwards’ occasionalism. He argued that God is “the only real cause or substance underlying 
physical and mental phenomena.” Ibid.  
 
31 Ibid.  
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human virtue is an imitation of divine benevolence and all finite beauty is an 
image of divine loveliness. True virtue is needed to discern this beauty, however, 
and to reason rightly about ‘divine things’.”32   
References to the influence of Smith abound in the massive literature on 
Edwards. Four areas of this influence have been identified; spiritual sensation, 
deification, morality, and Edwards’ rhetoric all draw heavily on Smith and the 
other Cambridge Platonists.  
Smith was an important, and widely cited, source for Edwards’ doctrine 
of the “sense of the heart.”33 However, while noting this, scholars have been 
overly tentative in asserting a clear line of influence. As Brad Walton puts it, “all 
commentators since John E. Smith have recognized that John Smith’s own 
discussion of the ‘spiritual sensation,’ presented in the first chapter of the Select 
Discourses, constitutes a clear anticipation of Edwards, and probably exercised a 
32 Wainwright, "Jonathan Edwards.” 
 
33 Brad Walton, Jonathan Edwards, Religious Affections, and the Puritan Analysis of True Piety, 
Spiritual Sensation, and Heart Religion (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), 121-2; William 
Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards and his Puritan Predecessors,” in The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving 
God in Western Christianity, eds. Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 224-40; Brandon G. Withrow, Becoming Divine: Jonathan Edwards’s 
Incarnational Spirituality within the Christian Tradition (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2011), 58, 62-3, 
194.  
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direct influence on his own thinking.”34 This merely “probable” case for Smith’s 
influence is rooted in the mistaken notion that it is only in the first Discourse that 
Smith discusses “spiritual sensation.” As has been made clear above, this ignores 
the role of spiritual or intellectual sense in Smith’s arguments for the basics of 
theism, his account of prophecy, and the role of sensibility in practical religion as 
well. Far from merely a likely influence, Edwards drew directly and definitively 
from Smith’s Discourse on “The Shortness of a Pharisaick Righteousness” and 
even quotes him at length on the “inward sense of the Divine goodness.”35 
Edwards also quotes at length the closing passage of this Discourse on the 
“boiling up of the imaginative powers” and comments that it is a “remarkable 
passage.”36  
Moreover, since as we have shown, Smith employs the spiritual senses 
throughout his theology we would be wise to look more broadly than “religious 
experience” in Edwards for his influence on the American Evangelical. Edwards 
has received significant attention in recent years for his theory of sanctification or 
34 Brad Walton, Jonathan Edwards, 121.  
 
35 Religious Affections, ed. John E. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 217-9; 
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 361.  
 
36 Walton, Jonathan Edwards, 121. 
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deification. Brandon Withrow especially has noted the strong resemblances 
between Edwards’ view and those of patristic and later Orthodox theologians 
(such as Origen, the Cappadocians, and Gregory Palamas).37 While the 
similarities are striking, there is however little to “no evidence that Edwards had 
access to these writings.”38  McClymond and McDermott have more recently 
argued that Edwards’ theory of divinization should be read “against the 
backdrop of Renaissance and early modern Neoplatonism, and specifically the 
writings of the seventeenth-century Cambridge Platonists” including Whichcote, 
Cudworth, More, and especially John Smith.39  In particular passages from Smith 
such as “God is the First Truth and Primitive Goodness: True Religion is a 
vigorous Efflux and Emanation of Both upon the Spirits of men, and therefore is 
called a participation of the divine Nature” display a profound similarity to 
expressions used by Edwards.40 Indeed, many passages in Edwards’ End of 
37 Brandon Withrow, “A Connecticut Valley Yankee in a Cappadocian Court: Jonathan 
Edwards, Eastern Christianity, and the ‘Spiritual Sense’,” (Unpublished paper, read at the 
American Academy of Religion, 3 November 2008).  
 
38 Michael J. McClymond and Gerald R. McDermott, The Theology of Jonathan Edwards 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 413.  
 
39 Ibid., 413-4.  
 
40 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 377-451.   
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Creation are anticipated by Smith in both argument and even phrasing.41 The 
influence of Henry Scougal’s The Life of God in the Soul of Man (1677) on Edwards, 
and the connections between Scougal and Smith, are also likely sources of the 
New Englander’s concerns for the inner life of Christian piety too.42 
Additionally, “Edwards’s moral reflections were . . . shaped by his 
reading of the Cambridge Platonists, especially John Smith and Henry More.”43 
Like the Platonists, Edwards too rejected the harsh and arbitrary portrayal of 
God in mainstream Calvinism and like Smith he argued that God is 
“fundamentally goodness and love.”44 Moreover, just as Smith had argued that 
“God judges creatures not by an arbitrary will but by his own internal goodness” 
so too did Edwards. In particular one can find remarkable similarity in Smith 
and Edwards’s views that “everything good in the created world is an emanation 
from God.”45 This is of course classic platonic doctrine but Edwards’ source for 
41 Ibid., 142, 147, 155; Edwards, End of Creation, ch. 1 sect. 3. 
 
42 Gerald R. Cragg, “Introduction,” in The Cambridge Platonists (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), 30.  
43 McClymond & McDermott, 534.  
 
44 Micheletti, Il pensiero religioso, 327 
 
45 McClymond & McDermott, 534. 
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this ancient wisdom seems to have been Smith and the rest of the Cambridge 
Platonists rather than the original authors themselves.46  
Finally, Smith seems also to be connected to Edwards’ rhetorical style.  
Compare for example the following passage from Smith and the proceeding 
from Edwards.  
God does most glorifie and exalt himself in the most triumphant way that 
may be ad extra or out of himself . . . when he most of all communicates 
himself . . . And we then most of all glorifie him when we partake most of 
him.47   
 
As there is an infinite fullness of all possible good in God . . . and as this 
fullness is capable of communication, or emanation ad extra; so it seems a 
thing amiable and valuable in itself that this infinite fountain of good 
should send forth abundant streams. . . . They are all but the emanation of 
God’s glory; or the excellent brightness and fullness of the divinity 
diffused, overflowing, and as it were enlarged; or in one word, existing ad 
extra.48  
 
Since Edwards is the first great New World philosopher in English and 
“America’s Evangelical” there is great interest in understanding his sources and 
46 There is no Plotinus in Edwards’s catalogue of books and only an abridged edition of 
select dialogues of Plato. Jonathan Edwards, Catalogues of Books, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, 
vol. 26, ed. Peter J. Thuesen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).  
 
47 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 142. 
  
48 Edwards, End of Creation, ch.1, sect. 4; ch.2, sect. 7.  
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influences.49 Moreover, it may well be that a lasting echo from Smith persists 
today in and through the continued appeal of Edwards. For all these reasons, 
future research on the influence of John Smith on Jonathan Edwards is needed, 
especially with regard to the spiritual senses.  
 
John Wesley 
In addition to his connection to the first great American theologian, 
Smith’s influence can be traced to John Wesley, the founder of Methodism as 
well. Wesley was born near London in 1703. In 1723 he enrolled at Christ 
College, Oxford where he earned both a Bachelor’s before and a Master’s after 
being ordained a deacon in the Church of England in 1726. Wesley served as a 
Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford while beginning to minister to the parish of 
Wroote. In the 1730s Wesley began to meet with a small group, including his 
brother Charles, to pray and study scripture that was dubbed the “Holy Club” 
by opponents who saw this as unjustified “enthusiasm.” It was around this time 
that others began to refer to the Wesley’s as “Methodists” a name originally 
49 Philip F. Gura, Jonathan Edwards: America's Evangelical (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005).  
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meant to signify their over-eagerness in spiritual matters but which was 
eventually co-opted by followers.50  
John Wesley’s major teachings include the possibility of Christian 
perfection and the denial of Calvinist predestination, both sentiments that 
resonate well with the Cambridge Platonists and the Latitudinarians of the 
Church of England.51 While Wesley himself never left the Anglican Church, his 
movement, “Methodism,” is today a major branch of Protestant Christianity 
which has itself given rise to the Holiness Movement as well as Pentecostalism.  
Most relevantly for our purposes, Wesley’s own doctrine of the spiritual 
senses owes much to his reading of John Norris, an “Oxford Platonist,” who was 
deeply influenced by Smith’s circle, especially Henry More, in addition to 
Malebranche.52 Moreover, in addition to publishing an abbreviated edition of 
50 Stephen Tomkins, John Wesley: A Biography (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2003), 
12-42, 95-100.  
 
51 Thomas C. Oden, John Wesley's Teachings, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2012-
2014), vols. 1& 2; and Don Thorsen, Calvin vs. Wesley: Bringing Belief in Line with Practice 
(Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2013), 29-57, 72-87.  
 
52 John C. English, "John Wesley's Indebtedness to John Norris," Church History 60, no. 1 
(1991): 55-69. Also, Mark T. Mealey, “Taste and See that the Lord is Good: John Wesley in the 
Christian Tradition of Spiritual Sensation” (PhD diss., University of St. Michael’s College, 
Toronto, 2006), 20.  
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Smith’s Select Discourses in his Christian Library, Wesley may also have drawn on 
Smith’s version of the spiritual senses in formulating his own approach.53 
As Isabel Rivers has aptly shown, John Wesley was among a significant 
group of clerics in the 18th century to use various means at their disposal to 
promote the Cambridge Platonists.54 In Wesley’s case and relative to Smith in 
particular this took the form of publishing selections from Smith’s Discourses in A 
Christian Library: Consisting of Extracts From and Abridgments of the Choicest Pieces 
of Practical Divinity Which Have Been Published in the English Tongue, in fifty 
volumes (the first in 1750). Wesley included selections from the Preface by 
Worthington and from all ten of the Discourses, thus making for essentially the 
publication of an abridgement of the Select Discourses.55  
53 Ibid., 26-27. See also Mealey, “John Wesley,” in The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in 
Western Christianity, ed. Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 241-56.  
 
54 Isabel Rivers, “The promotion of the Cambridge Platonists by some clerics and 
ministers from the later seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries: Gilbert Burnet, Henry 
Scougal, William Wishart, John Wesley, Richard Price, Alexander Knox, John Jebb,” 
(Unpublished paper, read at Revisioning Cambridge Platonism, Workshop 3: Reception and 
Influence, Clare College, Cambridge, 31 May 2013).  
 
55 John Smith, Selections from the Select Discourses, in A Christian Library. Consisting  
of Extracts from and Abridgements of The Choicest Pieces of Practical Divinity, Which have been publish’d 
in the English Tongue. Vol. 19: 161 – Vol. 20: 260, ed. John Wesley (Bristol: Felix Farley, 1752, 1753).  
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Whereas the “philosophical avant-garde” in the eighteenth century (e.g., 
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Reid) developed notions of moral and aesthetic 
sensation Wesley’s spiritual senses stand far more closely in the tradition of the 
“various heart-religion movements in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.”56 In this, one can appreciate Smith as standing chronologically before 
and conceptually between Shaftesbury and Wesley with his intellectual, 
imaginative, and affective versions of spiritual sense. Like Smith too, Wesley 
draws from the Greek Patristic Fathers, especially Origen, Clement of 
Alexandria, and others.57  
Mealey suggests however that Wesley’s “doctrine . . . resembles the 
Macarian homilies much more than it does, say, John Smith the Cambridge 
Platonist.”58 This judgment, however, ignores the deep similarities between 
Smith’s doctrine and the Greek spirituality found in Pseudo-Macarius. For 
example, both the Cambridge Platonist and the monk emphasize the role of the 
56 Mealey, “Taste and See,” 26-7.  
 
57 Ibid., 28.  
 
58 Mealey, “John Wesley,” 256.  
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spiritual senses in discerning one’s path through life.59 Moreover, both authors 
speak of progress by degrees in the perception of divine things.60 Wesley may 
have been particularly drawn to the Macarian corpus but the themes therein are 
not wanting in Smith either.  
Nevertheless, Mealey is correct that care should be taken to distinguish 
between the influences of others, including Smith, and Wesley’s unique 
development of this theme in his own particular way.61 Clearly then, additional 
careful study of the similarities, and important differences, between Smith’s and 
Wesley’s spiritual senses is necessary.  
  
Le Clerc and the Prophecy Discourse 
In addition to Wesley’s influential abridgement in the 1750s an additional 
edition was printed in Edinburgh 1756; further evidence of the continued interest 
59 Pseudo-Macarius, “Homily 4,” in The Fifty Spiritual Homilies and the Great Letter, trans., 
ed., with intro. George A. Maloney (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1992), 50-62; and 
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 3, 8-912-3.  
 
60 Pseudo-Macarius, “Homily 50,” 244-6; and Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 17-21.  
 
61 Mealey, “Taste and See,” 29-30  
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in Smith’s Select Discourses in the English speaking world.62 Earlier in the century 
however and after two complete editions in English, Smith’s lengthy discourse in 
thirteen chapters on prophecy was translated into Latin for an international 
readership. This translation was appended to Jean Le Clerc’s (1657-1736) 
Commentary on the Prophets, part of his massive commentary project on the entire 
Bible.63 It seems especially fitting that Le Clerc, a pioneer in the critical exegesis 
of scripture with special attention to the historical context and purpose of biblical 
books, included Smith’s essay. In “Of Prophecy” Smith includes long passages 
from Jewish authors, especially Maimonides among others, bringing their native 
insights to bear on Old Testament prophecy rather than simply reading it 
through a Christian lens. In this way, Smith contributed, albeit in a roundabout 
way, to the development of modern critical biblical scholarship in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.  
62 For full and abridged editions of the Select Discourses (excluding twentieth century and 
newer anthologies) see “Editions of John Smith’s Select Discourses” in the Works Cited below.  
 
63 “Dissertatione Joh. Smith de Prophetia,” in Jean Le Clerc, Veteris Testamenti Prophetae ab 
Esaia ad Malachiam usque ex Translatione Joannis Clerici cum ejusdem commentarii Philologicis et 
Paraphrasi in Esaiam Jeremiam ejus Lamentationis et Abdiam (Amsterdam: R. & J. Wetstenios & Gul. 
Smith, 1731), i-xxix.   
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Indeed, “Of Prophecy” remained an important resource for biblical 
scholars well into the mid-nineteenth century when it was recommended by John 
Kitto among others.64 William B. Collyer too cites Smith as an authority on 
prophecy in his Lectures on Scripture Prophecy.65 Even in our time, Smith has been 
cited as an important commentator on prophets and prophecy.66 It remains to be 
seen, however, the degree to which Smith’s version of the spiritual senses found 
a receptive audience through his work on prophecy.  
 
7.2.3 Nineteenth Century Reception 
Smith’s influence in the English speaking world continued apace well into 
the Victorian era as his Discourses appeared in print several times and his 
thought stimulated some of the great minds of the 19th century on both sides of 
64 John Kitto Cyclopaedia of Biblical Literature (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1845), 
2: 568. Kitto’s work was a valuable resource among evangelical bible scholars resistant to newer 
“liberal” scholarship for nearly a century. 
 
65 William B. Collyer, Lectures on Scripture Prophecy (London: Williams and Smith, 1809), 
20, 79.  
 
66 For example, Barbara A. Johnson, Reading Piers Plowmen and The Pilgrim’s Progress: 
Reception and the Protestant Reader (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), 57-8; 
Phyllis Mack, Visionary Women: Ecstatic Prophecy in Seventeenth-Century England (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1995), 62-4, 282-3; Joad Raymond, Milton’s Angels: The Early-
Modern Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), ch. 7; and Susan Juste, Doomsayers: 
Anglo-American Prophecy in the Age of Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2011), 35, 42.  
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the Atlantic.67 In fact, there was hardly a generation without a new edition or 
significant abridgement of the Discourses from the middle of the 18th through the 
end of the 19th centuries. This alone speaks to the continued appeal of Smith’s 
thought among philosophers, moralists and divines.  
  
 
Coleridge 
The appreciation that the great English Romantic Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
(1772 – 1834) had for John Smith is well documented. Coleridge commented 
favorably on a number of Smith’s Discourses in several places including his Aids 
to Reflection68 and in his Literary Remains.69 On a trip to Sicily, Coleridge 
“gratefully noted” Smith’s thoroughly platonic observation that as “the eye 
cannot behold the Sun . . . unless it be Sunlike . . . neither can the Soul of man, 
67 On nineteenth century English Platonism in general see part V in Platonism and the 
English Imagination, ed. Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 201-67. 
 
68 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Aids to Reflection in the Formation of a Manly Character on the 
Several Grounds of Prudence, Morality, and Religion: Illustrated by Select Passages from our Elder 
Divines, especially from Archbishop Leighton (London: Taylor and Hessey, 1825), 246. 
 
69 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Literary Remains, ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge (London: 
William Picering, 1836-1839), I: 213-4; III: 415-9.  
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behold God . . . unless it be Godlike.”70 This language of participation in God on 
analogy with light and the sun remained consistent throughout Coleridge’s 
literary career.71 
Smith was also an important source for Coleridge’s conception of 
Christian philosophy as a spiritual discipline.72 Like Smith, Coleridge is highly 
critical of mere speculation in philosophy and theology.73 Common notions such 
as the platonic commonplace of the soul as a mirror and more specific images 
such as the Christological heart of morality too may well find their roots in 
Coleridge’s reading of Smith.74 Finally, in his distinction between the merely 
external nature of the Jewish Law and the inward transformation of Gospel 
70 Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 2-4, quoted in John Beer, Coleridge’s Play of Mind (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 128.  
 
71 Ibid. Cf. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Notebooks, eds. Kathleen Coburn and Anthony John 
Harding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959-2002), 2: 21-64.  
 
72 Douglas Hedley, Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 98-99.  
 
73 Ibid., 225, 281.  
 
74 Ibid., 109, 175.  
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righteousness Coleridge follows not just the Apostle Paul but also John Smith, 
the “most eloquent of the Cambridge Platonists.”75  
  
Emerson 
Both Coleridge and Smith exerted a deep influence on Ralph Waldo 
Emerson (1803 – 1882), the founder of American Transcendentalism. Thus, the 
Cambridge Platonist’s legacy extends to the second noteworthy moment in the 
history of American philosophy after Jonathan Edwards. Notably, the third, C.S. 
Peirce and William James’s Pragmatism, too is a New England development, 
born of learned Puritan ancestry, first at Smith’s Emmanuel College and later at 
Harvard in Cambridge, Massachusetts. While Emerson drew on a far wider 
range of sources than the Cambridge Platonist was in a position to (i.e., Indian 
texts and traditions), he found in Smith inspiration and confirmation of the 
lasting significance of critical thought in religion and of Platonism in particular. 
A quotation from “Plato; or, the Philosopher” in Representative Men (1850) gives 
something of the flavor of this influence upon Emerson and his school.  
How many great men Nature is incessantly sending up out of night, to be 
his men,- Platonists! the Alexandrians, a constellation of genius; the 
75 Ibid., 190, 284.  
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Elizabethans, not less; Sir Thomas More, Henry More, John Hales, John 
Smith, Lord Bacon, Jeremy Taylor, Ralph Cudworth, Sydenham, Thomas 
Taylor . . . .76 
 
Here John Smith takes his place in the Transcendentalist pantheon beside Plato, 
Plotinus, Jeremy Taylor, and Thomas Taylor. Clearly then, Smith was an 
important representative of the Platonic tradition in nineteenth century America.  
 
7.2.4 Twentieth Century Reception & Beyond 
The twentieth century saw a proliferation of publications that selected, 
extracted, and collected texts from the Cambridge Platonists.77 Among these 
collections several of Smith’s Discourses almost always appeared, including 
especially the first on the “True Way or Method of Attaining to Divine 
Knowledge.” The editors of the many collections of texts from the Cambridge 
Platonists in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have played an 
absolutely invaluable role in keeping the attention of new generations of scholars 
76 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Plato; or, the Philosopher,” in Representative Men: Seven 
Lectures (Boston: Phillips, Samson and Company, 1850), 22-46, here 23. On the influence of the 
Transcendentalists on later Neoplatonism in America see Jay Bregman, “The Neoplatonic Revival 
in North America,” Hermathena no. 149 (1990): 99-119.  
 
77 On Platonism more generally in the twentieth century in England see part VI in 
Platonism and the English Imagination, ed. Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 271-342.  
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fixed on the group as a whole and Smith specifically. In particular, Campagnac, 
Cragg, Patrides, and Taliaferro and Teply have helped keep texts in the hands of 
successive generations (including myself).78 However, contemporary assessments 
of Smith are frequently colored by the selection process. Too often the Discourses 
are treated as standalone texts when most were actually intended to form a 
whole larger work. 
In 1979 the entire first edition of Smith’s Select Discourses was reprinted 
with a brief introduction by C.A. Patrides.79 This edition has since been the go-to 
version of the text despite the many errors corrected in the second, third, and 
fourth editions (to say nothing of the helpful annotations added by various 
editors in those later editions too). With the advent of the internet and especially 
the scanning of entire books by Google and scholarly projects like Early English 
78 E. T. Campagnac, The Cambridge Platonists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1901); 
Gerald R. Cragg, The Cambridge Platonists (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); C. A. 
Patrides, The Cambridge Platonists (London: Edward Arnold, 1969); and Charles Taliaferro and 
Alison J. Teply, eds., Cambridge Platonist Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 2004).   
 
79 John Smith, Select Discourses, ed. C.A. Patrides (Delmar, NY: Scholars’ Facsimiles & 
Reprints, 1979).  
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Books Online access to the Discourses has become as widespread as it is currently 
possible to imagine.80  
Most noticeable by its absence in 20th and 21st century work on Smith is a 
modern critical edition of the Select Discourses. The availability of digital copies of 
previous editions is a great help to the scholar, and perhaps also for a certain 
kind of eccentric, but nothing can replace a clean, modern text, with scholarly 
annotations for guiding students and potentially interested professionals alike 
through what is difficult territory. In fact, more time has now passed without a 
new edition of the Select Discourses than at any other time since Smith’s passing.81 
A new critical edition of the Select Discourses is now a project worthy of the 
considerable labor required as there is no single edition that has both a 
consistently reliable text and accurate annotations.   
There was a distinct turn in the disciplinary attention paid to Smith in the 
twentieth century toward literature and criticism, no doubt owing to the 
references to him and his circle in the works of figures like Coleridge and 
Emerson. Indeed, it is not among the theologians or philosophers that one finds  
80 http://books.google.com/ and http://eebo.chadwyck.com/home.  
 
81 Either 155 (1859) or 129 years (1885) if abridgements count. 
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the most enthusiastic (and knowing) readers of Smith, but instead among the 
poets, critics, and historians of English literature. Cudworth and More have 
enjoyed a far better reception among philosophers and theologians in recent 
decades but ironically when one wants to make one of their points clearly and 
briefly it is often a good idea to quote Smith instead.  
Nevertheless Smith did not go unnoticed among twentieth century 
philosophers and theologians. Indeed, there have been a several notable 
promoters of Smith in the century just passed. In particular, William Inge in 
Britain and Rufus Jones in the United States kept alive a historical and 
philosophical appreciation for the Cambridge Platonists in general and Smith in 
particular.  
William Ralph Inge (1860 – 1954) wrote widely and frequently on 
Neoplatonism and Christian mysticism.82 Dean Inge was born in 1860, educated 
at King’s College, Cambridge and became successively Lady Margaret's 
Professor of Divinity at Cambridge and Dean of St. Paul’s Cathedral, London. He 
is perhaps best known today for his Gifford Lectures on Plotinus (published in 
82 Adam Fox, Dean Inge (London: John Murray, 1960) contains a helpful biography and 
bibliography.  
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two volumes in 1918) but he also keep alive an interest in Christian Platonism in 
the early twentieth century. While Whichcote appears to be his favorite 
Cambridge Platonist, Inge’s early Christian Mysticism makes frequent approving 
references to Smith.83 Personal Idealism and Mysticism opens with an adaptation 
from Smith, “Such as men themselves are, such will God appear to them.”84 Such 
references continued throughout Dean Inge’s career. Perhaps most importantly, 
Inge had a natural understanding of the practical rational piety of Smith. “A 
study of . . . Smith’s Select Discourses, may not make the reader a better Catholic 
or a better Protestant, but they cannot fail to make him a better Christian and a 
better man.”85 The impact of Inge’s “Smithian” outlook had a profound impact 
on Anglican theology that can still be felt today.86  
Rufus Jones (1863 – 1948) was born (not far from my hometown) in central 
Maine and he is one of the best known Quakers of the 20th century. He “was 
83 W.R. Inge, Christian Mysticism: Considered in Eight Lectures Delivered before the University 
of Oxford (London: Methuen & Co.,1899), 9, 285-96.  
 
84 W.R. Inge, Personal Idealism and Mysticism (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), 1; 
cf. Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 5. 
 
85 W.R. Inge, Studies of English Mystics. (London: John Murray, 1906), 172 
 
86 Owen C. Thomas, “An Anglican Interpretation of the Christian Life,” in Christian Life 
and Practice: Anglican Essays (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2009), 1-17, esp. 12-3. 
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among the organizers of the Quaekerspeisung after World War I. In 1938 he 
traveled to Berlin seeking a personal meeting with Hitler after Kristallnacht. His 
efforts as a peacemaker were rewarded with the Nobel Peace Prize for the 
American Friends Service Committee in 1947.87  
Jones was also a noted historian and theologian as well as philosopher 
who singled out Smith as one of two examples of the “spirit of Cambridge 
Platonism” (the other was Whichcote) and dedicated an excellent chapter to him 
in his Spiritual Reformers in the 16th & 17th Centuries as well as making passing 
use of him throughout his twenty-two books and many articles.88 Given the 
importance of the relationship between Henry More and Anne Conway, and 
since the controverted nature of Quaker religion lies at the heart of that 
relationship in its later stages, it would seem that Cambridge Platonism and the 
Society of Friends had a significant influence upon each other.89 Nevertheless, the 
influence of Smith on modern Quakerism is in need of additional research.  
87 Claus Bernet, Rufus Jones (1863-1948) (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009), 3-17.  
 
88 Rufus Jones, Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries (New York: Macmillan and 
Co., 1914), 305-19. Also the bibliography in Claus Bernet, Rufus Jones, 49-136.  
 
89 The Conway Letters: The Correspondence of Anne, Viscountess Conway, Henry More, and 
their Friends, 1642-1684, edited by N.H. Nicolson and Sarah Hutton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
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Smith has remained an important influence upon some strands of 
contemporary work in philosophy and theology too. Pierre Hadot, for example, 
placed Smith in the historical context of the reception of Simplicius’ important 
Commentary on the Manuel of Epictetus.90 More recently, Charles Taliaferro, 
Sarah Hutton and Douglas Hedley have contributed to the historical 
appreciation of Smith and also made constructive use of his thought too. Charles 
Taliaferro and Douglas Hedley have contributed to the historical appreciation of 
Smith and have also made constructive use of his thought in works such as 
Taliaferro’s Evidence and Faith; Philosophy and Religion Since the Seventeenth 
Century91 as well as Hedley’s Coleridge, Philosophy, and Religion92 and his trilogy 
1992), passim; and Carol Wayne White, The Legacy of Anne Conway (1631-1679) (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2008), 11-38.  
 
90 Pierre Hadot, “La survie du Commentaire de Simplicius sur le Manuel d’Epictete du 
XVe au XVIIe siecles: Perotti, Politien, Steuchus, John Smith, Cudworth,” in Simplicius, sa vie, son 
oeuvre, sa survie, edited by Ilsetraut. (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1987), 326-68.  
91 Charles Taliaferro, Evidence and Faith; Philosophy and Religion Since the Seventeenth 
Century (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-4, 11-5, 17, 18-24, 26, 29, 31-8, 40, 42-55, 62, 79, 117, 
136-8, 168, 178, 384. His Consciousness and the Mind of God (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
does not cite Smith or the Cambridge Platonists but it does walk in their footsteps.   
 
92 Douglas Hedley, Coleridge, Philosophy, and Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
98-9, 109, 175, 190, 225, 281, 284.  
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on the religious imagination.93 Sarah Hutton too has helped to keep alive an 
appreciation for Smith with her entry in the Dictionary of National Biography 
(2005) as well as an important paper on Smith’s theory of prophecy.94 (Hutton 
1984, 73-81). 
 
7.3 Directions for the Future 
When one begins to look John Smith appears as a consistent, and 
significant if sometimes subtle, influence across the modern North Atlantic 
world. He played an important, even if peripheral, role in the development of 
theology (Latitudinarianism, American Evangelicalism, and Methodism), 
philosophy (Platonism, Cartesianism, and Transcendentalism), literature 
(Romanticism), and mathematics (calculus). His understanding of prophecy too 
was long held in high esteem across Europe. Indeed, Smith was a ubiquitous 
authority among eighteenth and nineteenth century scholars in Britain and the 
93 Hedley, Living Forms of the Imagination (London: T&T Clark, 2008), 5, 15, 22, 31, 33, 48, 
81-2, 89-90, 93, 108, 117, 133-4, 145, 184, 186-7, 224, 265, 270, 273; Sacrifice Imagined: Violence, 
Atonement, and the Sacred (New York and London: Continuum, 2011), 11-6, 51-6, 58, 109-11, 113-9, 
121-3, 125, 136, 183, 201-24, 226; and The Iconic Imagination (New York and London: Continuum, 
2015, forthcoming).  
 
94 Sarah Hutton, “The Prophetic Imagination: A Comparative Study of Spinoza and the Cambridge 
Platonist, John Smith,” In Spinoza's political and theological thought: international symposium under the 
auspices of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, commemorating the 350th anniversary of 
the birth of Spinoza, Amsterdam, 24-27 November 1982, edited by C. Deugd, 73-81 (Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1984). 
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United States. With the close of the Victorian era Smith began to fade from favor 
as various forms of positivism, existentialism, and scientism came to displace the 
idealist and romantic modes of thought that had been so congenial to his own 
unique brand of Christian Platonism. However, through consistent publication of 
selections from his Discourses and the regular historical study and constructive 
use of his thought Smith’s influence has never vanished.  
The task before us now that Smith’s place in the Christian tradition of the 
spiritual senses has been laid bare is to trace his influence on later figures. A 
preliminary review shows that his impact was clear and distinct upon two 
founding figures in major theological traditions today. Through Jonathan 
Edwards, something of Smith’s experiential piety passed to American 
Evangelicalism. Through John Wesley Smith’s insistence on the unity of reason 
and experience passed to Methodism. Additionally, Smith seems to have had a 
lasting impact on Anglican and Quaker thought that deserves far more scholarly 
attention than he has received.  
Along with these issues of historical and textual interpretation the 
theological and philosophical viability of Smith’s system requires careful 
constructive attention. This dissertation has only commented in passing on the 
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truth, or more minimally plausibility, of the accounts of human nature, God, 
knowledge, and morality offered by Smith. However, our period would appear 
poised to benefit from the lessons Smith has to teach about faith and reason 
generally, and religion and science in particular.  
Smith speaks exactly to our situation with the apparent conflict between 
piety and rationality brought on by superstitious anthropomorphic conceptions 
of God. Perhaps by purging religion of these false idols born of all-too-human 
fear and turning instead to the transcendent Divinity of Smith’s brand of 
Christian Platonism the tired conflicts between “religion” and “science” can be 
overcome. Such a development would require movement on the part of many 
religious people and perhaps most scientific naturalists, but the prize to be won 
is a more humane worldview that lacks neither rigor nor living existential power.  
In personal spirituality and communal worship too Smith’s appeal to 
essentials in religion provides a potential calming voice for our time. Against the 
secular relativistic approach to religions that makes them all equal in their 
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irrelevance, Smith offers genuine friendship based on actual unity in essentials 
and an eagerness to tolerate adiaphora in the name of that essential unity.95    
Since the themes of systematicity, spirituality, and the foundations of 
theological understanding all depend, critically, upon the spiritual senses for 
Smith, renewed attention to, and development of, that traditional way of 
thinking and being Christian is called for as we continue to navigate and (co-
)create our world; seeking to be at home, whole, and aware of otherness and 
transcendence too.96 A renewed Christian Platonism, at once theological and 
humanistic. A theology that lets us think what we feel and binds us to the Good 
that we may be God’s hands and feet in the world. These are the tasks to which 
Smith’s doctrine of the spiritual senses calls us today. And they are exactly the 
tasks that the Christian tradition of the spiritual senses has given to each 
generation for nearly two-thousand years.97  
95 “In necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas.” Marco Antonio de 
Dominis, De Repubblica Ecclesiastica Libri X (London, 1617), 676 
 
96 Cf. Conor Cunningham, “Naturalism Lost: Nature Regained,” in Turning Images in 
Philosophy, Science, and Religion: A New Book of Nature, eds. Charles Taliaferro and Jil Evans 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 156-88. 
 
97 “Ruusbroec withdrew into mysticism, to create a radical spiritual response to the crisis 
in his own times caused by the decline and opaqueness of the institutional, Christian religion, 
which was in his judgment rooted in a lack of taste-experience (smaken) in religious matters” 
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(Pyong-Gwan Pak, “The Relevance of Mystical Spirituality in the Context of Today’s ‘Spirituality 
Phenomenon’,” Logos 15 no. 3 [2012]: 117. 
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APPENDIX 
 
The Contents of the Complete Editions of the Select Discourses 
 
 
Discourse 
Pages 
 
1660 1673 1821 1859 
“To the 
Reader,” 
Worthington 
iii-xxxi iii-xxx iii-xxxii xiii-xxxv 
Of the True 
Way or 
Method of 
Attaining to 
Divine 
Knowledge 
1-21 
§ I 1-13 
§ II 13-7 
§ III 17-21 
1-21 
§ I 1-13 
§ II 13-7 
§ III 17-21 
3-25 
§ I 3-15 
§ II 16-20 
§ III 20-5 
1-22 
§ I 1-13 
§ II 13-7 
§ III 17-22 
Of 
Superstition 
23-37 23-36 27-42 23-39 
Of  
Atheism 
39-55 37-52 43-60 40-55 
Of the 
Immortality 
of the Soul 
 
57-120 
Ch.1 59-62 
Ch.2 63-8 
Ch.3 68-84 
Ch.4 85-92 
Ch.5 93-6 
Ch.6 96-101 
Ch.7 101-5 
 
53-115 
Ch.1 54-7  
Ch.2 58-63 
Ch.3 63-79 
Ch.4 80-7 
Ch.5 88-91 
Ch.6 91-96 
Ch.7 96-100 
 
61-129 
Ch.1 63-7 
Ch.2 67-73 
Ch.3 73-91 
Ch.4 91-99 
Ch.5 99-103 
Ch.6 103-8 
Ch.7 108-13 
 
57-123 
Ch.1 59-63 
Ch.2 63-9  
Ch.3 69-85 
Ch.4 86-93 
Ch.5 93-7 
Ch.6 97-102 
Ch.7 102-7 
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Ch.8 106-12 
Ch.9 112-20 
Ch.8 101-7 
Ch.9 107-15 
Ch.8 113-20 
Ch.9 120-9 
Ch.8 107-14 
Ch.9 114-23 
 
Of the 
Existence and 
Nature of God 
 
121-65 
Ch.1 123-6 
Ch.2 126-34 
Ch.3 135-9 
Ch.4 140-4 
Ch.5 144-7 
Ch.6 147-51 
Ch.7 151-3 
Ch.8 154-8 
Ch.9 158-61 
Ch.10 162-5 
 
 
117-60 
Ch.1 118-21 
Ch.2 121-9 
Ch.3 130-4 
Ch.4 135-9 
Ch.5 139-42 
Ch.6 142-6 
Ch.7 146-8 
Ch.8 149-53 
Ch.9 153-6 
Ch.10 157-60 
 
 
131-78 
Ch.1 133-6 
Ch.2 137-45 
Ch.3 145-50 
Ch.4 151-5 
Ch.5 155-8 
Ch.6 159-62 
Ch.7 163-5 
Ch.8 166-70 
Ch.9 170-4 
Ch.10 174-8 
 
 
125-68 
Ch.1 127-30  
Ch.2 130-8 
Ch.3 138-42 
Ch.4 143-7 
Ch.5 147-9 
Ch.6 150-3 
Ch.7 153-5 
Ch.8 156-60 
Ch.9 160-3 
Ch.10 163-8 
 
Of Prophecy 
 
167-280 
Ch.1 169-75 
Ch.2 176-83 
Ch.3 183-9 
Ch.4 190-209 
Ch.5 210-9 
Ch.6 220-9 
Ch.7 229-39 
Ch.8 240-51 
Ch.9 252-7 
Ch.10 257-60 
Ch.11 261-7 
Ch.12 267-72 
Ch.13 272-80 
 
161-273 
Ch.1 162-8 
Ch.2 169-76 
Ch.3 176-82 
Ch.4 183-202 
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